ML17300B170
| ML17300B170 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 12/21/1987 |
| From: | Ball J, Fiorelli G, Ivey K, Richards S, Sorensen C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17300B169 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-528-87-39, 50-529-87-38, 50-530-87-40, NUDOCS 8801110387 | |
| Download: ML17300B170 (18) | |
See also: IR 05000528/1987039
Text
U.
S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
Report
Nos:
Docket Nos:
License
Nos:
Licensee:
50-528/87-39,
50-529/87-38,
50-530/87-40
50-528,
50"529,
50-530
Arizona Nuclear
Power Project
P.
0.
Box 52034
Phoenix,
AZ. 85072-2034
Inspectors:
K. Ivey, Resident
nspector
Ins ection Conducted:
November 01,
1987 through December
J. Ball, Resident
nspector
G. Fsorelli,
Resi
nt Inspector
05,
1987.
t 2 - /I'-I'
Date Signed
l2-/P-d 7
Date Signed
l 2-/l'-'8 7
Date Signed
I2-/I'-P 7
Approved By:
C. Sorensen,
Pro
c
Inspector
S.
Richards,
Chief, Engineering Section
Date Signed
(2-2l-87
Date Signed
Summary:
Ins ection
on November
01
1987 throu
h December.
05
1987
Re ort Nos.
50-528/87-39
50-529/87-38
and 50-530/87-40
.
Areas Ins ected:
Routine, onsite,
regular
and backshift inspection
by
the three resident
inspectors
and one region based
inspector.
Areas
inspected
included:
followup of previously identified items;
review of
plant activities; plant tours;
engineered
safety feature
system
walkdowns; surveillance testing; plant .maintenance;
startup testing;
allegations;
and review of periodic and special
reports.
During this inspection the following Inspection
Procedures
were covered:
36301,
36301-1,
37700,
37700-1,
37700-2,
60710,
61701,
61726,
62700-1,
62703,
71707,
71707-1,
71710,
72302,
72308,
72583,
92701,
92702.
Results:
Of the
12 areas
inspected,
no violations were identified.
8801110387
871222
- DOCK 05000528
9
DETAILS
Persons
Contacted:
The below listed technical
and supervisory
personnel
were
among
those contacted:
Arizona Nuclear Power Project
J. Allen,
L. Brown,
F. Buckingham,
R. Butler,
B. Cederquist,
W. Fernow,
R. Gouge,
- J. G. Haynes,
W. E. Ide,
J. Kirby,
R. Papworth,
G. Perkins,
G. Sowers,
E. E.
Van Brunt,
J. Vorees,
R. Younger,
0. Zeringue,
Plant Manager, Unit 1
Manager,
Radiation Protection
and Chemistry
Operations
Manager, Unit 2
Director, Standards
and Technicl Support
Manager,
Chemical
Services
Manager, Training
Operations
Manager, Unit 3
Vice President,
Nuclear Production
Plant Manager, Unit 2
Director, Site Services
Director, guality Assurance
Yianager, Central Radiation Protectior
Manager,
Engineering Evaluations
Jr., Executive Vice President
Manager,
Nuclear Safety
Operations
Yianager, Unit I
Plant Manager, Unit 3
The inspectors
also talked with other licensee
and contractor
personnel
during the course of the inspection.
- Attended the Exit Meeting on December
10,
1987.
Previousl
Identified Items.
Unit I
Closed
Violation 50-528/87-01-03
Failure to Post All Accesses
to
a
a iation
rea
The licensee failed to post the required warning sign
on
a door
which allowed entry into a radiation area
and at the 100'levation
of the Turbine Building. It was subsequently
posted with the
required sign and documented
on the applicable survey record.
The
root cause
was determined to be personnel
oversight of the door as
an entrance
to the Turbine Building during the initial posting.
Radiation Protection Technicians
were instructed
by memo to ensure
required radiation area
postings
are properly completed.
This item is closed.
Closed
Fol I owu
Item 50-528 87-10-02 - Fol low~a Train~in
Records
This item was originated
when
a Unit
1 Shift Supervisor authorized
intentionally defeating
an engineered
safety feature
and voluntarily
entering Limiting Condition for Operation
(LCO) 3.0.3 during
a plant
cooldown.
Region
V sent the licensee
a Confirmatory Action Letter
(CAL) dated
Yiarch 6, 1987, confirming the licensee's
commitments to:
Revise administrative
procedures
to preclude intentionally
entering
LCO 3.0.3 except
under emergency conditions.
Ensure all operations
personnel
understand
the revision.
Ensure that all plant personnel
understand
the above policy.
In a subsequent
letter dated Harch 13,
1987,
Region
V asked
the
licensee
to address
additional questions
including:
Should preshift briefings
be held when conducting
complex
evolution?
Do operations
personnel
understand
that,
when unclear
situations arise,
they should stop, if possible,
and contact
management?
Vhat plant design aspects conflict with the Technical
Specifications?
The inspector
reviewed the revision to procedure
Conduct
of Shift Operations prohibiting intentionally entering
The inspector also reviewed
a memorandum
from the Operations
Supervisor to the individual Unit Superintendents
instructing Shift
Supervisors
they are prohibited from intentionally disabling safety
systems,
except
under certain specific circumstances.
The licensee
is currently in the process of ensuring that all
ANPP personnel
have
been instructed
concerning
verbatim compliance to procedures
and
consulting
management
when unclear situations arise.
The inspector also reviewed evidence of licensee
action to address
the other issues
stated
ab'ove,
and therefore this item is considered
closed.
Closed
Violation,50-528 87-10-03 Failure to Identif
and
~e re ate
oncon ormin
easurement
an
est
us ment
This violation was initiated when the inspector
found the
calibration past
due
on
a rotometer that was part of a grab sample
cart.
The licensee
subsequently
removed the overdue rotometer
and
replaced it with a calibrated rotometer.
Also, the licensee
took
action to enable radiation protection technicians
to more closely
monitor and control the calibration of their equipment.
Since the limited accuracy of rotometers
does
not qualify them
as
METE, rotometers
that are
used
as part of radiation protection
equipment
have
been
removed from the
MRTE calibration lists and
future calibrations will be performed
by radiation protection
under
the Radiation Protection Calibration
Program'.
This item is closed.
5D-528/6 -
-0
~id'onsiderations
for Ca
e
Racewa
This item was initiated when the inspector noticed
two boards lying
on
some cable
raceway
and tied to some nearby scaffolding.
The
boards
were to be used
by maintenance
personnel
to stand
on and
access
a damper located over the cable tray.
The inspector
had
expressed
a concern
over the additional
loading
on the raceway
supports after noting that
a safety analysis
accounting for this
type of transient
loading
had not been
performed.
The licensee
had committed to completing
a bounding calculation for
the loading effect on the worst case
cable support,
and also to
evaluate
the need for bounding calculations for other transient
loading situations.
The licensee
completed
a bounding calculation for transient
loads
on
cable trays
and supports
dated April 24,
1987.
The inspector
reviewed the calculation
and concluded that it had demonstrated
the
adequacy of the trays
and supports for access
by personnel.
In
addition, the licensee
had determined that
load analysis
was also
needed for HVAC ducts
and supports.
The calculation
was
performed
and while it showed the supports
and stiffeners to be
adequate, it showed the walls of the larger ducts
themselves
to be
inadequate
for transient
loads.
This information was forwarded to
the maintenance
department for use in planning work activities.
This item is closed.
Closed
Violation 50-528 87-17-02 - Inade uate Corrective Action
for Gravit
Drain
rou
Containment
S ra
to Containment
This violation resulted
from an event that occurred in Unit I that
was identical to an event'that
occurred in Unit 2 approximately
three
weeks before.
This occurred
when
ASME Section
XI stroke time
testing
was conducted
on
a containment
spray header
discharge
valve.
The associated
upstream isolation valves were not shut
and
270
gallons of water drained from the
RWT= to the containment building.
In the case of Unit 1, about
100 gallons drained to containment.
The licensee
determined
the root cause
to be
a personnel
error by a
licensed operator
who did not follow a caution statement
contained
in a surveillance test procedure.
Further, the caution statement
included
an action statement;
the procedure writers guide prohibits
such inclusions.
The licensee
committed to the following corrective action:
l.
A procedure
change
which changes
the closure of the associated
spray line valves
from a caution statement
to
a required action
statement.
This action was completed for all three units.
2.
These
events
were issued to the operations staff as Operations
Department
Experience
Reports
which were reviewed
by the
operations staff.
3.
The
ASME Section
XI surveillance test procedures
were reviewed
to incorporate
human factors
changes
which could prevent this
type of incident.
4.
The program for performing Special
Reports
and Investigations
was revised.
This revision included
a mechanism for
expeditiously disseminating
information from a Special
Reprot
or Investigation prior to final approval if it is determined
that
a similar event
has
a high probability of recurring in a
short time.
The inspector
reviewed documentary
evidence of the completion
of these four corrective actions
and
was satisfied with the
actions
taken.
This item is closed.
01
0111
I
d I
30-110/01-17-03
-
100~0B
11
S
111
ron h tontainm~ent
ra
vent
a
ves
This item was originated
when approximately
9000 gallons of
contaminated
water was spilled from the Refueling Water Tank
(RWT)
to the Auxiliary Building through the Containment
Spray System.
The
water was lost through two open vent valves during system venting
and filling, after the system
had undergone
a maintenance
outage.
A
valve lineup had
been accomplished after system restoration prior to
system filling and venting,
however,
these
two valves were excluded.
The reason
given by the licensee for the exclusion of these
two
valves
was that they had
been replaced during the system
outage
and
had
been neglected
to be included in the valve lineup.
As corrective action the Station Tagging
and Clearance
procedure,
was revised to require system restoration
not only on
the equipment actually tagged
by the clearance,
but also
any
components
that may have
been worked within the boundary of the
clearance.
It went so far as to suggest
performing
a complete
lineup within the clearance
boundary, if any doubt exists
as to the
status of the components.
Shift Supervisors
were then directed to familiarize themselves
and
their crew with this procedure
change.
This item is closed.
3.
Review of Plant Activities.
a
~
Unit
1
b.
Unit 1 continued the first cycle refueling outage
throughout
this inspection period.
The fuel shuffle was completed
on
November 8,
and Node
5 was entered
on December
2.
The licensee
continued to work on replacement
of reactor
coolant
pump
(RCP)
shafts, journal bearings,
and seal
assemblies
throughout the
period.
Yiajor activities completed
were the five year
inspections
on both trains of emergency diesel
generators,
and tube plugging,
and
on the shutdown cooling system
valves.
The major activities that remained to be
completed
were the train "A" integrated
safeguards
test
and
reassembly
and testing of the four RCPs.
Unit 2
C.
Unit 2 has operated at
100K until November
21 when the plant
was shutdown
under controlled conditions in order to repair two
pump speed
sensors.
The plant was restarted
on
November
22 but tripped from
7% power on the
same
day from a
combination of a bad matrix relay in one channel
and
a high
axial
shape
index condition in a second
channel
in the plant
protection system.
The plant was restarted
on November
23 and
operated
100Ã for the remainder of the period.
Unit 3
d.
Having completed
low power physics testing, Unit 3 was
shutdown
on November
1 in order to perform routine maintenance
while
awaiting Commission action
on issuance
of a full power license.
On November
23 the plant was restarted.
A full power license
was issued
on November
25 and the licensee
commenced
increasing
power to above
5k power entering
Yiode
1 for the first time on
November 26.
By the end of this inspection period, the
licensee
had completed testing through the
20Ã power plateau.
On December 5, the licensee
successfully
conducted
a test
shutting
down the reactor
from outside the control
room and
thus
was in Node
3 at the
end of the period.
Plant Tours
The following plant areas at Units 1,
2 and
3 were toured
by
the .inspector during the course of the inspection:
Auxiliary Building
Containment Building
Control
Complex Building
Diesel
Generator
Building
Radwaste
Building
Technical
Support Center
Turbine Building
Yard Area
and Perimeter
The following areas
were observed
during the tours:
0 eratin
Lo s and Records
Records
were reviewed against
echnica
Specs
ication and administrative control pro-
cedure requirements.
2.
3.
5.
6.
7.
Monitorin
Instrumentation
Process
instruments
were
o served for corre at~on Between
channels
and for con-
formance with Technical Specification requirements.
Shift Nannin
Control
room and shi ft manning
were
o served
or conformance with 10 CFR 50.54.(k), Technical
Specifications,
and administrative procedures.
E ui ment Lineu
s
Valve and electrical
breakers
were
ver>
se
to
e in the position or condition required
by
Technical Specifications
and Administrative procedures
for
the applicable plant mode.
This verification included
routine control board indication reviews
and conduct of
partial
system lineups.
~
~
E ui ment Ta
in
Selected
equipment, for which tagging
requests
a
een initiated,
was observed
to verify that
tags
were in place
and the equipment in the condition
specified.
General
Plant
E uipment Conditions
Plant equipment
was
o serve
or ind~cations~o
system leakage,
improper
lubrication, or other conditions that would prevent the
systems
from fulfilling their functional requirements.
Fire Protection
Fire fighting equipment
and controls were
~d<<
ihThi
1Sp ii
i
d
administrative
procedures.
8.
Plant Chemistr
Chemical analysis results
were reviewed
or conformance with Technical Specifications
and admin-
istrative control procedures.
9.
10.
~
~
~
Securit
Activities observed for conformance with
regu atory requirements,
implementation of the site
security plan,
and administrative
procedures
included
vehicle and personnel
access,
and protected
and vital area
integrity.
~P1
H
k
im
P1
di i
d
t
i 1/.
equipment storage
were observed
to determine
the general
state of cleanliness
and housekeeping.
Housekeeping
in
the radiologically controlled area
was evaluated with
respect
to controlling the spread of surface
and airborne
contamination.
11.
Radiation Protection Controls
Areas observed
included
p i,
d
within the radiological controlled areas
posting of
radiation
and high radiation areas,
compliance with
Radiation
Exposure Permits,
personnel
monitoring devices
being properly worn, and personnel
frisking practices.
'o violations of NRC requirements
or deviations
were identified.
En ineered
Safet
Feature
S stem Walkdowns - Units 1,
2 and 3.
Selected
engineered-safety
feature
systems
(and systems
important to
safety)
were walked
down by the inspector to confirm that the
systems
were aligned in accordance
with plant procedures.
During
the walkdown of the systems,
items
such
as hangers,
supports,
electrical
cabinets,
and cables
were inspected
to determine that
'hey
were operable,
and in
a condition to perform their required
functions.
Unit
1
Accessible portions of the following systems
were walked down on the
indicated date.
~Ss tern
Low Pressure
Safety Injection Aligned for Shutdown
Cooling System,
Train "B"
High Pressure
Safety Injection Aligned
for Boron Injection, Train "B"
Date
November
13
Novmeber
17
Emergency
Diesel Generator
System,
Train "B"
Emergency
Diesel Generator
System,
Train "A"
November
22
December
2
Unit 2
Accessible portions of the following ESF systems
were walked
down
on
the indicated dates.
~Sstem
Class
1E Battery Supply,
Channels
"B" and "D"
Date
November
13
Safety Injection Tanks
System,
Train "A"
November
14
November
17
System,
Train "A"
November
25
Unit 3
Accessible portions of the following systems
were walked
down on the
indicated dates.
Emergency
Diesel Generator,
Train "B"
November
18
~Sstem
Diesel
Generator
System,
Train "A"
High Pressure
Safety Injection System,
Trains "A" and "B"
Date
November
14
November
28
Low Pressure
Safety Injection,
Trains "A" and "B"
November
28
System,
Trains "A" arid "B"
December
4
No violations of NRC requirements
or deviations
were identified.
5.
Surveillance Teston
- Units 1,
2 and 3.
a ~
Surveillance tests
required to be performed
by the Technical
Specifications
(TS) were reviewed
on
a sampling basis
to verify
that:
1) the surveillance tests
were correctly included
on the
facility schedule;
2)
a technically adequate
procedure existed
for performance of the surveillance tests;
3) the surveillance
tests
had
been
performed at the frequency specified in the TS;
and 4) test results satisfied
acceptance
criteria or were
properly dispositioned.
b.
Portions of the following surveillances
were observed
by the
inspector
on the dates
shown:
Unit 1
Procedure
Unit 2
Procedure
Descri tion
Diesel
Engine Five Year
Inspection, Train "A"
Descri tion
Plant Protection
System
Bistable Trip Units
Functional Test.
Dates
Performed
November 17,
and
22
Dates
Performed
November 17, 18,
and
25
Control Element Assembly
Position Log.
November
18
Ko violations of NRC requirements
or deviations
were identified.
6.
Plant Yiaintenance - Units 1,
2 and 3.
a
~
During the inspection period, the inspector
observed
and re-
viewed documentation
associated
with maintenance
and problem
investigation activities to verify compliance with regulatory
requirements,
compliance with administrative
and maintenance
procedures,
required
QA/QC involvement, proper
use of safety
tags,
proper equipment alignment
and use of jumpers,
personnel
qualifications,
and proper retesting.
The inspector verified
reportability for these activities was correct.
b.
The inspector witnessed
portions of the following maintenance
activities:
Unit
1
Descri tion
Dates
Performed
o 'arious
Corrective Maintenance
November
17
on Diesel Generator,
Train "A"
Unit 2
Dates
Performed
o
Correct Cable Bending Problem
on Control
Room Recorders.
November
16
o
Installation of the Breathing
Air Hold Tank.
November
24
o
Troubleshooting
RU-141
Operabi
1 ity.
Unit 3
~II
i t.i
November
25
Dates
Performed
o
Troubleshooting
Nain Steam Isolation
November 9,
10
System Logic Cabinet
No violations of NRC requirements
or deviations
were identified.
7.
t1SIY
- Unit 3
A troubleshooting effort to determine the cause for the spurious
opening of MSIV 170 following reenergization
of its control circuit
confirmed the problem to be related to
a bad logic card.
The valve
malfunction could be repeated
several
times with the card installed
10
as well as during bench tests.
Replacement
of the card corrected
the problem.
The card along with a second
card which had produced
similar anomolus operation of the valve were returned to the vendor
for evaluation.
A main steam valve isolation signal
would not have
allowed the valve to open, or would have closed the valve had it
opened
due to the failed card.
No violations of NRC requirements
or deviations
were identified.
Seismic
Event - Units 1,
2 and
3
At 6: 18 AM, on November 24, 1987, floor motion was experienced
in
the contral
rooms of all three units
and throughout the plant area.
At the time of the disturbance
Unit
1 was in mode 6, Unit 2 in
mode
1 and Unit 3 in mode 2.
An analysis of the seismic event to
determine its intensity was undertaken.
At the time of the event
the seismic monitoring system
was out of service, due'o
a
malfunction in the playback unit.
Troubleshooting
was in progress.
The monitoring portion of the system
however,
was capable of sensing
an alarm condition.
There are three monitors which produce direct
alarming of the monitor.
They are located
(1)
on the 55'evel of
the tendon gallery - setpoint:
0.01g,
(2) on the 140'evel
of
containment - setpoint:
0.02g
and (3) on the tendon gallery floor-
setpoint: 0.0lg.
No alarms
were received in the Unit
1 control
room.
Observations
noted throughout the plant area
included:
o
The unit
1
RV head
was in the process
of being set
on the
vessel.
The System Engineer noted that the head,
suspended
form the polar crane,
appeared
to "jerk slightly up and down."
Additionally, motion was felt by an individual on the "D-Ring".
Water movement in the upper guide structure pit was also seen.
o
An individual reported floor motion on the second floor of the
Annex Building.
No objects
were observed to fall on the floor.
o
In Unit 3 water movement
was noted in the spent fuel pool
and
the fuel building door swung
on its hinges,
approximately 1-2".
-Based
on these
observations
the event
was classified,
per procedure
9IS-9SMOl "Analysis of Seismic Events",
as
an intensity level
V
seismic event corresponding
to a ground acceleration
of 0.015 to
0.033g.
Since the seismic triggers did not activate,
the ground
acceleration
would be expected
to be 0.01 to 0.02g.
This was
considered
consistent with the range of the Level
V event.
The Evaluations
Engineering
group was contacted
to implement the
inspections
in procedure
"Control Building Wall Seismic
Limits."
No problems
were noted.
The
PVNGS action level for declaring
a Notification of Unusual
Event
(NUE), is
a ground acceleration
O.lg.
As a result the occurrence
was not classified
as
a
NUE.
11
During the review of the analysis results,
the following
considerations
were
made
by the licensee.
The seismic trigoers
noted above did not alarm during the course of the event.
As
a
result the digital tape
system
was not activated.
The setpoints for
the seismic triggers were verified to be correct
by Instrumentation
and Control.
Additionally, though the playback unit was- in the
process
of being repaired, it was verified that the unit would have
alarmed for a seismic event of 0.0lg's in magnitude.
The event
was conservatively classified
as being 0.02g's
(Technical
Specification reportability intensity)
and that
no further analysis
would be required.
No violations of NRC requirements
or deviations
were identified.
Startu
Testin
- Unit 3
The inspector witnessed
portions of the following tests:
Procedure
73PA-3FW03
73PA-3SF02
Descri tion
Initia 1 Generator
Excitati on
FWCS Valve Transfer from
Downcomer to Economizer
Linear Power Subchannel
Calibration
Shutdown
from Outside Control
Room
Dates
Performed
November
28
December
1
December 2,
3
December
5
The inspector verified that approved
procedures
were used, test
personnel
were knowledgeable of the test requirements,
and data
was
properly collected.
Procedure
changes
and test exceptions
were
identified and significant events
were recorded
in the test log.
Other test related activities such
as the use of calibrated
measuring
and test equipment
and completion of test prerequisites
were also verified to have
been
accomplished
in accordance
with
administrative control procedures.
Successful
completion of
"Shutdown from Outside Control
Room" closes
Followup
Item 50-530/87-09-01.
No violations of NRC requirements
or deviations
were identified.
Containment
Local
Leak Rate Testin
Unit I
The ins~ector
reviewed procedure
"Containment
Leakage
Type "B'nd "C" Testing" for the observation of local leak rate
testing
(LLRT) on penetration
826 (shutdown'ooling
loop 2).
The
inspector
noted that the procedure
included:
o
notification of the Shift Supervisor prior to the start of any
work,
o
requirements
for the number of test personnel
and their
qualifications,
12
o
verification of test equipment calibration
and the current
revision of the procedure,
o
detailed test instructions
and system valve lineups,
o
acceptance
criteria for completion of the test,
and
o
contingencies
to be taken in the event of an unsuccessful
test.
The inspector
observed
the performance of the
LLRTs for containment
isolation valves
SI-UY-656 and SI-HY-690 associated
with shutdown
cooling loop b2.
The inspector verified that procedural
controls
were followed including venting
and draining of the system, test
equipment setup,
pressurization
of the penetration,
and satisfactory
completion of the tests.
Ho violations of NRC requirements
or deviations
were identified.
11.
Alle ation Followu
Alle ation RY-87-A-54
Characterization
A caller to the resident inspector's office stated that many
fire penetrations
in the Auxiliary Building and Control
Building of all three units were either open or had holes in
the seals.
~lid'
'
i,C <<i
~O
Inadequate fire penetration
seals
would increase
the
possibility of a single fire spreading
to more than
one fire
area without being detected
or extinguished.
This could result
in the failure, due to fire, of redundant trains of
safety-related
systems.
Assessment
of 'Safet
Si nificance
The inspector
reviewed the licensee's fire protection
program
to determine
the method
used to track and compensate
for
inadequate fire protection seals.
Procedure
14AC-02ZOl "Fire
System
Impairment" requires that an inoperable penetration
seal
be compensated
for in one hour by a continuous fire watch or an
hourly fire watch patrol
and verification of the fire detection
system
on one side of the inoperable seal.
The licensee's fire protection
(FP) group maintains
a list of
open penetration
seals
to ensure that compensatory
measures
are
completed,
when required.
The input for the list comes
from
Fire Barrier Seal
Removal
Reouests
(FBSRR) submitted
by
maintenance
planning personnel
when
a work order is issued
which would include making
seal
A
13
copy of the
FBSRR is taken to the
FP group for input to the
list and the initiation of compensatory
measures, if required.
The inspector verified that the
FP group was maintaining
a
FBSRR list for each of the three units.
The inspector also
obtained
a sample of penetration
seals
that were included
on
open
and recently completed
work orders for all three units
and
compared it to the
FBSRR list.
From
a sample of 23
the inspector identified
2 that were not included
on the
FBSRR list.
One of these required
no compensatory
actions
as it was not in a required fire wall.
The
inoperability of the other seal
(¹22, 30A-ZYD-442, h'.0.
¹176408),
however, required
compensatory
measures.
The
inspector
noted that there were
no
FBSRRs included with the
work package
and
no work order step requiring the completion of
FBSRRs
even though two fire penetration
seals
and several-fire
breaks
were removed.
The inspector discussed
the discrepancies
with the fire
protection supervisor
who stated that this problem has occurred
before
and was
due to the fact that
FP personnel
only receive
the
FBSRRs given to them by maintenance
personnel
and that they
do not review all work orders.
However,
he also stated that
revisions to the fire protection procedures
were in progress
to
require that
FP personnel
review each
work order for its impact
on the fire protection program.
The inspector also noted that
due to problems with fire doors
and the large
number of
inadequate
seals,
the licensee
has maintained
hourly fire watch patrols in the auxiliary, control, diesel
generator, fuel, and radwaste
buildings for more than three
years.
Staff Position
Inadequate fire penetration
seals exist in all three units
and
the 'licensee's
system for tracking them at the time of the
inspection did not provide confidence that
FP personnel
were
aware of all of them.
However, hourly fire watch patrols
have
been in place in all three units for more than three years.
An
hourly fire watch is consistent with the compensatory
requirements
of the fire protection procedure.
The licensee
was also in the process of revising procedures
to ensure that
FP personnel
review work orders for their impact
on penetration
seals
and other fire protection concerns.
Action Re uired
This allegation is considered
closed,
however, followup
inspection is required to verify completion of the procedure
changes
to include fire protection review of all maintenance
work orders
(50-528/87-39-01).
No violations of NRC requirements
or deviations
were identified.
12.
Licensee
Event~Re ort HLER
Fol lowe
- Units
1
2 and 3.
The following LERs associated
with operating
events
were reviewed
by
the inspector.
Based
on the information provided in the report it
was conicluded that reporting requirements
had
been met, root causes
had
been identified,
and corrective actions
were appropriate.
The
below listed
LERs are considered
closed.
LER NUMBER
DESCRIPTION
Unit
1
87-12
87-23
Late Surveillance Tests
Due to Personnel
Errors
Channel
Check Not Performed
Due to Personnel
Error
Unit 2
87-18
87-20
CREFAS Actuation Caused
By a Spurious
Signal
From a
Radiation Monitor
CREFAS Actuation Caused
By a Spurious
Signal
From a
Radiation Monitor
No violations of NRC requirements
or deviations
were ideritified.
13.
Review of Periodic
and
S ecial
Re orts - Units 1,
2 and 3.
Periodic
and special
reports
submitted
by the licensee
pursuant to
Technical Specifications 6.9. 1 and 6.9.2 were reviewed
by the
inspector.
This review included the following considerations:
the report
contained
the information required to be reported
by
NRC require-
ments; test results
and/or supporting information were consistert
with design predictions
and performance specifications;
and the
validity of the reported information.
Within the scope of the
above,
the following reports
were reviewed
by the inspector.
Unit 1
o 'onthly Operating
Report for September
and October,
1987.
Unit 2
o
Monthly Operating
Report for September
and October,
1987.
Unit 3
o
Monthly Operating
Report for September
and October,
1987.
No violations of NRC requirements
or deviations
were identified.
15
The inspector
met with licensee
management
representatives
period-
ically during the inspection
and held
an exit on December
10, 1987;
0'