ML17297A871

Forwards Responses to NRC 810416 Questions 222.01 & 02. Responses Will Be Incorporated Into Future FSAR Amend

ML17297A871
Person / Time
Site:	Palo Verde
Issue date:	09/25/1981
From:	Van Brunt E ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO. (FORMERLY ARIZONA NUCLEAR
To:	Tedesco R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
ANPP-19006-JMA, NUDOCS 8109290338
Download: ML17297A871 (30)

Text

~

0 REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIOS)

ACCESSIOV NBR;810 FACILE STN-50-528 STN 50 529 STN 50 S30 AUTHt,NA(NE VAN BRUVTPKi,E, RECIP ~ VA%El TEDESCOPR

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9290338 DOC ~ DATE!: 81/09/25 NOTARIZED:" YES DOCKER" 0 Pal o Verde Nucl ear>> Stations Un' 1R Arizona Publ i 05/~5@>

Palo Verde IVuclear>> Stationr Undt 2P Arizona Publi 050M529 Palo Verde Nuclear>> StationP Unit 3P Arizona Publi 05000530 AUTHOR AFF IL'CATION Arizona Public Ser vice Co ~

RECIPIENT AFFILIIATION Assistant Director>> for Licensing SUBJECT!'or wards responses to NRC 810416 Questions 222.01 L 0'2',

Re'sponaes will oe incoraorated into future FSAR

amend, DISTRIBUTION CODE.':

BODIS COPIES RECEIIVEO:LiTR L ENCL>>

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P.o. SOX 21666 PHOENIX, ARIZONA85036 September 25, 1981 ANPP-19006-JMA/TFQ Mr. R. L. Tedesco Assistant Director for Licensing Division of Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.

S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.

20555 i )..LI/,i cP j

Subj ect:

Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS) Units 1, 2 and 3

Docket Nos.

STN-50-528/529/530

~/I]'h II File:

81-056-026; G.1.10

Reference:

Letter from R. L. Tedesco, NRC to EEVB, Jr.,

Dated April 16, 1981;

Subject:

PVNGS Request for Additional Information (ICSB)

Dear Mr. Tedesco:

Attached is a response to NRC questions 222.01 and 222.02 for your use. These responseswill be incorporated into the FSAR in the upcoming amendment.

Please contact me if you have any further questions on this matter.

Very truly yours, EEVBJr/TFQ/bj Attachment E. E. Van Brunt, Jr.

APS Vice President Nuclear Projects ANPP Project Director cc:

J. Kerrigan (w/a)

P. L. Hourihan (w/a)

A. C. Gehr (w/a) 8109290338 810925"~

PDR ADOCK 05000528 A

-PDR

e STATE OF ARIZONA

)

) ss.

COUNTY OF MARICOPA)

I; Edwin E. Van Brunt, Jr., represent'that I am Vice President Nuclear Projects of Arizona Public Service

Company, that the foregoing document has been signed by me on behalf of Arizona'ublic Service Company with full authority so to do, that I have reap such document and @now its contents, and that to the best of my knowledge and belief, the statements made therein are true.

F, Edwin E.. Van Brunt, Jr, ".

~

e yB Sworn to before me tbde~day of

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Notary Public My Commission expires:

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PVNGS FSAR

I APPENDIX 7A Loss of Non-Class IE Instrumentation and Control Power S stem Bus Durin Power 0 eration IE Bulletin 79-27 If reactor controls and vital instruments derive power from I

common electrical distribution systems, the failure of such electrical distributicin systems may result in an event requiring-I I

operator action concurrent with failure of important instrumen-tation upon which these operator actions should be based.

This concern was addressed in IE Bulletin 79-27.

On November 30,

1979, IE Bulletin 79-27 was sent to operating license (OL) holders, the 'near term OL applicants (North Anna 2, Diablo Canyon,

McGuire, Salem 2,

Sequoyah, and Zimmer),

and other holders of construction permits (CP), including Palo Verde.

Of these recipients, the CP

'olders were not given explicit direction for making a submittal as part 'of the licensing review.

However, they were informed that the issue would be addressed later.

You 'are requested to address'his issue by taking IE Bulletin 79-27 Actions 1 thru 3 under "Actions to be Taken by'Licensees".

Within the response time called for in the attached transmittal II

letter, complete the review and evaluation required by Action~ 1 II I

thru 3 'and provide a written response describing your reviews I,

I I

S

', 'and actions." This report should be in the 'form of an amendmen I

I

~ to "your FSAR and submitted to the NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor P

Regulations as a licensing submittal.

RESPONSE

Action Item 1."

I IE Bulletin 79-27 addressed three review areas, as follows:

II

[Area] 1.

'Review the Class 1-E and non-Class 1-E buses I

'supplying power to safety

'and non-safety II related instrumentation and control systems September 1981 N

'7A.l-l 07-29-81 Amendment 6 ',

PVNGS FSAR APPENDIX 7A which could affect the ability to achieve a

cold shutdown condition using existing pro-cedures or procedures developed under

[Area]

item 2 below.

For each bus:

.'"a.

'identify and review the alarm and/or indication,provided, in the control room to alert the operator to the loss of,i h

power to the bus; b.

identify the instrument and control,,

-system loads connected to the bus and evaluate, the effects.of loss of power, to these loads including the ability',.

to achieve a cold shutdown condition; c.

describe any proposed design modifica-tions resulting from these reviews and evaluations, and your proposed schedule I'

for implementing those modifications.

k J

k I

[Area] 2.

Prepare emergency procedures or review a

J existing ones that will be used by control

)

room operators, including procedures required to achieve a cold shutdown condition, upon loss of power to each Class 1-E and non-Class 1-E bus supplying power to safety and t

y non-safety related instrument and control systems.

The emergency procedures should include:

a.

the diagnostics/alarms/indicators/

symptom resulting from the, review and evaluation conducted per [Area] item 1 above; Amendment.

6 7A.1-2 07-29-81 September 1981.;

I I

I'",

lpt PVNGS FSAR APPENDIX 7A

.b.

I C.

the use of alternate indication and/or control circuits which may be powered from" other non-Class 1-E or Class 1-E

- instrumentation and control buses; II p,

" methods for restoring power to the bus.

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'Describe any proposed

'design modifications or administrative controls to be implemented resulting from these procedures, and your proposed schedule for implementing the II changes.

t c'Area] 3.

I 1'

Re-review IE Circular No. 79-02, Failure of 4

.,120 Volt Vital AC Power Supplies,,dated

, January 11, 1979, to include both Class 1-E and non-Class 1-E safety related power ik supply inverters.

Based on a review of

operating experience and your re-review of I'

IE Circular No. '79-02, describe any proposed design modifications'or administrative 0

~

c controls to be 'implemented as a result of the re-review..

'VALUATION:

Our review has determined that the PVNGS design consists w

of two ungrounded non-Class IE 120V-ac instrument distri-

'bution panels E-NNN-Dll and E-NNN-D12 and four ungrounded vital (Class IE) 120V-ac instrument distribution panels E-PNA-D25, E-PNB-D26, E-PND-D27, and E-PND-D28.

Each ungrounded non-Class IE volt ac instrument distribution 4

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4 panel is normally supplied from a 480V-ac non-Class IE motor control center through a voltage regulator-,

transformer to a'ransfer switch.

A back-up source is p

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4 y l,(4 September 1981'A.1-3 07-29-81 Amendment'

PVNGS,FSAR g

1

.APPENDIX 7A

.provided from a 480V-ac Class IE motor control center through a Class IE voltage regulator-transformer as an

- isolation device to the transfer switch.

The transfer switch automatically transfers, upon loss of power on the normal source, to the back-up source. 'anual transfer is

, required to return to the normal source.

The distribution panel is fed from the transfei switch through a panel feeder breaker.

Distribution to the instrument cabinets

,,t, is through branch circuit breakers....

Each ungrounded vital (Class vIE) 120V-ac instrument. dis-tribution panel is normally supplied from a 125V-dc Class IE control center through an inverter to a manual r

transfer switch.

A back'-up source is provided from a I

V I

'480V-ac non-Class IE motor control 'center through a

V voltage regulator transformer to the manual transfer switch.

'The distribution panel is fed from the transfer switch through a panel feeder breaker.

Our specific. response to Area item l.a is that an alarm for

(

each non-Class IE instrument distribution panel is h(provided,to the operator in the control room.

Annunciation 1

(I I V

will occur,'on the following:

~

Normal source undervoltage

~

Back-up source undervoltage

~

Ground detection I

d

• ,g

~

~

Overload tripping of the panel feeder breaker

~.'

.=',Overload tripping of any branch circuit breaker g

I

n alarm is provided for each Class IE instrument distribu-

,tion panel and an alarm for each Class IE inverter and transfer switch.

,Annunciation will occur on the following:

gr.

'I

~

Inverter output or input breaker tripped

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Amendment 6,

7A.1-4 07-29-81 September 1981

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. 0 PVNGS FSAR v

.APPENDIX 7A Input dc voltage low Loss of sYnchronization g+~

Transfer switch not on. normal source IV Inverter fan failure Distribution panel undervoltage Ground detection

'Overload tripping of the panel feeder breaker For Area item 1.b, the instrument and control system loads connected to each instrument distribution panel are provided I

as noted on table 7A.1-1.

Those specific instrument parameters and controls detailed in CESSAR 7.4.1.1.10.7 as being required to achieve cold

, shutdown are listed in table 7A.1-2.

Instrument loop displays and controls available to the control room operator

~nd the instrument distribution panel supply are identified.

Motor operated valves, pumps, pressurizer heaters and sole-

'noids required to achieve cold shutdown are powered from buses other than the instrument distribution panels.

In response to Area item 1.c, we have determined that loss of a single instiument distribution panel, Class IE or non-IE, will cause a loss of some of the indicators and recorders I

available to the control room operator.

The affected indicators, which employ a gas-discharge display, will extinguish on the loss of the instrument distribution panel.

This failure mode is distinguishable and will not offer confusing information to the operator.

In addition, the

, instrumentation and control systems lost will generate alarms and actuation of some equipment as the loop output

'contacts fail to their deenergized states.

In the non-IE instrument loops affecting safe shutdown circuits, i.e.

'eptember 1981 7A.1-5 08-10-81 Amendment 6

1 E-PNA-D25

~ ESFAS Aux. Relay Cab.

J-SAA-C01 E-PNB-D26

~ ESFAS Aux. Relay Cab.

J-SAA-C01 E-PNC-D27

~ ESFAS Aux. Relay Cab.

J-SAB-C01 E-PND-D28

~ ESFAS Aux. Relay Cab.

J-SAB-C01 E-NNN-Dl1

~ RCS-2

& CVCS-2 Process Instr.

J-ZJN-C01B&D E-NNN-D12

~ RCS-1 & CVCS-1 Process Instr.

J-ZJN-C01A & C

~ Process Protective Instr. Cab. A-1 J-SBA-C02A

~ Supplementary Protect.

Sys.

J-SBA-C04

~ Radiation Monitors J-SQA-RU-29c 31

& 33

~ Remote Shutdown Panel

~ BOP Analog Instr.

Cab, J-ZJA-C02A

& B

~ Aux. Prot.

Cab.

J-SAA-C03

~ Plant Prot. Sys.

(PPS)

J-SBA-C01

~ Process Prot.

Instr. Cab. A-2.

J-SBA-C02B

~ BOP ESFAS & Load Sequencer J-SAA-C02A

~ MOV Position Indicators

~ Containment Hydrogen Analyzer J-HPA-E01

~ Chlorine Detector J-HJA-E01

~ Process Protective Instr. Cab.

B-2 J-SBB-C02B o Supplementary Protec.

Sys.

J-SBB-C04 e Radiation Monitors J-SQB-RU-l, 30, 32 & 34

~ Remote Shutdown Panel

~ BOP Analog Instr.

Cab.

J-ZJB-C02A

~ Aux. Prot.

Cab.

J-SAB-C03

~ Plant Prot. Sys.

(PPS)

J-SBB-C01

~ Process Protective Instr. Cab.

B-1 J-SBB-C02A

~ BOP ESFAS & Load Sequencer J-SAB-C02B

~ MOV Position Indicators

~ Containment Hydrogen Analyzer J-HPB-E02 '

Chlorine Detector J-HJB-EOl

~ Supplementary Protect.

Sys.

J-SBC-C04

~ CEDMCS Aux. Cab.

CS J-SFC-C01

~ Aux. Prot.

Cab.

J-SAC-C03

~ Plant Prot.

Sys.

(PPS)

J-SBC-C01

~ Process Protective Instr.

Cab C

J-SBC-C02A

~ MOV Position Indicators

~ Supplementary Protect.

Sys.

J-SBD"C04

~ CEDMCS Aux. Cab.

C6 J SFD-C01

~ Aux. Prot.

Cab.

J SAD-C03

~ Plant Prot. Sys.

(PPS)

J-SBD-C01

~ Process Protective Instr. Cab.

D J-SBD-C02A

~ MOV Position Indicators

~ SIS/RCP-1 Process Instr. J-ZJN-C01F

~ NSSS Rad.

Mon.

Cab.

J-SQN-C02 (Process

& Gas Stripper Eff.

Rad. Mon., Reac-tor Power Cut-

back, Boronometer S/U S/U & Control Ch.2)

~ BOP Analog Instr.

Cab.

J-ZJN-C02B&D

~ BOP Analog Instr.

Cab.

J-ZJN-C02F

~ Radwaste Instr.

Cab J-ZRN-COl &

C02

~ NSSS Rad.

Mon.

Cab.

J-SQN-C02 (MICD Amp.,

CEA Display,, S/U &

Control'h. 1)

~ CVCS-3 & SIS/RCP-2 Process Instr.

J-ZJN-C01E

& G

~ BOP Analog Instr.

Cab.

J-ZJN-C02A C & -C07

~ BOP Analog Instr.

Cab.

J-ZJN-C02E

& G

~ Fuel Pool Instr.

J-PCN-E02

~ CEDMCS

~ CEDMCS (incl. core mimic)

~ NSSS Control Sys.

J-SFN-C03 (FWCS-I

• 2 & SBCS)

~ MICDS ¹1

~ NSSS Control Sys.

J-SFN-C03 (RRS, SBCS permissives,

& AMI setpoint display)

~ MICDS ¹2

~ Reactor Trip Swgr.

~ Reactor Trip Swgr.

Current Monitor Current Monitor C

~ Loose Parts Vibration Mon..

~ Gen. Pyrolysate Collector C

'C

/c Table 7A.l-l 120V-AC UNGROUNDED INSTRUMENT DISTRIBUTION PANEL INSTRUMENT AND CONTROL SYSTEM LOADS

O>* '

'I U

Class IE Instrument Distribution Panels Non-Class IE Instrument Distribution Panels Parameter or Control E-PNA-D25 E-PNB-D26 E-PND-D27 E-PND-D28 E-NNN-Dl1 E-NNN-D12 Neutron log power Hot leg temperature

& TR-112HA Pressurizer pressure Pressurizer level J-SEA JI-lA ~

J-RCA-TI-112HA J-RCA-Pi-102A

& PR-102A J-RCA-LI-110K

& LR-110K J-SEB-JI-1B J-RCB TI 112HB J-RCB-PI-102B J-RCB LI-110Y J-SEC-JI-1C J-RCC-TI-112HC J-RCC-PI-102 C J-SED-JI-1D J-RCD-TI-112HD J-RCD-PI-102D

& TI-111X J-RCN-LIC-110 LR-110

& LI-113 J-RCN-TI-111K J-RCN-PI K-110

&'PR-100 SG pressure J-SGA-PI-1013A PI>>1023A

• PR-1013A J-SGB-PI-1013B

& PI-1023B

. J-SGC-J-SGD-PI-1013C PI-1013D

& PI-1023C

& PI-1023D H

E

~

H E

Table 7A.1-2 INSTRUMENT PARAMETERS AND CONTROLS REQUIRED TO ECHZEVE COLD EHUTDOEII SG level RWT level Charging flow Charging pressure SIT pressure LPSI pump flow Shutdown cooling heat exchanger diff.

temp.

Atmospheric dump valve control J-SGA-LI-1113A

& LR-1113A J-CHA-LI-203A J-CHA-FI-212 J-SIA-PI-331

& PI-333 J-SIA-FI-306 J-SIA-TR-351

& TR-303K J-SGA-HIC-179A

& HIC-184A J-SGB-LI-1113B J-CHB-LI-203B

& LI-201 J-CHB-PI-212 J-SIB-PI-311

& PI-313 J SIB FO-307 J-SIB-TR-352

& TR-303Y J-SGB-HIC-178A

& HIC-185A J-SGC-LI-1113C J-CHC-LI-203C J-SGD-LI-1113D J-CHD.-

LI-203D J-SGN-LR-1111 (narrow range)

J-SIN-PI-332 J-CHN-LI-200 J-SIN-PI-312

PVNGS FSAR S

~APPENDIX 7A pressurizer level control of the pressurizer backup heaters, selector switches are provided on the main control panel to enable, the operator to provide control from the unaffected control loop.

No control action generated by the loss of an instrument distribution panel will prevent the operator from controlling the required safe shutdown equipment

'or interfere with the safe shutdown functions.

Upon detec-tion of loss of an instrument distribution panel, adequate instrumentation and control functions from the list proviaed above will be available to the operator to enable the operator to achieve a cold shutdown condition.

No design modifications are proposed.

Action Item 2 Emergency procedures that will be used by control room operators, including procedures required to achieve a cola

-. shutdown condition, upon loss of power to each Class IE and non-Class IE bus supplying power to safety and non-safety related instruments and control systems will be prepared and then reviewed at least three months prior to the

.operating license.

The procedures will include the following information.

a.

The diagnostics/alarms/indicators/symptom resulting from the review and evaluation conducted per item 1 of IE Bulletin No. '79-27.

I I

b.

The use of alternate indication and/or control circuits which may be powered from other non=

t 'lass IE or Class IE instrumentation and control buses.

c ~

Methods for restoring power to the bus.

II A description of any proposed design modifications or

'dministrative controls to be implemented resulting from these procedures, and the proposed schedule for implementing the changes will also be provided.

6/

Amendment 6 ';,,;,

7A. 1-8

'eptember 1981 07-29-81'

'I I

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~

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F PVNGS FSAR Q 'PPENDIX 7A Action Item 3 IE Circular No. 79-02, Failure of 120 Volt Vital AC Power

Supplies, has been re-reviewed in consideration of item 3 to include both Class IE and non-Class IE instrument distribution panel suppliers.

For the Class IE inverters, the PVNGS design precludes the possibility of a transient causing a failure of a Class IE inverter by utilizing a V

battery source in parallel with a dc charger.

The battery source serves to eliminate any undervoltage transients that the charger may experience.

The non-Class IE instrument distribution panels are not supplied through inverters.

Both the normal and back-up supplies are fed from 480V-ac through a voltage regulator-transformer.

The transfer switch will automatically transfer, upon loss of power on the normal source, to the back-up source.

Manual

'ransfer is required to return to the normal source.

The switch is also equipped with a mechanical handle which bypasses electric circuitry and can switch to either source.

No design modifications are proposed.

September 1981 7A.1-9 07-29-81 Amendment 6

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IF SAFETY EQUIPMENT DOES NOT REMAIN IN ITS EMERGENCY

, NODE UPON RESET OF AN ENGINEERED SAFEGUARDS ACTUATION SIGNALS SYSTEM MODIFICATIONS DESIGN CHANGE OR OTHER

'ROTECTIVE ACTION OF THE AFFECTED EQUIPMENT IS NOT COMPROMISED ONCE THE ASSOCIATED ACTUATION SIGNAL IS RESET s

TH I S I SSUE WAS ADDRESSED IN IE BULLETIN 80-06 (ENCLOSED) s FOR FACILITIES WITH OPERATING LICENSES

, AS OF MARCH Ui 1980, IE BULLETIN 80-06 REQUIRED THAT REVIEWS BE CONDUCTED BY TME LICENSEES TO DETERMINE WHICH'F ANY'AFETY FUNCTIONS MIGHT BE UNAVAILABLE t AFTER RESETS AND WHAT CHANGES COULD BE IMPLEMENTED TO CORRECT THE PROBLENs FOR FACILITIES WITH A CONSTRUCTION PERMIT INCLUDING

, OL APPLICANTS BULLETIN 80-06 WAS ISSUED FOR INFOR-iNATION ONLY,

.-=,THE NRC STAFF HAS DETERMINED THAT ALL CP HOLDERS'S A PART OF TME OL REVIEW PROCESS ARE TO 'BE REQUESTED TO ADDRESS THIS ISSUEs ACCORDINGLY'OU ARE REQUESTED 70 TAKE TME ACTIONS CALLED FOR IN BULLETIN 80-06 ACTIONS 1 THRU f

UNDER "ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN BY LICENSEES s

HITHIN THE RESPONSE TINE

-CALLED FOR IN THE ATTACHED TRANSMITTAL LETTERS COMPLETE THE REVIEW VERIFICATIONS AND DESCRIPTIONS OF, CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TAKEN OR PLANNED AS STATED IN ACTION 1 TMRU 3 AND SUBMIT THE REPORT CALLED FOR IN ACTIONS ITEN l s THE REPORT SHOULD BE SUBMITTED TO THE NRC OFFICE OG NUCLEAR REGULATION AS A LICENSING SUBMITTAL IN THE FORM OF AN FSAR AMENDMENT

1'I t

'p t,

Asp~use:

'HE ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES (ESF)

ACTUATION lSIGNALS INCORPORATED IN THE PVN6S DESIGN INCLUDEt I')

NSSS ESFAS CONTAINMENT ISOLATION ACTUATION SIGNAL (CIAS)

CONTAINMENT SPRAY ACTUATION SIGNAL (CSAS)

'AIN STEAM ISOLATION SIGNAL (NS IS)

SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATION SIGNAL (SIAS)

RECIRCULATION ACTUATION SIGNAL (RAS)

AUXILIARY FEEDWATER ACTUATION SIGNALS (AFAS) 1 AND 2i 2)

AND BOP ESFAS FUEL BUILDING ESSENTIAL VENTILATION ACTUATION SIGNAL (FBEYAS)

CONTAINMENT PURGE ISOLATION ACTUATION SIGNAL (CPIAS)

CONTROL'OOM VENTILATION ISOLATION ACTUATION SIGNAL (CRYIAS)

CONTROL ROOM ESSENTIAL FILTRATION ACTUATION SIGNAL (CREFAS),

,MANUAL RESET OF THE ESF ACTUATION SIGNALS IN BOTH "THE NSSS AND BOP SYSTEMS DESIGN CAN BE PERFORMED ONLY AFTER THE INITIATING SIGNALS>

I sES LOW PRES-SUR I ZER PRESSURE>

HAVE CLEARED s RESET SWITCHES ARE LOCATED AT THE PPSp ESFAS AUXILIARY RELAYS

,', AND BOP ESFAS

CABINETS, SAFETY. OR EMERGENCY STATE ON RESET OF AN ESF AC ATION SIGNAL IS IDENTIFIED IN TABI Pf, THESE ACTUATED DEVICES CAN BE CATEGORIZED AS FO'OWsl PVN6S EQUIPMENT WHICH MAY CHANGE POSITION FROM THE TU-

'A

I CERTA I N ACTUATED DEVICES J I'e E ~

JOG TYPE VALVES OR THE ESF LOAD SEQUENCERp REQUIRE A MAINTAINED ESF SIGNAL THROUGH COMPLETION OF THEIR SAFETY FUNCTIONs IF AN ESF ACTUATION SIGNAL IS RESET PRIOR TO COMPLETION OF VALVE STROKE OR COMPLETION OF ESF LOAD SEQUENCING'HE VALVE WILL STOP MID-TRAVEL OR THE SEQUENCER WILL NOT COMPLETE SEQUENCING ON THE REQUIRED EQUIPMENT (EQUIPMENT ALREADY SEQUENCED OR DOES NOT STOP)

~

SINCE COMPLETION OF THESE ACTIONS TAKES NO MORE THAN 60 SECONDS'SF ACTUATION SIGNAL RESET IS NOT CONSIDERED, ESF ACTUATION'OLLOWED BY CLEARING OF THE INITIATING SIGNALS WITH THE REQUIREMENT OF MANUAL RESET AT THE APPROPRIATE CABINET ALL OCCURRING WITHIN A SHORT PERIOD OF TIME (<1 MIN)

IS NOT, CREDIBLE UNDER,TRUE ACCIDENT CONDITIONS ~

NO MODIFICATION TO THESE EQUIPMENT CONTROL CIRCUITS IS REQUIREDS AN S IAS IS EMPLOYED IN SOME INSTANCES TO TRIP NON ESF EQUIPMENT OFF THE IE BUSES S

0N RESET OF

'IAS THIS EQUIPMENT WILL RETURN TO AN AUTOMATIC MODE UNLESS THE CONTROL SWITCH HAS BEEN PUT INTO THE PULL.TO-LOCK POSITIONs 0N RETURN TO THE AUTOMATIC MODEp THE EQUIPMENT MAY START DUE TO PROCESS DEMANDs SINCE SIAS RESET MAY ONLY BE ACCOMPLISHED AFTER CLEARING OF BOTH INITIATING PROCESS CONDITIONS'OW PRESSURIZER PRESSURE OR HIGH CONTAINHENT PRESSURE, RETURN OF THIS EQUIPMENT TO AUTOMATIC CONTROL DOES NOT DEFEAT REQUIRED ESF SYSTEM FUNCTIONSs 80 MODIFICATION IS REQUIRED TO THESE EQUIPMENT CONTROL CIRCUITS>

HOWEVER ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES SHOULD ADDRESS PLACING THE CONTROL SWITCHES IN THE PULL-TO-LOCK POSITION TO AVOID BUS OVERLOAD ON SIAS RESETi P

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CERTAIN ACTUATED DEVICES HAVE DIFFERENT SAFETY MODES IN RESPONSE TO DIFFERENT ESF ACTUATION SIGNALS<

IN THE EVENT THAT ESF ACTUATION SIGNALS REQUIRING BOTH SAFETY MODES OCCURS ONE SAFETY MODE BY DESIGN WILL HAVE PRIORITY, ON RESET OF THAT PARTICULAR ESF ACTUATION SIGNALS THE ACTUATED DEVICE WILL CHANGE POSITION TO THE SAFETY MODE REQUIRED BY THE REMAINING ESF ACTUATION SIGNALs THIS MEANS OF CONTROL DOES NOT DEFEAT REQUIRED ESF SYSTEM FUNCTIONS'ND NO MODIFICATION IS REQUIRED TO THESE EQUIPMENT CONTROL CIRCUITS>

THE AFAS 1 AND AFAS 2 SIGNALS TO THE AUXILIARY FEEDWATER VALVES ARE DESIGNED TO CYCLE BASED ON STEAM GENERATOR LEVELs THIS AUTOMATIC RESETTING OF THE AFAS 1 AND AFAS 2 DOES NOT AFFECT THE AFAS 1 AND AFAS 2 SIGNALS TO OTHER ACTUATED EQUIPMENTs THE AUXILIARYFEEDWATER VALVE CYCLING REPRESENTS THE DESIRED ESF SYSTEM FUNCTION AND NO MODIFICATION IS REQUIRED TO THE EQUIPMENT CONTROL CIRCUITS<

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IDENTIFICATION OF ACTUATED DEVICES WHICH CHANGE POSITION ON RESET OF ESF ACTUATION SIGNAL

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ACTUATED DEVICE TAG NO.

ELEMENTARY, DIAGRAM ESF ACTUATION SIGNAL SAFETY MODE ACTION OF ESF ACTUATION SIGNAL RESET CORRECTIVE ACTION AUXILIARY FEEDWATER REGULATING VALVES TO SG 1

AUXILIARYFEEDWATER REGULATING VALVES TO SG 2 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER ISOLATION VALVES TO SG 1

AUXILIARYFEEDWATER ISOLATION VALVES TO SG 2 CEDM NORMAL ACU FANS CONTAINMENT NORMAL ACU FANS FUEL BUILDING ESSENTIAL EXHAUST AFU DAMPERS I

J-AFB-HV-30 J-AFA-HV-32 J-AFB-HV-31 J-AFC-HV-33 J-AFB-UV-34 J-AFC-UV-36 J-AFB-UV-35 J-AFA-UV-37 M-HCN-A02A,

-A02B,-A02C,

& A02D M-HCN-AOlA,

-Aole,-Aolc,

& AOlD M-HFA-M05

'-HFB-M05 13-E-AFB-003 13-E-AFB-004 13-E-AFB-003 13-E-AFB-006 13-E-AFB-005 13-E-AFB-011 13-E-AFB-005 13-E-AFB-010

'3-E-HCB-001 13-E-HCB-002 13-E-HCB-004 13-E-HCB-005 13-E-HFB-005 AFAS-1 AFAS-2 AFAS-l.

AFAS-2 SIAS SIAS SIAS FBEVAS OPEN/CLOSE OPEN/CLOSE OPEN/CLOSE OPEN/CLOSE STOPS STOPS CLOSES

'PENS VALVES CYCLE ON AFAS-1 VALVES CYCLE ON AFAS-2 VALVES CYCLE ON AFAS-1 VALVES CYCLE ON AFAS-2 RETURNS TO AUTO IF-NOT IN "PULL>>TO-LOCK" RETURNS TO AUTO IF NOT IN "PULL-TO-LOCK" SIAS IS THE PRIORITY MODE.

ON RESET OF

SIAS, DAMPERS WILL RE-OPEN IF FBEVAS IS PRESENT.

NONE (D)

NOnE (D)

NONE (D)

II NONE (O)

NONE (e)

NONE (B)

NONE (C)

A

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IDENTIFICATION OF ACTUATED DEVICES WHICH CHANGE POSITION ON RESET OF ESF ACTUATION SIGNAL I

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ACTUATED DEVICE TAG No.

ELEMENTARY DIAGRAM ESF ACTUATION SIGNAL SAFETY MODE ACTION OF ESF ACTUATION SIGNAL RESET SHEET 2 CORRECTIVE ACTION o

AUXILIARYBUILDING ESSENTIAL EXHAUST AFU DAMPERS o

CONTROL ROOM ESSENTIAL AHU OSA.

INTAKE DAMPERS M-HFA-M06 M-HFB-M06 M-HJA-024

& -M03 M-HJB-M02

& -M03 13-E-HFB-Oll 13-E-HJB-024 SIAS FBEVAS SIAS CREFAS CRVIAS OPENS CLOSES OPENS CLOSES SIAS IS THE PRIORITY MODE ON RESET OF

SIAS, DAMPERS WILL RE-OPEN IF FBEVAS IS PRESENT.

CRVIAS IS THE PRIORITY MODE.,

ON RESET OF CRVIAS, DAMPERS WILL.

RE-OPEN IF SIAS OR CREFAS IS PRESENT.

NONE (C)

NONE (C) o PRESSURIZER BACKUP HEATERS M-RCE-A5,

-A14,-81,

-B9,-B10)

& -B18 13-E-RCB-010 S IAS STOPS RETURNS To AUTO IF NOT IN "PULL-TO-LOCK" -

NONE (B) o ESF LOAD SEQUENCERS J-SAA-C02A J-SAB-C02B 13-E-SAB-004 CSAS SIAS AFAS-1 AFAS-2, FBEVAS-.

CRV IAS CREFAS.

SEQUENTIAL STARTING OF ESF PUMPS AND FANS RESET OF SEQUENCER OUTPUTS DEPENDING ON ESF ACTUATION SIGNALS-PRESENT.

RESET OF SEQUENCER OUTPUTS DOES NOT RESET ANY ACTUATED EQUIPMENT.

RESET PRIOR TO COMPLETION OF SEQUENCING TERMINATES-SEQUENCE.

NONE -(A) o SG 2 To AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP A STEAM SUPPLY VALVE J-SGA-UV-138 13-E-SGB-002 AFAS-2 OPENS IF AFAS-1 HAS PRIORITY.

AFAS-) IS ON RESET OF AFAS-1, NOT PRESENT VALVE WILL OPEN IF AFAS-2 IS PRESENT.

NONE (C)

A

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4 IDENTIFICATION OF ACTUATED DEVICES WHICH CHANGE POSITION ON RESET OF ESF ACTUATION SIGNAL.

ACTUATED DEVICE TAG NO.'LEMENTARY DIAGRAM ESF ACTUATION SIGNAI SAFETY MODE ACTION OF ESF ACTUATION SIGNAL RESET SHEET 3 CORRECTIVE ACTION

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LP SAFETY INJECTION PUMPS

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SAFETY INJECTION TANK ISOLATION VALVES

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LPSI FLOW CONTROL TO REACTOR COOLANT VALVES M-SIA-POl.

M-SIB-Pol J-SIA-UV-634

& -644 J-S IB-UV-614

& -624 J-SIB-UV-615

& -625 J-S IA-UV-625

& -645 13-E-S IB-002 13-E-SIB-005 13-E-S I8-006 13-E-SIB-007 13-E-S IB-OOB SIAS (VIA SEQUENCER)

RAS SIAS SIAS STARTS STOPS OPENS OPENS RAS IS THE PRIORITY.

MODE.

ON RESET OF

RAS, PUMPS WILL RE-'TART IF SIAS {VIA SEQUENCER)

IS PRESENT.

JOG TYPE VALVES HAY STOP MID-TRAVEL; BREAKERS ARE LOCKED

'PEN DURING POWER OPERATION.

JOG TYPE VALVES HAY STOP HID TRAVEL NONE (C)

, NONE (A)

NONE (A) o HPSI FLOW CONTROL TO REACTOR COOLANT VALVES J-SIA-UV-

-617,-627,

-637,-647, J-S IB-UV-

-616,-626,

-636,-646 13-E-SI8-009 13-E-SIB-010 13-E-S IB-Ol1 13-E-SIB-012 SIAS OPENS JOG TYPE VALVES HAY STOP MID-TRAVEL NONE (A) o CONTAINHENT SPRAY CONTROL VALVES J-SIA-UV-672 J-SIB-UV-671 13-E-SIB-020 CSAS OPENS JOG TYPE VALVES HAY STOP HID-TRAVEL NONE (A)

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NORMAL. CHILLER M-WCN-E01A 13-E-WCB-001 S IAS STOPS RETURNS TO AUTO IF NOT IN "PULL-TO-LOCK" NONE (B)

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