ML17311A172

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Ack Receipt of 940527 Petition & 940708 Suppl to Petition Re Numerous Concerns Re Plant & Licensee Operation of Plant.Nrc Will Review Petition Per 10CFR2.206 & Final Decision Will Be Issued within Reasonable Time
ML17311A172
Person / Time
Site: Palo Verde  
Issue date: 07/26/1994
From: Russell W
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To: Saporito T
SAPORITO, T.J.
Shared Package
ML17311A173 List:
References
2.206, NUDOCS 9408110090
Download: ML17311A172 (14)


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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON. D.C. 2055&000I JlJl 26 ]R Docket Nos.

STN 50-528, STN 50-529, and STN 50-530 (10 CFR 5 2.206)

Thomas J. Saporito, Jr.

Florida Energy Consultants, Inc.

1620 North U.S.

1, Suite 6

Jupiter, Florida 33469-3241

Dear Mr. Saporito:

On May 27, 1994, you filed a letter with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff (the staff) for consideration as a petition under 10 CFR 5 2.206.

This letter acknowledges the staff's receipt of your petition, and your July 8, 1994 supplement to your original petition.

In the petition, you raise numerous concerns regarding the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (Palo Yerde) operated by the Arizona Public Service Company (licensee).

You request that the NRC (1) institute a show cause proceeding pursuant to 10 CFR 5 2.202 for the modification, suspension, or revocation of the Palo Verde operating licenses; (2) issue a notice of violation against the licensee for continuing to employ The Atlantic Group (TAG) as a labor contractor at Palo Verde; (3) investigate alleged material false statements made by William F. Conway, Executive Vice President at Palo Verde, during his testimony at a

DOL hearing (ERA Case No. 92-ERA-30) and, in the interim, require that he be relieved of any authority over operations at Palo Verde; (4) investigate the licensee's statements in an August 10, 1993, letter from Mr. Conway to NRC Administrator, Mr. Bobby H. Faulkenberry, regarding Mr. Saporito, in which the licensee said that Mr. Saporito gave materially

false, inaccurate, and incomplete information on his application for unescorted access to Palo Verde, so that as a result of that event; he lacks trustworthiness and reliability for access to Palo Verde; (5) investigate pursuant to 10 CFR 5 50.7 the circumstances surrounding the February 1994 termination of licensee employee Joseph
Straub, a former radiation protection technician at Palo Yerde, to determine if his employment was illegally terminated by the licensee for having engaged in "protected activity" during the course of his employment; (6) require that the licensee respond to a "chilling effect" letter regarding the circumstances surrounding Mr. Straub's termination from Palo Verde and whether any measures were taken to ensure that his termination did not cause a chilling effect at Palo Yerde; and (7) initiate appropriate actions to require the licensee to immediately conduct eddy current testing on all steam generators at Palo Verde, because the steam generator tubes were recently subjected to cracks.

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II Mr. Thomas J. Saporito, Jr.

As bases for these

requests, you allege that (I) a show cause proceeding is necessary because the public health and safety concerns alleged are significant and to permit public participation to provide NRC with new and relevant information; (2) past practices of TAG demonstrate that employees of TAG were retaliated against for having raised safety concerns while employed at Palo Verde; (3) citations to testimony from transcripts and numerous newspaper articles (appended as exhibits to the petition), demonstrate that Mr. Conway's testimony is not credible; (4) statements in the August 10,
1993, letter are inaccurate and materially false and characterize Mr. Saporito as an individual lacking trustworthiness and reliability for access to Palo Verde, so that such negative characterizations have blacklisted him from continued employment in the nuclear industry which is all in retaliation for him raising safety concerns about operations at Palo Verde; thus, petitioners ask that these statements be rescinded; (5) an investigation into the termination of Mr. Straub is warranted in view of the fact that the licensee has engaged in similar illegal conduct in the past where the NRC has required the licensee to pay fines; (6) Mr. Straub is entitled to reinstatement with pay and benefits pending the NRC's investigation into his termination to offset any chilling effect his termination had on the Palo Verde workforce; and (7) the stress corrosion and cracking in the steam generators is a recurring problem which the licensee is aware of and has failed to properly correct, in addition to cooling tower problems, so that the NRC should be concerned about proper maintenance of safety systems and equipment there.

With respect to your request that in the interim, the NRC require that Mr. Conway be relieved of any authority over operations at Palo Verde, the licensee informed the NRC by letter of June 22, 1994, that Mr. Conway has retired and,Mr. William L. Stewart has assumed the duties of the position of Executive Vice President.

With respect to your request that the NRC require the licensee to immediately conduct eddy current testing on all steam generators at Palo Verde, the licensee completed eddy current inspections on each of the Palo Verde units in the last year.

The staff issued two confirmatory action letters on June 4 and October 4, 1993, regarding steam generator tube eddy. current testing.

The licensee conducted eddy current inspections on Unit I in October

1993, on Unit 2 in May 1993 and January
1994, and on Unit 3 in December 1993 and May 1994.

The staff issued safety evaluations for the eddy current inspections and operating intervals by letters of August 19,

1993, and June 22, 1994.

In

summary, the results of the staff's reviews conclude that Units 2 and 3 can be operated for up to 6 months prior to the next steam generator eddy current inspection (for example, Un':t 2 started up from its last mid-cycle outage on March 22,
1994, and is currently scheduled to shutdown for a refueling outage on September 17, 1994).

The licensee stated that Unit I, which has not identified free-span axial indications, can operate for its full cycle.

The staff is currently reviewing this information.

The licensee performed the necessary inspections, and the staff extensively reviewed Palo Verde steam generator eddy current inspection results and continues to review additional information regarding the integrity of the steam generator tubes.

Therefore,

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Mr. Thomas: J. Saporito, Jr.

your request that the staff take action to require the licensee to immediately conduct eddy current testing on all Palo Verde steam generators is denied.

On July 8,

1994, you filed a supplement to this petition raising six additional issues.

You request that the NRC (1) institute a show cause proceeding pursuant to 10 CFR 5 2.202 for the modification, suspension or revocation of the Palo Verde operating licenses for Units 1, 2 and 3; (2) modify the Palo Verde operating licenses to require operation at 86X power or less; (3) require the licensee to submit a

No Significant Hazards safety analysis to justify operation of those units above 86X power; (4) take immediate action (e.g. confirmatory order) to cause the licensee to reduce operation to 86X power or less; (5) require the licensee to analyze a design basis SGTR event to show that the offsite radiological consequences do not exceed a small fraction of the limits of 10 CFR Part 100; and (6) require the licensee to demonstrate that its emergency operating procedures for SGTR events are adequate and the plant operators are sufficiently trained in emergency operating procedures.

As bases for these requests, you allege that (1) the licensee experienced a

steam generator tube rupture in the free span area on Unit 2 on March 14, 1993; (2) during a January, 1994 inspection on Unit 2, 85 axial indications were identified, the longest indication being 7.5 inches; (3) more extensive, testing will confirm the existence of circumferential crack indications in the expansion transition area; (4) in May, 1994, steam generator sludge from Units 1 and 2 indicated a lead content of 4,000-6,000 ppm, which is unusually high, accelerates the crevice corrosion process, and is believed to be caused by a feedwater source deficiency; (5) the licensee failed to properly implement operational procedures regarding the March 14,

1993, steam generator tube rupture event, citing eight instances; (6) the licensee's failure to comply with approved procedures in the above event is indicative of a problem plant that war rants further NRC action; (7) the NRC is aware of additional licensee weaknesses regarding the steam generator tube event, citing four instances; (8) the licensee cannot assure that the radiation dose limits are satisfied for applicable postulated accidents; (9) the licensee is not maintaining an adequate level of. public protection in that the offsite dose limits will be exceeded during a steam generator tube rupture; (10) the licensee cannot demonstrate that a Palo Verde unit can safely shut down and depressurize to stop steam generator tube leakage prior to a loss of reactor water storage tank inventory; (11) steam generator tubes are an integral part of the reactor coolant boundary, and that tube failures could lead to containment
bypass, and therefore must be carefully considered by the NRC and the licensee; (12) the licensee cannot demonstrate compliance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, which establishes the fundamental requirements for steam generator tube integrity; (13) the licensee has failed to comply with NRC requirements under NUREG-0800 to show that in the case of a steam generator tube rupture event, the offsite conditions and single failure do not exceed a

small fraction of the limits of 10 CFR Part 100; and (14) the licensee has posed an unacceptable risk to public health and safety by raising power on all three Palo Verde units above 86', considering the severe degradation of the steam gener ator tubes.

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Sapor ito, Jr.

With respect to your request that the NRC take immediate action to cause the licensee to reduce operation of the Palo Verde units to 86X power or less, the safety evaluations performed by the staff regarding continuing operation of the Palo Verde units do not assume operation at a power level less than 100X.

The licensee imposed an administrative limit of approximately 86X power as an interim measure to curtail steam generator tube degradation.

The primary purpose of the 86X power administrative limit was to operate with a lower reactor coolant system hot 1"eg temperature (T, ).

On June 7,

1994, the staff issued a technical specification change to the licensee that permitted reactor operation at full power, fir Units I and 3, with a lower reactor coolant temperature (the Unit 2 technical specification change is currently being evaluated).

The licensee has implemented this technical specification change on Units I and 3 and has returned those units to full power.

Unit 2 is currently operating at a licensee-imposed administrative power limit of 88X.

This power level was selected, because it provides for a T that approximates that of Units I and 3.

The bases you assert do not relate directly to, or provide bases for, your request that the NRC take immediate action to require the licensee to reduce operation of the Palo Verde units to 86X power or less.

The bases for your requests are largely related to specific areas the staff reviewed following the Parch 14,

1993, steam generator tube rupture event.

For example, the staff's augmented inspection team (AIT) report (Inspection Report 50-529/93-I4 dated April 16, 1993) details and evaluates procedural and operator weaknesses.

The licensee implemented the necessary procedural changes and provided training to address the issues identified by the AIT.

Additionally, the staff's safety evaluation, dated August 19,

1993, assessed a single steam generator tube rupture event, and induced single and multiple tube ruptures due to a major secondary side rapid depressurization, and concludes that the radiological consequences are acceptable.

Therefore, since the staff's safety evaluations do not impose a lower power operating limit, and since the bases supporting your request for a lower power limit do not provide information that would change the staff's conclusion, your request that the NRC take immediate action to cause the licensee to reduce operation of the Palo Verde units to &6X power or less is denied.

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Hr. Thomas J. Saporito, Jr.

The staff will review your petition in accordance with 10 CFR 5 2.206.

A final decision with regard to your petition will be issued within a reasonable time.

Enclosed is a copy of the notice that is being filed for publication with the Office of the Federal Register.

Sincerely,

Enclosure:

Notice cc w/enclosure:

See next page Original Signel TILLILXT.

RUSSELG William T. Russell, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

  • See Previous Concurrence Sheets OFC LA:DRPW PM:PD4-2*

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94 BHolian 7 21 94 Tguay 7/21/94 JMain 7

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Arizona Public Service Company Palo Verde CC:

Hr. Steve Olea Arizona Corporation Commission 1200 W. Washington Street

Phoenix, Arizona 85007 T. E. Oubre, Esq.

Southern California Edison Company P. 0.

Box 800

Rosemead, California 91770 Senior Resident Inspector Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station 5951 S. Wintersburg Road
Tonopah, Arizona 85354-7537 Regional Administrator, Region IV U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Harris Tower 5, Pavillion 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 400 Arlington, Texas 76011-8064 Mr. Charles B. Brinkman, Manager Washington Nuclear Operations ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Power 12300 Twinbrook Parkway, Suite 330 Rockville, Maryland 20852 Hr. Aubrey V. Godwin, Director Arizona Radiation Regulatory Agency 4814 South 40 Street Phoenix, Arizona 85040 Chairman Maricopa County Board of Supervisors Ill South Third Avenue Phoenix, Arizona 85003 Jack R.
Newman, Esq.

Newman 8 Moltzinger, P.C.

1615 L Street, N.W., Suite 1000 Washington, D.C.

20036 Hr. Curtis Hoskins Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer Palo Verde Services 2025 N. 3rd Street, Suite 220

Phoenix, Arizona 85004 Roy P.

Lessey, Jr.,

Esq.

Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer and Feld El Paso Electric Company 1333 New Hampshire Avenue, Suite 400 Washington, DC.

20036 Hs. Angela K. Krainik, Manager Nuclear Licensing Arizona Public Service Company P. 0.

Box 52034

Phoenix, Arizona 85072-2034 Hr. William T. Stewart Executive Vice President, Nuclear Arizona Public Service Company Post Office Box 53999
Phoenix, Arizona 85072-3999 (w/incoming letter)

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DISTRIBUTION FOR 2.206 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT LETTER DATED JUly 26, 1994 l:Do"ket:Fi1e (w/incoming 1 etter)

NRC/Local PDRs (w/incoming letter)

EDOP P94-014 (EDO 0010121)

EDO Reading PD4-2 Reading (w/incoming)

WRussell/FNiraglia RZimmerman JRoe EAdensam TQuay DFoster-Curseen BHolian LTran OPA OCA NRR Mail Room (EOOD P94-014 w/incoming) (12/G/18)

TGibbons JGoldberg, OGC

ABeach, RIV
KPerkins, MCFO
JGray, OE (7-H-5)

OE Files (7-H-5)

RRosano, OE (7-H-5)

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