ML17298B331

Forwards FSAR Changes,Reflecting Rev to Shutdown Cooling Design Pressure.Design Change Will Be Implemented to Shutdown Cooling Sys to Use Sys for Low Temp Overpressure Protection

ML17298B331
Person / Time
Site:	Palo Verde
Issue date:	10/09/1984
From:	Van Brunt E ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO. (FORMERLY ARIZONA NUCLEAR
To:	Knighton G Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
ANPP-30776-TFQ, NUDOCS 8410120063
Download: ML17298B331 (38)

Text

REGULATOR NFORMATION DISTRIBUTION

'TEM (RIDS)

AC'CESSION NBR 80 1 0 1 20063 DOC ~ DATE 84/1 0/'09 NOTARI ZED YES FACIL:STN 50 528 Palo Verde Nuclear Stationi Unit 1g Arizona Publi STN-50-529 Palo Verde Nuclear Station~

Unit 2~ Arizona Publi STN-50-530 Palo Verde Nuclear Station~

Unit 3~ Arizona Publi AUTH,{<AME AUTHOR AFFILIATION VAN BRUNTiE,E.

Arizona Public Service Co.

RECIP ~ NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION KNIGHTONgGp Licensing Branch 3

SUBJECT:

Forwards FSAR changesir eflecting rev to shutdown cooling design pressure, Design change will be implemented to shutdown cooling sys to use sys for low temp overpressure protection, DISTRIBUTION CODE:

B001D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL SIZE:

TITLE'icensing Submittal:

PSAR/FSAR Amdts 8, Related orrespondence NOTES:Standardized

plant, Standardized plant+

Standardized plant.

DOCKET 05000529 05000530 O5OoO528 05000529 05000530 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME NRR/DL/ADL NRR LB3 LA INTERNAL: ADM/LFMB IE FILE IE/DEPER/IRB 35 NRR ROEpM,L NRR/DE/CEB 11-NRR/DE/EQB 13 NRR/DE/MEB 18 NRR/DE/SAB 20 NRR/DHFS/HFEB40 NRR/DHFS/PSRB NRR/DS I/AEB 26 NRR/Dsr/CPB 10 NRR/DSI/ICSB 16 NRR/DS I/PSB 19 NRR/DSI/RSB 23 RGN5 EXTERNAL: ACRS 01 DMB/DSS (Ah1DTS)

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Arizona Public Service Company Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attention: Mr. George Knighton, Chief Licensing Branch No.

3 Division of Licensing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.

20555 October 9, 1984 ANPP-30776 TFQ/JYM

Subject:

Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS)

Units 1, 2 and 3

Docket Nos. STN-50-528/529/530 Shutdown Cooling System Upgrade File: 84-056-026.

G.1.01.10

Dear Mr. Knighton:

Attached are FSAR changes reflecting our revision to the, Shutdown Cooling design pressure.

Low Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP) for the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) at PVNGS is provided through the Shutdown Cooling System (SCS).

A design change wi11 be implemented to the SCS to facilitate the use of the SCS for LTOP and provide a suitable operating window for RCS operation where LTOP is required, specifically the SCS maximum operating suction pressure is being increased from 435 psig to 485 pslgo If you have any questions on this matter, please contact me.

Very truly your CIA E. E.

Van Brunt, Jr.

APS Vice President Nuclear Production ANPP Project Director EEVBJr/TFQ/JYM Attachments cc:

E. A. Licitra (w/attachment)

A. C. Gehr (w/attachment)

R.

Zimmerman (w/attachment) 8410120063 84l,009 PDR ADOCK 05000528 l

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ANPP-30776 STATE OF ARIZONA

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COUNTY OF MARICOPA)

I, Edwin E.

Van Brunt, Jr.,

represent that I am Vice President, Nuclear Production of Arizona Public Service

Company, that the foregoing document has been signed by me on behalf of Arizona Public Service Company with full authority to do so, that I have read such document and know its

contents, and that to the best of my knowledge and belief, the statements made therein are true.

Edwin E.

Van Brunt, Jr.

Sworn to before me this day of 1984.

C lh I'y <<Commission, Expires:

My f,'mlrilL~sjen CxpJjes hpr!I 8, ":38K Notary Public

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5.4.3 REACTOR COOLANT PIPING Refer to CESSAR Section 5.4.3.

0 COMPONENT AND SUBSYSTEM DESIGN 5.4.4 MAIN STEAM LINE FLON RESTRICTIONS Refer to CESSAR Section 5.4.4.

5.4.5 MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION SYSTEM Refer to CESSAR Section 5.4.5.

In addition, the main st'earn system valves and arrangement are described in section 10.3.2.

Main steam line isolation system operability is discussed in section 3.9.

5.4.6 REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM This system is not applicable to a pressurized water reactor.

5.4.7 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM

~wsE-wu Cj Hc~c 5.4.7.1 CESSAR Interface Re irements Provided below are interface requirements repeated from CESSAR Section 5.4.7.1.3.

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PVNGS FSAR COMPONENT AND SUBSYSTEM DESIGN 6

The elevation difference between the shutdown cooling line overpressure relief valves and the LPSI pump suction centerline is less than 45 feet.

s reduced to compensate for the elevation difference.

7.

RCS components are provided with equipment tags which include a designator, A, B, C,

D, or E, for safety'related components, or N for non-safety-related components.

8.

The elevation difference between the bottom dis-charge,nozzles of the SITs and the centerline of the LPSI pump suctions is less than 70 feet.

9.

10.

In the event of a limited leakage passive failure in one SCS train during long term cooling, per-sonnel access to the intact train will not be prevented by flooding.

However, access will be limited by the dose rate at the intact train.

Protection is provided from internally generated flooding that could prevent performance of safety-related functions.

Also refer to sections 3.6 and 9.3.3.

N.

Radiological Waste 1.

The containment emergency recirculation sump is designed to accept relief valve discharge from the shutdown cooling suction line overpressure relicf valves at temperatures up to 400F and at flows up to 4000 gal/min.

Amendment 12

,5.4-80 February 1984

PVHGS FSAR CONTAINANT SYSTEYiS G.

The CSS shall be protected against the dynamic effects associated with the postulated rupture of piping as discussed in section 3.6.

H.

The CSS shall be designed to permit periodic inspection and testing as described in section 16.3/4.

The CSS shall be designed to add hydrazine to the spray water to rapidly reduce fission product 'iodine concentration in the containment atmosphere.

System sizing shall be based on the long-term heat rejection function of the system.

The CSS shall use the shutdown cooling heat exchangers to reject heat from the containment.

Protection of the CSS from wind and tornado effects is discussed in section 3.3.

Flood design is discussed in section 3.4.

Missile protection is discussed in section 3.5.

Principal design codes and standards are given in table 3.2-1.

6.

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~ 2 Piping and instrumentation diagrams and spray header arrangements of the CSS are provided in figures 6.3-1 and 6.5-1.

A table o

the design and performance data for the system is provided in CESSAR Appendix 6A, Sections ~~ 3.3.2, 4.4.1, 4.4.2, and 663 Table 5.2 of CESSAR Appendix 6A shows plant protection signals and setpoints that actuate the CSS.

The assumed delay times following postulated accidents are tabulated in CESSAR Appendix 6A, Section 6.3.

A discussion of the delay times following receipt of the actuation signals is provided in section 7.3.

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PVNGS FSAR CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 08 A discussion of the extent to which the CSS is required to be remote manually operated from the main control room and the extent of operator intervention in system operation is provided in CESSAR Appendix 6A, Sections 4.0 and 5.064~ tl4661ZT Hn<<

A description of the qualification tests performed on system

~components is provided in CESSAR Sections 3.10 and 3.11.

Environmental test conditions, as shown in CESSAR Figure 3.11A-1, are representative of post-accident conditions as described in section 6.2.1.

Fan systems for post-accident containment heat removal are not employed at PVNGS.

The design features of the recirculation intake s'tructures (sumps) comply with Regulatory Guide 1.82 and include the following features:

A.

Two independent, sumps and screens are provided, one for each safety-related train.

B.

Physically separated sumps preclude simultaneous damage to both screens.

C.

Sumps located in the lowest floor of the containment building, at elevation 80 ft-0 in., are protected by two screens, plus a trash rack.

The sump screens are placed on a

3 in. high curb.

D.

The floor level in the sump vicinity local floor drains.

In addition, to waste from plugging the screens, a

3 provided.

slopes toward preclude surface in. curb is E.

, The 3 in. curb around the sumps also provides protec-tion from surface drains.

No drains from upper regions impinge on the screen assemblies.

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maximum particle size in water exiting from the refueling water tank will be 0.09 in. in diameter.

4.

The fire protection sys em mee+s the interface requirements listed in CESSAR Section 6.3.1,3.P.4.

The detailed description of the fire protection system provided to protect the SIS components is discussed in section 9'.5.1.

5.

The SIS containment penetrations will not be subject to loss of function from dynamic effects (e.g.', missiles, pipe reactions, fluid reaction forces) resulting from failure of equipment or piping inside or outside the containment.

This is accomplished by physical separation and the use of shielding barriers.

6.

Not applicable.

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The SIS is provided with an environmental control system such that the safety-related equipment operates within the environmental design limits specified in appendix 3E.

6.3.2 SYSTKC DESIGN 6.3.2.1 S stem Schematic Refer to CESSAR Section 6:3.2. 1g A1so refer to figure 6.3-1 for the piping and instrument diagram applicable for the PVNGS design.

Figure 6.3-1 is consistent with CESSAR Figures 6.3 1A and 6.3-1B, except PVNGS has an additional pressure boundary isolation check valve (SI-513,

523, 533, 543) in each of the HPSI/LPSI combined headers to the RCS cold legs.

Figure 6.3-1 shows PVNGS tag numbers and vent/drain valves.

6.3.2.2 Com onent Descri tion WVSE~W Ce)

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EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM 6.3.2.2.1 Safety Injection Tank Re fer to CESSAR Section

6. 3. 2. 2. l.

6. 3. 2. 2. 2 Iow-Pressure Safety Injection Pumps

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6.3.2.2.3 High-Pressure Safety Injection Pumps Refer to CESSAR Section 6.3.2.2.3.

6.3.2.2.4 Piping Refer to CESSAR Section 6.3.2.2.4.

In addition, the flexibility and seismic loading analyses of piping are presented in section 3.9.

6.3.2.2.5 Valves

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6.3.2.2.6 Containment Sump For interfaces see CESSAR Section 6.3.1.3.

The design of the containment recirculation sump is described in section 6.2.2.

6.3.2.3 A

licable Codes and Classification Refer to CESSAR Section 6.3.2.3.

6.3.2.4 Material S ecification and Com atibilit Refer to CESSAR Section 6.3;2.4.

6.3.2. 5 S stem Reliabi1it Re fer to CESSAR Section 6.3.2. 5.

Also, re fer to section 8. 3 for a discussion of pow'er sources.

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PVNGS FSAR 7.6 ALL OTHER INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEMS RE UIRED FOR SAFETY Refer to CESSAR Section 7.6.

7.

6.1 INTRODUCTION

Refer to CESSAR Section 7.6.1.

In addition, interlocks utilized to preclude fuel handling accidents aie discussed in section 9.1.

Instrumentation utilized to mitigate the consequences of fuel handling accidents are discussed in sections 9.4 and 15.7.

7.6.1.1 S stem Descri tions 7.6.1.1.1 Shutdown Cooling System Suction Line Valve Interlocks ADL> /USE<> g HERE 7.6.1.1.2 Safety Injection Tank Isolation Valve Interlocks Refer to CESSAR Section 7.6..1.1.2.

7.6.1.1.3 Class IE Alarm System A Class IE alarm system is provided for a limited number of operational occurrences for which no specific automatic actua-tion of a safety system is required.

The C'ass IE alarm system alert: the operator to keep the plant operating within technical specification limits and prevent equipment damage.

The IE alarm system consists of individual visual status indi-cators dedicated to each instrument channel.

An audible alarm is provided for each alarm channel.

The alarmed condition requires manual reset, once initiated.

The IE alarm system is independent of the normal plant annuncia-tion system and the redundant channels are powered from separate IE power trains.

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PVNGS FSAR Q8 15.5 INCREASE IN RCS INVENTORY Refer to CESSAR Section 15.5.

Additionally, CIAS or SIAS signals will actuate control room and fuel building essential ventilation systems.

See sections 6.4 and 9.4 for details.

A CIAS or SIAS will terminate the containment power access

purge, as described in section 9.4.

The auxiliary feedwater system is described in section 10.4.9.

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