ML17263A482

Amend 57 to License DPR-18,revising TS Sections to Eliminate Provision of High Concentration Boric Acid to SIS

ML17263A482
Person / Time
Site:	Ginna
Issue date:	12/07/1993
From:	Butler W Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
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ML17263A483	List: ML17263A482 ML17263A484
References
NUDOCS 9312100220
Download: ML17263A482 (29)

Text

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0 0+**k UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASjllNGTO51~ D.C. 20555-0001 ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION DOCKET NO. 50-244 R.

E.

GINNA NUCLEA PO ER P

AN AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE C

Amendment No.

57 License No.

DPR-18 1.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commiss'ion or the NRC) has found that:

2.

A.

The application for amendment filed by the Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation (the licensee) dated December 17,

1992, as supplemented April 8,

1993, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.

The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.

There is reasonable assurance:

(i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.

The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.

The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No.

DPR-18 is hereby amended to read as follows:

9312100220 931207 PDR ADDCK 0500OZ44

'P,

'PDR (2).

Technical S ecifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 57

, are hereby incorporated in the license.

The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3.

This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 90 days, FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Attachment:

Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance:

December 7,

i993 Walter R. Butler, Director Project Directorate I-3 Division of,Reactor Projects I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

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ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO.

FACI ITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-18 DOCKET NO. 50-244 Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the attached pages.

The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change.

'emove 1-8 3.2-1 3 ~ 2 2

3.2-3 3.2-4 3.3-1 3 ~ 3 2

303 2a 3 ~ 3 3 3.3-4 3.3-14 3.3-14a 4.1-6 4.1-7a 4.1-8 4.1-9 Insert 1-8 3.2-1 3 ~ 2 2

3 0 2 2a 3 ~ 2 3

3. 2-4 3.2-5 3.3-1 3 ~ 3 2 3 ~ 3 3 3.3-4 3.3-14 3.3-14a 4.1-6 4.1-7a 4.1-8

4. 1-9

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(

I

(

I

e

1. 18

1. 19 Dose E uivalent I-131 I

The dose equivalent I-131 shall be that concentration of I-131 which alone would produce the same thyroid dose as the quantity and isotopic mixture of I-131, I-132, I-133, I-134 and I-135 actually present.

The dose conversion factors used for this calculation shall be those for the adult thyroid dose via inhalation, contained in NRC Regulatory Guide 1.109 Rev.

1 October 1977.

Re ortable Event A Reportable Event shall be any of those conditions specified 1.20 in Section 50.73 to 10CFR Part 50.

Canisters Containin Consolidated Fuel Rods 1.21 Canisters containing consolidated fuel rods are stainless steel canisters containing the fuel rods of no more than two fuel assemblies which have decayed at least five years and are capable of being stored in a storage cell of the spent fuel pool e Shutdown Mar in Shutdown margin shall be the amount of reactivity by which the reactor is subcritical, or would be subcritical from its present condition assuming all rod cluster control assemblies (shutdown and control) are fully inserted except for the single rod cluster control assembly of highest reactivity worth which is assumed to be fully withdrawn, and assuming no changes in xenon or boron concentration.

Amendment No. g 57 1-8

l 4

3.2 Chemical and Volume Control S stem licabilit Applies to the operational status of the chemical and volume control system.

3.2.1 3.2. 1. 1 3 '

3.2.3 To define those conditions of the chemical and volume control system necessary to assure safe reactor operation.

S ecification During cold shutdown or refueling with fuel in the reactor there shall be at least one flow path to the core for boric acid injection.

The minimum capability for boric acid injec-tion shall be equivalent to that supplied from.the refueling water storage tank.

With this flow path unavailable, immediately suspend all operations involving core alterations or positive reactivity changes and return a flow path to operable status as soon as possible.

When the reactor is above cold shutdown, two boron injection flow paths shall be operable with one operable charging pump for each operable flow path, and one operable boric acid transfer pump for each operable flow path from the boric acid storage tank(s).

Zf required by specification 3.2.2

above, the Boric Acid Storage Tank(s) shall satisfy the concentration, minimum volume and solution temperature requirements of Table 3.2-1.

Amendment No.

3 57 3 ~ 2 1

3'.4 3.2.5 With only one of the required boron injection flow paths to the RCS operable, restore at least two boron injection flow paths to the RCS to operable status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, or within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> be in at least hot shutdown and borated to a shutdown margin equivalent to at least 2.454 delta k/k at

cold, no xenon conditions.

If the requirements of 3.2.2 are not satisfied within an additional 7 days, then be in cold shutdown within the next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

Whenever the RCS temperature is greater than 200'F and is, being cooled by the RHR system and the over-pressure protec-tion system is not operable, at least one charging pump shall be demonstrated inoperable at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> by verifying that the control switch is in the pull-stop posi-tion.

Amendment No.

57 3 ~ 2 2

Table 3.2-1 Boric Acid Storage Tank(s)

Minimum-Volume-Temperature-Concentration+

Concentration ppm boron Minimum Volume gal.

Minimum Solution Temperature

'F 4700 to less than 5000 5000 to less than 6000 6000 to less than 7000 7000 to less than 8000 8000 to less than 9000 9000 to less than 10000 10000 to less than 11000 11000 to less than 12000 12000 to less than 13000 13000 to less than 14000 14000 to less than 15000 15000 to less than 16000 16000 to less than 17000 17000 to less than 18000 18000 to less than 19000 19000 to less than 20000 20000 to less than 21000 21000 to less than 22000 22000 to less than 23000 8400 7800 6400 5400 4700 4200 3800 3500 3200 3000 2700 2500 2400 2200 2100 2000 1900 1800 1800 40 52 62 70 78 85 91 97 103 108 113 118 123 127 131 137 140 143 145 Amendment No. 57 3

~ 2 2a

0L J

l t4

Basis The chemical and volume control system provides control of the reactor system boron inventory.+

This is normally accomplished by using one or more charging pumps in series with one of the two boric acid transfer pumps.

Above cold shutdown conditions, a minimum of two of four boron injection flowpaths are required to insure single functional capability in the event that an assumed single active failure, renders one of the flow paths inoperable.

The boration volume available through any flow path is sufficient to provide the required shutdown margin at cold conditions from any expected operating condition and to compensate for shrinkage of the primary coolant from the cooldown process.

The maximum volume requirement is associated with boration from just critical, hot zero

power, peak xenon with control rods at the insertion limit, to cold shutdown with single reactor coolant loop operation.

This requires 26,000+ gallons of 2000 ppm borated water from the refueling water storage tank or the concentrations and volumes of borated water specified in Table 3.2-1 from the boric acid storage tanks.

Two boric acid storage tanks are available.

One of the two tanks may be out of service provided the required volume of boric acid is available to the operable flow paths.

(2)

Above cold

shutdown, two of the following four flow paths must be operable with one operable charging pump for each operable flow path, and one operable boric acid transfer pump for each operable flow path from the boric acid storage tanks.

(1)

Boric acid storage tanks via one boric acid transfer pump through the normal makeup (FCV 110A) flow path to the suction of the charging pumps.

Boric acid storage tanks via one boric acid transfer pump through the emergency boration flow path (MOV 350) to the suction of the charging pumps.

(3)

Refueling water storage tank via gravity feed through AOV 112B

..to the suction of the charging pumps.

Amendment No.

4 57 3 '

3

c t

"I

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Refuel water storage tank via g.

ity feed through manual bypass valve 358 to the suction of the charging pumps.

Available flow paths from the charging pumps to the reactor coolant system include the following:

(1)

Charging flow path through AOV 392A to the RCS Loop B hot leg.

(2)

Charging flow path through AOV 294 to the RCS Loop B cold leg.

(3)

Seal injection flow path to the reactor coolant pumps.

The rate of boric acid injection must.

be sufficient to offset the maximum addition of positive reactivity from the decay of xenon after a trip from full power.

This can be accomplished through the operation of one charging pump at minimum speed with suction from the refueling water storage tank.

Also the time required for boric acid injection allows for the local alignment of manual valves to provide the necessary flow paths.

The quantity of boric acid specified in Table 3.2-1 for each concentra-tion is sufficient at any time in core life to borate the reactor coolant to the required cold shutdown concentration and provide makeup to maintain RCS inventory during the cooldown.

The temperature limits specified on Table 3.2-1 are required to maintain solution solubility at the upper concentration in each range.

The temperatures listed on Table 3.2-1 are taken from Reference (4).

An arbitrary 54F is added to the Reference (4) for margin.

Heat tracing may be used to maintain solution temperature at or above the Table 3.2-1 limits.

If the solution temperature of either the flow path or the borated water source is not maintained at or above the minimum temperature specified, the affected flow path must be declared inoperable and the appropriate actions specified in 3.2.4 followed.

Placing a charging pump in pull-stop whenever the reactor coolant system temperature is ~200'F and is being cooled by RHR without the over-pressure protection system, operable will prevent inadvertent overpres-surization of the RHR system should letdown be terminated.+

(4)

References:

UFSAR Section 9.3.4.2 (1)

(2)

RG&E Design Analysis DA-NS-92-133-00 "BAST Boron Concentration Reduction Technical Specification Values" dated Dec.

14, 1992 (3)

L.D. White, Jr. letter A.

Schwencer,

NRC,

Subject:

Reac-tor Vessel Overpressurization, dated February 24, 1977 Amendment No.

57

3. 2-4

(4)

Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp. Bulletin 0151 "Boric Acid Techni-cal Grades" dated 5/84 Amendment No.

57 3.2-5

3.3 e

e c Co e Coo stem Auxilia Cool'n S stems Air Recirculation Fah Coo'lers Containment S ra and Charcoal HEPA Filters 3 ' '

To define those conditions for operation that are neces-sary:(1) to remove decay heat from the core in emergency or normal shutdown situations, (2) to remove heat from contain-ment in normal operating and emergency situations, (3) to remove airborne iodine from the containment atmosphere following a postulated Design Basis

Accident, and (4) to minimize containment leakage to the environment subsequent to a Design Basis Accident.

S ecification Safet In'ection and Residual Heat Removal S stems 3.3,.1.1 The reactor shall not be taken above the mode indicated unless the following conditions are met:

a ~

b.

c ~

Above cold shutdown, the refueling water storage tank contains not less than 300,000 gallons of water, with a boron concentration of at least 2000 ppm.

Above a reactor coolant system pressure of 1600 psig, except during performance of RCS hydro

test, each accumulator is pressurized to at least 700 psig with an indicated level of at least 504 and a maximum of 824 with a boron concentration of at least 1800 ppm.

At or above a reactor coolant system temperature of 350'F, three safety injection pumps are operable.

Amendment No.

3 ~ 3 1

l

'I 4 I

~ g

d.

At or above an RCS temperature of 350'F, two residual heat removal pumps are operable.

e.

At or above an RCS temperature of

350OF, two residual heat removal heat exchangers are operable.

f.

- At the conditions required in a through e

above, all g

h.

valves, interlocks and piping associated with the above components which are required to function during accident conditions are operable.

At or above an RCS temperature of 350 F, A.C. power shall be removed from the following valves with the valves in the open position: safety injection cold leg injection valves 878B and D.

A.C.

power shall be removed from safety injection hot leg injection valves 878A and C with the valves closed.

D.C. control power shall be removed from refueling water storage tank delivery valves

896A, 896B and 856 with the valves open.

At or above an RCS temperature of 350'F, check valves 853A, 853B, 867A, 867B,

878G, and 878J shall be operable with less than 5.0 gpm leakage each.

The leakage requirements of Technical Specification 3.1.5.2.1 are still applicable.

Above a reactor coolant system pressure of 1600 psig, except during performance of RCS hydro test, A.C. power) shall be removed from accumulator isolation valves 841 and 865 with the valves open.

At or above an RCS temperature of 350',

A.C.

power shall be removed from Safety Injection suction valves 825A and B with the valves in the open position, and from valves

826A, B,

C, D with the valves in the closed position.

Amendment No.

3 ~ 3 2

3.3 '.2 3 ~ 3

~ 1.3 3.3. 1e4 3.3. 1.5 If the conditions of 3.3.1.1a are not met, then satisfy the condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> or be at hot shutdown in the next 6

ho'urs and at least cold shutdown within an additional 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

The requirements of 3.3.1.1b and 3.3.1.1i may be modified to allow one accumulator to be inoperable or isolated for up to one hour.

If the accumulator is not operable or is still isolated after one hour, the reactor shall be placed in hot shutdown within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and below a RCS pressure of 1600 psig within an additional 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

The requirements of 3.3.1.1c may be modified to allow one safety injection pump to be inoperable for up to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. If the pump is not operable after 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, the reactor shall be placed in hot shutdown within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and below a

RCS temperature less than 3504F within an additional 6

hours.

The requirements of 3.3.1.1d through h.

may be modified to allow components to be inoperable at any one time.

More than one component may be inoperable at any one time provided, that one train of the ECCS is operable.

If the requirements of 3.3.1.1d through h. are not satisfied within the time period specified below, the reactor shall be placed in hot shutdown within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and at an RCS temperature less than 350'F in an additional 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

a.

One residual heat removal pump may be out of service provided the pump is restored to operable status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

Amendment No. f4 57 3 ~ 3 3

P

3.3.1e6 b.

One residual heat removal heat exchanger may be out of service for a period of no more than 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

c.

Any valve, interlock, or piping required for the func-tioning of one safety injection train and/or one low head safety injection train (RHR) may be inoperable provided repairs are completed within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> (except as speci-fied in e. below).

d.

Power may be restored to any valve referenced in 3.3.1.1g for the purposes of valve testing provided no more than one such valve has power restored and provided testing is completed and power removed within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

e.

Those check valves specified in 3.3.1.1h may be inopera-ble (greater than 5.0 gpm leakage) provided the inline MOVs are de-energized closed and repairs are completed within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

Deleted Amendment No.

3.3-4

~i that the mass addition from the inadvertent operation of safety injection will not result in RHR system pressure exceeding design limits.

The limitation on no safety injection pumps operable and the discharge lines isolated when overpressure protection is provided by the pressur-izer PORV's removes mass injection from inadvertent safety injection as an event for which this configuration of overpressure protection must be designed to protect.

Inoperability of a safety injection pump may be verified from the main control board with the pump control switch in pull stop, or the pump breaker in the test racked out position such that the pump could not start from an inadvertent safety injection signal.

Isolation of a

safety injection pump discharge path to the RCS may be verified from the main control board by the discharge MOV switch position indicating closed, or the discharge valve closed with A.C.

power removed, or a manual discharge path isolation valve closed such that operation of the associated safety injection pump would not result in mass injection to the RCS.

High concentration boiic acid is not needed to mitigate the consequences of a design basis accident.

Reference (10) demonstrates that the design basis accidents can be mitigated by safety injection flow of RWST concentration.

Therefore, SI pump suction is taken from the RWST.

Requiring that the safety injection suction valves (825A and B,

826A, B,

C and D) are aligned with A.C.

power removed insures that the safety injection system would not be exposed to high concentration boric acid and the assumptions of the accident analysis are satisfied.

Amendment No.

P4, 57 t

3.3-14

~Ij

References (1)

Deleted (2)

UFSAR Section 6.3.3.1 (3)

UFSAR Section 6.2.2.1 (4)

UFSAR Section 15.6.4.3 (5)

UFSAR Section 9.2.2.4 (6)

UFSAR Section 9.2.2.4 (7)

Deleted (8)

UFSAR Section 9.2.1.2 (9)

UFSAR Section 6.2.1.1 (Containment Integrity) and UFSAR Section 6.4 (CR Emergency Air Treatment)

(10) Westinghouse

Report, "R.E. Ginna Boric Acid Storage Tank Boron Concentration Reduction Study" dated Nov.

1992 by C.J.

McHugh and J.J.

Spryshak Amendment Ne. P, 57 3.3.14a

TABLE 4.1-1 (Continued)

Channel escri tion 10.

Rod Position Bank Counters 11.

Steam Generator Level

12. Charging Flow

13. Residual Heat Removal Pump Flow Check S(1,2)

N.A.

N.A.

Calibrate Test Remarks N.A.

N.A.

N.A.

N.A.

1) With rod position indication

2) Log rod position indications each 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> when rod deviation monitor is out of service

14. Boric Acid Storage Tank Level D

N.A.

Note 4

15. Refueling Water Storage Tank Level N.A.

N.A.

16. Volume Control Tank Level N.A.

N.A.

17. Reactor Containment Pressure M(1)

1) Isolation Valve signal

18. Radiation Monitoring System

19. Boric Acid Control N.A.

N.A.

Area Monitors R1 to R9, System Monitor R17

20. Containment Drain Sump Level

21. Valve Temperature Interlocks N.A.

N.A.

N.A.

N.A.

22.

Pump-Valve Interlock

23. Turbine Trip Set-Point N.A.

N.A.

N.A.

M(1)

1) Block Trip

24. Accumulator Level and Pressure N.A.

Amendment No. P, 57

4. 1-6

0 L

~

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TABLE 4.1-1 (Continued)

Channel Descri tion Check Calibrate Test remarks 39.

Reactor Trip Breakers N.A N.A.

M Function test Includes independent testing of both undervoltage and shunt trip attachment of reactor trip breakers.

Each of the two reactor trip breakers will be tested on alternate months.

40.

Manual Trip Reactor N.A.

N.A.

R Includes independent testing'of both undervoltage and shunt trip circ-uits.

The test shall also verify the operability of the bypass break-er.

41a.

Reactor Trip Bypass Breaker N.A.

N.A.

M Using test switches in the reactor-protection rack manually trip the reactor trip bypass breaker using the shunt trip coil.

41.b Reactor Trip Bypass Breaker N.A.

N. A.

R Automatically trip the undervoltage trip attachment.

NOTE 1:

NOTE 2'OTE 3

Logic trains will be tested on alternate months corresponding to the reactor trip breaker testing.

Monthly logic testing will verify the operability of all sets of reactor trip logic actuating contacts on that train (See Note 3).

Refueling shutdown testing will verify the operability of all sets of reactor trip actuating contacts on both trains.

In testing, operation of one set of contacts willresult in a reactor trip breaker trip; the operation of all other sets of contacts will be verified by the use of indication circuitry.

Testing shall be performed monthly, unless the reactor trip breakers are open or shall be performed prior to startup if testing has not bee performed within the last 30 days.

The source range trip logic may be excluded from monthly testing provided it is tested within 30 days prior to startup.

NOTE 4

When BAST is required to be operable.

Amendment Nn. g, 57

4. 1-7a

TABLE 4.1-2 IN MUM FRE UENCIES FO E UIPMENT AND S PL NG TESTS 1.

Reactor coolant Chemistry Samples 2.

Reactor Coolant Boron Test Chloride and Fluoride Oxygen Boron Concentration

~Fre u~enc 3 times/week and at least every third day 5 times/week and at least every second day except when below 250 F

Weekly 3.

Refueling Water Storage Tank Water Sample Boron Concentration Weekly 4.

Boric Acid Storage Boron Concentration Tank Twice/Week"'.

Control Rods 6a. Full Length Control Rod 6b. Full Length Control Rod 7.

Pressurizer Safety Valves 8.

Main Steam Safety Valves 9.

containment Isolation Trip

10. Refueling System Interlocks Rod drop times of all full length rods Move any rod not fully inserted a sufficient number of steps in any one direction to cause a

change of position as indicated by the rod position indication system Move each rod through its full length to verify that the rod position indication system transitions occur Set point Set point Functioning Functioning After vessel head removal and at least once per 18 months (1)

Monthly Each Refueling Shutdown Each Refueling Shutdown Each Refueling Shutdown Each Refueling Shutdown Prior to Refueling Operations Amendment No.

57 4'-8

11.

Service Water System 12.

Fire Protection Pump and Power Supply 13.

Spray Additive Tank 14.

Accumulator 15.

Primary System Leakage Test Functioning Functioning NaOH Concent Boron Concentration Evaluate

~Fre u~enc Each Refueling Shutdown Monthly Monthly Bi-Monthly Daily 16.

Diesel Fuel Supply Fuel Inventory Daily 17.

Spent Fuel Pit 18.

Secondary Coolant Samples Boron Concentration Gross Activity Monthly 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> (2)

(3) 19.

Circulating Water Calibrate Flood Protection Equipment Each Refueling Shutdown Notes:

(3)

Also required for specifically affected individual rods following any maintenance on or modification to the control rod drive system which could affect the drop time of those specific rods.

Not required during a cold or refueling shutdown.

An isot'opic analysis for I-131 equivalent activity is required at least monthly whenever the gross activity determination indicates iodine concentration greater than 104 of the allowable limit but only once per 6 months whenever the gross activity determination indicates iodine concentration below 10+m of the allowable limit.

(4)

When BAST is required to be operable.

Amendment No. g 57 4'-9

lg