ML17299A303
| ML17299A303 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 05/24/1985 |
| From: | Van Brunt E ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO. (FORMERLY ARIZONA NUCLEAR |
| To: | Knighton G Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| ANPP-32732-EEVB, TAC-59247, NUDOCS 8505310215 | |
| Download: ML17299A303 (6) | |
Text
SUBJECT
- Responds to open item noted in App R Audit Insp Rept<<
50 528/85<<06 on 850304,Containment
.evaluated to address fire concern,Detafled component level spurious actuation study unnecessary, IZE DISTRIBUTION CODE,:
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ACCESSION;NSRo85053102i5 DOC ~ DATE: 85/05/24 NOTARIZED:
NO
DOCKET FACIL:STN 50. 528 Palo Verde. Nuclear Statfong Unit li Arizona Publf 05000528 AUTH~ NAME AUTHOR AFFILI'AT'ION VAN BRUNTi4>>,E.
Arizona Public Service Co.
RECIP ~ NAMEl RECIPIENT AFFILIATION KNIGHTONiG ~ W ~
Licensing Branch 3
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Arizona Nuclear Porter Project P.O. 8OX 52034 4
PHOENIX, ARIZONA85072-2034 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attention:
Mr. George W. Knighton, Chief Licensing Branch No.
3 Division of Licensing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.
20555 ANPP-32732-EEVB/WFQ May 24, 1985
Subject:
Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS)
Units 1, 2, and 3
Appendix R Audit Open Item (50-528/85-06-01)
Docket Nos.
STN 50-528 (License No. NPF-34)/529/530 File:
85-056-026;G.l.01.10
Reference:
Letter to G.
W. Knighton, NRC, from E.
E.
Van Brunt, Jr.,
ANPP, dated November 13, 1984;
Subject:
- 10CFR50, Appendix R Spurious Actuation Analysis (ANPP-31101)
Dear Mr. Knighton:
As a result of an NRC Region V Appendix R Audit (Inspection Nos.
50-528/85-06, 50-529/85-11, 50-530/85-08) conducted during the week of March 4,
- 1985, an open item (50-528/85-06-01) was identified concerning Spurious Actuation Analysis for a fire inside containment.
Four aspects of the containment design were evaluated to address this concern.
The results of tde evaluation are contained within.
- First, as discussed in the PVNGS FSAR Appendix 9A responses to FSAR Questions 9A.98 and 9A.130, adequate separation between Train A and Train B safe shutdown components is maintained inside containment to assure that a fire will not disable both trains.
- Second, although a postulated fire can potentially affect instru-mentation which could produce false readings, the operator has the capability of differentiating between correct and incorrect displays.
This capability exists because the safe shutdown equipment is listed by fire zone for inside containment in the Prefire Strategies Book.
- Also, a spurious ESFAS is identifiable and can be overriden by the operator in the control room.
Third, if an open circuit,.occurs in a containment power circuit the device fails to the desired or loss of power (LOP) position.
As discussed in Assumption/Basis No.
4 of the "Outside Control Room Fire Spurious Actuation Study", submitted in the referenced letter, hot shorts in three-phase power circuits resulting in maintained contact are not considered credible, therefore, the affected device will fail in its predesignated. safe position.
85053i02i5 850524 PDR:
ADOCK 05000528 8
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G.
W. Knighton Appendix R Audit Open Item A'HAPP-32732 Page 2
Last, there are no auxiliary relay cabinets or circuit breakers physically located within containment.
There is, however, breaker control and auxiliary relay control circuitry which is routed through containment.
These control circuits are of a type which when subjected to fire damage result in the loss of power to the device or in the inability to remotely control the device.
The, only devices which the latter occurrence affects are MOVs required for cold shutdown, therefore these valves can be locally manually operated.
Based on the evaluation a detailed component level spurious actuation study is not necessary to demonstrate ANPP compliance to 10CFR50, Appendix R.
Please contact Mr. W. F. guinn of my staff, should you have any questions.
Very truly yours, u.M ~~M<
E. E.
Van Brunt, Jr.
Executive Vice President project Director EEVB/KLM/mkm cc:
E. A. Licitra R.
P.
Zimmerman A. C. Gehr
, ~>(J,