ML17303B036

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Insp Repts 50-528/88-08,50-529/88-08 & 50-530/88-05 on 880223-24 & 0229-0303.Violation Noted.Major Areas Inspected: QA for Radiochemical Analyses,Chemistry Control & Analysis, Onsite Followup of Items & Plant Tours
ML17303B036
Person / Time
Site: Palo Verde  
Issue date: 03/30/1988
From: Tenbrook W, Yuhas G
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
To:
Shared Package
ML17303B033 List:
References
50-528-88-08, 50-528-88-8, 50-529-88-08, 50-529-88-8, 50-530-88-08, 50-530-88-8, NUDOCS 8804190160
Download: ML17303B036 (15)


See also: IR 05000528/1988008

Text

U.

S ~

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION V

Report

Nos.

50-528/88-05,

50-529/88-05

and 50-530/88-05

Docket Nos.

50-528,

50-529

and 50-530

License

Nos.

NPF-41,

NPF-51 and NPF-74

Licensee:

Arizona Nuclear

Power Project

P.

0.

Box 52034

Phoenix,

Arizona 85072-2034

Facility Name:

Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station - Units 1,

2 and

3

Inspection at:

Palo Verde Site - Wintersburg,

Arizona

Inspection

Conducted:

February 23-24,

1988,

February

29-March 3,

Inspected

by:

2) 3

W.

K.

e

rook,

Rad

tion Specialist

D te

Approved by:

G.

P.

u as,

Chief

Facility

s Radiological Protection Section

1988

igned

Signed

~Summar:

Ins ection durin

the

eriod of Februar

23-24 and Februar

29-March

3

1988

Re ort Nos.

50-528/88-08

50-529/88-08

50-530/88-08

radiochemical

analyses,

chemistry control, chemical analysis,

onsite followup

of inpector identified items

and plant tours.

Inspection procedures

30703,

79701,

84725

and 92701 were addressed.

Results:

Based

on the areas

inspected,

the licensee's

chemistry program

appears

to be adequate

to fulfillits safety function.

Strong performance

was

observed in the areas

of laboratory analytical control standards

for

non-radioactive

analytes

(Section 3) and plant chemistry control (Section 3).

Weak areas

observed

were the implementation of the interlaboratory

comparison

sample

program for radiological analysis

(Section 4) and one example of a lack

of attention to detail regarding proper implementation

and review of a gaseous

radioactive

release

permit (Section 4).

The latter example resulted in a

violation for failure to implement procedural

detection limits for

radioactivity analysis of a waste

gas

decay tank sample.

SS04190160

SS0330

PDf'DOCK 0500052S

Q

DCD

Persons

Contacted

Licensee

  • L. Brown, Manager,

Radiation Protection

and Chemistry

  • R. Butler, Director, Standards

and Technical

Support

  • J. Cederquist,

Supervisor,

Chemistry Standards

"W. Doyle, Manager,

Unit 2 Radiation Protection

"R. Ferro,

Manager,

Unit 2 Chemistry

"D. Fuller, Manager,

Unit 1 Chemistry

C. Gray,

Lead Technician,

Unit 3 Chemistry

~J.

Haynes,

Vice President,

Nuclear

Production

~J.

Mann, Supervisor,

Health Physics Controls

R.

Ochoa,

Lead Health Physicist,

Health Physics Controls

~R.

Rouse,

Engineer,

Compliance

"J. Schlag,

Supervisor,

Radioactive

Waste Standards

~J.

Schmedeke,

Manager,

Operations

Computer

Systems

"J. Scott,

Manager,

Unit 3 Chemistry

  • R. Selman,

Manager,

Central

Radiation Protection

"J.

Shawver, Scientist,

Chemistry Standards

"W. Sneed,

Manager,

Unit 3 Radiation Protection

  • L. Souza,

Manager, guality Audits and Monitoring

  • E.

Van Brunt, Jr.,

Executive Vice President,

ANPP

D. Whitcomb, Senior Scientist,

Chemistry Standards

U.S.

Nuclear

Re ulator

Commission

"H. North, Senior Radiation Specialist,

Region

V

"T. Polich, Senior Resident Inspector,

Palo Verde

Denotes individuals attending exit interview on March 3,

1988.

Fpl 1 owu

92701

Open Item 50-528/87-04-01

(Closed)

This matter concerned

the capability

of vendor laboratories

to obtain accurate

measurements

of Sr-89/Sr-90

and

H-3 as reflected

by analysis of an

NRC blind sample.

The licensee's

contractor laboratory analyzed

the

NRC sample

and

had obtained

adequate

measurements

for Sr-89 and tritium, but had not obtained

adequate

accuracy for Sr-90.

The inspector

reviewed records

submitted to the

licensee

from the licensee's

contract laboratory describing the

contractor's participation in the Environmental

Protection

Agency (EPA)

Intercomparison

Program.

Two samples of Sr-90 in water were analyzed

by

the contractor in 1987.

The results of the

EPA intercomparison

indicated

adequate

agreement.

The licensee

did not submit any

additional'lind

samples

to its vendor laboratory beyond the sample provided by NRC.

Based

on the adequate

performance of the licensee's

contractor in the

EPA

intercomparisons

for Sr-90 in water,

1987, this item is considered

cl osed.

LWR Chemistr

Control

and Chemical

Anal sis

79701)

The inspector

reviewed guality Assurance

Audit Report

No.87-007,

"ANPP

Plant Chemistry".

The audit was conducted

March 6-April 3,

1987

and

was

applicable to all three units.

Content of the audit included

Systems

Chemistry Specifications

and Chemistry Control Instructions,

Nuclear

Sampling,

Document Control, Secondary

Water

Chemistry,

Post-Accident

Sampling.and

Laboratory Analytical Control.

An emphasis

was placed

on

Laboratory Analytical Control.

Three Corrective Action Requests

(CAR)

and four items requiring follow-up were generated

as

a result of Audit

87-007.

One

CAR, CA87-0041, involved safeguards

information and

had not

been closed at the time of the inspection.

The two remaining

CARs are

described

below:

CA87-0047, Failure to meet two week deadline for submittal of reviewed

surveillance test packages

to

SPGC.

CA87-0049, Various instances

of nonconformance

with chemistry procedures.

The inspector evaluated

the follow-up to CA87-0047

and CA87-0049.

The

response

from the Manager,

Chemistry Services

and subsequent

gA closeout

was

documented for both

CARs.

Given the number of deficiencies

described

in CA87-0049,

gA gave only partial approval

to the initial response,

and

requested

additional

commitment for more extensive

review of the subject

procedures

by chemistry personnel.

The final response

and

gA approval

were documented.

All four Monitoring Reports requiring followup generated

by Audit 87-007

were closed

by gA at the time of the inspection.

The inspector

examined twelve guality Monitoring Reports in the chemistry

area

from the year

1987.

Each Monitoring Report

had been closed at the

time of the inspection.

The inspector also verified that Chemistry

Control Instructions

(CCIs) for dispersant

addition to the Unit 1

essential

spray pond system

had been

issued

by Unit 1 chemistry in

response

to Monitoring Report ST-87-1011.

Changes

to the chemistry control

and analysis

program were identified in

two areas:

Sampling

and analysis practices

and laboratory facilities.

Procedure

74CH-9XC16,

"Sampling and Analytical Schedule",

has

been

amended to delete the circulating water

system analytical

s'chedule

and to

include

pH and halogen analysis

on closed cooling systems

and to specify

the frequency of Reactor Coolant System

(RCS)

ammonia analysis

during hot

functional testing.

Changes

to the unit laboratories

included the

procurement of a

new ion chromatograph for analysis of RCS..organic

acids

at Unit 2.

Contamination of the cold-side laboratory area

and steam

generator

blowdown demineralizer

system

had occurred in Unit 1 due to a

primary-to-secondary

system leak.

Areas with non-removable

contamination

remained at the Unit 1 wet racks

and sample sinks.

Cleanup operations

were continuing at the Unit 1 blowdown demineralizer

system.

No changes

were identified in chemistry control action levels or procedures

for

chemistry control implementation.

A major reorganization

of chemistry personnel

was completed in 1987 as

part of an overall reorganization of ANPP staff.

The Chemistry Services

Department,

under the authority of the site-wide Plant Manager,

had

previously implemented

the plant chemistry program via three Unit

chemistry organizations

answering to the Chemistry Services

Manager.

The

licensee's

reorganization

had eliminated the position of site-wide Plant

Manager

in favor of three Plant Managers,

one assigned

to each Unit.

Also, the Chemistry Services

Department

was eliminated in favor of a new

Chemistry Standards

Department.

Following the reorganization,

the

chemistry staff associated

with each Unit were under the authority of the

Unit's assigned

Plant Manager.

The inspector

observed that the Chemistry

Standards

Department did not have direct supervisory authority over the

Unit chemistry organizations.

The inspector did not identify any

new

administrative

channels

by which Chemistry Standards

could effect change

in the Unit chemistry organization.

At the time of the inspection, it

appeared

that the Chemistry Standards

Department's

means

for affecting

Unit chemistry performance

were programs for procedure

improvement,

such

as refinement of laboratory procedures

and systems

chemistry

specifications,

implementation of various aspects

of the laboratory

analytical control program,

and technical

assistance

to the Unit

chemistry organizations.

Given that the site-wide Chemistry Services

Department

was eliminated,

the performance

of the Unit chemistry

organizations

in implementing the chemistry program

and Chemistry

Standards

Department initiatives were particularly dependent

upon the

Unit Plant Manager

and Unit Chemistry Manager.

The inspector

reviewed Chemistry Control Instructions

(CCIs) at the unit

chemistry laboratories.

The chief sources

of CCIs were elevated

levels

of sodium (greater

than

20 ppb) in feedwater/steam

generator

blowdown and

ongoing

needs for control of pH and dispersant

in the essential

spray

pond system.

The Chemistry staff and

Radwaste staff of Units

1 and

2

were pursuing

means to minimize sodium intrusion to the secondary

system

by refining techniques

for condensate

demineralizer

regeneration

and

improving resin layering.

The sodium intrusion problem appears

to be

largely corrected in Unit 2.

Procedure

74CH-9XC16, "Sampling and Analytical Schedule",

Procedure

74AC-9ZZ04,

"Systems

Chemistry Specifications",

and Procedure

74AC-9ZZ03,

"Chemistry Control Instructions" basically constitute

the licensee's

chemistry control program.

'These

procedures

provide for analysis of

appropriate plant samples,

acceptance

criteria for analytical results,

and corrective actions for conditions out of specification.

The

licensee's

program fulfills the requirements

of technical specification 6.8.4,

item (c), Secondary

Water Chemistry.

The inspector

reviewed the licensee's

program for laboratory quality

assurance

for non-radioactive

analytes.

The Chemistry Standards

group

implements

an analytical blind program at each Unit laboratory.

The

analytes

and the

number of samples

analyzed

in 1987 are presented

below:

~Anal te

uantit

of Sam les

Hydrazine

27

Fluoride

Chl ori de

Sul fate

Lithium

Iron

Copper

Sodium

Sodium (25 ppb)

Silica

Phosphate

Ammonia

Boron

Total Organic

Carbon

32

32

31

28

21

21

98

35

36

18

23

39

27

The analytic blind program

has

been effective in identifying problems in

Unit laboratories

such

as difficulties with copper analysis

in Unit l.

However, strict criteria for acceptance

and corrective action were not

implemented.

The Chemistry Standards

Department

was developing

more

rigorous acceptance

criteria for Unit laboratory measurements

of analytic

blinds.

The inspector

reviewed documentation

in Unit 2 and Unit 3 laboratories

associated

with the atomic absorbtion

spectrophotometer

(AA) and ion

chromatograph

(IC).

Spikes

and replicates

were provided as required for

the instruments

examined.

Verifications of calibrations

and

recalibrations

were performed

as required.

No control charts

were kept

for the

AA or IC since recalibrations

or calibration verifications

are

procedurally required before

each analysis to maintain instrument

accuracy.

The inspector

reviewed reactor coolant chemistry surveillances

for

dissolved

oxygen, flouride, chloride and boron at Unit 2 and Unit 3.

Results

were reported

as "less than" levels at both Units.

Unit 3 "less

than" values for fluoride and chloride were

one order of magnitude

below

TS requirements.

However, Unit 2 "less than" values

were approximately

equal

to the

TS values.

The Unit 2 Chemistry Manager explained that the

analysis for chloride was

more sensitive

than the "less than" value, but

the fluoride sensitivity by ion selective

electrode

was consistent with

the "less than" value,

100 ppb.

The ion selective electrode

is

considered

the method of choice for RCS fluoride monitoring by industry

groups.

Also, utility experience

indicates that good

RCS chemistry

control can reduce reactor coolant fluoride to less

than

50 ppb.

This

suggests

that an improvement of RCS fluoride measurement

sensitivity to a

level at or below 50 ppb should

be possible with the apparatus

available.

As noted above,

the Unit 1 and Unit 2 laboratories

have procured

advanced

ion chromatographs,

which has

been successfully

used for fluoride

analysis at Unit 3.

The inspector

discussed

with the licensee

representative

the valve in

reviewing reporting practices for analyses

to assure that "less than"

values actually reflect a measurement

below instrument sensitivity.

If

analytical sensitivity for for a given

RCS chemistry surveillance

are

approximately

equal

to the Limiting Condition for Operation,

then

analytical sensitivity provides

no operating margin below the

TS steady

'C

state limit.

This matter will be tracked

as

an "Open Item"

(50-529/88-08-01) for examination in a future inspection.

The licensee's

program for chemistry control

and analysis

appears

capable

of fulfillingits safety function.

An improving trend is noted in the

implementation of the analytical blind program.

Continued

management

support is encouraged

in the area of feedwater

sodium control to

disseminate

lessons

learned

between Unit organizations

involved in

secondary

chemistry

and condensate

demineralizer operations.

The

licensee

representative

indicated that they would review the adequacy of

analytical sensitivities for RCS chemistry

and reporting of data

from

RCS

survei llances.

No violations or deviations

were identified.

ualit

Assurance

and Confirmator

Measurements

for In-Plant

Radiochemical

Anal sis

84725

The inspector

reviewed the licensee's

program for quality assurance

of

laboratory radiological

measurements.

The Chemistry Standards

Department

began participating in a laboratory analytical blind program for

radioactive analytes

in 1987.

A private laboratory provided

a single set

of blind samples

on

a quarterly basis.

The samples

contained

alpha,

beta

and

gamma activity in solid, liquid and gas matrices

commonly found at

nuclear

power facilities.

Chemistry Standards

then provided the sample

set to each unit laboratory for analysis.

The licensee's

contractor for

this service is employed

by many other facilities in the U.S.,

and the

content of the program is regarded

as excellent.

The agreement criteria

used

by the contractor for assessing

the licensee's

results is

substantially similar to those

used

by the

NRC confirmatory measurements

program.

The administration of the radiological blind sample

program

has

encountered difficulties in 1987.

The sample set for the third quarter,

1987,

was misplaced prior to analysis

by the Unit laboratories.

The

sample set for the fourth quarter,

1987,

had not been

exchanged with Unit

2 laboratory.

The Unit 2 Chemistry Manager stated that radiological

blinds had not been analyzed in the Unit 2 laboratory since the October,

1987 reorganization of Unit chemistry personnel.

The inspector

examined selected quality control records

and practices

at

the Unit 1 and Unit 2 laboratories

for gas flow proportional

counters

(gross

alpha

and beta analysis)

and

gamma spectrometers.

Proportional

counters

had been annually calibrated for gross

alpha

and gross

beta

measurements,

and control logs and charts

were kept for alpha

and beta

efficiency response

and background.

Gamma spectrometers

had been

annually calibrated for the four liter Marinelli beaker

geometry,

and

control logs were kept for centroid channel, efficiency response

and

resolution,

each at two energies.

Control charts

were kept for

efficiency response

at two energies.

The inspector

examined

records of analyses

of cooling water hold-up tank

(CWHUT) samples,

Chemical

Waste Neutralizer

Tank

(CWNT) samples

and Waste

Gas

Decay Tank

(WGDT) samples to determine

compliance with chemistry

procedures

and radioactive effluent technical specification

requirements.

The

CWHUTs at Unit 2 and Unit 3 were analyzed shiftly for indications of

intrusion of activity to the

CWNTs.

The

CWNT was promptly surveyed for

total activity content

by Unit 2 chemistry laboratory following an

addition of activity in February,

1988, per

TS 4. 11. 1.3.

The inspector

reviewed

WGDT grab

sample

analyses

for radioiodine,

noble

gas

and particulates

at Unit 2 and Unit 3.

The analyses

for radioiodine

and particulates

were satisfactory at both Units.

However,

Gaseous

Radioactive

Release

Permit 882044,

Update

1, dated February

27,

1988

contained

an analysis of a

WGDT "B"

noble

gas

grab sample

by Unit 2

chemistry laboratory that did not meet the lower limits of detection

(LLDs) required

by Procedure

75AC-9ZZ02,

"Gaseous

Radioactive Effluent

Release

Administrative Control", Appendix B, "Effluent Sampling

Schedule".

The inspector

noted that the licensee

does not employ an

~a

riori

LLO determination of measurement

system sensitivity for

radioactive effluent measurements,

but instead relies

on review of all

analytical

data

from the count room to insure that each

measurement

meets

properly

implemented,

would insure

adequate

sensitivity for each

analysis.

However, if the

LLDs were not met for a particular sample,

there

was

no

~a

riori data to verify that the measurement

method

was

adequate.

The subject analysis,

dated

February 25,

1988,

involved a

WGDT

"B" noble

gas

sample in a 9.2

ml vial, 1020 seconds

counting time.

The

required sensitivity for principal

gamma emitters

was

1 E-4 uCi/ml.

The

following detection limits exceeded

those required:

Radionuclide

Re orted Detection Limit

uCi/ml

Kr-87

Kr-88

Xe-138

1.6 E-4

1.9 E-4

3.6 E-4

The licensee

stated that the subject analysis

was part of an effluent

technician training activity, and the results

obtained

were intended to

verify that

WGDT "B" could be released within the limits of TS 3. 11.2. a.

The effluent technician verified that the release

was within TS 3. 11.2.a

limits, and identified the

LLD deficiency in the analytical

data.

Two

hours

had elapsed

since the initial sampling,

so an additional

sample

was

obtained in keeping with internal laboratory practice.

However,

laboratory technicians

erred in assuming

the initial sample

had fulfilled

all analytical

requirements.

The second

sample

was not analyzed

and the

permit was subsequently

issued with the deficient analytical

data

attached.

This occurred despite

review by an effluent technician

as

verified by initial on the "Permit Package

Checklist" under "Check for

Correct LLD's".

No completion or review signitures

were found on the

Ortec

"Gamma 1" data for the sample,

per internal laboratory practice.

WGDT "B" was released

to the environment

on February

26, 1988,'t 3:58

am.

The noble

gas activities exceeding

the procedural

LLDs were entered

into the Gaseous

Radioactive Effluent Tracking System after the inspector

identified the deficient analysis.

No Limiting Conditions for Operation

were exceeded

by the release.

It appears

that the cause of the analytical deficiency was

a poor

turnover between

the technician

who identified the

LLD deficiency in the

first sample,

and the laboratory personnel

responsible

for analysis of

the second

sample.

Procedures

for effluent administrative control,

effluent permits,

gaseous

effluent surveillance

and

gamma analysis

state

that

LLDs are to be met, but contain

no guidance

as to actions to be

taken for analyses

not meeting analytical sensitivities to insure that

adequate

analytical

data are obtained.

The inspector

reviewed six waste

gas

decay tank release

permits

from the

latter half of 1987.

No additional deficiencies

were identified.

This

is the second

incidence of radioactive effluent release

to the

environment without meeting required detection limits.

On August 7,

1987,

NRC Region

V received

Licensee

Event Report,

LER 87-016-00,

from

the licensee

describing the release

of liquid effluent from Unit 2

Chemical

Waste Neutralizer Tank to the onsite evaporation

pond without an

analysis

adequate

to meet the

LLD for Mo-99 required

by TS Table 4. 11-1.

The deficiency in the analysis

contained in Permit 882044

was

subsequently

identified as

an apparent violation of TS 6.8. 1

(50-529/88-08-02).

The

NRC mobile laboratory

was not operable at the time of the inspection.

Confirmatory measurements

will be performed

on split samples

and

replicate

samples

during

a future inspection.

The licensee's

program in the area of radiochemical

measurements

is

adequate

to carry out its safety function.

However, additional attention

is warranted to insure proper implementatation of procedures

for

radiological analytic blinds and review of analytical

data for

radiological effluents.

One apparent violation was identified involving

gaseous

effluent administrative control.

5.

Exit Interview

The inspector

met with the licensee

management

on March 3,

1988 to

discuss

the scope

and findings of the inspection.

The licensee

was

informed that the failure to obtain

a gas

sample analysis of Unit 2 waste

gas

decay tank "b" sufficient to meet the detection limits specified in

TS Table 4. 11-2 was

an apparent violation of TS 4. 11.2. 1.2.

1

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