ML17303B126

Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 31 to License NPF-41

ML17303B126
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Site:	Palo Verde
Issue date:	05/05/1988
From:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
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'i I UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION PELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 31 TO FACILI,Y OPERATING LICENSE NO.

NPF-41 ARIZONA PUBLIC SEPVICE COMPANY ET AL.

PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT NO.

1 DOCKET NO.

STN 50-528 1.O INTRODUCTION By letters dated January 21 and February 2, 1988, the Arizona Public Service Company (APS) on behalf of itself, the Salt River Project Agri-cultural Improvement and Power District, Southern California Edison

Company, El Paso Electric Company, Public Service Company of New Mexico, Los Angeles Department of Mater and Power, and Southern California Public Power Authority (licensees),

requested changes to the Technical Specifica-tions for the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1 (Appendix A to Facility Operating License No. NPF-41).

The proposed changes would revise Specification 3/4.4.8.3 with regard to the applicability of the Specification for reactor coolant system temperatures between 255'F and 295'F,'pecification

4. 11.2.5 with regard to the surveillance requirements for hydrogen and oxygen monitoring of the waste gas holdup system, and Bases Section 3/4. 11.2.5 with regard to the automatic control features of the waste gas holdup system.

2. 0 DISCUSSION The proposed changes to the Technical Specifications, as requested in the January 21 and February 2, 1988 submittals, are discussed below.

A.

Technical S ecification 3 4.4.8.3 This specification provides the limiting conditions for operation, surveillance requirements and action statements for the low temperature.oyerpressure protection (LTOP) of the reactor coolant system (RCS) during system heatup below 295'F and system cooldown below 255'F.

In the January 21, 1988 request, the licensees propose to add a footnote to allow a change in the upper limit temperature (i.e., 295'F) applicability in the specification during heatup to read as follows:

"*255'F during heatup provided the heatup rate is limited to 10'F/hr or less for RCS temperatures greater than 255'F and less than or equal to 295'F."

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The purpose of the proposed change is to eliminate confusion as to whether LTOP is required to be in service for the situation where the plant is cooled down below 295'F but not below 255'F (while cooling down in this range, LTOP operability is not required) and then reheated orior to reaching 255'F.

B.

Technical S ecification 4. 11.2.5 and Bases Section 3/4. 11.?.5 This specification provides the surveillance requirement.

for monitoring the concentration of hydrogen and oxygen in the waste gas holdup system to be within the limits of Specification 3.11.2.5.

Specification 4.11.2.5 currently states that the concentrations shall be determined by:

"...continuously monitoring the waste gases in the waste gas holdup system with the hydrogen and oxygen monitors required OPERABLE by Table 3.3-12 of Specification 3.3.3;8."

In the February 2, 1988 request, the licensees propose to revise the statement within the above quotes to read as follows:

"...monitoring the waste gases in the waste gas holdup system in accordance with Specification 3.3.3.8."

The purpose of the proposed change is to account for the situation when the gas monitoring equipment is inoperable since Specification

3. 11.2.5 does not provide any specified action when the monitoring equipment is not operable.

Specification 3.3.3.8 does provide operability requirements for the gas monitoring equipment when the gaseous radwaste system is in operation and also provides for grab sampl'e monitoring when the monitoring equipment is inoperable.

The other proposed change is to delete from the bases section of Specification 3/4.11.2.5 the reference to automatic diversion to recombiners in the description of the automatic control features of the waste gas holdup system since the system design was never intended to provide automatic diversion to the recombiners.

3. 0 EVALUATION The evaluation of the proposed changes to the Technical Specifications is presented below.

A.

Technical S ecification 3 4.4.8.3 Figure 3/4 3.4-2 in Specification 3/4.4.8 provides acceptable pressure/temperature limits and heatup and cooldown rates for the RCS to assure compliance with the requirements of Appendix G to

'I

3 10 CFR Part 50 for overpressure protection.

These limits are not based on the availability of LTOP.

As shown on Figure 3/4 3.4-2, a

heatup rate of 10'F/hr is permissible for all RCS temperatures above 255'F.

The licensees'roposed footnote to Specification 3/4.4.8.3, to allow an RCS heatup rate of 10'F/hr between 255'F and 295'F, with or without LTOP in service, is consistent with Figure 3/4 3.4-2 and in compliance with Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50.

Also, the proposed change does not affect any accident previously evaluated nor create a different kind of accident since it does not affect any of the assumptions used in the safety analyses.

On the basis of the above evaluation, the staff finds the proposed change to Specification 3/4.4.8.3 to be acceptable.

B.

Technical S ecification 4. 11.2.5 and Bases Section 3 4. 11.2.5 The operability requirements for the hydrogen and oxygen monitors for the waste gas holdup system are stated in Table 3.3-12 of Specification 3.3.3.8.

Specifically Table 3.3-12 requires two channels for each monitor to be operable during gaseous radwaste system operation.

When one or more channels become inoperable, operation of the gaseous radwaste system may continue provided grab samples are taken in accordance with the frequency specified in Action Statement 39.

Specification 4. 11.2.5, which describes the surveillance requirements for hydrogen and oxygen monitoring of the waste gas holdup system, refers to Specification 3.3.3.8 to identify the monitors which are required to be operable for performing the surveillances.

Since Specification 3.3.3.8 does not require the hydrogen and oxygen monitors to be operable when the gaseous waste system is not in operation, the licensees'roposed change to Specification 4.11.2.5 would clarify the requirement for monitoring continuously to when the gaseous waste system is in operation.

In addition, the proposed change would provide the appropriate Action Statement in Specification 3.3.3.8 for when the monitoring channels are inoperable.

~ ~

The proposed change to the bases section of Specification 3/4. 11.2.5 is purely administrative to correct an inconsistency regarding the design capability of the waste gas holdup system.

On the basis of the above evaluation, the staff finds the proposed changes to Specification 4.11.2.5 and its bases section to be acceptable.

In summary, the staff has completed its review of the licensees'roposed Technical Specification changes submitted by letters dated

4 January 21 and February 2, 1988 and finds the changes to be acceptable.

These changes also make these specifications consistent with the specifications for Palo Verde Units 2 and 3 which were previously reviewed and accepted by the staff prior to licensing of Units 2 and 3.

4.0 CONTACT WITH STATE OFFICIAL 5.0 The Arizona Radiation Regulatory Agency was advised of the proposed determination of no significant hazards consideration with regard to these changes.

No comments were received.

ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION This amendment involves a change in the installation or use of facility components located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR 20 and clarifies surveillance requirements and limiting conditions for operations.

The staff has determined that this amendment involve no significant increase in the amount, and no significant change in the type, of any effluent that may be released offsite and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.

The Comission has previously issued proposed findings that the amendment involves no significant hazard consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding.

Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9).

Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment needs to be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.

6.0 CONCLUSION

The staff has concluded, based on the considerations discussed

above, that (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed

manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Comnission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

We, therefore, conclude that the proposed changes are acceptable.

Principal contributor:

E. A. Licitra Dated:

May 5, 1988

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS0 ELECTRIC'YOROGEN RECOMBINERS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.4.2 Two portable independent containment hydrogen recombiner systems shared among the three units shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1 and 2.

ACTION:

With one hydrogen recombiner system inoperable, restore the inoperable system to OPERABLE status within 30 days or meet the requirements of Specifica-tion 3.6.4.3, or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />."

SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS 4.6.4.2 Each hydrogen recombiner system shhll be demonstrated OPERABLE:

aO At least once per 6 months by:

1.

Verifying through a visual examination that there is no evi-dence of abnormal conditions within the recombiner enclosure and control console.

2.

Operating the recombiner to include the air blast heat exchanger fan motor and enclosed blower motor continuously for at least 30 minutes at a temperature of approximately 8004F reaction chamber temperature.

At least once per year by perforIing a CHANNEL CALIBRATION of recombiner instrumentation to include a functional test of the recombiner at 12004F (i 50 F) for at least four hours.

~Prior to March 30, 1986 or until the cohpletion of the environmental qualifi-cation aodifications to the hydrogen recoabiner systea, whichever occurs first, the provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable during implementation of the environmental qualification modifications to the hydrogen recombiner system when the containment hydrogen purge cleanup system described.in

$yecifi-.

cation 3.6.4.3 is OPERABLE.

PALO VERDE-QQT 1

.hNKCNEXT N). 19

Reissued 5/5/88.

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS HYDROGEN PURGE CLEANUP SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3. 6. 4. 3 A containment hydrogen purge cleanup

system, shared among the three units, shall be OPERABLE and capable of being powered from a minimum of one OPERABLE emergency bus.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1" and 2".

ACTION:

With the containment hydrogen purge cleanup system inoperable and one hydrogen recombiner OPERABLE as determined by Specification 4.6.4.2, restore the hydrogen purge cleanup system to OPERABLE status within 30 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS 4.6.4. 3 The hydrogen purge cleanup system shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a.

b.

At least once per 31 days by initiating flow through the HEPA filters and'harcoal adsorbers and verifying that the system operates for at least 15 minutes.

At least once per 18 months or (1) after any structural maintenance on the HEPA filter or charcoal adsorber

housings, or (2) following painting, fire, or chemical release in any ventilation zone communicating with the system by:

1.

Verifying that the cleanup system satisfies the in-place testing acceptance criteria and uses the test procedures of Regulatory Positions C. 5. a, C. 5. c, and C. 5. d of Regulatory Guide 1. 52, Revision 2, March 1978, and the system flow rate is 50 scfm 2 10K.

2.

Verifying within 31 of a representative Regulatory Position March 1978,"" meets tory Position C.6.a March 1978.""

days after removal that a laboratory analysis carbon sample obtained in accordance with C.6.b of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, the laboratory testing criteria of Regula-of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, "With less than two hydrogen recombiners OPERABLE.

"*ANSI N509-1980 is applicable for this specification.

PALO VERDE - UNIT 1 3/4 6"38 AMENDMENT NO. 27

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM OPERATIONAL LEAKAGE LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.4. 5.2 a y b.

C.

e.

Reactor Coolant System leakage shall be limited to:

No PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE, 1 gpm UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE, 1 gpm total primary-to-secondary leakage through all steam generators, and 720 gallons per day through any one steam generator, 10 gpm IDENTIFIED LEAKAGE from the Reactor Coolant System, and 1 gpm leakage at a Reactor Coolant System pressure of 2250 f 20 psia from any Reactor Coolant System pressure isolation valve specified in Table 3.4-1.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

a ~

b."

c ~

d.

With any PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

With any Reactor Coolant System leakage greater than any one of the limits, excluding PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE and leakage from Reactor Coolant System pressure isolation valves, reduce the leakage rate to within limits within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLO SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

With any Reactor Coolant System pressure isolation valve leakage greater than the above limit, isolate the high, pressure portion of the affected system from the low pressure portion within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> by use of at least one closed manual or deactivated automatic valve, or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

With RCS leakage alarmed and confirmed in a flow path with no flow rate indicators, coaeence an RCS water inventory balance within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> to determine the leak rate.

SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS 4.4.5.2. 1 Reactor Coolant System leakages shall be demonstrated to be within each of the above limits by:

a.

Honitoring the containment atmosphere gaseous and particulate radioactivity monitor at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

iy i

igtt y

t y g, gtti 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> is granted to cold shutdown.

During this 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> if the unidentified leakage exceeds 2.0 gpm, an ineediate cooldown will be initiated.

The RCS leakage (Surveillance Requirement 4.4.5.2.1.c) will be calculated at least once per eight hours during this 72-hour extension.

PALO VERDE - UNIT 1 3/4 4-19 AHENDHENT NO. 27

Revised

>/>/~8 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS (Continued b.

Monitoring the containment sump inventory and discharge at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

c.

Performance of a Reactor Coolant System water inventory balance at least once per 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />"*.

d.

Monitoring the reactor head flange leakoff system at least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

. 4.4.5.2.2 Each Reactor Coolant System pressure isolation valve specified in Table 3.4-1 shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying leakage to be within its limit"":

a.

At least once per 18 months, b."

Prior to entering MODE 2 whenever the plant has been in COLD SHUTDOWN for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or more and if leakage testing has not been performed in the previous 9 months, c.

Prior to returning the valve to service following maintenance, repair or replacement work on the valve, d."

Within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> following valve actuation due to automatic or manual action or flow through the valve, e."

Within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> following a system response to an Engineered Safety Feature actuation signal.

The provisions of Specifications

4. 4. 5. 2. 2. b, 4.4. 5. 2. 2. d, and 4.4. 5. 2. 2. e are not applicable fo 'valves UV 651, UV 652, UV 653 and UV 654 due to position indication of valves in the control room.

• • The provisions of. Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 3 or 4.

PALO VERDE - UNIT 1 3/4 4-20 AMENDMENT NO. >7

Revised 5/5/SS BASES.

3/4. 1. 1 BORATION CONTROL 3/4 1

1 1 and 3/4 1 1 2

SHUTDOWN MARGIN AND KN The function of SHUTDOWN MARGIN 1s to ensure that the reactor remains subcritical following a design basis accident or anticipated operational occurrence.

The function of K 1 is to maintain sufficient subcriticality to preclude inadvertent criticali(y following ejection of a single control element assembly (CEA).

During operation in MODES 1 and 2, with k

< greater than or equal to 1.0, the transient insertion limits of Specificatf/n

3. 1.3.6 ensure that sufficient SHUTDOWN MARGIN is available.

SHUTDOWN MARGIN is the amount by which the core is subcritical, or would be subcritical immediately following a reactor trip, considering a single malfunction resulting in the highest worth CEA failing to insert.

KN is a

measure of the core's reactivity, considering a single malfunction resllting in the highest worth inserted CEA being ejected.

SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirements vary throughout the core life as a function of fuel depletion and reactor coolant system (RCS) cold leg temperature (T

).

The most restrictive condition occurs at EOL, with T l

at no-load opfI iling temperature, and is associated with a postulated stencil Pine break accident and the resulting uncontrolled RCS cooldown.

In the analysis of this

accident, the specified SHUTDOWN MARGIN is required to control the reactivity transient and ensure that the fuel performance and offsite dose criteria are satisfied.

As (initial) T l

decreases, the potential RCS cooldown and the resulting reactivity trans$ 3nI are less severe and, therefore, the required SHUTDOWN MARGIN also decreases.

Below T of about 210'F, the inadvertent deboration event becomes limiting with rBj1)ct to the SHUTDOWN MARGIN require-ments.

Below 210F, the specified SHUTDOWN MARGIN ensures that sufficient time for operator actions exists between the initial indication of the deboration and the total loss of shutdown margin.

Accordingly, with at least one CEA partially or fully withdrawn, the SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirements are based upon these limiting conditions.

Additional events considered in establishing requirements on SHUTDOWN MARGIN that are not limiting with respect to the Specification limits are single CEA withdrawal,.and startup of an inactive reactor coolant pump.

K requirements vary with the amount of positive reactivity that would be intPoluced assuming the CEA with the highest inserted worth ejects from the core.

In the analysis of the CEA ejection event, the K

requirement ensures that the radially averaged enthalpy acceptance criteriok ks satisffod, consider-ing power redistribution effects.

Above T of 500'F, Doppler reactivity feedback is sufficient to preclude the nees ror a specific K requirement.

With all CEAs fully inserted, K

and SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirekents are equivalent in terms of minimum acceptable core boron concentration.

PALO VERDE - UNIT 1 B 3/4 1-1 AMENDMENT NO. 23

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BASES 3/4. 1. 2 BORATION SYSTEMS The boron injection system ensures that negative reactivity control is available during each mode of facility operation.

The components required to perform this function include (1) borated water sources, (2) charging

pumps, (3) separate flow paths, (4) an emergency power supply from OPERABLE diesel generators, and (5) the volume control tank (VCT) outlet valve CH-UV-501, capable of isolating the VCT from the charging pump suction line.

The nominal capacity of each charging pump is 44 gpm at its discharge.

Up to 16 gpm of this may be diverted to the volume control tank via the RCP control bleedoff.

Instrument inaccuracies and pump performance uncertainties are limited to 2

gpm yielding the 26 gpm value.

With the RCS temperature above

2104F, a minimum of two separate and redundant boron injection systems are provided to ensure single functional capability in the event an assumed failure renders one of the systems inoper-able.

Allowable out-of-service periods ensure that minor component repair or corrective action may be completed without undue risk to overall facility safety from injection system failures during the repair period.

Each system is capable of providing boration equivalent to a

SHUTOOWN MARGIN of 4X delta k/k after xenon decay and cooldown to 2104F.

Therefore, the boration capacity of either system is more than sufficient to satisfy the SHUTOOWN MARGIN and/or K

requirements of the specifications.

The maximum expected boration capabifi)y requirement occurs at EOL from full power equi-librium xenon conditions and requires 23,800 gallons of 4000 ppm borated water from either the refueling water tank or the spent fuel'pool.

With the RCS temperature below 2104F one injection system is acceptable without single failure consideration on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the additional restrictions prohibiting CORE ALTERATIONS and positive reactivity changes in the event the single injection system becomes inoperable.

The restrictions of one and only one operable charging pump whenever reactor coolant level is below the bottom of the pres-surizer is based on the assumptions used in the analysis of the boron dilution event.

Each system is capable of providing boration equivalent to a SHUTOOWN MARGIN of 4X delta k/k.

Therefore, the boration capacity of the system required below 210 F is more than sufficient to satisfy the shutdown margin and/ol KN ]

requirements of 'the specifications.

This condition requires 9,700 gallons of 4000 ppm borated water from either the refueling water tank or the spent fuel pool.

PALO VEROE - UNIT 1 B 3/4 1-2 AMENOMENT NO.

27

3/4.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS BASES.

3/4.8.1 3/4.8.2 and 3/4.8.3 A.C.

SOURCES D.C SOURCES'.and ONSITE POINTIER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS The OPERABILITY of the A.C, and D.C.

power sources and associated distribution systems during operation ensures that sufficient power will be available to supply the safety-related equipment required for (1) the safe shutdown of the facility and (2) the mitigation and control of accident condi-tions within the facility.

The minimum specified independent and redundant A.C.

and D AC. power sources and distribution systems satisfy the requirements of General Design Criterion 17 of Appendix "A" to 10 CFR 50.

The ACTION requirements specified for the levels of degradation of the power sources provide restriction upon continued facility operation commen-surate with the level of degradation.

The OPERABILITY of the power sources are consistent with the initial condition assumptions of the safety analyses and are based upon maintaining at least one redundant set of onsite A.C.

and D.C.

po~er sources and associated distribution systems OPERABLE during accident conditions coincident with an assumed loss-of-offsite power and single failure of the other onsite A.C. source.

The required steady state frequency for the emergency diesels is 60 + 1.2/

-0.3 Hz to be consistent with the safety analysis to provide adequate safety injection flow.

The OPERABILITY of the minimum specified A.C. and D.C.

power sources and associated distribution systems during shutdown and refueling ensures that

{1) the facility can be maintained in the shutdown or refueling condition for extended time periods and (2) sufficient instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit status.

The surveillance requirements for demonstrating the OPERABILITY of the diesel generators are in accordance with the recommendations of Regulatory Guides 1.9 "Selection of Diesel Generator Set Capacity for Standby Power Supplies,"

Harch 10,

1971, and

1. 108 "Periodic Testing of Diesel Generato~

Units Used as Onsite Electric Power Systems at Nuclear Po~er Plants,"

Revision 1, August 1977.

PALO VERDE - UNIT 1 B 3/4 8"1 hl%ENDMENT NO.

27

Rev'sed 5/5/88 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS BASES A.C.

SOURCES D.C.

SOURCES AND ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS (Continued)

The surveillance requirement for demonstrating the OPERABILITY of the Station batteries are based on the recommendations of Regulatory Guide

1. 129, "Maintenance Testing and Replacement of Large Lead Storage Batteries for Nuclear Power Plants,"

February

1978, and IEEE Std 450-1980, "IEEE Recommended Practice for Maintenance,

Testing, and Replacement of Large Lead Storage Batteries for Generating Stations and Substations."

Verifying average electrolyte temperature above the minimum for which the battery was sized, total battery terminal voltage on float charge, connection resistance values and the performance of battery service and discharge tests ensures the effectiveness of the charging system, the ability to handle high discharge rates and compares the battery capacity at that time with the rated capacity.

Table 4.8-2 specifies the normal limits for each designated pilot cell and each connected cell for electrolyte level, float voltage and specific gravity.

The limits for the designated pilot cells float voltage and specific gravity, greater than 2. 13 volts and 0.010 below the manufacturer's full charge specific gravity or a battery charger current that had stabilized at a low value, is characteristic of a charged cell with adequate capacity.

The normal limits for each connected cell for float voltage and specific gravity, greater than 2. 13 volts and not more than 0.020 below the manufacturer's full charge specific gravity with an average specific gravity of all the connected cells not more than 0.010 below the manufacturer's full charge specific gravity, ensures the OPERABILITY and capability of the battery.

~ Operation with a battery cell's parameter outside the normal limit but within the allowable value specified in Table 4.8-2 is permitted for up to 7 days.

During this 7-day period:

(1) the allowable values for electrolyte level ensures no physical damage to the plates with an adequate electron transfer capability; (2) the allowable value for the average specific gravity of all the cells, not more than 0.020 below. the manufacturer's recommended full char ge specific gravity, ensures that the decrease in rating will be less than the safety margin provided in sizing; (3) the allowable value for an individual cell's specific gravity, ensures that an individual cell's specific gravity will not be more than'4.040 below the manufacturer's full charge specific gravity and that the overall capability of the battery will be maintained within an acceptable limit; and (4) the allowable value for an individual cell's float voltage, greater than 2.07 volts, ensures the battery's capability to perform its design function.

If any other metallic structures (e. g., buildings, new or modified piping

systems, conduit) are placed in the ground in the vicinity of the fuel oil stor-age system or if the original system is modified, the adequacy and frequency of inspections of the cathodic protection system shall be re-evaluated and ad-justed in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1. 137.

PALO VERDE - UNIT 1 B 3/4 8-2 AMENDMENT NO.

27

3 Amendment 27 Revised 5/5/88 Amenament Pa es 3/4 6-3 3/4 6-5 3/4 6-7 3/4 6-15 3/4 6-17 3/4 6-19 3/4 6-22 3/4 6-35 3/4 6-36 3/4 6-3S E 3/a 6-2 3/4 6

4 3/4 7-1 3/4 7-6 3/4 7-10 3/4 7-16 3j4 7-21 3/4 /-22 3/4 8-Sa 3/4 8-14 3/4 8-22 3/4 6-24 3/4 8-25

"'i'4 8-26 3/'4 8-27 3/4 8-33 thru 8-38 3/4 8-39 3/4 8-41 thru 8-48" E 3/4 8-1 B 3/4 8-2 3/4 9-2 3/4 9-8

>>3/4 9-9 3/4 9-13 B 3/4 9-1 Overleaf Pa es 3/4 6-4 3/4 6-6 3/4 6-8 3/4 6-16 3/4 6-18 3/4 6-20 3/4 6-21 3/4 6-37 B 3/4 6-1 B 3/4 6-3 3/4 7-2 3/4 7-5 3/4 7-9 3/4 7-15 3/4 8-13 3/4 8-21 3/4 8-23 3/4 8-28 3/4 8-40 3/4 9-1 3/4 9-7 3/4 9-10 3/4 9-14 B 3/4 9-2

• 3/4 8-48 has been deleted.

0

~

~

Reissued

>/a/S8 TABLE 3.8-2 (Continued)

CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES PRIMARY OEVICE NUMBER E-ZAA-C05 (FUSE)

E-ZAA-C05 (FUSE)

E-ZAA-C05 (FUSE)

E-ZAA-C05 (FUSE)

E-ZAA-C06 (FUSE)

E-ZAA-C06 (FUSE)

E-ZAA"C06 (FUSE)

E-ZAA-C06 (FUSE)

E-ZAA-C06 (FUSE)

E-ZAA-C06 (FUSE)

E-ZAA-C06 (FUSE)

E-ZAB-C03 (FUSE)

E-ZAB-C03 (FUSE)

E-ZAB-C03 (FUSE)

E-ZAB-C03 (FUSE)

BACKUP DEVICE NUMBER E-PKA-02114 E-PKA-02114 E"PKA-02114

. E-PKA-02114 E-PKA-02121 E-PKA-02121

'E-PKA-02121 E-PKA-02121 E-PKA-02121 E-P KA-D2121 E-PKA-02121 E-PKB-02209 E-PKB-02209 E-PKB-D2209 E-PKB-02209 SERVICE DESCRIPTION STEAM GEN BLOWOOWN CTMT ISOLATION VALVE J-SGA-UV-500P BLOWOOWN SAMPLE CTMT ISOLATION VALVE J-SGA"UV"204 BLOWOOWN SAMPLE CTMT ISOLATION VALVE J-SGA-UV-211 BLOWOOWN SAMPLE CTMT ISOLATION VALVE J-SGA-UV-220 SAFETY INJ TANK NITROGEN SUPPLY VALVE J-5IA-HV-619 SAFETY INJ TANK NITROGEN SUPPLY VALVE J-SIA-HV-629 SAFETY INJ TANK VENT VALVE J-SIA-HV-605 SAFETY INJ TANK VENT VALVE J" SIA-HV-606 SAFETY INJ TANK VENT VALVE J-SIA-HV-607 SAFETY INJ TANK VENT VALVE J" SIA-HV-608 RC SYSTEM VENT TO CTMT VALVE J-RCA-HV-106 REGEN HEAT EXCH TO AUX SPRAY VALVE J-CHB-HV-203 REACTOR COOLANT VENT VALVE J-RCB-HV-102 SAFETY INJ TANK FILL AND DRAIN VALVE J-SIB-UV-611 SI TANK CHECK VALVE LEAKAGE LINE ISO VALVE J-SI8-UV-618 PALO VERDE - UNIT 1 3/4 8-37 AMENDMENT NO.

27

Reissued 5/5/88 TABLE 3.8-2 (Continued)

CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR

'VERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES PRIMARY DEVICE NUMBER E-ZAB-Col (FUSE)

E-ZAB-Col (FUSE)

E-ZAB-C01 (FUSE)

E"ZAB"C01 (FUSE)

E-ZAB"C04 (FUSE)

E-ZAB-C04 (FUSE)

E-ZAB-C04 (FUSE)

E-ZAB-C05 (FUSE)

E-ZAB-C05 (FUSE)

E-ZAB-C05 (FUSE)

E-ZAB-COS (FUSE)

E-ZAB"C05 (FUSE)

E-ZAN-C01 (FUSE)

E-ZAN-Col (FUSE)

E-ZAN-C01 (FUSE)

BACKUP DEVICE NUHBER E-PKB-02210 E-PKB-02210 E-PKB-02210 E-PKB-D2210 E-PKB-02202 E-PKB-02202 E"PKB-02202 E-PKB-02214 E-PKB-02214 E-PKB-D2214 E-PKB-D2214 E-PKB-D2214 E-NO-D4226 E-.NO-D4224 E-NO-D4222 SERVICE DESCRIPTION CTHT ATM RADIATION MONITORING ISO VALVE J-HCB-UV-44 CTHT ATM RADIATION MONITORING ISO VALVE J-HCB"UV"47 CONTAINMENT POWER ACCESS PURGE MODE ISOLATION VALVE J-CPB-UV-5A CONTAINMENT POWER ACCESS PURGE MODE ISOLATION VALVE J-CPB-UV-5B REACTOR COOLANT VENT VALVE J-RCB-HV-108 SAFETY INJ TANK FILL AND DRAIN VALVE J-SIB-UV"621 SI TANK CHECK VALVE LEAKAGE LINE ISO VALVE J-5 I8-UV-628 REACTOR COOLANT VENT VALVE J-RCB-HV-109 STEAN GEN BLOWDOWN CTMT ISOLATION VALVE J-SGB-UV-500R SLOWDOWN SAHPLE CTHT ISOLATION VALVE J-SGB-UV-222 SLOWDOWN SAMPLE CTHT ISOLATION VALVE J-SGB-UV-224 BLOWDOWN SAHPLE CTMT ISOLATION VALVE J-SGB-UV-226 SEAL INJECT VALVES TO RCP J-CHE-FV-241 SEAL INJECT VALVES TO RCP J-CHE-FV-242 SEAL INJECT VALVES TO RCP J-CHE-FV-244 PALO VERDE - UNIT 1 3/4 8-38 AMENDMENT NO. 27