ML17279A732
| ML17279A732 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Columbia  |
| Issue date: | 12/08/1987 |
| From: | Martin J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | Sorensen G WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17279A733 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8712230134 | |
| Download: ML17279A732 (7) | |
See also: IR 05000397/1987019
Text
REGULATORY INFORMATION, DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)
CESSION
NBR: 8712230134
DOC. DATE: 87/12/08
NOTARIZED:
NO
DOCKET
CIL: 50-397
WPPSS Nuclear
Prospect.
Unit 2i
Washington Public Poee
05000397
AUTH. NAME
AUTHOR AFFILIATION
MARTINiJ. B.
Region
5.
Ofc of the Director
REC IP. NAME
RECIPIENT AFFILIATION
SORENSENi G. C.
Washing ton
Pub lie Poeer
Supp lg
Sg stem
SUBJECT:
Foreard s
'
'
on 870803-28i
summary of significant findings. Insp overviee
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conc usions
discussed.
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DISTRIBUTION CODE:
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TITLE: General
(50 Dkt)-Insp Rept/Notice of Violation Response
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Docket No. 50-397
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
1460 MARIALANE. SUITE 210
WALNUTCREEK, CALIFORNIASl696-6366
8 1987
Washington Public Power Supply System
P.O.
Box 968
3000 George Washington
Way
Richland, Washington
99352
Attention: Mr. G.
C. Sorensen,
Manager
Regulatory
Programs
Gentlemen:
Subject:
NRC Inspection at WNP-2
This refers to the special
team inspection,
conducted
by Mr. F.
R.
Huey and
other members -of our staff on August 3 through August 28, 1987.
This
inspection
examined your activities as authorized
by NRC License
No.
Discussion of our findings were held with members of your staff at the
conclusion of the inspection.
Areas examined during this inspection are described
in the enclosed
inspection
report.
Within these
areas,
the inspection consisted of selective
examinations
of procedures
and representative
records,
interviews with
personnel
and observations
by the inspectors.
Based
on the results of this inspection, it appears that certain of your
activities were not conducted in full compliance with NRC requirements,
as set
forth in the Notice of Violation, enclosed
herewith
as Appendix A.
Your
1
p
as stated in the Notice of Violation.
I
Ins ection Overview
The inspection
conducted
by the team was a safety system functional inspection
(SSFI).
The objective of an SSFI is to assess
the operational
readiness
of
selected safety systems
to function under all operational
and analyzed
accident conditions.
For this inspection,
the
AC and
DC electrical
distribution systems,
the standby service water system,
and the automatic
depressurization
system were selected for review.
These
systems
were selected
because it is considered
essential
that they function correctly following an
event
such
as
a loss of offsite power or a major plant transient.
Additionally, Probabilistic Risk Assessment
studies of boiling water reactors
have indicated that the failure of the selected
systems,
following a loss of
offsite power or a major plant transient,
contribute highly to the probability
of occurrence of a core melt event or an event with significant offsite
consequences.
In assessing
the operational
readiness
of these
systems,
the
team focused heavily on the capability of your engineering organization to
access
the design basis of the systems;
and their capability to maintain the
design basis
when modifying the systems.
Additionally, the team considered
maintenance,
surveillance, testing, quality assurance,
and plant operational
aspects
associated
with the systems
selected.
As di'scussed
in detail below,
the team identified a large number of deficiencies
and raised
many significant
questions with regard to these
systems.
8712230134
871208
2
8 1987
It is worthwhile to 'more carefully consider the basic approach of this type of
inspection
and the manner in which findings are reached.
The first step
involves the selection of a small
number of plant systems that have
significant impact on plant safety
and which involve a broad cross section of
site activities.
As noted above,
the team selected
the site
AC and
electrical
systems,
with additional attention to the standby service water and
automatic depressurization
systems.
The second
step involves
a thorough
and methodical
review of the licensee's
design
and engineering
processes,
as applied to the selected
systems.
An SSFI
inspection is based
on the premise that an effective design
and engineering
organization
incorporates
the following basic functions in a logical and
disciplined manner:
1.
The system design basis is valid and can
be
shown to fulfill
specified design requirements.
2.
The system design basis is well documented,
available
and understood
by the licensee.
3.
Effective administrative
programs
are implemented to control design
and engineering activities such that system design requirements
are
properly factored into applicable site activities (e.g.
construction, testing, operation,
maintenance,
training).
4.
Effective quality assurance
controls are implemented to ensure
a
continuing high standard
of performance.
Overall Conclusions
The team identified a number of significant deficiencies in the management
control of engineering
work at MNP-2.
Specific concerns
involve an incomplete
understanding
of the design basis for important plant equipment
and examples
of inadequate
control of implementation of design requirements
into site
activities.
The team observed
weaknesses
in your design control processes
which allowed errors in design modification activities to go undetected
and
which failed to ensure that necessary
design related parameters
were properly
factored into station operating
documents.
Implementing the inspection
approach
discussed
above, the team identified the following concerns
which, to
varying degrees,
are applicable to each of the systems
reviewed:
1.
Several
examples of significant errors in design basis
documents
were identified.
In the area of DC electrical
systems,
design errors
significantly reduced available margin for battery performance
under accident conditions.
In the area of AC electrical
systems,
design errors contributed
to a potentially significant reduction in the ability of
emergency
diesel
generators
to function as designed following a
fire or volcanic ash event.
DE<
8i9S7
In the area of the standby service water and other safety
related
systems,
the lack of a properly defined design basis
.
for time delay relays resulted in failure to perform required
testing
and raised questions
as to the design
adequacy of time
delay settings.
In the area of the automatic depressurization
system,
inconsistencies
between the design basis in the
FSAR and system
design
documents
raised questions
as to the adequacy of the
system to fulfillits design requirements.
2.
Several
examples
were identified in which inadequate
administrative
control of the design process
resulted in improper implementation of
design requirements.
In the area of DC electrical
systems,
design control
deficiencies
resulted
in, instances
of improperly revised design
calculations
and improper testing of station batteries.
In the area of AC electrical
systems,
design control problems
resulted in examples of improper testing of emergency diesel
generators
and improper modification of system
components.
In the area of the standby service water system
and other
safety related
systems,
inadequate
control of testing of motor
operated
valve thermal overload devices
raised questions
as to
the adequacy of these
components
to fulfilltheir design
functions.
In addition, lack of proper control over the
equipment modification process
resulted in cases
where specific
modifications, required
by completed
design
change
packages,
had not been
accomplished
as mandated.
In the area of the automatic depressurization
system,
j
inadequate
design controls allowed the installation of a system
defeat circuit without necessary
limitations for use of this
function being properly factored into site operating
procedures.
In addition to design related problems,
the team noted other areas of
deficiencies warranting increased
management
attention.
In particular:
1.
The team observed
several
examples of the need for increased
management
attention to plant material condition and housekeeping
in
general.
2.
The team noted instances
in which your staff did not appear to have
properly addressed
root cause
evaluations
associated
with safety
related
equipment malfunctions.
The number of design control related deficiencies identified during this
inspection indicates
a significant weakness
in the basic administrative
programs
implemented at WNP-2 for control of these
processes.
Ouring the
course of the inspection,
the team identified several
examples of
administrat'ive procedure deficiencies
which contributed to specific problems.
4
8 ~g87
The number
and type of problems
noted is also indicative of the need for
additional
and better focused quality assurance
attention to design related
activities.
In this regard,
the team
had several
discussions
with licensee
quality assurance
management
personnel.
These
management
personnel
shared
this concern
and noted that comprehensive
efforts have already
been initiated
to enhance
performance in this area.
During the team exit meeting,
Mr. Burn acknowledged
the team's
conclusions
relating to design
and design control deficiencies
and described
several
planned actions to correct these deficiencies.
The team understands
that
these actions
are intended to:
1) review and update
design basis information
and calculations
associated
with plant safety systems
and bring this
information together into an accessible,
controlled format; 2) review the
operation,
maintenance,
surveillance,
and training activities associated
with
plant safety systems,
and confirm that these activities reflect design basis
information; 3) provide improved administrative control over all organizations
implementing design basis
requirements
and 4) provide improved quality
assurance
overview of the technical
aspects
of design
and modification
activities.
These corrective actions
appear to be appropriate in addressing
the areas of weakness
noted.
You are strongly encouraged
to assign
the
highest priority to efforts to improve your performance
in this area.
It is further requested
that, in addition to your response
to the enclosed
Notice of Violation,. you provide
a detailed written description of your action
plan.
We anticipate periodically meeting with you and your staff to discuss
the status of your actions.
It should also
be noted that sever'al
areas
of
potential violation of NRC requirements
remain unresolved,
pending your
completion of additional evaluations
of the specific problems involved.
Most
of the items in this category involve perceived
problems with your basic
program for controlling plant design activities.
In addition to your response
to the Notice of Violation, Appendix A, please
provide your assessment
of the apparent deficiencies identified as unresolved
items in the enclosed report, including any corrective actions taken or
planned.
In accordance
with 10 CFR 2.790(a),
a copy of this letter
and the enclosures
will be placed in the
NRC Public Document
Room.
The responses
directed
by this letter and the attached
Notice are not subject
to the clearance
procedures
of the Office of Management
and Budget
as required
by the Paperwor k Reduction Act of 1980,
PL 96-511.
Should you have
any questions
concerning this inspection,
we will be glad to
discuss
them with you.
S
rely,
J.
B. Martin
Regional Administrator
DCC
SiSS7
I
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Encl osures:
l.
Appendix A, Notice of Violation
2.
Appendix B, Summary of Significant Findings
3.
Inspection
Report
No. 50-397/87-19
cc w/enclosures:
C.
M. Powers,
P.
L. Powell,
R.
B. Glasscock,
G.
E.
Doupe,
Esq.,
A.
L. Oxsen,
State of Washington
N.
S.
Reynolds,
Esq.,
BCP8R
8 l987
l..
Appendix A, Notice of Violation
2.
Appendix B,
Summary of Significant Findings
3.
Inspection
Report
No. 50-397/87-19
cc w/enclosures:
C.
H. Powers,
P.
L. Powell,
R.
B. Glasscock,
G.
E.
Doupe,
Esq.,
A.
L. Oxsen,
State of Mashington
N.,S.
Reynolds,
Esq.,
BCP8R
bcc w/enclosures:
Resident
Inspector
Project Inspector
Drew Persinko,
G.
Cook,
RV
.B. Faulkenberry,
RV
J. Martin,
RV
bcc w/o enclosure
3:
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M. Smith
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