Text

Insp Rept 50-397/95-31 on 951015-1125.Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Control Room Operations,Licensee Action on Previous Insp Findings,Operational Safety Verification, Surveillance Program,Maint Program & LER
	ML17291B182
Person / Time
Site:	Columbia
Issue date:	12/26/1995
From:	Wong H; NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:	;
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ML17291B180	List: ML17291B179; ML17291B181; ML17291B182;
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	50-397-95-31, NUDOCS 9512290338
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ENCLOSURE 2

U. S.

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IY

Inspection Report:

50-397/95-31

License:

NPF-21

Licensee:

Washington Public Power Supply System

3000 George

Washington

Way

P.O.

Box 968,

MD 1023

Richland,

Washington

Facility Name:

Washington

Nuclear Project-2

Inspection At:

WNP-2 site near Richland,

Washington

Inspection

Conducted:

October

15 through

November

25,

1995

Inspectors:

R.

C. Barr, Senior Resident

Inspector

G.

W. Johnston,

Senior Project Inspector

J.

L. Dixon-Herrity, Resident

Inspector

Approved:.

ong

C ie

,

eactor

roJect

rane

ate

Ins ection

Summar

Areas

Ins ected:

Routine,

announced

inspection

by resident

and Region-based

inspectors of control

room operations,

licensee

action

on previous inspection

findings, operational

safety verification, surveillance

program,

maintenance

program,

and licensee

event reports

(LERs).

Results:

Operation

The licensee's

Gold Card Program effectively identified good

and poor

practices

associated

with operations activities;

however,

a number of

deficiencies identified in the Gold Card

Program that met the criteria

for problem evaluation

requests

(PER)

were not documented

in the

PER

Program.

This finding indicates

the need for increased

management

oversight of the Gold Card Program (Section 3.2. 1).

Shift turnovers

were generally effective.

In some instances,

operators

did not implement management's

expectations

for alarm response

in

95i2290338 95i22h

PDR

ADQCK 05000397

8

PDR

announcement

of alarms

and reference

to alarm response

procedures

(Section 3.2.3).

A walkdown of several

engineered

safety features

systems

indicated

generally

good material conditions

and the proper lineups

(Section 3.3).

A noncited minor violation was identified when

an equipment operator

failed to adhere

to plant procedures

in that

he implemented

a clearance

by not individually hanging

and signing clearance

tags

were to have

been

hung individually or as

a group.

As corrective action,

the licensee

discussed

with the equipment operator

on

the expectations

for clearance

order implementation.

The inspectors

concluded that the work performed

was generally well planned

and performed in accordance

with the procedures

and work instructions,

with

the exception of the two examples

discussed

above.

6.2

Transversin

In-Core Probe

TIP

Indexer Maintenance

On November

1,

1995,

the inspectors

observed

an instrument

and control

( I&C)

technician

and the system engineer

investigate

a problem with the TIP indexer

on TIP-CRM-5B,

The work performed

was in accordance

with PPN 1.3.7G,

"Work

Implementation,"

Revision 9,

and Job Investigation

Sheet

(JIS)

95005795.

The

inspectors

questioned

why a JIS was

used

instead of using formal

troubleshooting

instructions

as required

by

PPM 1.3.42,

"Troubleshooting Plant

Systems

and Equipment," Revision

11,

The system engineer

and

I&C supervisor

explained that the JIS was

used for tasks

where detailed

work controls,

an

RWP, or

a clearance

order were not needed

or where the work would not aFfect

other systems.

The inspectors

reviewed the procedures

used to control work management

which

included the

PPM 1.3.7 series of procedures

and

PPM 1.3.42.

The purpose for

PPM 1.3.42

was to establish

guidelines for the control of troubleshooting

activities not covered

by the work order process

or not contained

in other

procedures,

The inspector

found that there

was nothing in the

PPN 1.3.7

series of procedures

that would cause

the troubleshooting

Procedure

PPN 1.3.42

to be used.

The decision

process

described

by the engineer

and supervisor

was

not included in procedures.

The inspectors

discussed

this concern with the

I&C supervisor.

The supervisor

was

aware of the problem due to

a similar

concern

he

had addressed

in a

PER on

a separate

subject.

The inspectors

concluded that the work management

procedure

did not provide adequate

administrative instructions for the development of a work package

to control

troubleshooting activities.

The licensee

agreed with this observation

and

planned to revise appropriate

procedures

to control troubleshooting.

7

PLANT SUPPORT ACTIVITIES

(71750)

The inspector evaluated

plant support activities based

on observation of work

activities, review of records,

and facility tours.

The inspector

noted the

following during this evaluation.

-13-

7.1

Fire Protection

The inspector

observed firefighting equipment

and controls for conformance

with administrative

procedures.

The inspector

noted that

a high number of

fire impairments existed for which fire tours were being conducted

because

of

concerns with Thermo-Lag

and fire seals.

7.2

Radiation Protection Controls

The inspector periodically observed radiological protection practices

to

determine whether the licensee's

program

was being

implemented

in conformance

with facility policies

and procedures

and in compliance with regulatory

requirements.

The inspector

also observed

compliance with RWPs,

proper

wearing of protective

equipment

and personnel

monitoring devices,

and

personnel

frisking practices with the exception of the equipment operator

working on the

SSPVs discussed

in Section

6. 1.

Radiation monitoring equipment

was frequently monitored to verify operability and adherence

to calibration

frequency.

7.3

Plant Housekee

in

The inspector

observed

plant conditions

and material

and equipment

storage

to

determine

the general

state of cleanliness

and housekeeping.

Housekeeping

in

the radiologically controlled area

was evaluated

with respect

to controlling

the spread of surface

and airborne contamination.

Housekeeping

was observed

to be good,

except in the

DG rooms.

The inspector identifie'd

a number of discrepancies

on November

1,

1995.

Two

tool gang

boxes

were located within 4 feet of safety-related

flexible conduits

in both

DG Rooms

1

and 2,

even

though signs

on the boxes indicated that the

boxes

should not be within 4 feet of safety-related

equipment.

(The box was

within

1 foot of the conduits in

DG Room

1

and within 2 I/2 feet in

DG Room

2

and both had their wheels locked).

A vacuum,

a coil of vacuum hose,

and

a mop

were stored in

DG

Room 2,

A speaker

was stored

in front of the fire

extinguisher in

DG Room 1.

The top of an oil can permanently

set

up to

collect vented oil fumes

had not been replaced correctly and

had spilled

on

the floor.

The inspector

reviewed

PPH 10.2.53,

Revision

12, "Seismic Requirements

for

Scaffolding,

Ladders,

Man-Lifts, Tool

Gang

Boxes, Hoists,

and Hetal Storage

Cb

<<."

I>>

d

q

<<h

b

h

stored in safety-related

areas

be stored in the designated

area delineated

by

striping or painting.

If the box was not restrained

(held down or tied back)

in some manner, it was not to be placed nearer to safety-related

equipment

than the full height of the item plus

12 inches.

The boxes in the

OG rooms

were not held

down or tied back

and did not have striping around

them.

The

inspector considered

the failure to store the tool boxes at the required

distance

from safety-related

equipment

as

an example of a minor procedural

adherence

issue

and

an isolated incident.

Because

the potential for the tool

boxes to move was limited since the wheels

were blocked,

there

was minor

safety significance to this occurrence.

This failure constitutes

a violation

of minor significance

and is being treated

as

a noncited violation, consistent

with Section

IV of the

NRC Enforcement Policy.

The inspector discussed

the

corrective actions for the other concerns

identified with the system engineer

and

found that the actions

taken or planned

appeared

appropriate.

The licensing engineer initiated

PER 295-1176 to address

the improper storage

of the tool boxes.

As

a corrective action,

the licensee

held shop training

on

the proper storage of all types of equipment

which could

damage safety-related

equipment.

The licensee

walked the plant to verify that

no other tool boxes

were improperly stored.

The licensee's

corrective actions,

while not

particularly timely, appeared

adequate.

7.4

~Securit

The inspector periodically observed

security practices

to ascertain

that the

licensee's

implementation of the security plan

was in accordance

with site

procedures,

that the search

equipment

at the access

control points

was

operational,

that the vital area portals were kept locked

and alarmed,

that

personnel

allowed access

to the protected

area

were

badged

and monitored,

and

that the monitoring equipment

was functional.

No problems

were noted during

these observations.

7.5

Emer enc

Plannin

The inspector toured the

Emergency Operations Facility, the Operations

Support

Center,

and the Technical

Support Center

and ensured

that these

emergency

facilities were in

a state of readiness.

Housekeeping

was noted to be very

good

and all necessary

equipment

appeared

to be functional.

The inspector

reviewed chemical

analyses

and trend results for conformance

with TS and administrative control procedures.

Plant chemistry

was

satisfactory during this inspection period.

The plant experienced

several

resin intrusions

and sulfate excursions

as discussed

in Section

2 of this

report.

7.7

Conclusions

II

Plant support

performance

was generally

good during this inspection period.

8

FOLLOWUP ON CORRECTIVE ACTIONS FOR VIOLATIONS

(92702)

The inspector

reviewed records,

interviewed personnel,

and inspected

plant

conditions relative to licensee

actions

in response

to previous

open items.

0

-15-

8. 1

Closed

Violations 397 9350-03

and

397 9414-02:

Failure to Secure

Com ressed

Gas Bottles in Accordance

With Procedures

On December

22,

1994,

and again

on April 24,

1994,

NRC inspectors

found two

compressed

gas cylinders unattended

and unrestrained

near safety-related

equipment.

These

were repetitions of previous incidents of unattended

and

unrestrained

gas cylinders.

The licensee's

corrective actions for the

April 24,

1994,

instance

included extending training in handling

gas cylinders

to operations,

chemistry,

and other personnel

who routinely use

compressed

gas

cylinders.

The inspectors

noted that training for the previous events

was

conducted

only for maintenance

personnel.

The inspectors

found that

corrective actions for a previous violation were not Fully effective because

the licensee

did not train personnel

that could use

gas bottles.

The

licensee's initial corrective actions

were too narrowly focused to prevent

recurrence.

Subsequent

corrective actions

were more comprehensive

and appears

appropriate.

8.2

Closed

Violation 397 9419-02:

Shroud

Head Bolts for Moisture

Se arator

Not Pro erl

Ali ned for Removal of Moisture

Se arator

Per Procedure

During reFueling operations,

licensee

personnel

did not effectively self- and

second-verify that all

36 shroud

head bolts were properly aligned for removal

of the moisture separator.

The error in verification resulted

From the

personnel

not being able to effectively view the shroud

head bolts.

To

correct this problem,

the licensee

revised

PPH 10.3.6,

"Reactor Vessel

Steam

Dryer and Moisture Separator

Removal

and Replacement,"

to require the use of

underwater

viewing equipment to verify unlatching of the shroud

head bolts.

The inspectors

reviewed the revised

procedures

and found the changes

reflected

in the procedures.

Subsequent

reFuelings

have encountered

no problems

determining the position of these bolts.

8.3

Closed

Violation 397 9419-03:

Exceedin

Liftin force

When Attem tin

Removal of Moisture

Se arator Contrar

to Procedure

During an attempt to lift the mois'ture separator,

the personnel

violated

PPH 10.4. 12,

"Crane

and Hoist Program Control,"

Revision 3, which required

that

a lift attempt not exceed

110% of the expected

weight of the load.

The

licensee

revised

PPH 10.3.6,

"Reactor Vessel

Steam Dryer and Moisture

Separator

Removal

and Replacement,"

to incorporate

the requirements

of

PPH 10.4. 12 that established

the load limit requirements.

The inspectors

reviewed the revised

procedures

and found the changes

reflected in the

procedures.

The licensee

conducted

subsequent'efueling

and heavy load lifts

without exceeding

load limits.

8.4

Closed

Violation 397 9424-01:

0 erators

Failed to Enter the

Emer enc

0 eratin

Procedures

EOPs

After Notin

That

an

EOP Entr

Condition

Existed

On July 27,

1994, operators

noted that suppression

pool water level

was at

+2.5 inches,

but did not enter

EOP

PPH 5.2. 1, "Primary Containment Control."

-16-

This action represented

a failure to note the significance of a

TS requirement

and to make

an immediate entry into the

EOP.

To prevent recurrence,

the

licensee

implemented

changes

to their

LCO entry sheets

that require

a review

by the shift manager

and

CRS.

The review provides

a second

check to assure

entry into the

TS

LCO action requirements

is made

when required.

The licensee

has also

implemented

a training program that includes

case

studies of TS

requirements.

The inspectors

reviewed the proposed training and f'ound that it

is adequate

to address

the issue

and enhances

the task-oriented

systematic

approach

to training.

8.5

Closed

Violation 397 9427-01:

Failure to Ensure

Containment

Atmos here

Control

S stem Instrumentation

Tubin

Clam

s Were Installed in Accordance

With As-Built Dr awin

s

An

NRC inspector identified missing instrument tubing support

clamps for

tubing attached

to Transmitter

CAC-FT-7B,

a flow transmitter for the

containment

atmosphere

control

(CAC) system.

There

was

a lack of conformance

between

the approved as-built drawing

and the installed tubing.

A quality

control inspector,

maintenance

personnel,

and the system engineer did not

question

the missing tubing clamps

when compared with Train A of the

CAC

system,

and failed to initiate

a

PER.

The licensee

corrected

the installation

and initiated changes

to the

PER program that addressed

the inspector's

concerns.

The personnel

involved were counseled

as to the importance of

initiating a

PER when conditions warrant.

The inspector

considered

the

corrective actions

adequate.

8.6

Closed

Violation 397 9429-02:

Failure to Store Hoist in Prescribed

Location

This violation identified the failure to store Hoist NT-HOI-8 in the

prescribed

storage location.

The licensee

determined that the cause of the

failure was

a deficient procedure.

PPN 10.4. 10, "Jib Cranes

and Electrically

Operated

Hoists Inspection,

Maintenance,

and Testing," did not reference

or

include the hoist safe

storage

requirements

described

in Drawing N-568 or in

PPN 10.2.53,

"Seismic Requirements

for Scaffolding,

Ladders, Nan-lifts, Tool

Gang

Boxes, Hoists,

and Metal Storage

Cabinets."

The immediate corrective

actions

included returning the hoist to its prescribed

location

and holding

a

"time-out" with mechanical

and electrical craft personnel

to provide training

on the proper storage

requirements

for hoists.

I

The licensee identified another hoist that was stored outside of its storage

location

on December

21,

1994.

The licensee

determined this occurred prior to

resolution of the violation.

Contractors

had identified the need to assign

an

alternative

maintenance

location for Hoist NT-HOI-6 during maintenance,

but

left the hoist unattended

for 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> before

an alternate

storage

location

was assigned.

As

a result,

a second

"time-out" was held with contractor craft

to ensure

they understood

the need to return hoists to prescribed

storage

locations or have

an alternative

storage location approved.

To prevent

recurrence,

the licensee

revised

PPM 10.4. 10 to require that Hoists NT-HOI-6

-17-

through -10 be returned to the storage

locations identified in

PPM 10.2.53 if

they were to be left unattended.

The inspectors

reviewed

PPM 10.4. 10 and 10.2.53

and verified that they were

revised to reflect the

need to store the crane in a prescribed

or approved

location.

Through tours in the plant, the inspectors

noted that. the storage

locations for the hoists

were c1early marked

and hoists

were stored

on the

proper locations.

The inspectors

concluded that the implemented corrective

actions

were adequate.

8.7

Closed

Violation 397 9433-01:

Failure to Follow Procedure

to Check

Cou lin

and Verif Full-Out Rod Li ht Lit

This violation identified the failure of control

room operators

to verify the

completion of coupling checks

and that the rod full-out light was lit.

The

licensee

found that the root cause

was the failure of operations

personnel

to

self-check,

and independently verify, the completion of the coupling checks.

As an immediate corrective action,

the licensee

performed the coupling checks

to verify operability.

As additional corrective actions,

operations

management

coached

the control

room crews regarding their responsibilities

associated

with control rod manipulation

and stressed

the need for proper

self-checking

and independent verification.

The

CRSs

were assigned

an

oversight responsibility for rod movements that occurred during their watch.

An operations

supervisory task was created

to require the review of various

operations

documentation

For accuracy

and completeness.

A program for

monitoring personnel

performance

was

implemented to provide feedback to

operators

regarding

performance.

The inspectors

made observations

as rod movements

were

made

and determined

the

new practice of using

second verification for each

step in the procedure

should prevent future errors.

In addition, the inspectors

reviewed the OI-09

Program

Form,

"Moving Control

Rods," which was

used to review individual

performance

in performing this task.

The form clearly defined management's

expectations

for the task.

The

CRS indicated that it was management's

expectation

that the 01-09 form be completed for the first rod movement

in a

shift.

The inspectors

reviewed the recent

rod movements

and verified that the

documentation

was completed to licensee

management's

expectation.

The

inspectors

concluded that the current procedure

and the implemented corrective

actions

were appropriate.

8.8

Closed

Violation 397 9433-02:

Failure to

Com l

With TS Action

Statement

When Allowed Outa

e Time

Was

Exceeded for a Containment

Isolation Valve

An

NRC inspector identified licensed operators'ailure

to comply with Post

Accident Sampling

TS 3.3.7.5.

The operators failed to comply with the

TS

because

they were not aware of the significance of the position indication of

the control

room valve indicator.

As corrective actions,

the licensee

revised

the

TS bases

to clarify TS 3.3.7.5

and instructed the control

room operators

regarding

reviews of operability and communicating sufficient information when

-18-

determining

TS

LCO applicability.

The inspector'determined

that the actions

were adequate.

9

FOLLOWUP ENGINEERING

(92903)

9. 1

Closed

Ins ection Followu

Item 397 9402-05:

Effects of

S ra

Pond

Icin

on Seismic

Loads for S ra

Pond

Su

orts

The licensee initiated

PER 293-0140,

dated

February

5,

1993, to review

concerns of the

NRC inspector

who observed

approximately

5 inches of ice in

the service water spray ponds.

The inspector's

concern

focused

on the impact

the ice would have

on the supports for the piping in the ponds during

postulated

seismic events.

The licensee's

analysis for PER 293-0140 indicated that the additional

'loads

from the ice during postulated

seismic events

were all within'the expected

loads

and design margins for the piping.

The inspectors

assessed

the

licensee's

methodology

and concluded that the assumptions

were within accepted

practice.

The licensee's

analysis

included bounding the

maximum possible

thickness of ice,

then calculating the loads

both in the horizontal

and the

vertical planes for a 10-inch depth of ice.

The inspectors

concluded that the

licensee

had adequately

addressed

the inspectors'oncerns.

10

LER REVIEWS

{90712, 92700)

10. 1

Closed

LER 397 93-14

Revision

1:

Inade uate

Backu

Overcurrent

Protection for Containment

Penetrations

This item documented

the licensee's

discovery of five primary containment

electrical lighting circuits with inadequate

overcurrent protection that were

not turned off during plant operations.

While completing corrective

actions,

the licensee

discovered

additional

inadequate

penetration

overcurrent

protection conditions.

The licensee

determined that the cause of this event

was

a design analysis that used

inaccurate

and incomplete documentation.

The licensee

immediately opened

the breakers

in the five lighting circuits.

Upon discovery of eight additional circuits, the licensee

declared

the

penetrations

and the equipment

supported

by the penetrations

inoperable

and

entered

the appropriate

TS.

The licensee

modified the wiring in the circuits

identified later with the exception of two valves to provide adequate

primary

and

backup overcurrent protection.

The two valves that were not modified,

Valves

RHR-V-123A and -123B,

were

removed

from service,

declared

inoperable,

and will remain inoperable.

To prevent recurrence,

the licensee

revised

PPM

1.3.4,

"Operating Data

and Logs," to require that the five lighting circuits

be verified in the tripped condition at least

once per day while the plant is

in Modes

1, 2, or 3.

The

TS and

FSAR were changed

to reflect the actual

condition of the circuits.

The primary containment electrical penetration

short circuit capability calculation

was updated.

The inspectors

reviewed the

corrective actions

taken

and determined that they were appropriate.

-19-

10.2

Closed

LER 397 94-05

Revision

1:

Failure of Control

Rod to Scram

Due to

De radation of Pilot Valve Elastomers

Caused

b

In-Service

A in

This

LER documented

the failure of Control Rod 06-39 to scram during routine

scram testing.

The licensee

determined that the root cause of the failure was

an unusual

combination

of., degradation

of both the

SSPV pressure

and exhaust

diaphragms.

The licensee

believed the cause of the degradation

was

accelerated

aging .due to differences

in diaphragm composition.

Upon

discovering the failure, the control

room operator manually inserted

Control Rod 06-39

and hydraulically disarmed it.

All the remaining control rods were

scram time tested to verify that there

was

no

common

mode failure.

As

a

result,

the licensee

identified four control rods with acceptable,

but slower

than expected

scram times,

declared

the rods inoperable,

and hydraulically

disarmed

them.

The licensee

commenced

weekly scram time testing of all

operable control

rods

and expedited

replacement

of SSPV diaphragms.

All SSPVs

were rebuilt prior to the completion of Refueling Outage

R10.

The licensee

changed

the environmental

qualified service life for the diaphragm in the

SSPVs

from the manufacturer's

suggested

3 to

4 years to

2 years,

with the

option to extend it to

3 years after further analysis.

The licensee

plans to replace

the

SSPVs with valves with improved diaphragm

material

(Viton) that should last

10 or more years.

The licensee

replaced

the

SSPVs

on 75 of the

HCUs with valves that

used the improved material.

The

licensee

plans to replace

the remaining prior to the completion of Refueling

Outage

R12.

The schedule

to replace

the remaining valves will depend

on

analysis of the degradation

of the diaphragm material recently

removed during

SSPV maintenance.

The inspectors

reviewed the corrective actions

taken

and

observed installation of the

new diaphragms.

The inspectors

determined

the

actions

taken

and compl'etion of the planned

replacement

of the remaining

SSPVs

were adequate.

10.3

Closed

LER 397 94-18

Revision

1:

Failure to

Com l

with a TS

Action Re uirement

When Ino erable Control

Rod Block Instrumentation

Exceeded

the Allowed Outa

e Time

This item identified the failure to comply with the action statement

for

TS 3.3.6.b

as

a result of the failure of the Channel

A scram discharge

volume

high water level control rod block level switch.

The licensee

determined

the

root cause

was the failure to identify the nonadjustable

design characteristic

of the replacement

scram discharge

volume rod block level switch.

The

licensee

declared

the switch inoperable,

placed it in the tripped condition

as

required

by the

TS action statement,

and repaired

the switch.

To prevent

recurrence,

the licensee

strengthened

the substitution evaluation

process,

revised the replacement

level switch substitution evaluations

and information,

obtained

the proper operation

and maintenance

manual,

and conducted

maintenance

shop briefings concerning

the event.

The inspectors

reviewed the

LER and supporting information and determined that

an additional

causal

factor involved the failure of IKC personnel

to follow

procedures

after identifying differences

between

the switch removed

and the

0

-20-

replacement

switch.

As discussed

in

NRC Inspection

Report 50-397/94-32,

I&C

technicians

modified and installed the switch without an approved modification

package

or procedure.

This concern

was addressed

in the response

to

PER 294-0975,

but was not brought out in the

LER.

The inspectors

reviewed the

corrective actions

and concluded that both the root cause

and the causal

factor were adequately

addressed

in either the

PER or LER.

10.4

Closed

LER 397 95-03:

Failure to

Com

1

With TS Action Statement

When

Allowed Outa

e Time Was

Exceeded for a Containment

Isolation Valve

This

LER is closed

based

on the review of Violation 397/9433-02

discussed

in

Section 8.8,

ATTACHMENT I

1

PERSONS

CONTACTED

Washin ton Public Power

Su

1

S stem

J.

D.

J

R.

p

~

D

J

L

G

V

H

p.

R.

A.

T

N.

J

H.

J

C

W.

V

J

W

G.

C

W.

L

G

J

D

p

R.

J

Albers, Radiation Protection

Manager

Atkinson, Reactor

and Fuels Engineering

Manager

Baker, Training Director

Barbee,

System Engineering

Manager

Bemis,

Regulatory

and Industry Affairs Di'rector

Bennett,

Chemistry Supervisor

Burn, Engineering Director

Fernandez,

Licensing Engineer

Gelhaus,

WNP-2 Projects

Manager

Harris,

Maintenance Specialist

Hedges,

Corporate

Chemist

Inserra,

equality Assurance

Manager

Koenigs,

Project

Manager

Langdon, Assistant

Operations

Manager

Love, Chemistry Manager

Mann, Operations Staff

McDonald, Assistant

Engineering Director

Monopoli, Maintenance

Manager

Muth, equality Support

Manager

Noyes, qua')ity Control Manager

Oxenford,

Outage/Work Control Supervisor

Parrish,

Vice President

Nuclear Operations

Pedro,

Compliance Specialist

Rigby, Health Physics Supervisor

Sanford,

Planning,

Scheduling,

Outage

Manager

Schwarz,

Operations

Manager

Shaeffer,

Operations

Training Manager

Sharp, Assistant

Engineering Director

Smith, equality Assurance Director

Swailes,

Plant General

Manager

Swank,

Licensing Manager

Taylor, Shift Manager

Winslow, Radiation Protection

Support Supervisor

Wyrick, Assistant to Plant General

Manager

Southern California Edison

U.S

Faranandi,

equality Assurance

Supervisor

Nuclear

Re ulator

Commission

H.

R.

J

Wong, Chief, Project

Branch

E

Barr, Senior Resident

Inspector

Clifford, Senior Project

Manager,

NRR

I

'

The inspectors

also interviewed various control

room operators,

shift

supervisors,

shift managers,

and maintenance,

engineering,

quality assurance,

and management

personnel.

Attended the exit meeting

on December

5,

1995.

2

EXIT MEETING

An exit meeting

was conducted

on December

5,

1995.

During this meeting,

the

inspectors

reviewed the scope

and findings of the report.

The licensee

acknowledged

the inspectors'indings.

The licensee

did not identify that any

proprietary information was provided to, or reviewed

by, the inspectors.

ATTACHMENT 2

ACRONYNS

CFD

IS.C

LCO

LER

NRC

PER

ppb

PPH

TS

WNP-2

containment

atmosphere

control

conderisate filter demineralizer

control

room supervisor

diesel

generator

emergency

operating

procedure

Final Safety Analysis Report

hydraulic control unit

health physics

instrument

and control

job investigation

sheet

limiting condition for operation

licensee

event report

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission

problem evaluation

request

parts

per billion

plant procedure

manual

quality assurance

reactor

feedwater

residual

heat

removal

radiation work permit

scram solenoid pilot valve

transversing

in-core probe

Technical Specifications

Washington

Nuclear Project-2

l

P

ML17291B182

Text

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