LER-1995-002, Forwards LER 95-002-01,providing Addl Info on Cause, Corrective Actions & Safety Significance of Temp Dependent Shutdown Margin Used in Mode 3 Steam Line Break Analysis Reported in Original Submittal |
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RZORj:Tr l, ACCELERATED RZDS PROCESSZNG)
REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)
ACCESSION NBR:9509050102 DOC.DATE: 95/08/25 NOTARIZED-NO DOCKET FACIL:STN-50-528 Palo Verde Nuclear Station, Unit 1, Arizona Publi 05000528 P
AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION LEVINE,J.M.
Arizona Public Service Co. (formerly Arizona Nuclear Power RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION R
Document Control Branch (Document Control Desk)
SUBJECT:
Forwards LER 95-002-01,providing addi info on cause,
corrective actions
& safety significance of temp dependent shutdoen margin used in Mode 3 steam line break analysis reported in orginial submittal.
DISTRIBUTION CODE:
IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL j SIZE: (8 TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER),
ncident Rpt, etc.
NOTES:STANDARDIZED PLANT 05000528 0
R RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD4-2 PD TRAN,L INTERNAL: ACRS AEOD/SPD/RRAB NRR/DE/ECGB NRR/DE/EMEB NRR/DRCH/HHFB NRR/DRCH/HOLB NRR/DSSA/SPLB NRR/DSSA/SRXB RGN4 FILE 01 EXTERNAL: L ST LOBBY WARD NOAC MURPHY,G.A NRC PDR COPIES LTTR ENCL 1
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1
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RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME HOLIAN, B AEO B
ILE CENTER D~EELB NRR/DISP/PIPB NRR/DRCH/HICB NRR/DRPM/PECB NRR/DS SA/S PS B/B RES/DSIR/EIB LITCO BRYCE,J H
NOAC POORE,W.
NUDOCS FULL TXT COPIES LTTR ENCL 1
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NOTE TO ALL "RZDS" RECZPZENTS:
PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE!
CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL
- DESK, ROOM OWFN 5D8 (415-2083)
TO ELZMZNATE YOUR NAME FROM DZSTRZBUTZON LZSTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU,DON'T NEED!
FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED:
LTTR 28 ENCL 28
II f.
JAMES M. LEVINE VICE PRESIDENT NUCLEAR PRODUCTIDN Arizona Public Serv'ice Company PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION P.O. BOX 52034
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PHOENIX. ARIZONA85072-2034 192-.00944-JML/BAG/BE August 25, 1995 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Mail Station P1-37 Washington, DC 20555-0001
Dear Sirs:
Subject:
Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS)
Units 1, 2, and 3 Docket Nos. STN 50-528, 50-529, 50-530 License Nos. NPF41, NPF-51, NPF-74 Licensee Event Report 95-002-01 Attached please find supplement 1 to Licensee Event Report (LER)95-002 prepared and submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.73.
This supplement provides additional information on the cause, corrective
- actions, and
safety significance
of the temperature.
dependent shutdown margin used in the Mode 3 Steam Line Break analysis reported in the original submittal.
In accordance with 10CFR50.73(d), a copy of this LER is being forwarded to the Regional Administrator, NRC Region IV.
If you have any questions, please contact Burton A. Grabo, Section L'eader, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs, at (602) 393~92.
Sincerely, JML/BAG/BE/pv Attachment (all with attachment) cc:
L. J. Callan IC E. Perkins K E. Johnston INPO Records Center yQ(;t 9509050102 950825 PDR ADOCK 05000528 PDR
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| 05000528/LER-1995-001, :on 950215,plant Switchyard Voltage Dropped Below Administratively Imposed Limit of 525 Kv for Approx 2.5 Minutes & Caused TS LCO 3.0.3 to Exist.Prepared Personnel for Potential Voltage Drops |
- on 950215,plant Switchyard Voltage Dropped Below Administratively Imposed Limit of 525 Kv for Approx 2.5 Minutes & Caused TS LCO 3.0.3 to Exist.Prepared Personnel for Potential Voltage Drops
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) | | 05000529/LER-1995-001-02, :on 940817,containment Spray TS Violation Occurred Due to Unrecognized Valve Failed.Issued Night Order on 940831 to Alert CR Personnel to Problems Experienced W/Failed 2JSIAUV664 to Close 940817 |
- on 940817,containment Spray TS Violation Occurred Due to Unrecognized Valve Failed.Issued Night Order on 940831 to Alert CR Personnel to Problems Experienced W/Failed 2JSIAUV664 to Close 940817
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000530/LER-1995-001-01, :on 950412,leak Identified Through Cracked Weld in Piping Near Charging Pump Suction Drain Valve.Caused by Defective Weld.Pump Weld Repaired & Returned to Svc |
- on 950412,leak Identified Through Cracked Weld in Piping Near Charging Pump Suction Drain Valve.Caused by Defective Weld.Pump Weld Repaired & Returned to Svc
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000530/LER-1995-002, Forwards LER 95-002-00 Re Condition Where Max Power Level of Facility OL Exceeded for Nine H.Highest Rolling 12 H Average 100.97 Percent Power | Forwards LER 95-002-00 Re Condition Where Max Power Level of Facility OL Exceeded for Nine H.Highest Rolling 12 H Average 100.97 Percent Power | | | 05000530/LER-1995-002-02, :on 950924,identified That Abnormal Blowdown Valves to Blowdown Flash Tank (Bft) Isolated,Resulting in Reactor Core Power Exceeding 3,800 Mwt Due to Personnel Error.Procedure for Aligning Blowdown to Bft Revised |
- on 950924,identified That Abnormal Blowdown Valves to Blowdown Flash Tank (Bft) Isolated,Resulting in Reactor Core Power Exceeding 3,800 Mwt Due to Personnel Error.Procedure for Aligning Blowdown to Bft Revised
| | | 05000528/LER-1995-002, :on 950303,identified That Slb Analyses Failed to Consider as Initial Condition One Percent SDM for All Rods in (ARI) Due to Lack of Coordination & Unclear Div of Responsibilities.Ari Core Data Book SDM Curves Modified |
- on 950303,identified That Slb Analyses Failed to Consider as Initial Condition One Percent SDM for All Rods in (ARI) Due to Lack of Coordination & Unclear Div of Responsibilities.Ari Core Data Book SDM Curves Modified
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000529/LER-1995-002-01, :on 950519,TS LCO 3.1.2.2 & LCO 3.1.2.4 Action Statements Not Met.Caused by an Unsatisfactory Swagelok Compression at Union of Flexible Tubing & Rigid Tubing. Pressure Transmitter Sensing Line Repaired |
- on 950519,TS LCO 3.1.2.2 & LCO 3.1.2.4 Action Statements Not Met.Caused by an Unsatisfactory Swagelok Compression at Union of Flexible Tubing & Rigid Tubing. Pressure Transmitter Sensing Line Repaired
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000528/LER-1995-002-01, Forwards LER 95-002-01,providing Addl Info on Cause, Corrective Actions & Safety Significance of Temp Dependent Shutdown Margin Used in Mode 3 Steam Line Break Analysis Reported in Original Submittal | Forwards LER 95-002-01,providing Addl Info on Cause, Corrective Actions & Safety Significance of Temp Dependent Shutdown Margin Used in Mode 3 Steam Line Break Analysis Reported in Original Submittal | | | 05000529/LER-1995-003, :on 950613,TS LCO 3.0.3 Entered Following Loss of Both Trains of Essential Cw Sys & Both Hydrogen Recombiners.Caused by Spurious Actuations Due to Broken EDG Speed Probe Connector.Connector Replaced |
- on 950613,TS LCO 3.0.3 Entered Following Loss of Both Trains of Essential Cw Sys & Both Hydrogen Recombiners.Caused by Spurious Actuations Due to Broken EDG Speed Probe Connector.Connector Replaced
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000528/LER-1995-003-01, :on 950729,switchyard Voltage Dropped Below Administratively Imposed Limit of 524 Kv for Approx 10 Seconds Due to Transient Grid Voltage.No C/A Taken Since Transmission Sys Transient Short Duration |
- on 950729,switchyard Voltage Dropped Below Administratively Imposed Limit of 524 Kv for Approx 10 Seconds Due to Transient Grid Voltage.No C/A Taken Since Transmission Sys Transient Short Duration
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000529/LER-1995-004-01, :on 950706,identified Four Occassions Between 950407 & 0630 When Conditional Surveillance in TS LCO 3.8.4.1 Action a Not Performed Due to Inattention to Detail. CR Copy of Temporary Procedure 40TP-9ZZ04 Corrected |
- on 950706,identified Four Occassions Between 950407 & 0630 When Conditional Surveillance in TS LCO 3.8.4.1 Action a Not Performed Due to Inattention to Detail. CR Copy of Temporary Procedure 40TP-9ZZ04 Corrected
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(4)
10 CFR 50.73(s)(2) | | 05000528/LER-1995-004, :on 950329,containment Electrical Penetration Overcurrent Protective Devices Found Outside Design Basis. Caused by Error on Part of Original Architect Engineer. Modified Affected Circuits Critical to Normal Operational |
- on 950329,containment Electrical Penetration Overcurrent Protective Devices Found Outside Design Basis. Caused by Error on Part of Original Architect Engineer. Modified Affected Circuits Critical to Normal Operational
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000528/LER-1995-005, Forwards Suppl LER 95-005 Reporting Six Electrical Penetration Circuits | Forwards Suppl LER 95-005 Reporting Six Electrical Penetration Circuits | | | 05000529/LER-1995-005-01, :on 950717,RT on Low SG Water Level Was Result Following Degradation of MFW Flow.Completed Evaluation of Event |
- on 950717,RT on Low SG Water Level Was Result Following Degradation of MFW Flow.Completed Evaluation of Event
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000528/LER-1995-006, :on 930418,identified That Motor Pinion Key for Containment Spray Header Isolation Valve Occurred.Caused by Improper Key Matl.All Identified Valves Had Motor Pinion Keys Replaced |
- on 930418,identified That Motor Pinion Key for Containment Spray Header Isolation Valve Occurred.Caused by Improper Key Matl.All Identified Valves Had Motor Pinion Keys Replaced
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability | | 05000528/LER-1995-007, :on 950512,determined That Bench Settings of air-operated Letdown & Containment Isolation Valves Adversely Affected Ability of Valves to Perform 10CFR50 App R Safety Function.Affected Valves Modified |
- on 950512,determined That Bench Settings of air-operated Letdown & Containment Isolation Valves Adversely Affected Ability of Valves to Perform 10CFR50 App R Safety Function.Affected Valves Modified
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000528/LER-1995-007-02, Forwards LER 95-007-02 Re Adverse Affect of Low Bench Set on Fisher Air Operated Letdown/Containment Isolation Valves | Forwards LER 95-007-02 Re Adverse Affect of Low Bench Set on Fisher Air Operated Letdown/Containment Isolation Valves | | | 05000528/LER-1995-010, :on 950727,equipment Qualification of Air Handling Unit Caused Essential Cw Pump to Be Inoperable. Used Work Orders to Drill Weep Holes in Motor Lead Connection Boxes |
- on 950727,equipment Qualification of Air Handling Unit Caused Essential Cw Pump to Be Inoperable. Used Work Orders to Drill Weep Holes in Motor Lead Connection Boxes
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)
10 CFR 50.73(s)(2)(i)
10 CFR 50.73(s)(2)(ii)
10 CFR 50.73(s)(2)(x)
10 CFR 50.73(s)(2)(v)
10 CFR 50.73(s)(2) | | 05000528/LER-1995-011, :on 951018,identified Procedural Deficiency W/Msiv & FWIV ISTs Due to Personnel Error.Verified Operability of MSIVs & FWIVs |
- on 951018,identified Procedural Deficiency W/Msiv & FWIV ISTs Due to Personnel Error.Verified Operability of MSIVs & FWIVs
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000528/LER-1995-013, :on 951201,AFW Sys Was Outside Design Basis of Plant.Caused by Design Error.Performed Assessment to Demonstrate That Existing Condition Does Not Pose Addl Safety Concerns |
- on 951201,AFW Sys Was Outside Design Basis of Plant.Caused by Design Error.Performed Assessment to Demonstrate That Existing Condition Does Not Pose Addl Safety Concerns
| | | 05000528/LER-1995-014, :on 951209,reactor Tripped Following Degradation of Main FW Flow.Caused by Malfunction of FWCS Power supply,NNN-D11,transfer switch.NNN-D11 Aligned to Normal Power Supply |
- on 951209,reactor Tripped Following Degradation of Main FW Flow.Caused by Malfunction of FWCS Power supply,NNN-D11,transfer switch.NNN-D11 Aligned to Normal Power Supply
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000528/LER-1995-016, :on 951212,containment Spray TS Violation Occurred Due to Unrecognized Valve Failure.Shim/Band Was Placed Around Stator of 1JSIBUV665 Motor Operator to Maintain Stator in Correct Position |
- on 951212,containment Spray TS Violation Occurred Due to Unrecognized Valve Failure.Shim/Band Was Placed Around Stator of 1JSIBUV665 Motor Operator to Maintain Stator in Correct Position
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications |
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