ML17300B340

Informs That NRC Staff Completed Midcycle PPR of Plant,Units 1,2 & 3 on 990818 & Identified No Areas in Which Licensee Performance Warranted Addl Insp Effort Beyond Core Insp Program.Core Insps Will Be Conducted Over Next 7 Months

ML17300B340
Person / Time
Site:	Palo Verde
Issue date:	09/16/1999
From:	Harrell P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:	Overbeck G ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO. (FORMERLY ARIZONA NUCLEAR
References
NUDOCS 9909240127
Download: ML17300B340 (30)

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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION Iv 611 RYAN PLAZA DRIVE, SUITE 400 ARLINGTON,TEXAS 76011-8064 September 16, 1999 Gregg R. Overbeck, Senior Vice President, Nuclear Arizona Public Service Company P.O. Box 52034 Phoenix, Arizona 85072-2034

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SUBJECT:

MIDCYCLEPLANT PERFORMANCE REVIEW (PPR) - PALO VERDE On August 18, 1999, the NRC staff completed the midcycle Plant Performance Review (PPR) of the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station. The staff conducts these reviews for all operating nuclear power plants to integrate performance information and to plan for inspection activities. The focus of this performance review was to identify changes in performance over the past 6 months, and to allocate inspection resources for the next 7 months.

We did not identify any areas in which your performance warranted additional inspection effort beyond the core inspection program.

Based on this review, we plan to conduct only core inspections at your facilityover the next 7 months.

Enclosure 1 contains a historical listing of plant issues, referred to as the Plant Issues Matrix (PIM), that were considered during this PPR process to arrive at our integrated review of licensee performance trends.

The PIM includes items summarized from inspection reports or other docketed correspondence between the NRC and Arizona Public Service Company from October 1, 1998, through July 16, 1999. As noted above, greater emphasis was placed on those issues identified in the past 6 months during this performance review. The NRC does not attempt to document all aspects of licensee programs and performance that may be functioning appropriately.

Rather, the NRC only documents issues that it believes warrant management attention or represent noteworthy aspects of performance.

This letter advises you of our plans for future inspection activities at your facilityso that you will have an opportunity to prepare for these inspections and to provide us with feedback on any planned inspections that may conflict with your plant activities. Enclosure 2 details our inspection plan through March 2000. This date was chosen to coincide with the scheduled implementation of the revised reactor oversight process in April 2000. Also included in the plan are NRC noninspection activities.

Routine resident inspections are not listed due to their ongoing and continuous nature.

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Arizona Public Service Company If circumstances arise which cause us to change this inspection plan, we will contact you to discuss the change as soon as possible.

Please contact

. Harrell at 817-860-8250 with any questions you may have.

P arrell, Chief r 'ects Branch D Divi ion of Reactor Projects Docket Nos. 50-528 50-529 50-530 License Nos. NPF-41 NPF-51 NPF-74

Enclosures:

1. Plant Issues Matrix

2. Inspection Plan CC:

Steve Olea Arizona Corporation Commission 1200 W. Washington Street Phoenix, Arizona 85007 Douglas K. Porter, Senior Counsel Southern California Edison Company Law Department, Generation Resources P.O. Box 800

Rosemead, California 91770 Chairman Maricopa County Board of Supervisors 301 W. Jefferson, 10th Floor Phoenix, Arizona 85003 Aubrey V. Godwin, Director Arizona Radiation Regulatory Agency 4814 South 40 Street Phoenix, Arizona 85040 Angela K. Krainik; Director Regulatory Affairs Arizona Public Service Company P.O. Box 52034 Phoenix, Arizona 85072-2034

Arizona Public Service Company John C. Horne, Vice President, Power Generation El Paso Electric Company 2702 N. Third Street, Suite 3040 Phoenix, Arizona 85004 Terry Bassham, Esq.

General Counsel El Paso Electric Company 123 W. Mills El Paso, Texas 79901 John W. Schumann Los Angeles Department of Water & Power Southern California Public Power Authority P.O. Box 51111, Room 1255-C Los Angeles, California 90051-0100 David Summers Public Service Company of New Mexico 414 Silver SW, ff1206 Albuquerque, New Mexico 87102 Jarlath Curran Southern California Edison Company 5000 Pacific Coast Hwy. Bldg. DIN San Clemente, California 92672 Robert Henry Salt River Project 6504 East Thomas Road Scottsdale, Arizona 85251 Harry E. Border Division of Emergency Management State of Arizona 5636 East McDowell Road Phoenix, Arizona 85008

Arizona Public Service Company SEP l 6 l999 bcc to DCD (IE40)

Resident Inspector DRS Branch Chiefs (3 copies)

RITS Coordinator RIV File Chief, NRR/DISP/PIPB Chief, OEDO/ROPMS B. Henderson, PAO Records Center, INPO C. Gordon ement Section, OEDO bcc distrib. by RIV:

Regional Administrator DRP Director DRS Director Branch Chief (DRP/D)

Senior Project Inspector (DRP/D)

Branch Chief (DRP/TSS)

T. Boyce, NRR/DISP/PIPB C. Hackney, RSLO W. D. Travers, EDO (MS: 16E15)

Associate Dir. for Projects, NRR Associate Dir. for Insp., and Tech. Assmt, NRR PPR Program Manager, NRR/ILPB (2 copies)

Chief, Inspection Program Branch, NRR Chief, Regional Operations and Program Manag W. Bateman, NRR Project Director (MS: 13E16)

M. Fields, NRR Project Manager (MS: 13E16)

Chief, NRR/DIPM/IIPB DOCUMENT NAME: S:XPPR 99-02NLettersNPV To receive co of document, Indicet ox'C"~ Co without enclosures "E" = Co viith enclosures "N" = No co RIV:SPE:DRP/D KMKenned;I'b 09/

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Arizona Public Service Company SEP 16 859 bcc to DCD (IE40)

Resident Inspector DRS Branch Chiefs (3 copies)

RITS Coordinator RIV File Chief, NRR/DISP/PIPB Chief, OEDO/ROPMS B. Henderson, PAO Records Center, INPO C. Gordon ment Section, OEDO bcc distrib. by RIV:

Regional Administrator DRP Director DRS Director Branch Chief (DRP/D)

Senior Project Inspector (DRP/D)

Branch Chief (DRP/TSS)

T. Boyce, NRR/DISP/PIPB C. Hackney, RSLO W. D. Travers, EDO (MS: 16E15)

Associate Dir. for Projects, NRR Associate Dir. for Insp., and Tech. Assmt, NRR PPR Program Manager, NRR/ILPB (2 copies)

Chief, Inspection Program Branch, NRR Chief, Regional Operations and Program Manage W. Bateman, NRR Project Director (MS: 13E16)

M. Fields, NRR Project Manager (MS: 13E16)

Chief, NRR/DIPM/IIPB DOCUMENT NAME: S:~PPR 99-02~,Letter"gPV To receive co of document, indicate 'x: "C" = Co vliithout enclosures "E" = Co viith enclosures "N"= No co RIV:SPE:DRP/D KMKenned;I'b

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1 of 19 09/01/1999 11:16:08 IR Report 3 Region IV PALO VERDE ENCLOSURE 1

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSOE MATRIX By Primary Functional Area Date Source Functional Area Template ID Type Codes Item Title Item Description 06/12/1999 1999012 Pri: OPS Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000529 PALO VERDE 2 NRC NEG Pri: 1A Sec: 3A Ter:

Failure to evaluate TS LCO prior to making a mode change.

Inattention to details was demonstrated by the operations shift manager when he failed to evaluate a Technical Specification limitingcondition for operation prior to making a mode change (Section 01.1 ).

Dockets Discussed:

05000529 PALO VERDE 2 05/18/1999 1999006 Prl: OPS NRC POS Prl: 1A Sec:

Sec:

Ter:

Operator oversight and direction of the Unit 2 dralndown to midloop evolution were excellent.

Optlrator oversight and direction of the Unit 2 draindown to midioop evolution were excellent.

Licensee activities related to midloop operation demonstrated a strong safety focus (Section 01.1).

05/01/1999 1999006-01 Dockets Discussed:

05000528 PALO VERDE 1 05000529 PALO VERDE 2 05000530 PALO VERDE 3 Pri: OPS Sec:

NRC NCV Pri: 5C Sec:

Ter:

Inadequate corrective action for previously Identified surveillance procedure Inadequacy The licensee failed to take actions to correct an inadequate procedure that was used to verifythe position of valves in the Unit 1 essential chilled water system.

This deficiency was again identified during operation of the system for maintenance, which resulted from mispositioned valves in the essential chilled water system. This is a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI. This Severity Level IVviolation is being treated as a noncited violation.

consistent with Appendix C of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This issue is in the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report/Disposition Request 9-9-00107 (Section 07.1).

05/01/1999 1999006.02 Pri: OPS Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000528 PALO VERDE 1 05000529 PALO VERDE 2 Licensee NCV Prl: 3A Sec:

Ter:

Two examples of failure to bypass parameters as required by TS Sect/on 3.3 Two examples of a violation of Technical Specification 3.3 were identified for not placing an instrument in the bypass or tdpped condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> from the time the instrument was identified as inoperab! e. These events were reported in Licensee Event Reports 50-528/98-001-00, 50-529/98.003.00, and 50-529/98.003.01.

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Severity Level IVviolation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Appendix C of the NRC Enforcement Policy. These issues are in the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report/Disposition Requests 1-8.0044 and 9.8.0931 (Section 08.1) 05/01/1999 1999006 03 Pri: OPS Licensee Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000529 PALO VERDE 2 NCV Prl: 3A Sec:

Ter:

Failure to store a spent fuel assembly in the correct spent fuel pool location as required by TS 3.7.17 Personnel error in preparing a material balance transfer sheet form and inadequate independent verification of the form resulted in Assembly P1B241 being stored in an incorrect location in the Unit 2 spent fuel pool since August 1997. This is a violation of Technical Specification 3.7.17. This Severity Level IVviolation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Appendix C of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This issue is in the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report/Disposition Request 2-9-0048 (Section E2.1).

03/20/1999 1999004 Dockets Discussed:

05000528 PALO VERDE 1 Prl: OPS Sec:

NRC NEG Prl: 1B Sec:

Ter:

Operator misdiagnosis of plant conditions results In Unit 1 trip.

Misdiagnosis of plant conditions and unnecessarily hurried operator actions in response to a failure in the main turbine electrohydraulic control system caused a Unit 1 reactor trip on high pressurizer pressure.

Posttrip operator actions were good.

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2 of 19 09/01/1 999 11:16:08 IR Report 3 Region IV PALO VERDE Date Source Functional Area United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Primary Functional Area Template Item Title ID Type Codes Item Description 02/06/1999 1998010 Pri: OPS Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000530 PALO VERDE 3 NRC POS Prl: 1B Sec: 3A Tef:

Actions taken by the operations staff to mitigate instrument air header leak were effective.

A failed gasket at a flanged connection caused a substantial leak in the Unit 3 instrument air header.

Operator actions to isolate the leak, combined with the proper functioning of the backup nitrogen supply, stabilized the instrument air header pressure to allow the unit to remain stable throughout this event. Actions taken by the operations staff to mitigate this event were effective.

02/06/1999 1998010 Pri: OPS Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000528 PALO VERDE 1 POS Pri: 1B Operator response to the unexpected loss of the Unit1120-Vac Bus PND-D28 was good.

Sec: 3A Control room operator response to the unexpected loss of the Unit 1 120-Vac Instrumentation Bus PND-D28 was good.

Ter:

01/29/1999 1999002 Prl: OPS NRC STR Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000528 PALO VERDE 1 05000529 PALO VERDE 2 05000530 PALO VERDE 3 Prl: 1A Sec: 1B Ter: 3B Good performance by shift and staff crews In operator requal exams.

The licensed operators on both shift and staff crews demonstrated strong capability to respond to and mitigate a variety of abnormal and emergency conditions to protect the public health and safety. Operators exhibited improved performance in several behavioral skills including communication, self.verification, concurrent or peer verification, and supervisory oversight.

01/29/1999 1999002 Pri: OPS NRC STR Prl: 1C Good performance by ffcensed operator requal training organization.

Sec:

Sec: 3B The operations training organization exhibited a sustained high level of performance in implementing a systems approach to training for the licensed operator requalification program.

Ter:

Dockets Discussed:

05000528 PALO VERDE 1 05000529 PALO VERDE 2 05000530 PALO VERDE 3 12/26/1998 1998009.01 Pri: OPS Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000530 PALO VERDE 3 NRC VIOly Pri: 3A Operator failure to followprocedure results in shutdown cooling valve being in wrong position.

Sec:

Valve 3JSIBHV690 (shutdown cooling (SDC) system warmup line isolation valve) was found by the inspectors to be approximately 10 percent open with Unit 3 in the SDC mode of operation. This allowed a small amount of coolant to bypass the core; however, sufficient flowwas available to the core. This resulted from an operator not placing SDC Train B in service, during the Unit 3 refueling outage, in accordance with the applicable procedure.

This is a repeat violation of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1 for failure to followa procedure.

12/16/tgg8 1998301 Prl: OPS NRC POS Prl: 1C Effective examination security maintaIned for initial operator licensing exams.

Sec:

Sec:

Effective examination security was maintained.

The licensee's development of a written security plan and conduct of daily security briefings were notable.

Ter:

Dockets Discussed:

05000528 PALO VERDE 1 05000529 PALO VERDE 2 05000530 PALO VERDE 3

Page:

3 of 19 09/01/1999 11:16:08 IR Report 3 Region IV PALO VERDE Date Source Functional Area United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Primary Functional Area Template Item Title ID Type Codes Item Description 12/16/1998 1998301 Pri: QPS Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000528 PALO VERDE 1 05000529 PALO VERDE 2 05000530 PALO VERDE 3 NRC PQS Prl: 1C Simulation facilities and staff supported Initial operator licensing examinations.

Sec:

The simulation facilities and simulation facilitystaff supported the examinations very well.

Ter:

12/16/1998 1998301 Prl: QPS Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000528 PALO VERDE 1 05000529 PALO VERDE 2 05000530 PALO VERDE 3 NRC STR Prl: 1A Sec: 1B Ter: 1C Allapplicants passed Initial operator licensing examinatfons4SRO, 11 RO.

All6 applicants for senior operator and 1 1 applicants for reactor operator licenses passed the licensing examinations and were issued the appropriate licenses.

Strong applicant performance with good communication techniques was observed during the operating test.

12/16/1gg8 1998301 pri: QpS NRC STR Prl: 1C Inovatlve examination schedule for Initial operator licensing examinations.

Sec:

Sec:

The licensee developed an innovative examination schedule, which allowed administration of the examination with one set of materials, and submitted a high quality examination, which was assembled to facilitate administration Ter:

Dockets Discussed:

05000528 PALO VERDE 1 05000529 PALO VERDE 2 05000530 PALO VERDE 3 1 1/14/1998 1998008 Pri: QPS Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000530 PALO VERDE 3 NRC POS Pri: 1A Sec:

Ter:

Oversight and direction of the Unit 3 draindown to mldloop was excellent.

Operator oversight and direction of the draining of the Unit 3 reactor coolant system to the midloop condition were excellent. Midloop operation was conducted to remove a piece of foreign material that had become trapped during reinstallation of the manway cover following steam generator (SG) tube inspections.

This was a conservative management decision, since an engineering evaluation indicated that the material did not interfere with the sealing of the gasket.

Dockets Discussed:

05000530 PALO VERDE 3 11/14/1998 1998008.01 Prl: QPS NRC NCV Pri: 1A Sec:

Sec:

Ter:

Failure to Establish Containment Integrity Prior to Commencing Core Reload Failure to adequately perform a verification of containment integrity resulted in movement of fuel for 14 hours1.62037e-4 days <br />0.00389 hours <br />2.314815e-5 weeks <br />5.327e-6 months <br /> without containment closure. A noncited violation of Technical Specification pS) 3.9.3 was identified. The refueling team successfully performed the core reload in accordance with plant procedures.

Dockets Discussed:

05000529 PALO VERDE 2 11/14/1998 1998008-02 Pri: OPS NRC NCV Prl: 3A Sec:

Sec:

Ter:

Inadvertant Drain Down of SFP while establishing clearance.

Aweakness in attention to detail by an auxiliary operator while establishing a clearance associated with the fuel pool cleanup pump resulted in a S-inch, inadvertent draindown of the spent fuel pool. The inspectors considered this an isolated human error and, as a result, a noncited violation of TS 5.4.1 was identified.

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4 of 19 09/01/1999 11:16:08 IR Report 3 Region IV PALO VERDE Date Source Functional Area United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Primary Functional Area Template Item Title ID Type Codes Item Description 10/03/1998 1998007 Pri: QPS Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000528 PALO VERDE 1 NRC NEG Pri: 1A Sec: 3B Ter:

Unclear Work Plan for Acid System Maintenance contributes to acrid tank rupture.

An unclear work plan for preparing the acid system for maintenance, and failure of auxiliary operators to followthe work plan for establishing a vent path for the acid tank, contributed to the rupture of the tank. The recovery plan following the incident was prompt and appropriate 10/03/1998 1998007 Pri: QPS Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000530 PALO VERDE 3 NRC NEG Prl: 1B Sec:

Ter:

Failure to recognize that safety-related battery chargers had been lost after loss of a non-safety load center The control room staff responded in a prompt manner to the loss of a nonsafety-related load center in Unit 3. The operations crew exhibited good oversight of activities during the response by appropriately prioritizing the critical plant parameters in order of safety significance.

However, recognition that the safety-related battery chargers had been lost at the onset of the event was not accomplished in a timely manner.

Once discovered, corrective actions were accomplished to restore the battery chargers 10/03/1998 1998007 Prl: QPS Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000530 PALO VERDE 3 NRC PQS Prl: 1A Good Performance by Operations During Mldloop Conditions.

Sec:

Qperator oversight and direction of the evolution to drain Unit 3 to the midioop condition, and decisions to take conservative actions during the evolution, were excellent.

Ter:

10/03/1998 1998007 Prl: OPS Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000530 PALO VERDE 3 NRC POS Prl: 1A Sec: 3A Ter:

Good Effort by Operations Personnel During Fuel Offload Qbservation of core offload activities associated with the Unit 3 refueling outage indicated that refueling personnel consistently used good communications and demonstrated a safety-conscious approach to performing refueling operations 10/03/1998 1998007 Prl: QPS Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000530 PALO VERDE 3 NRC POS Prl: 1A Sec: 3A Ter:

Well Planned Rx Shutdown for Unit 3 Refueling Outage (RF7)

The Unit 3 reactor shutdown for the seventh refueling outage was well planned and conducted in accordance with procedures.

Supervisory oversight and direction of the operating crew and operator performance during the shutdown were excellent 10/03/1998 1998007 Pri: QPS NRC PQS Prl: 1B Good Operator Response to Unit 1excess steam demand power transient.

Sec:

Sec:

Corrosion induced failure of a nonsafety-related pressure switch in the secondary plant caused Unit 1 to experience a power transient. Operator response to the transient was good Ter:

Dockets Discussed:

05000528 PALO VERDE 1

Page:

5 of 19 09/01/1999 1 1:1 6:08 IR Report 3 Region IV PALO VERDE Date Source Functional Area United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Primary Functional Area Template Item Title ID Type Codes Item Description 05/1 1/1999 1999008 Pri: MAINT NRC POS Prl: 2A Observable material condition of Unit 2 pumps, valves, piping and component supports was good.

Sec:

Sec:

The external material condition of the observed Unit 2 pumps, valves, piping, and component supports was good, in that, no visible oil or water leaks were noted. The observed equipment was properly identified.

Teri Dockets Discussed:

05000529 PALO VERDE 2 05/1 1/1999 1999008 Pri: MAINT NRC POS Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000528 PALO VERDE 1 05000529 PALO VERDE 2 05000530 PALO VERDE 3 Pri: 3A Sec:

Ter:

NDE procedures were good.

The nondestructive examination procedures used to perform the inspector-observed inservice inspections contained sufficient detail and inspection acceptance criteria to enable the performance of the intended examinations.

The procedures were in compliance viith Sections V and XI of the ASME Code 05/1 1/1999 1999008 Dockets Discussed:

05000528 PALO VERDE 1 05000529 PALO VERDE 2 05000530 PALO VERDE 3 Seci Sec:

Ter:

Pri: MAINT NRC POS Pri: 4C Licensee personnel were effective In their oversight and control of contractor inservice inspection activities.

Licensee personnel were effective in their oversight and control of contractor inservice inspection activities.

Contractor inservice inspection personnel were properly certified and knowledgeable of applicable nondestructive examination procedures and ASME Code requirements.

Very good performance was demonstrated by contractor inservice inspection personnel during conduct of equipment calibration and examinations (three-liquid penetrant, four-ultrasonic, and four-magnetic particIe) observed by the inspectors.

05/1 1/1999 1999008 Prl: MAINT Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000528 PALO VERDE 1 05000529 PALO VERDE 2 05000530 PALO VERDE 3 NRC WK Pri: 4C Sec:

Ter:

The licensee implemented an ISI program which had not been approved by the NRC.

The licensee's inservice inspection program implemented the 1992 Edition of the ASME Code, which had not been approved for use by the NRC. While the licensee determined that they had not deviated from the 1989 Edition of the ASME Code, they did however, identify the need for immediate submittal of two requests for relief that dealt viith examination of bolted connections and corrective actions associated with detected leaks of bolted connections.

The licensee appeared to have not recognized the differences between the 1980 Edition and Winter 1981 Addenda, the 1989 Edition, and the 1992 Edition and 1992 Addenda. This was considered by the inspectors as a programmatic weakness.

05/1 1/1999 1999008-02 Pri: MAINT NRC NCV Prl: 2B Technical Specification 5.4.1 violation for inadequate test procedure Sec:

Sec:

A noncited violation was identified regarding an inadequate surveillance test procedure.

Ter:

Dockets Discussed:

05000528 PALO VERDE 1 05000529 PALO VERDE 2 05000S30 PALO VERDE 3

<~r~ Tosnn (r nraauonra Foilnwun.Otherk From 10/01/1998 To 07/16/1999

Page:

6 of 19 09/01/1999 1 1:1 6:08 IR Report 3 Region IV PALO VERDE Date Source Functional Area United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Primary Functional Area Template Item Title ID Type Codes Item Description 05/01/1999 1999006 Pri: MAINT Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000529 PALO VERDE 2 Licensee NEG Prl: 3A Sec:

Ter:

An improperly written surveillance procedure results in water discharge to the containment sump.

Knowledgeable technicians and operators used approved procedures to conduct surveillance activities in a satisfactory manner.

However, during Unit 2 integrated safeguards testing of the containment spray actuation signal, operators overlooked a caution note in the procedure providing for the isolation of nuclear cooling water relief valves. The relief valves inadvertently lifted during the test, which resulted in approximately 80 gallons of water being discharged to the containment sump. The caution note contained guidance that should have been included as a procedure sign-off step. Ucensee actions to correct the procedure deficiency were acceptable (Section M1.2).

Dockets Discussed:

05000528 PALO VERDE 1 05000529 PALO VERDE 2 05000530 PALO VERDE 3 05/01/1999 1999006 Prl: MAINT NRC POS Prl: 2A Sec:

Sec:

Ter:

Observable material condition of the three units was good.

Observable material condition of the three units was good. During a postshutdown walkdown of the Unit 2 containment, licensee inspection of Inconel 600 resistance temperature detector nozzles revealed no evidence of leakage.

The licensee's actions to address the boron accumulation were good (Section M2.1).

04/13/1999 1999012.02 Pri: MAINT Licensee NCV Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000528 PALO VERDE 1 05000529 PALO VERDE 2 05000530 PALO VERDE 3 Pri: 1C Sec:

Ter:

Violation of TS 5.4.1 for failure to Implement procedures for control of lubricants.

The failure to properly implement procedures for control of lubricants used in the facilityis a violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1. The concerns with the control of lubricants included adding the incorrect oil and grease to safety-related components and not ensuring that the requirements of the program were applied to all appropriate personnel within the maintenance department.

This Severity Level IV violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Appendix C of the NRC Enforcement Policy. These issues are in the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report/Disposition Request 9 9.0443.

Dockets Discussed:

05000528 PALO VERDE 1 05000529 PALO VERDE 2 05000530 PALO VERDE 3 Sec:

Sec:

Ter:

03/20/1999 1999004-01 Prl: MAINT Licensee NCV Prl: 3A Sec:

Sec:

Ter:

Dockets Discussed:

05000529 PALO VERDE 2 03/20/1999 1999004 Pri: MAINT NRC POS Prl: 2A Observable material condition of the three units was good.

Observable material condition of the three units was good. During a posttrip walkdown of the Unit 1 containment, the licensee discovered a moderate amount of boron crystals on carbon steel components of Reactor Coolant Pump 2A. The licensee's actions to address the boron accumulation were good.

Missed 18-month surveillance of trisodium phosphate baskets A violation of Technical Specification 4.5.2.d.3 was identified for the failure to perform the required surveillance test on the trisodium phosphate baskets.

This Severity Level IV violation is being treated as a noncited violation per the guidance provided in Appendix C of the Enforcement Policy. This issue is in the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report/Disposition Request 9.8.0047.

T s Ic nmnlisnra Fnuqwnn Othert From 10/01/1998 To 07/16/1999

Page:

7 of 19 09/01/1999 1 1:1 6:08 IR Report 3 Region IV PALO VERDE United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Primary Functional Area

~r Date Source Functional Area Template ID Type Codes Item Title Item Description 03l20/1999 1999004-02 Pri: MAINT Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000528 PALO VERDE 1 05000529 PALO VERDE 2 05000530 PALO VERDE 3 03l20/1 999 1 999004-03 Prl: MAINT Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

0500052 8 PALO VERDE 1 05000529 PALO VERDE 2 05000530 PALO VERDE 3 Licensee NCV Prl: 5B Sec: 5C Ter:

Licensee NCV Pri: 2A Sec: 2B Ter: 4C Failure to correct a deficient condition In the auxiliary feedwater pump governors The licensee failed to take actions to ensure that a deficient condition was appropriately corrected on all affected components.

As a result, the deficiency was not corrected for all turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps in all units. This deficiency was identified again by an overspeed trip of the Unit 2 turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump. This is a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III. This Severity Level IVviolation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Appendix C of the NRC Enforcement Policy. The ticensee took prompt actions to assess transportibility and correct the conditions. This issue is in the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report/Disposition Request 2-9-0019.

Failure to provide sufficient Instructions for torqueing the EDG air-start header bolts The licensee failed to provide sufficient design basis information in the appropriate procedures.

As a result, missing and/or loose bolts were identified on the Units 1,2, and 3 emergency diesel generator air-start headers.

The torque value for the bolts was increased from 25 to 50 foot-pounds, and the bolts that required torqueing were not identified in the appropriate maintenance instructions. This is a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III,for not implementing design basis information. This Severity Level IVviolation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Appendix C of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This issue is in the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report/Disposition Request 3-9-0026.

03/20/1 999 1 999004-04 Pri: MAINT Licensee NCV Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000530 PALO VERDE 3 Pri: 2A Sec: 2B Ter: 3A Inadequate postmaintenance testing of valve actuators During routine testing of a containment isolation valve for the hydrogen control system, the valve failed to function, as designed.

The failure was caused by the valve wYiing being improperly installed folloviingmaintenance.

The condition was not detected by postmaintenance testing because the procedure, which specified the testing requirements for the valve actuators, was inadequate.

This is a violation of 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix B, Criterion XI;however, this Severity Level IVviolation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Appendix C of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This issue is in the licensee's corrective action plan as Condition Report/Disposition Request 3-9-0010, 03/20/1999 1999004-05 Prl: MAINT Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000528 PALO VERDE 1 05000529 PALO VERDE 2 05000530 PALO VERDE 3 Licensee NCV Prl: 2A Sec: 2B Ter: 3A Failure to followprocedure for Identification of correct replacement parts Inattention to detail led to a failure to followprocedures while retrieving and verifying replacement 480-Vac circuit breakers.

This resulted in the installation of two nonsafety-related circuit breakers into safety-related motor control center cubicles affecting two high pressure safety injection valves. This is a violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1 for the failure to followprocedures.

Postwork reviews also failed to prevent the discrepancies.

This Severity Level IVviolation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Appendix C of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This issue is in the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report/Disposition Request 1-9.0030.

Dockets Discussed:

05000528 PALO VERDE 1 05000529 PALO VERDE 2 05000530 PALO VERDE 3 02/06/1999 1998010 Pri: MAINT NRC POS Prl: 2A Sec:

Sec:

Ter:

During routine tours, the observed material condition of components In all three units was good.

During routine tours, the observed material condition of components in all three units was good.

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Page:

8 of 19 09/01/1999 1 1:16:08 IR Report 3 Region IV PALO VERDE United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Primary Functional Area Date Source Functional Area Template ID Type Codes Item Title Item Description Dockets Discussed:

05000528 PALO VERDE 1 05000529 PALO VERDE 2 05000530 PALO VERDE 3 02/06/1999 1998010 Pri: MAINT NRC POS Prl: 3A Sec:

Sec: 3B Ter:

Dockets Discussed:

05000528 PALO VERDE 1 05000529 PALO VERDE 2 05000530 PALO VERDE 3 01/29/1999 1999003 Pri: MAINT NRC STR Prl: 3A Sec:

Sec: 3B Ter:

Dockets Discussed:

05000528 PALO VERDE 1 05000529 PALO VERDE 2 05000530 PALO VERDE 3 02/06/1999 1998010 Prl: MAINT NRC POS Prl: 3A Sec:

Sec: 3B Ter:

Knowledgeable technicians used approved procedures to perform routine maintenance activities.

Knowledgeable technicians used approved procedures to perform routine maintenance activities in a safety conscious manner.

Good work and foreign material control practices were observed.

Knowledgeable technicians used approved procedures to conduct surveillance activities.

Knowledgeable technicians used approved procedures to conduct surveillance activities in a safety-conscious manner.

A good ventilation filtertesting program was implemented for ESF filtered ventilation systems.

A good ventilation filtertesting program was implemented.

The engineered safety feature filtered ventilation systems were routinely tested within the intervals required by technical specifications.

Test procedures followed regulatory guidance.

Individuals performing in-place filtertesting had received related training and were knowledgeable of testing requirements and acceptance criteria. System engineers demonstrated a good knowledge of equipment status and of industry events related to air cleaning systems.

12/26/1998 1998009-02 Pri: MAINT Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000528 PALO VERDE 1 NRC NCV Prl: 5A Sec: 3A Ter:

FAILURETO PROPERLY MONITOR THE PASS UNDER THE MAINTENANCERULE Rupture of the low pressure portion of the Unit 1 postaccident sampling system (PASS) on July 16, 1998, resulted from a failure to take timely and appropriate actions to correct four maintenance rule repetitive functional failures that occurred between 1993 and 1998, a violation of 10 CFR 50.65(a)1.

Inadequate evaluation of the Unit 1 PASS history prior to July 10, 1996, for maintenance rule repeat functional failures resulted in the failure to monitor and establish goals for the system for 6 months after implementation of the maintenance rule. The licensee identified this issue as a significant Quality Assurance program breakdown.

This was licensee. identified and is a noncited violation of 10 CFR 50.65(a)2 12/26/1998 1998009-03 Prl: MAINT Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000528 PALO VERDE 1 NRC VIOIV Prl: 2B Sec:

Ter:

Failure to take corrective actions to prevent recurrence of Unit 1 PASS overpressure events.

Rupture of the low pressure portion of the Unit 1 postaccident sampling system (PASS) on July 16, 1998, resulted from a failure to take timely and appropriate actions to correct four maintenance rule repetitive functional failures that occurred between 1993 and 1998, a violation of 10 CFR 50.65(a)1.

Inadequate evaluation of the Unit 1 PASS history prior to July 10, 1996, for maintenance rule repeat functional failures resulted in the failure to monitor and establish goals for the system for 6 months after implementation of the maintenance rule. The licensee identified this issue as a significant Quality Assurance program breakdown.

This was licensee. identified and is a noncited violation of 10 CFR 50.65(a)2.

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Page:

9 of 19 09/01/1999 1 1:1 6:08 IR Report 3 Region IV PALO VERDE Date Source Functional Area United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Primary Functional Area Template Item Title ID Type Codes Item Description Dockets Discussed:

05000528 PALO VERDE 1 05000529 PALO VERDE 2 05000530 PALO VERDE 3 1 1/14/1998 1998008 Pri: MAINT NRC POS Prl: 2A Material condition of all three units was good Sec:

Sec:

Matrerial condition of all three units was good.

Ter:

Dockets Discussed:

05000528 PALO VERDE 1 05000529 PALO VERDE 2 05000530 PALO VERDE 3 10/03/1998 1998007 Pri: MAINT NRC POS Pri: 3A Sec:

Sec:

Ter:

proactive Approach to Preventing Material Condition Deficiencies caused by boric acid accumulation.

A proactive approach for the prevention of material condition deficiencies caused by boric acid corrosion was implemented by the licensee.

Pre-outage containment walkdovms and zone inspections of auxiliary building components resulted in the early identification of potential problems that would result from boric acid corrosion 05/11/1999 1999008-01 Pri: ENG NRC NCV Prl: 4A Failure to maintain adequate drawing design control Sec:

Sec:

A noncited violation was identified for inadequate design control.

Dockets Discussed:

05000528 PALO VERDE 1 05000529 PALO VERDE 2 05000530 PALO VERDE 3 03/20/1999 1999004 Pri: ENG Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000528 PALO VERDE 1 05000529 PALO VERDE 2 05000530 PALO VERDE 3 NRC POS Ter:

Prl: 4B A Y2Kreadiness plan had been developed and was being Implemented by the licensee.

Sec: 4C A Y2K readiness plan had been developed and was being implemented by the licensee.

The plan was organized and contained the necessary elements to address current and potential problems from the Y2Kbug. A Y2K contingency plan has been developed, but not finalized. The licensee was well positioned to complete Y2K remediation prior to the end of the year.

03/20/1999 1999004-06 Pri: ENG Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000528 PALO VERDE 1 Licensee NCV Prl: 4A Sec:

Ter:

Failure to conduct an adequate design review of conduit penetrating flooding barriers Aviolation of Criterion IIIwas identified for not specifying the correct type of seal fittings for conduits. As a result, during flooding of a portion of the auxiliary building, water entered the conduits. This affected the operability of safety. related equipment.

This Severity Level IVviolation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Appendix C of the enforcement policy. This issue is in the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report/Disposition Request 1-60236.

~ a v.m tf'n~nunnnn r nllnealia Atharva Frnm 10/01/1998 TO 07/16/1999

.0 of 19 i999 11:16:08 ieport 3 Region IV PALO VERDE United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Primary Functional Area Date Source Functional Area Template ID Type Codes Item Title Item Description 02/06/1999 1998010.01 Prl: FNG Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000528 PALO VERDE 1 05000529 PALO VERDE 2 05000530 PALO VERDE 3 02/06/1999 1998010 02 Pri: ENG Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000528 PALO VERDE 1 05000529 PALO VERDE 2 05000530 PALO VERDE 3 NRC NCV NRC NCV Prl: 4B Sec:

Ter:

Pri: 3A Sec: 3C Ter:

Failure to establish adequate measures to ensure correct parts are selected for modifications Several deficiencies in the work control and planning process were identified by the licensee.

The combination of poor planning, engineering, technical reviews, verification inspection criteria, and verification specifications were identified. In addition, a lack of periodic monitoring of modification activities and effective planner and worker

. training were noted. These problem areas resulted in poor work planning in the plant design modification and welding areas.

Some personnel involved in the work planning process did not devote the required attention to detail to perform effective planning. Two noncited violations were identified. A violation of Criterion IIIoccurred when a design error resulted in the installation of an improper component, which eventually failed.

Failure to establish adequate measures to ensure that nondestructive testing is accomplished Several deficiencies in the work control and planning process were identified by the licensee.

The combination of poor planning, engineering, technical reviews, verification inspection criteria, and verification specifications were identified. In addition, a lack of periodic monitoring of modification activities and effective planner and worker training were noted. These problem areas resulted in poor work planning in the plant design modification and welding areas.

Some personnel involved in the work planning process did not devote the required attention to detail to perform effective planning.

Aviolation of Criterion IX occurred when code-required nondestructive examination was not performed on modification welds prior to placing the system in service. This resulted in a train of auxiliary feedwater later being dedared inoperable until the examinations were performed and evaluated.

02/06/1999 1998010-03 Pri: ENG Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000528 PALO VERDE 1 05000529 PALO VERDE 2 05000530 PALO VERDE 3 NRC NCV Prl: 4A Sec: 4C Ter:

Failure to maintain design control measures for replacement part commensurate with the original design The licensee failed to maintain adequate design control measures when the cooling water line flexible joints for the emergency diesel generators were replaced.

The replacement joints were not preapproved for use. The appropriate design measures were nol taken to verify that the new joints could perform their intended safety function. Failure of these joints would render the diesels inoperable.

The licensee promptly responded to address the issue and identified numerous other diesel expansion joint design discrepancies.

Upon completion of an evaluation, the licensee determined that the joints would perform satisfactorily and all emergency diesel generators remained operable.

This problem is a violation of Criterion III;however, this Severity Level IVviolation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Appendix C of the NRC Enforcement Policy.

Dockets Discussed:

05000530 PALO VERDE 3 11/14/1998 1998008 Pri: ENG NRC NEG Pri: 2A Sec:

Sec:

Tel" Insufficient planning for retrieval of foreign material in Unit 3 reactor vessel.

The engineering disposition of foreign material left in the Unit 3 reactor vessel was thorough and reasonable.

Better planning of the retrieval operation would have allowed recovery of the material.

11/14/1998 1998008 Prl: ENG Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000528 PALO VERDE 1 NRC NEG Pfl: 4B Sec:

Ter:

Weak safety evaluation for Unit 1 activity In general

~ the licensee's response to correct the pinhole leak in the service water supply line to the water-to-air aftercooler of Unit 1 Emergency Diesel Generator B was adequate.

However, the initial safety eva!uation, to provide a conditional release from applying the epoxy coating to the pipe interior until the next refueling outage, did not adequately consider the affects of the damaged epoxy coating on other system components should the coating not adhere to the pipe.

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Page:

11 of 19 09/01/1 999 11:16:08 IR Report 3 Region IV PALO VERDE Date Source Functional Area United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Primary Functional Area Template Item Title ID Type Codes Item Description 10/03/1998 1998007 Prl: ENG NRC NEG Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000528 PALO VERDE 1 05000529 PALO VERDE 2 05000530 PALO VERDE 3 Prl: 4A Sec: 3A Ter:

Inadequate Information Notice Evaluation on Refueling Water Tank Level Instrumentation The initial documented evaluation of an information notice did not fullyaddress the issue of the refueling water tank level instrumentation being affected by the fuel building ventilation system.

However, instrument uncertainty appropriately accounted for the maximum level error that the refueling water tank would experience due to ventilation system operation 07/01/1999 1999013-01 Pri: PLTSUP NRC NCV Prl: 2A Sec:

Sec:

Ter:

Dockets Discussed:

05000528 PALO VERDE 1 05000529 PALO VERDE 2 05000530 PALO VERDE 3 Eight security perimeter detection zones defeated by inspectors.

A violation of Paragraphs 6.3.1 and 6.9.2.2 of the Physical Security Plan. Amendment 43, was identified when eight detection zones were defeated by the NRC inspectors and contractors.

This Sevedty Level IVviolation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Appendix C of the NRC Enforcement Policy. The violation was placed in the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report/Disposition Report 990660.

06/10/1999 1999013 Pri: PLTSUP NRC STR Pri: 1A Personnel access to plant protected area effectivel controlled.

Sec:

Sec: 3A Tests of the metal detection and x-ray search equipment, coupled with the performance of the guard force, indicated that the licensee effectively con'trolled personnel access to the plant protected area (Section S1.1).

Ter:

Dockets Discussed:

05000528 PALO VERDE 1 05000529 PALO VERDE 2 05000530 PALO VERDE 3 06/10/1999 1999013 Prl: PLTSUP NRC STR Prl: 1C Excellent performance during two force-on-force exercises.

Sec:

Sec: 3B The licensee performed in an excellent manner during two force-on-force exercises (Section S8.1).

Ter:

Dockets Discussed:

05000528 PALO VERDE 1 05000529 PALO VERDE 2 05000530 PALO VERDE 3 06/10/1999 1999013 Pri: PLTSUP NRC STR Prl: 2A Sec:

Sec: 4A Ter:

Dockets Discussed:

05000528 PALO VERDE 1 05000529 PALO VERDE 2 05000530 PALO VERDE 3 Responses during security exercises and table top drills were effective.

The new modular vital area barriers significantly increased the time line for response personnel. The reduction in the number of armed responders assigned to each unit was evaluated during exercises and table top drills. Responses during both the exercises and the table top drills were effective (Section S2.2).

Item Tvne IComoliance,Followup,Other), From 10/01/1 998 To 07/16/1999

Page:

12 of 19 09/01/1999 11:16:08 IR Report 3 Region IV PALO VERDE Date Source Functional Area United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Primary Functional Area Template Item Title ID Type Codes Item Description 05/11/1999 1999008 Prl: PLTSUP NRC POS Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000528 PALO VERDE 1

05000529 PALO VERDE 2 05000530 PALO VERDE 3 Pri: 5A Inservice Inspection program self-assessment was thorough, objective and Inslghfful.

Sec: 5B The most recent inservice inspection program selt-assessment was quite thorough, objective, and insightful. Issues were identified and documented in condition reports/disposition requests, and were being tracked in the licensee's corrective action program.

05/07/1999 1999009 Pri: PLTSUP Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000528 PALO VERDE 1 05000529 PALO VERDE 2 05000530 PALO VERDE 3 NRC STR Pri: 1C Sec: 3B Ter:

Effective implementation of radiological envlromental monitoring and meterologlcal monitoring programs.

Overall, effective radiological environmental monitoring and meteorological monitoring programs were implemented.

Implementation of the radiological environmental monitoring program was in accordance with Technical Specifications and the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual. Sample collection, analyses, and associated analyses report forms were conducted in accordance viith procedural requirements.

Implementation of the meteorological monitoring program agreed with the guidance contained in Regulatory Guide 1.23 and commitments in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report. Excellent meteorological data recovery in 1998 was noted (99.7 percent).

Knowledge and performance of the radiological environmental monitoring and meteorological monitoring programs personnel were outstanding Dockets Discussed:

05000528 PALO VERDE 1 05000529 PALO VERDE 2 05000530 PALO VERDE 3 05/07/1999 1999009 Pri: PLTSUP NRC STR Pri: 5A Sec:

Sec:

Ter:

Comprehensive audits and evaluations.

Comprehensive audits and evaluations were performed by well experienced auditors along with outside technical specialists.

Audit findings were appropriately placed in the licensee's corrective action process.

Corrective actions were generally timely and effective (Section R7.1).

05/07/1999 1999010 Pri: PLTSUP NRC POS Prl: 2A Rad waste facilities materal conditon was good.

Sec:

Sec:

The material condition within the licensee's waste facilities was good. Tanks and piping in the rooms showed no signs of degradation.

There were no indications of resin spillage( Section R2).

Ter:

Dockets Discussed:

05000528 PALO VERDE 1 05000529 PALO VERDE 2 05000530 PALO VERDE 3 p5/p7/1999 1999010 Prl: Pl TSUP NRC POS Pri: 3A Good program for packagIng and shipping radioactive materials and waste.

Sec:

Sec:

The licensee maintained a good program for packaging and shipping radioactive materials and radioactive waste (Section R1.2).

Ter:

Dockets Discussed:

05000528 PALO VERDE 1 05000529 PALO VERDE 2 05000530 PALO VERDE 3 r

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Page:

13 of 19 09/01/1999 11:16:08 IR Report 3 Region IV PALO VERDE Date Source Functional Area United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Primary Functional Area Template Item Title ID Type Codes Item Description Dockets Discussed:

05000528 PALO VERDE 1 05000529 PALO VERDE 2 05000530 PALO VERDE 3 Ter:

05/07/1999 1999010-01 Pri: PLTSUP Licensee NCV Prl: 3A Sec:

Sec:

Ter:

Dockets Discussed:

~

05000528 PALO VERDE 1 05000529 PALO VERDE 2 05000530 PALO VERDE 3 04/09/1999 1999007 Pri: PLTSUP NRC POS Prl: 3A Sec:

Sec:

-Ter:

Dockets Discussed:

05000528 PALO VERDE 1 05000529 PALO VERDE 2 05000530 PALO VERDE 3 05/07/1999 1999010 Pri: PLTSUP NRC STR Prl: 3A Sec:

Sec:

Implementation of a good solid radioactive waste management program.

The licensee implemented a good solid radioactive waste management program. Radioactive material was correctly stored and controlled. Radioactive waste was correctly classified and stabilized for burial. Waste manifests were prepared in accordance with regulatory requirements (Section R1.1).

Failure to placard a radioactive waste transport vehicle in accordance with 49CFR 172.504 The licensee failed to pfacard a radioactive waste transport vehicle, in violation of 49 CFR 172.504. This Severity Level IVviolation is being treated as a noncited violation. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report/Disposition Request 99.0287 (Section R1.2).

Good radioactive material controls were maintained.

Good radioactive material controls were maintained.

Radiation workers generally used good contamination control practices.

Radiation protection personnel surveyed items correctly before releasing them from the radiological controlled area.

The licensee maintained a sufficient supply of calibrated radiation detection instruments.

Radiation dose rates and airborne radioactivity concentrations were evaluated correctly.

04/09/1999 1999007 Pri: PLTSUP Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000528 PALO VERDE 1 05000529 PALO VERDE 2 05000530 PALO VERDE 3 NRC POS PI'I: 3A Sec:

Ter:

The licensee implemented good radiation exposure controls.

The licensee implemented good radiation exposure controls. Radiation workers were thoroughly instructed in the radiation hazards and precautions to reduce radiation dose.

The radiation work permit authorization process was not implemented properly, but the licensee addressed the situation promptly. Radiation protection personnel provided good support and oversight of radiological controlled area work activities, Dockets Discussed:

05000528 PALO VERDE 1 05000529 PALO VERDE 2 05000530 PALO VERDE 3 04/09/1999 1999007 Prl: PLTSUP NRC

. POS Pri: 3A Sec:

Sec: 3C Ter:

Outage preparations demonstrated strong support for ALARA.

The licensee's preparations for the outage demonstrated strong support for the ALARAconcept.

Radiological work packages included dose saving measures.

Chemistry controls, temporary shielding, and hot spot flushing reduced dose rates in work areas.

The licensee established a challenging ALARAgoal for Unit 2 Refueling Outage 8.

Page:

14 of 19 09/01/1 999 11:16:08 IR Report 3 Region IV PALO VERDE Date Source Functional Area United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Primary Functional Area Template Item Title ID Type Codes Item Description 03/26/1999 1999005 Pri: PLTSUP NRC STR Prl: 1C Excellent security procedures.

Sec:

Sec: 2B The security procedures were excellent in that they were well written and comprehensive and provided performance. based instruction for the security organization.

Ter:

Dockets Discussed:

05000528 PALO VERDE 1 05000529 PALO VERDE 2 05000530 PALO VERDE 3 03/26/1999 1999005 Pri: PLTSUP NRC STR Prl: 1C A very good security event reporting program.

Sec:

Sec: 3A A very good security event reporting program was in place. The security staff was correctly reporting security events.

The security field repoAs were accurate and well written.

Ter:

Dockets Discussed:

05000528 PALO VERDE 1 05000529 PALO VERDE 2 05000530 PALO VERDE 3 Dockets Discussed:

05000528 PALO VERDE 1 05000529 PALO VERDE 2 05000530 PALO VERDE 3 03/26/1999 1999005 Pri: PLTSUP NRC STR Prl: 1C Excellent Implementation of security compensatory measures.

Sec:

Compensatory measures were implemented in an excellent manner.

The security officers were well trained on the program requirements.

Ter:

Dockets Discussed:

05000528 PALO VERDE 1 05000529 PALO VERDE 2 05000530 PALO VERDE 3 03/26/1999 1999005 Prl: PLTSUP NRC STR Pri: 1C Sec:

Sec: 3B Ter:

Training and qualification for security officers program was excellent.

The licensee training program exceeded the training and qualification plan requirements.

The security officers demonstrated a thorough knowledge of program requirements.

Instructors observed during the inspection were very proficient. The training and qualification program was excellent.

03/26/1999 1999005 Pri: PLTSUP NRC STR Pri: 3A Well trained and capable security organization.

Sec:

Sec: 3B The licensee had a well trained and capable security organization.

Ter:

Dockets Discussed:

05000528 PALO VERDE 1 05000529 PALO VERDE 2 05000530 PALO VERDE 3 en n

~ i ~v~i ~~ei~ hihar'I crnm 10/01/1998 To 07/16/1999

Page:

15 of 19 09/01/1999 11:16:08 IR Report 3 Region IV PALO VERDE Date Source Functional Area United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Primary Functional Area Template Item Title ID Type Codes Item Description 03/26/1999 1999005 Prl: PLTSUP NRC STR Prl: 3A Implementation of security program by well qualified and highly professional staff.

Sec:

Sec: 3B The security program was implemented by a well qualified and highly professional staff.

Dockets Discussed:

05000528 PALO VERDE 1 05000529 PALO VERDE 2 05000530 PALO VERDE 3 03/1 1/1999 1999001 Pri: PLTSUP NRC NEG Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000528 PALO VERDE 1 05000529 PALO VERDE 2 05000530 PALO VERDE 3 Ter: 3C Prl: 1A Sec:

Ter:

Control room simulator staff performance was satisfactory during emergency plan drill.

Control room simulator staff performance was satisfactory. Analysis of plant conditions was acceptable: however, command and control and conduct of operations were not always effective. Three.leg communications were not used in some instances, and communications concerning plant status were delayed on some occasions.

03/11/1999 1999001 Dockets Discussed:

05000528 PALO VERDE 1 05000529 PALO VERDE 2 05000530 PALO VERDE 3 Pri: PLTSUP NRC POS Sec:

Pri: 1C Emergency preparedness exercise performance was good.

Sec: 1B Overall exercise performance was good. The control room, satellite technical support center, technical support center, operations support center, and emergency operations facilitysuccessfully implemented key emergency plan Ter: 3B requirements Including emergency classifications, off-site notification, off-hours emergency response facirity activation, emergency worker protection, dose assessment, and protective action recommendations.

Dockets Discussed:

05000528 PALO VERDE 1 05000529 PALO VERDE 2 05000530 PALO VERDE 3 Ter:

03/11/1999 1999001 Pri: PLTSUP

~ NRC POS Pri: 5A Sec:

Sec:

Effective emergency preparedness critique process.

The overall critique process was effective in identifying issues in need of corrective action and areas for improvement.

The post-exercise facilitycritiques were conducted systematically and identified many issues with facilityoperations and the scenario.

The management critique was thorough and self.critical.

03/11/1999 1999001-01 Prl: PLTSUP Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000528 PALO VERDE 1 05000529 PALO VERDE 2 05000530 PALO VERDE 3 NRC IFI Pri: 1C Emergency plan exercise weakness-failure to set facilitypriorities.

Sec: 5B An exercise weakness was identified in the technical support center for failure to establish and communicate facility priorities to the operations support center to ensure that mitigation efforts were properly accomplished.

The engineering group was the only functional area that dearly established priorities. There was no integration between functional area directors to develop overall facilitypriorities. As a result: (1) a post-earthquake recovery plan was developed by the engineering group without input from other functional areas, (2) field activities which involved multiple disciplines were not well coordinated, and (3) the operations support center was given multiple directions.

This exercise weakness was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Item 99-0283; therefore, no response is requested.

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Page:

16 of 19 09/01/1999 11:16:08 IR Report 3 Region IV PALO VERDE Date Functional Source Area United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Primary Functional Area Template Item Title ID Type Codes Item Description 01/29/1 999 1 999003 Dockets Discussed:

05000528 PALO VERDE 1 05000529 PALO VERDE 2 05000530 PALO VERDE 3 Pri: PLTSUP NRC STR Sec:

Pri: 3A Sec: 3B Ter:

The licensee implemented a good radioactive effluent management program.

The licensee implemented a good radioactive effluent management program. The licensee's radioactive effluent sampling, analysis, and dose projection program met the requirements of the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual.

Releases of radioactive effluents were viithin regulatory requirements and did not exceed the commitments within the Final Safety Analysis Report. The licensee calibrated the effluent monitors correctly and maintained them well, particularly in view of the lack of manufacturer's support. Chemistry technicians who prepared radioactive effluent release permits were qualified iriaccordance to procedural requirements and regulatory guidance.

Dockets Discussed:

05000528 PALO VERDE 1 05000529 PALO VERDE 2 05000530 PALO VERDE 3 11/14/1998 1998008 Pri: PLTSUP NRC POS Pri: 1A Sec:

Sec:

Ter:

Dockets Discussed:

05000530 PALO VERDE 3 01/29/1999 1999003 Prl: PLTSUP NRC STR Prl: 5A Sec:

Sec: 5B Ter: 5C The licensee provided good oversight of the radioactive effluent monitoring program.

The licensee provided good oversight of the radioactive effluent monitoring program.

Nuclear assurance division audits were comprehensive, and the audit team had the proper technical expertise to provide insightful observations.

The self-assessment of radiation monitoring activities demonstrated the licensee's ability to be self-critical and to identify areas in need of improvement.

Excellent radiation protection controls during Unit 3 refueling outage.

Implementation of radiological controls in the Unit 3 refueling outage was characterized by excellent radiation protection controls and effective radiation work practices.

Source term reduction effo'rts were successful in reducing overall radiation exposure.

10/24/1998, 1998013 Pri: PLTSUP NRC POS Prl: 2B Good program for searching personnel, packages, and vehicles.

Sec:

Sec:

Avery good program for searching personnel. packages, and vehicles was maintained.

Dockets Discussed:

05000528 PALO VERDE 1 05000529 PALO VERDE 2 05000530 PALO VERDE 3 Ter:

10/24/1998 1998013 Prl: PLTSUP NRC POS Prl: 2B Proper protected area barrier in place.

Sec:

Sec:

A proper protected area barrier was in place.

Dockets Discussed:

05000528 PALO VERDE 1 05000529 PALO VERDE 2 05000530 PALO VERDE 3 Ter:

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Page:

17 of 19 09/01/1 999 11:16:08 IR Report 3 Region IV PALO VERDE Date Source Functional Area United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Primary Functional Area Template Item Title ID Type Codes Item Description 10/24/1998 1998013 Prl: PLTSUP NRC POS Prl: 2B Very good security event reporting program in place.

Sec:

Sec:

Avery good security event reporting program was in place. The security staff was correctly reporting security events.

The security field reports were accurate and neat.

Ter:

Dockets Discussed:

05000528 PALO VERDE 1 05000529 PALO VERDE 2 05000530 PALO VERDE 3 Dockets Discussed:

05000528 PALO VERDE 1 05000529 PALO VERDE 2 05000530 PALO VERDE 3 10/24/1998 1998013 pri: pLTSUp NRC pOS Prl: 2B Audits of various security programs effective, thorough, and Intrusive.

Sec:

Sec:

Audits of the security, access authorization, and fitness. for-duty programs were effective, thorough, and intrusive.

Ter:

Dockets Discussed:

05000528 PALO VERDE I 05000529 PALO VERDE 2 05000530 PALO VERDE 3 10/24/1998 1998013 Prl: pLTSUp NRC STR Prl: 2B Effective implementation of safeguards contingency plan in response to a bomb threat.

Sec:

Sec:

The licensee effectively implemented the safeguards contingency plan in response to a bomb threat.

Ter:

Dockets Discussed:

05000528 PALO VERDE 1 05000529 PALO VERDE 2 05000530 PALO VERDE 3 10/24/1998 1998013 Pri: PLTSUP NRC POS Prl: 2B Very good senior management support for the security organization.

Sec:

Sec:

Senior management support for the security organization was very good. The security program was implemented by a well qualified and highly professional staff.

Ter:

10/24/1998 1998013.01 Pri: PLTSUP

~

NRC Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000528 PALO VERDE 1 05000529 PALO VERDE 2 05000530 PALO VERDE 3 VIOIV Pri: 2B Sec:

Ter:

Inadequate Changes to the Physical Security Plan Changes to security plans were reported within the required time frame. Revision 40 to the physical secunty plan was a violation in that changes were not made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(p). Implementing procedures met the performance requirements in the physical security plan.

Itr m Tvoe (Compliance.Followup,Other), From 10/01/1998 To 07/16/1999

Page:

18 of 19 09/01/1 999 11:16:08 IR Report 3 Region IV PALO VERDE Date Source Functional Area United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Primary Functional Area Template Item Title ID Type Codes Item Description Dockets Discussed:

05000528 PALO VERDE 1 10/03/1998 1998007 Pri: PLTSUP NRC NEG Pri: 1B Sec:

Sec: 3A Ter:

Late declaration of NOUE for Rupture of Unit 1 Acid Day Tank An untimely initial declaration (44 minutes) of a Notification of Unusual Event was made in response to rupture of the Unit 1 sulfuric acid day tank because the shift manager left the control room to personally assess the scene instead of implementing his emergency response responsibilities r.

inane /cnaa Tn n7/1n/1ooo

Page:

19 of 19 09/01/1999 1 1:16:08 IR Report 3 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Primary Functional Area Type Codes:

Template Codes:

Legend Functional Areas:

BU Bulletin CDR Construction DEV Deviation EEI Escalated Enforcement Item IFI Inspector follow-up item LER Licensee Event Report LIC Licensing Issue MISC Miscellaneous MV Minor Violation NCV NonCited Violation NEG Negative NOED Notice of Enforcement Discretion NON Notice ot Non.Conformance OTHR Other P21 Part 21 POS Positive SGI Safeguard Event Report STR Strength URI Unresolved item VIO Violation WK Weakness 1A Normal Operations 1 B Operations During Transients 1 C Programs and Processes 2A Equipment Condition 2B Programs and Processes 3A Work Performance 3B KSA 3C Work Environment 4A Design 4B Engineering Support 4C Programs and Processes SA Identification 5B Analysis SC Resolution ID Codes:

NRC NRC Selt Selt. Revealed Licensee Licensee OPS Operations MAINT Maintenance ENG Engineering PLTSUP Plant Support OTHER Other EFis are apparent violations of NRC Requirements that are being considered for escalated enforcement action in accordance with the 'General Statement ot policy and procedure for NRC Enforcement Action (Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600. However, the NRC has not reached its final enforcement decision on the issues identified by the EEls and the pIM entries may be modified when the final decisions are made.

URIs are unresolved items about which more informabon is required to determine whether the issue in question is an acceptable item, a deviation, a nonconformance, or a violagon. A URI may also be a potential violation that is not likelyto be considered for escalated enforcement action. However, the NRC has not reached its final conclusions on the issues, and the piM entries may be modified when the final conclusions are made.

~ ~

Y ~w IP'emnusnr a cnllnw<in Ather'I From 10/01/1998 To 07/16/1999

CW

Page1 of 1 09/16/1 999 08:54:46

~Units ins ection Activii Title ENCLOSURE 2

PALO VERDE Inspection / ActivityPlan 09/01/1999 - 03/31/2000 Number of NRC Inspectors / Individuals Planned Dates Start End Inspection Type 1.2,3 1.2,3 1.2.3 1,2,3 1,2.3 1.2,3 IP 37001 X02032 X02033 X02034 IP 2515/139 IP 40500 IP 64704 IP 83750 IP 82701 10 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluation Program PVI/INITIALEXAMS PV2/iNITALEXAMS PV3/INITIALEXAMS Insp of Licensee's Implementation of Generic Letter 96.01

~ Testing of Safety R Effectiveness Of Licensee Process to Identify, Resolve, And Prevent Problems Fire Protection Program Occupational Radiation Exposure Operational Status Of The Emergency Preparedness Program 08/30/1999 08/30/1999 08/30/1999 08/30/1999 09/13/1999 11/29/1999 12/06/1999 01/10/2000 01/24/2000 09/03/1999 09/03/1999 09/03/1999 09/03/1999 09/17/1999 12/03/1999 12/10/1999 01/14/2000 01/28/2000 Core Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable Safety Issues Core Core Core Core This report does not include INPO and OUTAGE activities.

Trsto. sssnnrt ~hn~ nnlv nn-sile and announced inspection procedures.