ML17306A183
| ML17306A183 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 09/23/1991 |
| From: | Huey F NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17306A181 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-528-91-25, 50-529-91-25, 50-530-91-25, NUDOCS 9110070133 | |
| Download: ML17306A183 (28) | |
See also: IR 05000528/1991025
Text
U. S.
REGULATORY COMMISSION
~Re ion
V
50-528/91-25,
50-529/91-25,
50-530/91-25
Docket Nos.
50-528, 50-529,
50-530
License
Nos.
Licensee:
Arizona Public Service
Company
P. 0.
Box 53999, Sta.
9012
Phoenix,
85072-3999
~Pili:Pl
d
5
1
5
102
1 .0/
1.2
d3
Ins ection Conducted:
July 8 through August 13,
1991
D. Corporandy,
Reactor Inspector,
Region
V
C. Myers, Resident
Inspector,
Region
V
C. Clark, Reactor Inspector,
Region
V
T.
S
Senior
echanical
Engineer
(NRR)
R.
'n,
MOV Cons
tan
(Contractor,
INEL)
A
roved
b
F.
R. Huey, Chief
Engineering Section
Date Signed
Ins ection
Summar
Ins ection
on Jul
8 throu
h Au ust
13
1991
Re ort Nos. 50-528/91-25
50-529/91-25
50-530 91-25
A~id:
981
1
P
1
1
20 ll
'
1
1
89-10
program for safety-related
motor operated
valves.
(SIMS Issue
Temporary Instruction 2515/109
was
used
as guidance for the inspection.
Results:
General
Conclusions
and
S ecific Findin
s
In general,
the inspection findings indicated that the licensee
was developing
an aggressive
program for assuring
MOV reliability.
Program strengths
were
found in the areas of scope
and test scheduling.
Meaknesses
were identified
in the areas
of program implementing procedures,
overall
program integration,
test acceptance
criteria, review of vendor information notices, corrective
actions
and trending.
Summar
of Violations
t
Two violations were identified.
One violation involved a failure to
adequately
review
a test deficiency of torque switch chattering for potential
reportability under
10 Part
CFR 21.
(Enforcement
Item 50-528/91-25-06;
refer
q1 go070133
~~OO~~~~~
ADOCK 0
pDR
6
-2-
to Section 4.6.)
A second violation was identified involving a .failure to
establish
appropriate
acceptance
criteria for MOV testing.
(Enforcement
Item
50-528/91-25-02;
refer to Section 4.4.)
0 en Items
Summar
Nine new followup items were identified:
91-25-01
91-25-03
91-25-04
91-25-05
91-25-07
91-25-08
91-25-09
91-25-10
91-25-11
Motor Sizing for 75K degraded
voltage (p.5)
Test acceptance
criteria (p.8)
Periodic verification (p.9)
Adequacy of test procedure
notes to preclude actuator
over-thrusting
(p. 10)
(p.15)
Vendor services
and software (p.15)
Margin for accuracy
and rate-of-loading
(p.17)
Implementation of vendor information (p.18)
NRR evaluation of DC MOV stroke time (p.19)
TABLE OF
CONTENTS
Section
~Pa
e
1.
PERSONS
CONTACTED
2.
BACKGROUND
3.
INSPECTION
PLAN
4.
MOV PROGRAM REVIEW
4.1
Scope
4.2
Design Basis
Reviews
4.3
MOV Sizing and 'Switch Setting Calculations
4.4
Design Basis Differential Pressure
and Flow Testing
4.5
Periodic Verification of MOV Capability
4.6
MOV Failures,
Corrective Actions and Trending
t
4.7
Schedule
13
4.8
4.8.1
4.8.2
4.8.3
4.8.4
4.8.5
4.8.6
5.
6.
7.
Other
MOV Program Areas Addressed
Control of MOV Switch Settings
Training
Diagnostics
Maintenance
Industry Experience
and Vendor Information
Inservice Testing
SUMMARY OF OVERALL PROGRAM ADMINISTRATION
EXIT MEETING
LICENSEE
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
14
14
15
16
17
18
19
19
20
20
PERSONS
CONTACTED
DETAILS
J. Levine, Vice President,
Nuclear Production
B. Ballard, Sr., Director,
J. Bailey, Director,
NED
G. Overbeck, Director,
J.
Hesser,
Manager,
Nuclear
ICE
J. LoCicero, Manager,
A. Ogurek, Manager,
NSLL
P. Prandjes,
Manager,
CAG
C. Russo,
Manager,
R. Prabhaker,
Manager,
QE/QA
M. Radoccia,
Manager,
SNED
D. Blackson,
Manager,
Central
Maintenance
B. Webster,
Manager,
Component Engineering
T. Bradish,
Compliance
Manager
R. Badsgard,
Assistant
Manager of Nuclear Projects,
T. Weber, Supervisor,
Component
5 Speciality
S.
Coppock, Supervisor,
Component Engineering
(MOV Coordinator)
R. Rogalski, Audit Supervisor,
A. Khanpour, Engineering Supervisor,
Site Nuclear
N. Eidsmoe,
Procurement
Engineering Supervisor
W. Weems,
Elec/HVAC Supervisor,
CMPO
E. Smith,
MOV Supervisor,
Nuclear
ICE
R. Rouse,
Compliance Supervisor
R. Ebann,
MOV Foreman,
Central
Maintenance
J. Baxter,
Compliance
Engineer
T. Phillips,
IEC Senior Engineer,
SNED
J. Zaghloul, Senior Electrical Engineer,
SNED
S. Schroeder,
Senior Electrical Engineer,
NED
S. Kanter, Senior Coordinator,
Owner Services
R. Henry, Salt River Project Site Representative
J. Draper,
SCE Site Representative
B. Druin, Consultant,
CMPO
The inspectors
also interviewed other licensee
and contractor
personnel
during the course of the inspection.
- Attended Exit Meeting
BACKGROUND
Generic Letter (GL) 89-10, "Safety-Related
Motor-Operated
Valve Testing
and Surveillance,"
dated June
28,
1989 requested
that licensees
establish
a program to ensure that switch settings for safety-related
motor-operated
valves
(MOVs) and certain other
MOVs in safety-related
systems
are selected,
set
and maintained properly.
Supplement
1 to
GL 89-10 provided the results of public workshops
on the implementation of
the Generic Letter.
Supplement
2 to
dated August 3, 1990,
stated that inspections
of programs
developed in response
to
would begin January
1, 1991.
In response
to concerns
raised
by the results of NRC sponsored
MOV tests,
Supplement
3 to GL 89-10, dated October 25,
1990, requested all licensees
to consider the applicability of the information obtained
from the
NRC-sponsored
tests
to MOVs within the scope of GL 89-10 and to consider
this information in the development of priorities for implementing the
Generic Letter program.
GL 89-10 requested
that licensees
submit
a response
to the Generic Letter
by December 28,
1989.
In a letter on that date,
the licensee
committed
to implement the recommendations
of GL 89-10 and stated that
a schedule
would be provided by June
28,
1990.
The licensee
indicated,
however,
that their commitment might be revised if experience
showed that testing
every
MOV was unnecessary.
In a letter dated July 2, 1990, the
NRC staff
acknowledged
the licensee's
response.
INSPECTION
PLAN
The inspection
was performed in accordance
with Temporary Instruction
(TI) 2515/109,
"Inspection Requirements for Generic Letter 89-10,
Safety-Related
Motor-Operated
Valve Testing
and Surveillance,"
dated
January
14,
1991.
The inspection
focused
on Part
1 of the Temporary
Instruction (TI), which involves
a review of the program being
established
by the licensee
in response
to
The inspectors
did
not address
Part
2 of the TI, which involves
a review of program
implementation,
except to assist
in evaluating
the licensee's
program.
The inspectors
reviewed the licensee's
program commitments
as established
in their December
28,
1989 response
and the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating
Station
NRC Generic Letter 89-10 Program
document
(Rev. 1, July 5, 1991)
and supporting documentation.
In addition, the inspectors
discussed
program details with licensee
personnel.
YiOV PROGRAM REVIEW
~Sco
e
GL 89-10 Recommendations
and Licensee
Commitments
GL 89-10 recommended
that all safety-related
MOVs and other
YiOVs that are
position-changeable
in safety-related
piping systems
be included within
the scope of the licensee's
GL 89-10 program.
Supplement
1 to the
Generic Letter defined "position-changeable"
as
any
MOV in a
safety-related
piping system that is not blocked from inadvertent
operation from the control
room.
The licensee
response
to
committed to the scope of the program
as
recommended
in GL 89-10.
Observations
A review of the licensee's
GL 89-10 program
scope
was conducted
using the
licensee's
"Implementation Plan for NRC Generic Letter 89-10," Revision
1, dated July 5, 1991,
and other available
documents.
The licensee's
GL 89-10 program included
117
MOVs per unit. Yiost of these
MOVs have
Limitorque actuators.
However, the inspectors
noted
some Rotork and EIN
actuators
in the licensee's
GL 89-10 scope.
The inspectors
noted that the scope of the licensee's
program included
safety related
systems that could be
inadvertently mispositioned
from the control
room,
and
MOVs for which
credit was taken in the Emergency Operating
Procedures
(EOPs).
The inspectors
also noted that the licensee
had planned to extend
many of
the recommendations
advocated
in GL 89-10 to MOVs outside of the
scope.
Conclusion
The inspectors
determined that the scope of the licensee's
program
appeared
to be adequately
established.
Desi
n Basis
Reviews
GL 89-10 Recommendations
and Licensee
Commitments
Recommended
Action "a" of GL 89-10 requested
the review and documentation
of the design basis for the operation of each
MOV to determine
the
maximum differential pressure
and flow (and other factors)
expected for
both normal operations
and abnormal
conditions.
The licensee
committed
to follow the recommendations
of GL 89-10.
Observations
The inspectors
discussed
the performance
of design basis
reviews with
licensee
personnel.
The licensee
had contracted with Combustion
Engineering
(CE) to provide worst case
pressure,
flow, and differential
pressure for each of the valves in the
GL 89-10 scope.
The licensee
used
the
CE design
data
as input to their initial NOV sizing and switch
setting calculations.
The inspectors
noted that the licensee
had only recently developed
a
procedure for conducting design basis
reviews.
The inspectors
reviewed
procedure
81DP-4DC10, Revision 0, "Motor Operated
Valve Design Basis
Review and Thrust/Torque Calculation,"
and found that it appeared
to
adequately
address
the guidelines set forth in GL 89-10.
The inspectors
found that no similar specific guidance
had
been established
by the
licensee for the original design
basis
review performed
by CE.
According
to the licensee,
the initial CE review established
conservative
bounding
values for the worst case conditions for cases
where the specific design
basis conditions
had not been determined.
The licensee
committed to
review the
CE pressure,
flow, and differential pressure
design input to
verify compliance with their procedure
by December
31, 1991.
This
schedule
commitment date
was reflected in their business
plan.
The inspectors
cautioned
the licensee that if the approved
design basis
review reveals
a different differential pressure
than the previously used
CE value, the licensee
may need to repeat
NOV sizing
and torque switch
setpoint calculations,
reset the affected
and repeat
the design basis testing.
This could impact the licensee's
program
schedule.
The licensee's
design
basis
reviews will be examined in a
future inspection.
Conclusion
The inspectors
determined that the licensee
appeared
to have developed
adequate
plans
and procedures for the performance of design basis
reviews.
4.3
MOV Sizin
and Switch Settin
Calculations
GL 89-10 Recommendations
and Licensee
Commitments
Recommended
action "b" of Generic Letter 89-10 requested
licensees
to
review,
and revise
as necessary,
the methods for selecting
and setting
all
NOV switches.
The licensee
committed to follow the recommendations
of GL 89-10.
Observations
a 0
The inspectors
reviewed selected
calculations
and licensee
procedure
13-JC-ZZ-201,
"YiOV Thrust, Torque
and Actuator Sizing Calculation,"
Revision 0, dated
1991, which the licensee initially utilized for
sizing
NOVs and calculating their switch settings.
The inspectors
found that the licensee's
calculations
and procedure
did not
consider the effects of elevated
temperature
on motor performance
and cable losses for degraded
voltage calculations.
Furthermore,
the licensee
did not consider motor ambient temperature
in sizing
their thermal
overload protection devices
(TOLs).
The licensee
had
not included margin to account for rate-of-loading effects,
nor had
any, margin been established
to account for seismic/dynamic
loading.
The inspectors
found that many of these
concerns
and other
programmatic
weaknesses
were addressed
in Revision I of the Palo
Verde "Implementation
Plan for NRC Generic Letter 89-10" which was
issued
during the inspection.
In particular, the revised plan
committed to consider the following:
Physical
valve orientation, piping configuration
and fluid type
Component
weak link analysis
based
on
ASNE Code allowable
stresses
(Seismic
and stem thrust/torque
values to be considered)
Control circuit logic for the purpose of determining proper
torque/limit switch settings
and thermal
overload configurations
Degraded voltage effects
due to power supply and cable sizing,
cable
impedances
accounting for in-rush or locked rotor currents,
and temperature effects
under
normal
and abnormal
conditions
and
thermal
overload sizes
Evaluation of motor capabilities
with respect
to operating
temperature
requirements
The implementation
plan also committed to consider
rate-of-loading effects
as more data
became available.
The inspectors
observed that licensee calculations
were not
consistent
in their use of an assumed
valve stem friction
coefficient in establishing
stem factors.
The values varied from
0.2 to as
low as 0.1.
These values
would correspond
to assumed
lubrication quality ranging from poor to ideal.
The licensee
was
cautioned that use of non-conservative
valve stem friction
coefficients lower than 0.2 would require specific justification.
The inspectors
found that the licensee
had not included any margin
in their calculation of the minimum required target thrust setting
to account for potential
degradation
of valve stem lubrication
between maintenance/lubrication
intervals.
Furthermore,
the
inspectors
found that the licensee
adjusts
the torque switch setting
using
MOVATS diagnostic
equipment after cleaning
and lubricating the
valve stem.
Since the licensee
could set the torque switch at the
minimum required thrust under these
ideal lubrication conditions,
the inspectors
were concerned that any subsequent
degradation of the
lubricant quality over time would result in inadequate
thrust
capability.
(Refer to Section 4.8.4 for further discussion)
In response
to the inspectors'oncern,
the licensee identified that
general
procedural
guidance
had been established
to set torque
switch settings
to the high end of the specified target window to
establish
a margin for degradation.
The inspectors
found no instances
of torque switch settings at the
minimum value.
However, the inspectors
recommended
that the
licensee
consider the
need to more formally account for lubrication
degradation within their setpoint methodology
and controls.
In
addition, the inspectors
emphasized
the need for justification of
the assumed
consistency of lubrication based
on feedback
from the
licensee's
ongoing preventative
maintenance activities.
(Refer to
Section 4.8.4 for further discussion.)
The inspectors
noted that the Palo Verde
FSAR stated that Class
1E
motors were specified to perform under
75K degraded
voltage.
However, the inspectors
observed that certain
MOVs with
Class
1E motors were
shown
by calculation to be inadequate
to
perform under worst case
design conditions at 75K degraded
voltage.
The inspectors
noted that the current equations for demonstrating
MOV operability under degraded
voltage conditions were more
conservative
than those
used in the original design (e.g. valve
factors for most flex wedge gate valves
had
been increased
from 0.3
to 0.4).
The inspectors
also noted that Palo Verde degraded
voltage
protective relays would typically limit maximum degraded
voltage to
far less
severe
conditions than
75K degraded
voltage.
Further, the
inspectors
expressed
concerns that established
design margins
were
being reduced.
This is
a followup item (Followup Item
50-528/91-25-01).
d.
The inspectors
observed that the licensee
had incorporated
recent
industry experience
into their calculational
methodology.
The
licensee's
calculations for flex wedge gate valves
used
a valve
factor of 0.4 which was more conservative
than the standard
industry
valve factor of 0.3.
Furthermore,
the inspectors
observed that,
on
a case-by-case
basis,
valve factors
had
been increased
from 0.4 to 0.5 as
a result of test
fai lures.
The licensee
had performed several differential pressure
tests to demonstrate
NOV operability
under design basis conditions.
The tests for auxiliary feedwater
(AFW) valves
13AFBUV0034 and
13AFBUV0035 failed on the first attempts.
The subsequent
increase
in torque switch setting
and thrust was sufficient to achieve valve
operability
when the subject
at design basis
differential pressure.
The inspectors
were concerned,
however, that
the licensee
had increased
the valve factor as
a corrective action
only for the test failures without evaluating
the generic
applicability to other flex wedge gate valves which had not yet been
tested.
The licensee
responded that evaluation of the adequacy of
their calculational
methodology would be addressed
at the conclusion
of their test program when the fai lure data could
be statistically
assessed.
However, the inspectors
emphasized
the need for a more
timely evaluation of the generic applicability of the test results
to ensure that the licensee's
interim program
was conservatively
established.
The licensee
acknowledged
the need to evaluate their
DP test data in a more timely manner.
The inspectors
considered
the licensee's
use of an increased
valve
factor as corrective action on a case-by-case
basis in lieu of an
identifiable root cause
to be
a weakness
in'the development of the
licensee's
program.
Conclusion
The inspectors
determined that the licensee
had not yet adequately
established
procedures
for performing calculations
to verify proper
sizing of NOVs and setting of their switches.
4.4
Desi
n Basis Differential Pressure
and Flow Testin
GL 89-10 Recommendations
and Licensee
Commitments
Recommended
action "c" of the Generic Letter requested
licensees
to test
MOVs within the Generic Letter program in-situ under their design basis
differential pressure
and flow conditions.
If testing in-situ under
those conditions is not practicable,
alternate
methods
may be used to
demonstrate
the capability of the
NOV.
A two-stage
approach
was
suggested
for situations
when design basis testing in-situ was not
practicable
and when
an alternate
method of demonstrating
NOV capability
could not be justified at the time.
With the two-stage
approach,
a
licensee
would evaluate
the capability of the
NOV using the best data
available
and then would work to obtain applicable test data within the
schedule of the generic letter.
The licensee
committed to follow the
recommendations
of GL 89-10, except that with regard to testing all
where practicable,
the licensee
requested
to reserve
the option to reduce
the scope of their design basis testing
program if subsequent
industry
developments
and results of the licensee's
testing
program could provide
justifiable alternatives.
Observations
a ~
b.
The licensee
uses
NOVATS diagnostic
eauipment
during testing.
The
parameters
measured
as part of the licensee's
testing
program
appeared
consistent with current industry recommendations.
The
licensee
had
an aggressive
plan for full flow differential pressure
testing
and
had completed
31 differential pressure
tests
by the time
of the inspection.
The licensee
was in the process
of prioritizing
the
NOV test schedule
by NOV safety significance
based
on input from
the licensee's
Probability Risk Assessment
Group.
The inspectors
considered
these
aspects
of the testing
program to be strengths.
The inspectors
reviewed licensee test procedures,
73TI-9ZZ43 and
73TI-9ZZ44, Rev. 0, which were used for design
basis testing of MOVs
in the
in Unit 3 during April, 1991.
The
inspectors
noted that the procedures
had
no acceptance
criteria for
the design basis test data,
nor did they use the test data
as
feedback into their calculations.
However,
when
a valve failed to
operate,
the licensee
would modify valve factors to accommodate
the
increased
torque/thrust
requirements for the failed NOV.
Failure to incorporate appropriate
acceptance
criteria in the
DP
test procedures
is an apparent violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix
B. (Enforcement
Item 50-528/91-25-02)
The inspectors
emphasized
the intended twofold pur pose of design
basis differential pressure
(DP) and flow testing: first, to
demonstrate
MOV capability to perform under design basis conditions;
and second,
to provide input for validating or refining the
licensee's
design methodology.
Without acceptance criteria, the
DP
testing
cannot satisfy these goals.
Of the
31
NOVs which underwent
DP testing,
6 failed to perform their
design function.
The failures involved
AFW valves.
Subsequently,
the valve factors for these
valves
were adjusted
from 0.4 to 0.5 and
calculations for required thrust were revised.
However,
as pointed
out in the previous section,
the licensee
had not attempted to
determine applicability of the observed
phenomena
to other similar
valves.
The inspectors
reviewed other
DP tests
which had demonstrated
to perform their design function.
For Unit 3 Safety Injection
Valves SI-V-666 and SI-V-667, the inspectors
found that the
DP test
results indicated
a lower available margin than predicted
by the
licensee's
design calculations.
The inspectors
stressed'the
importance of verifying available margin as part of the test
acceptance criteria.
Available margin is important,
because
the
DP
tests
do not simulate all design conditions.
For example,
DP tests
are not conducted
under degraded
voltage or seismic/dynamic
conditions.
Despite completion of 31
DP tests at the time of the inspection,
none of the
MOVs were considered
by the licensee to have completed
their
GL 89-10 program.
The licensee
considered their program to be
developing
and acknowledged
the need for specific acceptance
criteria which was being prepared for future testing.
The inspectors will review the licensee's
DP test acceptance
criteria and their review of test data in a future inspection.
(Followup Item 50-528/91-25-02)
Conclusion
The inspectors
considered
the licensee's
design basis
measured
test
parameters,
number of NOVs presently
scheduled for testing,
and the fact
that
31
DP tests
had already
been conducted to be
a program strength.
However,
due to the lack of test acceptance
criteria and timely review of
test results,
the inspectors
concluded that the licensee
had not yet
adequately
established their program for demonstrating
the capability of
NOVs through design basis differential pressure
and flow testing.
4.5
Periodic Verification of MOV Ca abilit
GL 89-10 Recommendations
and Licensee
Commitments
Recommended
action "d" of the Generic Letter requested
that licensees
prepare
or revise procedures
to ensure that adequate
MOV switch settings
are determined
and maintained
throughout the life of the plant.
Paragraph "j" of the Generic Letter
recommended
that the surveillance
interval
be based
on the safety importance of the
NOV as well as its
maintenance
and performance history, but the interval should not exceed
5
years or 3 refueling outages.
Further,
the capability of the
NOV should
be verified, if the
NOV is replaced,
modified, or overhauled
to an extent
that the existing test results
are not representative
of the
NOV.
The
licensee
committed to follow the recommendations
of GL 89-10.
Observations
a.
The inspectors
reviewed the licensee's
procedures for post
maintenance
testing,
including Nuclear Administrative and Technical
Manual
30AC-9WP04 (Rev. 1, November 1, 1988), "Retest,"
and
(Rev. 2, July 28, 1989), "Valve Motor Operator Monitoring
and Test Program."
The licensee
indicated that they intended to use
NOVATS static tests to measure thrust before
and after packing
adjustments
in conjunction with stroke time tests.
The inspectors
noted that the licensee's
post-maintenance
test procedures
did not
clarify when the use of diagnostic thrust tests
were required to
verify MOV capability for other types of maintenance activities.
The licensee
acknowledged
the concern
and committed to revise their
procedures.
The inspectors
also
recommended
that the licensee
review their procedures
to identify where thrust diagnostics
would
be needed to verify NOV operability for other
MOV maintenance
items.
b.
The inspectors
noted that the licensee
was in the process of
formulating their perio'dic verification and testing
program for
MOVs.
The inspectors
noted that the results of NRC sponsored
testing
had
shown that current static testing methods .were not
capable of detecting certain
MOV performance deficiencies
which
dynamic testing
had been able to detect.
The inspectors
emphasized
to the licensee that the use of static testing alone for periodic
verification would require justification.
The inspectors will review the licensee's
plans
and procedures for
periodic verification of NOV capability during
a future inspection.
(Followup Item 50-528/91-25-04)
Conclusion
Since the licensee
had not yet finalized this area of their
program, the inspectors
determined that the licensee
had not yet
adequately
developed
plans
and procedures
for periodic verification of
the capability of NOVs.
4.6
MOV Failures
Corrective Actions
and Trendin
GL 89-10 Recommendations
and Licensee
Commitments
Recommended
action "h" of the Generic Letter requested
that licensees
analyze or justify each
NOV failure and corrective action.
The
documentation
should include the results
and history of each as-found
deteriorated
condition, malfunction, test,
inspection, analysis,
repair,
or alteration.
All documentation
should
be retained
and reported in
accordance
with plant requirements.
This data
should
be periodically
examined
(every
2 years or after each refueling outage after program
implementation)
as part of the monitoring and feedback effort to
establish
trends of MOV operability.
These trends
could provide the
basis for a licensee
revision of the testing frequency established
to
periodically verify adequate
NOV capability.
The Generic Letter
indicated that
a well-structured
and component-oriented
system is
necessary
to track, capture,
and share
equipment history data.
The
licensee
committed to follow the recommendations
of GL 89-10.
Observations
a.
The inspectors
reviewed the over-thrusting
event of auxiliary
MOV 3JSGAUV134,
as described
by Engineering Evaluation
Report
EER-NO-033.
The inspectors
noted that in evaluating
the
adequacy of the motor sizing, the
EER credited the dc motor as
capable of operating at 110$ torque rating without justification.
The licensee
did not consider elevated
ambient temperature
effects
in this evaluation.
In addition, the licensee
used
a stem friction
coefficient of 0.12 (as
compared to the more conservative
value of
0.20) without justification.
Based
on standard
sizing calculations,
the inspectors
concluded that it appeared
that the motor would have
been inadequately
sized to provide the required torque under
degraded
voltage conditions.
Hence, it did not appear that an
adequate
margin was established
to ensure that the subject motor
would not have stalled before the point of torque switch trip. Since
10
the thermal
overload protection is bypassed
during safety features
actuation, stalling or jamming of this valve could have resulted in
burn-out of the motor.
Subsequent
modifications
made
by the licensee
resulted in the
actuator thrust exceeding
the Limitorque rating in the opening
direction.
In attempting to justify the acceptability of this as-
left condition, the licensee
used
an industry study which had not
been
reviewed or approved
by Limitorque.
Further,
the licensee
did
not have
a documented
evaluation of the study.
While encouraging
the licensee to incorporate current industry experience
and the best
available data into their program,
the inspectors
cautioned
the
licensee
to ensure that design input data
and references
were
properly reviewed
and approved within established
design control
measures.
The inspectors
noted that over-thrusting would occur principally
during valve testing
under static conditions rather than under
design basis conditions.
The licensee
recognized this fact and the
need to limit the thrust experienced
by the actuator during testing.
The licensee
had prepared
notes to inform test personnel
to lower
the torque switch setting prior to static testing to avoid
over-thrusting
the actuator.
In a future inspection,
the inspectors
plan on reviewing the adequacy of these test procedures
notes to
preclude over-thrusting the actuator in the opening direction.
(Followup Item 50-528/91-25-05)
The inspectors
reviewed selected
tests
which had
been conducted
under maximum
DP conditions
by the licensee
during the recently
completed Unit 3 refueling outage.
The inspectors
found that in two
of seven tests
conducted
on high pressure
safety injection (SI)
valves,
the valves
had failed to close completely under
maximum dp
conditions.
The safety injection valves are normally closed,
2"
Borg-Marner wye-globe throttle valves, with SMC-04 actuators.
The
valves
have
an active safety function to open
on
a safety injection
signal for cold leg injection.
The valves also perform
a passive
safety function of containment isolation in the normally closed
position.
The licensee
had determined that the electrical
contacts
in the torque switch had chattered
under flow induced vibration
causing
the actuator to intermittently interrupt operations prior to
completely closing.
The licensee installed
a stiffer contact spring
which maintains contact closure until intended actuation of the
Subsequent
repeat testing
was successful
with no
further incidence of chattering.
The licensee modified the two affected valves to incorporate
the
stiffer contact spring.
In addition,
as
a precaution,
the licensee
initiated work orders to modify the remaining six safety injection
valves
and two mini-recirculation valves for the safety injection
pumps in all three units.
The licensee
had considered
the flow
induced vibration to be unique to the test conditions
and not
representative
of either normal or design basis conditions.
As such
the test deficiency was not considered
to affect the operability of
the
MOV or its capability to perform its safety function under
design basis conditions.
The inspectors
reviewed prior tests
conducted
on the safety
injection valves under similar conditions during startup of Unit 3
in 1984.
The inspectors
found that the licensee
had previously
encountered
the
same
problem on two other safety injection valves.
At that time,
a stiffer contact spring
had also
been installed
on
all 30 SMC-04 safety injection MOYs, along with other system
modifications to reduce
Successful
'epeat
testing at that time demonstrated
that the problem had
apparently
been eliminated.
(For all 30 SI
MOVs with SMC-04
actuators,
the replacement of the standard
contact springs with
stiffer contact springs in the
1984 time period constituted
the
first set of contact spring stiffness
increases.
The changeout of
contact springs during and subsequent
to the recent Unit 3 refueling
outage constitutes
a second contact spring stiffness increase.)
The inspectors
found that the licensee
had not evaluated
Part
21
reportabi lity at the time they became
aware of the problem of flow
induced vibration causing
torque switch chattering either in
November
1984 or in April 1991.
No MNCR had
been initiated as
a
result of the findings in either case.
The inspectors
noted that
NMCR No. 91-SI-1057
had
been initiated in 'July, 1991, addressing
the
previous incidents.
However, the inspectors
found that the
disposition of this
MNCR appeared
to discredit its validity, stating
that it was written based
on an misinterpretation of requirements
for operability.
At that time, the licensee
had determined that the
problem did not constitute
a defect
as defined under Part
21 and was
not reportable.
The licensee
determination
was based
on their
conclusion that the instances
of the problem were isolated to
non-representative
flow conditions
and that the problem did not
affect the ability of the affected
component to perform its active
safety related function.
The inspectors
found that the licensee
had not adequately
evaluated
the torque switch chattering
problem.
This conclusion
was
based
on
the following observations:
1.
The two mini-flow safety injection
pump valves which the
licensee
modified to install stiffer contact springs did have
a
close safety function which could be affected
by the
deficiency.
Although these
MOVs had not demonstrated
the
problem during testing,
they wet e identical to the affected
valves.
2.
The deficiency could directly affect the ability of SMC-04
Limitorque actuators
to perform an active safety related close
function due to flow induced vibration under high differential
pressure.
DCP 3CM-SI-150, dated
November 1984, identified all
30 SI valves with SMC-04 actuators
(10 in each unit) as having
the potential for torque switch chatter.
Two of the
MOYs in
each unit are located
on minimum recirculation lines
and have
an active safety function to close.
12
3.
The Limitorque actuators
were procured
as seismically
qualified.
The seismic qualification report for the safety
injection valve actuators
(N001-1.01-828-1) identified that
torque switch chattering
was
an analyzed failure mode which was
not expected
to be encountered
in operation of the actuator
under any expected vibration frequencies.
4.
Repeat
occur rences
of the deficiency in different valves
indicated that past corrective actions
had not been sufficient
to eliminate the problem.
For example,
40% (4 of 10) of the
safety injection valves in Unit 3 had experienced
the problem.
5.
The licensee
evaluation for Part
21 reportability appeared
to
restrict consideration of the deficiency to the safety function
of only the component
on which the problem was encountered.
There appeared
to be no evaluation of the safety related
functions of other applications of the component.
This
appeared
to be
a programmatic
weakness.
6.
The licensee
had not evaluated
the effect of the torque switch
chattering
on the actuator motor.
Although the thermal
overload devices
were bypassed
during the opening stroke, they
were relied on to provide motor protection during the closing
stroke.
The inspectors
were concerned
that previous repetitive
cycling of inrush current to the motor while the torque switch
chatters
may have resulted in motor degradation
which may go
undetected
and subsequently
preclude safety function operation.
The licensee initiated
a review to determine if the thermal
overload device settings
were adequate
to protect the actuator
motor when subjected
to chattering conditions.
The inspectors
considered this issue of torque switch chatter
may be
potentially reportable
under Part 21.
This issue will be forwarded
to
NRR for further evaluation.
The inspectors
reviewed Palo Verde Nuclear Administrative and
Technical
manual
Procedure
94AC-OLC02, Review of Conditions Adverse
to guality for 10 CFR 21.
The procedure
requires,
in part, that
a
finding be evaluated
and
a Reportability Evaluation Report initiated
if it is determined to be
a deviation.
Paragraph
4.2 defines
a
"deviation," in part,
as
a departure
from the technical
requirements
included in a procurement
document
(an engineering
or design
document).
However,
a Reportability Evaluation Report
was not
initiated for the reported
problem of contact chattering
due to
vibration in Limitorque SMC-04 actuation
under
MNCR 91-SI-1057.
This failure to adequately
evaluate
conditions for Part
21
reportability is an apparent violation.
(Enforcement
Item
50-528/91-25-06)
The inspectors
noted that the licensee
had reported
124
MOV failures
to the Nuclear Plant Reliability Data
System
(NPRDS) since
1986.
Of
the 124
NOV failures,
37 were identified as limit switches out of
adjustment, with normal or cyclic wear identified as
a contributor
13
for 12 of these failures.
The inspectors
noted that normal/cyclic
wear did not appear to be
a parameter
used in the design.
The inspectors
found that 28 of the
124 failures were .identified as
miscellaneous
breakdowns,
which the licensee identified as
seen only
once or twice since the three units went on line.
While the
licensee
had established
a data
base, it did not appear that the
program
was trending failures
by valve, operator
and component
type
(gate,
globe and/or butterfly), as well as service application.
Discussions
with the licensee identified the following:
A review of the last three years of NOV Work Order
(WO)
activity was in progress
or would be performed to ensure that
all
NOV failures
had been captured
by the Failure Data Trending
(FDT) system.
A review of all the identified
NOV failure data generated
over
the last three years
would be performed to ensure
the actual
root cause for each failure was clearly identified.
The inspectors
also emphasized
the importance of trending
accelerated
wear and degradation
of NOV components
in addition to
failures.
Conclusion
The inspectors
considered
NOV failure corrective actions
and trending to
be an area of weakness
in the licensee's
GL 89-10 program.
The
inspectors
determined that the licensee
had not yet adequately
developed
plans
and procedures for analyzing
NOV failures, justifying corrective
actions,
and trending.
4.7
Schedule
Recommendations
and Licensee
Commitments
GL 89-10 requested
that licensees
complete all design-basis
reviews,
analyses,
verifications, tests,
and inspections
that were initiated in
order to satisfy the Generic Letter recommended
actions
by June
18, 1994,
or 3 refueling outages after December
28, 1989, whichever is later.
The
licensee
committed to follow the recommendations
of GL 89-10.
Observations
The inspectors
reviewed the licensee's
schedule for implementation of
their GL 89-10 program.
The licensee
had organized their program into a
detailed set of tasks,
each of which had
a schedule
and was included in
the licensee's
business
plan.
In general,
the program schedule
appeared
reasonable
and well oroanized.
The inspectors
expressed
concern,
however, over certain aspects
of the
licensee's
program.
For example,
the licensee's
reliance
on unverified
design input (refer to section 4.2 of this report)
and performance of
0
testing without acceptance
criteria and without review of test results
(refer to section 4.4) left the licensee's
program vulnerable to
reiterations
and schedule
slippage, if current assumptions
establishing
adequate
margin could not be substantiated.
In order to keep
on schedule,
the inspectors
emphasized
the importance of
verifying design input, implementing
an
MOV sizing and switch settin9
calculation methodology which includes conservative
design margin to
assure
adequate
performance
under subsequent
design basis testing,
and
evaluating current
DP test data
on
a timely basis.
Conclusion
The inspectors
determined that the licensee
had apparently
established
an adequate
schedule for the completion of the
recommended
actions of GL 89-10.
4.8
Other
MOV Pro
ram Areas Addressed
4.8.1
Control of MOV Switch Settin
s
a ~
The inspectors
were concerned
that the licensee
was
no longer
controlling torque switch settings
on the ZZI-004 drawings per
their established
procedure,
but instead
were using Engineering
Evaluation
Requests
(EERs).
The
EER process
was adapted
to
provide
an expeditious
means for Engineering to specify switch
settings without the encumbering
delays
associated
with the
drawing change
process.
An open
ended
EER was utilized by Nuclear Engineering Division
(NED) to specify and change
required torque switch settings,
which were determined either by analysis
or testing.
The
licensee
referred to this information as the Interim Controlled
Motor Operator
Data
Base which was administered
through the
process.
The
MOV monitoring and test procedure
(73-J-ZZI-004)
which directs the use of Drawing 12-J-ZZI-004,
had been
changed
to refer to either the ZZI-004 drawing or an
EER for the
required switch setting information.
In practice,
the
EER was
the only document which specified switch settings
during the
implementation of the
GL 89-10 program.
Mhile it appeared
that
some adaptation of the existing licensee
program was appropriate
during the
GL 89-10 program,
the
inspectors
emphasized
the importance of ensuring that program
controls
embodied quality assurance
measures
equivalent to
those within established
plant procedures.
The inspectors
noted that the licensee's
gA department
Corrective Action Report
(CAR) 91-0021 identified potential
problems associated
with keeping torque switch (TS) settings
in
an interim data
base via EERs.
The licensee's
Component
and
Specialty Engineering
group, which had primary responsibility
for the
MOV program,
had committed to respond to the
CAR within
15
b.
the next few months.
The inspectors
intend to review this in a
future inspection.
(Followup Item 50-528/91-25-07)
The licensee
was questioned
on the controls for torque switch
limiter plate removal.
The licensee
indicated that limiter
plates
could be removed if required to achieve
the specified
target thrust.
No special
or procedural
controls were in place
for the removal of torque switch limiter plates.
The licensee
was cautioned that setting torque switch setpoints
above the
maximum recommended
by Limitorque constituted
a design
change
of that actuator
and required appropriate
review prior to
implementation.
The inspectors
acknowledged that the
licensee's
GL 89-10 program procedures
incorporated
design
review measures
when they removed torque switch limiter plates.
~Tnainin
a ~
b.
The inspectors
discussed
the training program with licensee
management,
reviewed general
training requirements,
outlines
and records,
and toured the training facility.
The inspectors
noted that,
as part of the licensee's
indoctrination program, technical
personnel
were required to
complete
an orientation
package.
The orientation
package
was
tailored to specifically address
the necessary
requirements for
the applicable duties.
The packages
included requirements for
the licensee's
administrative
procedures,
goals
and objectives,-
NRC rules
and regulations,
and quality assurance
procedures;
as
well as industry codes,
technical specifications
and procedures
applicable to the employee's
duties.
The orientation
package
required signatures
by the employee
and the employee's
supervisor to acknowledge
completion.
Training and requirements for MOV personnel
appeared
adequate.
However, the need for refresher training courses for
maintenance
and testing technicians
was identified by the
inspectors
as
a potential
weakness
in the licensee's
program.
The inspectors
observed that the licensee relied heavily on
contract personnel
in their
MOV program.
The inspectors
checked
the licensee's
certification of NOVATS personnel.
Although the licensee verified that
NOVATS personnel
had
been
certified to comply with NOVATS standards,
the licensee
had not
verified the
NOVATS certification to be in compliance with the
licensee's
requirements.
The inspectors
also noted that
NOVATS
had also issued
updated
software for their test equipment
and
that the licensee
was apparently
using the updated
NOVATS
software without verifying compliance of the software to
standards.
The inspectors
emphasized
the licensee's
responsibility to adequately
control vendor services
and
software.
Review of vendor services
and software will be
addressed
in a future inspection.
(Followup Item
50-528/91-25-08)
16
nostics
~
4.8.3
~0i
a
~
c ~
The inspectors
found that the licensee
used
MOVATS diagnositc
test equipment to establish
required torque switch settings
during static baseline testing.
Diagnostic signatures
were
also obtained during
DP testing.
In addition, the licensee
has recently utilized stem strain
gaging
(Teledyne technique) for thrust determination during
DP
testing in Unit 3.
This technique
involves attaching strain
gauges to the valve stem
and analytically correlating output to
thrust.
Currently, the licensee
considers
the use of stem
strain gaging to provide supplemental
data,
acquired for
information only, in developing
the utility of the technique.
The inspectors
noted that no procedures
currently exist
controlling stem strain gaging nor is load cell calibration
performed
as
a check against
the analytically derived thrust
values.
The inspectors
cautioned
the licensee
against
subsequent
use of informal data to verify required torque
switch settings until the accuracy of the data
had
been
determined
and the data obtained
under appropriate test control
measures.
The licensee
acknowledged
the inspectors'oncerns.
The inspectors
informed the licensee of a recent Notice of
Nonconformance
issued to MOYATS for inadequate
verification of
equipment accuracy.
The licensee
noted that the results of
industry sponsored
testing of NOVATS accuracy would be
presented
at the upcoming
NUG meeting scheduled for the
following week.
The inspectors
stressed
that consideration
and
implementation of these results
were necessary
in order to
comply with the recommendations
of Gi 89-10.
At the subsequent
MUG meeting,
NUG released
a preliminary
report on its testing
program for NOYATS and other diagnostic
equipment.
NUG intends to release
a final report in January
1992.
During the period when results of the diagnostic testing
are being finalized by NUG, the licensee is encouraged
to take
inventory of all NOVs for which diagnostic
equipment
has
been
used to establish
switch settings.
This would provide the
licensee with some
advance
information about the number of
operability evaluations
and potential switch setting
changes
or
modifications that might be required
when the results of the
final report are released.
d.
The inspectors
noted that the licensee
had not addressed
MOYATS
Engineering
Report 5.0, Revision 0, January
1991,
"Equipment
Accuracy Summary," which provided guidance for the
consideration of rate-of-loading effects that might reduce the
available thrust delivered
by the motor operator
under high
differential pressure
conditions.
The inspectors
recommended
that the licensee
consider this information when they develop
their margin to account for rate-of-loading effects.
17
The licensee's
consideration
and implementation of NOVATS
accuracy
and rate-of-loading effects will be reviewed in a
future inspection.
(Followup Item 50-528/91-25-09)
Maintenance
a ~
b.
The inspectors
reviewed detailed assembly/disassembly
maintenance
procedures
for the licensee's
Limitorque, Rotork,
and
EIM motor operated
valve actuators.
The Limitorque
procedures
had recently
been
issued for use;
however, the
Rotork and EIN procedures
were still in draft form.
The
inspectors
found that these
procedures
appeared
to be
adequately detailed,
including requirements for maintenance
and
testing
and special tools.
The inspectors
observed that the licensee
had
an
18 month
preventative
maintenance
The
inspectors
observed that several
of the maintenance
procedures
were lacking in details for identifying and recording excessive
wear and degredation.
For example,
the licensee's
preventative
maintenance
procedure
32NT-9ZZ48 did not require specific
observation
or evaluation of the as found condition of the stem
thread lubricant.
The inspectors
noted that such observations
were required for the quantity and quality of the actuator
housing lubricant and the limit switch lubricant.
The
inspectors
emphasized
that since there
was
no established
frequency for actuator overhaul,
the
PN observations
of
degradation
constituted
the only established
opportunity to
thoroughly assess
the actuator for unexpected
degradation.
The inspectors
observed that the licensee's
program did not
include provisions for confirming assumptions
embodied in the
calculational
methodology.
As described
above,
as-found
stem
lubricant quality was not observed
during
PN activities.
However,
stem friction coefficients
assumed
in engineering
calculations credited ideal lubricant quality in some cases.
The inspectors
found these
assumptions
to be unrealistic
and
non-conservative
without justification from PM observations.
The inspectors
pointed out that stem wear and lubricant
degradation
were
common deficiencies
as identified in
Attachment
A of GL 89-10.
Furthermore,
such
a deficiency would
directly reduce
the actual thrust delivered to the valve,
potentially causing
the actuator to torque out early before the
valve could complete its required safety function.
The inspectors
found this lack of coordination of PN activities
in verifying engineering
assumptions
to be
a weakness
in the
licensee's
program.
The inspectors
observed that the licensee
did not have
a
specific refurbishment
schedule for NOVs.
Preventative
maintenance
and diagnostic testing,
alone,
have
been
found at
some facilities to be insufficient for detecting all aspects
of
18
MOV degredation
(e.g.
stem nut wear).
The inspectors
note
that, recently, at another facility which did not have
an
refurbishment
program,
an
MOV failed because
of excessive
wear
of an actuator
component.
The solution to the problem was
refurbishment of the
MOV, but other similar NOVs at the
facility had to undergo operability evaluations
and, in some
cases,
refurbishment
before the facility was restarted.
Industr
Ex erience
and Vendor Information
The inspectors
observed that the licensee's
technical
data
group
controlled
NRC, EPRI,
and
INPO information.
This portion of the
program appeared
adequate.
The inspectors
also reviewed the licensee's
receipt, review,
and
control of vendor information.
Vendor information was controlled by
the licensee's
Site Nuclear
and Construction
Procurement
Engineering
Department.
The inspectors
selected
the Limitorque Maintenance
Update
as
a means
of sampling the licensee's
handling of vendor information; because
they contained
important information about actuator
assignment
adjustments,
operating experience,
and maintenance
which could
potentially affect valve operability.
The inspectors
noted that the review of the Limitorque Maintenance
Updates
had
been initiated in September of 1990, but had not been
completed until June 28,
1991.
The inspectors
noted that the
licensee's
Naintenance
Standards
Review group
had reviewed the
Limitorque updates
and incorporated pertinent information into
affected draft maintenance
procedures.
However, the inspectors
also noted
a number of significant omissions in the licensee's
review process.
The review package
document
had specifically waived
electrical
and engineering
reviews,
as well as review by nuclear
training.
The inspectors
were especially
concerned that information
notices
had
been allowed to bypass
the review of the licensee's
motor operated
valve group.
Furthermore,
these notices
dated
as far
back as August of 1988.
The inspectors
emphasized
the importance of timely review and
implementation of vendor documents
(where applicable)
in light of
the safety significant information they often contain.
The
inspectors
considered
the licensee's
lack of control of vendor
information to be
a significant weakness
in their NOV program.
The licensee
acknowledged
the need to evaluate
vendor
information
and provided their detailed plans for responding to Generic Letter 90-03 on vendor interface.
The inspectors
plan on reviewing this
response
and the licensee's
evaluation
and implementation of
pertinent information contained in these
documents
during a future
inspection.
(Followup Item 50-528/91-25-10)
0
19
4.8.6
Inservice Testin
5.
Palo Verde valve stroke time acceptance
criteria did not initially
consider motor speed
changes
under load or degraded
voltage conditions.
In the case
of
DC MOVs this will significantly affect motor speed
and,
hence,
The inspectors
observed
a case
where actual
stroke time was within 1/2 second of the acceptance
criteria and
questioned if the licensee
had considered
whether the valve would be able
to satisfy stroke time under
load and degraded
voltage conditions.
The
licensee
had not evaluated this case.
However, the licensee's
revised
GL 89-10 program plan, dated July 1991,
committed to include this area of
concern.
The inspectors
emphasized
that if the design basis
function was time critical and credited operations
of the
MOV under
maximum
DP and degraded
voltage conditions,
the acceptance
criteria for
testing should either demonstrate
acceptable
time under those design
basis conditions or account for the anticipated effect by including an
appropriate
margin within the test criteria.
The licensee
kept records of MOV stroke times obtained during
surveillance testing.
While the stroke times were recorded,
the
licensee identified that they were still developing
computer
software to fully develop their trending capabilities in this area.
The inspectors
noted that the static zero pressure
stroke times for
some
MOVs were already close to
FSAR acceptable
This
issue will be referred to
NRR for further evaluation
and will be
a
followup item for future inspections.
(Followup Item
50-528/91-25-11)
SUMMARY OF OVERALL PROGRAM ADMINISTRATION
The inspectors
found that overall administration of the licensee's
program appeared
to be established
with interim controls which required
some customizing of plant procedures
to expedite
the program.
The
" inspector cautioned
the licensee
to insure that required controls were
not bypassed
in their efforts to expedite portions of their program.
The inspectors
found that
some of the licensee's
plant departments
did
not fully recognize
the significance of the design basis testing
program
nor the
GL 89-10 program.
This was evidenced
by the reluctance
to
recognize that the purpose of the design basis testing
was to provide
assurance
of MOV operability under design basis conditions and, for
example, in the case of the torque switch chatter,
the licensee
stated
that the failure of the
MOY to operate
under test conditions did not
constitute
a failure to operate
under design basis conditions.
Regarding
the significance of the
GL 89-10 program, there appeared
to be
some misconception that the purpose of the program
was only to satisfy
a
commitment to
NRC recommendations
and
no regulatory requirements
were
involved.
The inspectors
emphasized
that the basis of the
program was to provide assurance
that specific design requirements
were
fulfilled. Specifically, these
design requirements
are given in General
Design Criteria 1, 4,
18 and
21 of Appendix
A to 10 CFR Part 50 and
Criterion NI of Appendix
B to 10 CFR Part 50.
20
In general,
the inspectors
observed
that the licensee
had
made strong
commitments to develop
an
MOV program to meet the intent of GL 89-10.
However, in light of the findings detailed in this report, the licensee
is encouraged
to maintain adequate
resources
to ensure timely and
thorough implementation of all of the
GL 89-10 program components.
6
EXIT MEETING
The inspectors
met with the licensee
management
representatives
denoted
in Section
1 on July 26,
1991.
The scope of the inspection
and the
findings were discussed.
The inspectors identified that additional
information would be reviewed in order to complete the inspection.
Review of the additional information necessary
to complete the inspection
was concluded
on August 13, 1991.
7.
LICENSEE
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Res
onse to
GL 89'-10:
12/28/90
Pro
ram Descri tion:
Implementation Plan,
R.O. 6/22/90, R.l., 7/5/91
~Sco e:
EER 90-XE-037
Desi
n Basis
Review:
Motor Operated
Valve Design Basis
Review and
Torque/Thrust Calculation,
81DP-4DC 10, R.O.
Sizin
and Switch Settin
Calculations:
and Actuator Sizing Calculation,
13-JC-ZZ-201
R.O. 7/27/90,
CCN.1 1/16/91,
CCN.29 7/12/91
TOL Sizing,
13-EC-PH-250,
1/24/89
Engineering
Guide for AC Motor-Sizing (draft)
Desi
n Basis Testin
SI System
MOVATS testing,
73 TI 97243 R.O.
AFW System
MOVATS testing,
73 TI-97744 R.O.
Strain gaging,
W.O. 476622,
EER91-XE-016
Periodic Verification:
Retest,
NATM 30AC-9WP04, R.l 9/1/88
Valve Motor Operator Monitoring and Test Program,
73 PR-9ZZ04, R.2, 7/28/89
Failures Corrective Action and Trendin
EER-MO-033
DCP-3CM-SI-150,
10/84
N001.1.01-828-1
Seismic gualification Report
NATM 94AC-OLC02 Review of Conditions
Adverse to guality for 10 CFR 21
MNCR 91-SI-1057
21
Control of Switch Settin s:
13'-ZZI-004
NOV Setpoint Controlled Data
Base
EER-91-NO-046 Unit 3 Interim CNODB
Dia nostics:
NOVATS Engineering
Report 5.0
R.O 1/91,
Equipment Accuracy
Summary
Maintenance:
32MT-9ZZ43.44,45,46 Limitorque Actuators
32NT-9ZZ99 R.O. Rotork Actuators (draft)
32MT-9ZZ48 Maintenance of Limitorque NOVs
32NT-9ZZ50 Niotor Generator Trouble Shooting
30AC-9WP04 Retest
~Trendin:
81DP-ORA08 Failure Data Trending
73DP-OEE02 Utilitzation and Processing
Failure Data
Trending Reports