ML17258A850
| ML17258A850 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Ginna  |
| Issue date: | 02/11/1981 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17258A849 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8103060408 | |
| Download: ML17258A850 (38) | |
Text
PARTIAL REVIEW (F'
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Equipment Evaluation Report By the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation For Rochester Gas 8 Electric Corp.
R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Station Docket No. 50-244 Environmental Qualification of Safety-Related ELectricaL Equipment Dated:
February ll, 1981
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(PARTIAL REVIEW)
EQUIPMENT EVALUATION REPORT BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION FOR, ROCHESTER GAS 8 ELECTRIC CORP.
R.E.
GINNA NUCLEAR POWER STATION DOCKET NO. 50-244 ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF SAFETY-RELATED ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT 3.0 STAFF EVALUATION The staff's evaluation of the Licensee's responses included an on-site inspection of selected CLass IE equipment and by examining the Licensee's report for completeness and acceptability.
The criteria described in the DOR Gui'deLines and NUREG-0588~ in part, were used as a basis for the etaff'e evaluation of the adequacy of the Licensee'~s qualification program.
J During the week of May 5, 1980, NRC and FRC representatives visited the Ginna plant site, inspected safety-related systems and equipment identified I and tabulated safety-related components through discussions with plant personneL, and conducted a general review of RGSE's submittaL of Apr. 25~ 1980.
The inspection verified proper instaLLation of equipment, overaLL interface integrity, and manufacturers nameplate data.
The manufacturer and model number from the nameplate data was compared to information given in the Licensee's submittaL.
The foLlowing evaluation, incorporates the RGE,E submittal and the Franklin Research Center technical evaluation report (TER).
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3.1 COMPLETENESS OF SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT In accordance with the DOR guidelines, the Licensee was di rected to establish a List of systems and display instrumentation needed to mitigate the consequences of a LOCA or HELB, inside or outside con-
- tainment, and reach safe shutdown.
The Lists of safety-related systems and display instrumentation were developed from a review of plant safety analyses and emergency procedures.
The display instrumentation selected includes parameters to monitor overaLL plant performance as weLL as to monitor performance of the systems on the List.
The systems List was established on the basis of the functions that must be performed for mitigation of the consequences of a LOCA or HELB without regard to Location of equipment relative to a potentially hostile environment.
The staff has determined and verified that the systems considered by the Licensee are those required to achieve or support:
(1) emergency reactor
- shutdown, (2) containment isolation, (3) reactor core cooling~ (4) containment heat
- removal, (5) core residual heat
- removaL, and (6) prevention of significant release of radioactive material to the environment.
In addition to the concerns identified below the staff's systems review has not included those equipment items discussed in section 5.0 of this report.
List is contained in Appendix D.
The systems and instrumentation The Licensee submitted an extensive List of safety-related electrical equipment.
This List was evaluated and identicaL components within a pLant area exposed to the same environment were grouped; 44 item types of equipment were identified and assessed by the staff.
The Licensee has also identified certain equipment items as providing important safety H
functions~ but has not incLuded them in the List of equipment that must be qualified.
Justification for the omission should be presented.
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3.2 Service Conditions The Commission Nemorandum and Order (CLI-80-21), dated Nay 23, 1980 requires that the DOR Guidelines and the "For Comment" NUREG-0588 are to be used as the criteria for establishing the adequacy of the safety related electricaL equipment environmental qualification program.
These documents provide the option of establishing a bounding pressure and temperature condition based on plant specific analysis identified in the Licensees FSAR or based on generic profiles using the methods identified in these documents.
On this basis the staff has
- assumed, unless otherwise noted, that the analysis for developing the environmental envelopes for Ginna relative to the temperature, pressure~
and the containment spray caustics, have been performed in accordance with the above stated requirments
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For this review the staff reviewed the qualification documentation to ensure that the qualification specifications envelope the conditions established by the Licensee.
During this review the staff assumed that for plants~
designed and equipped with an automatic containment spray
- system, which satisfies the single failure criterion, the main steam Line break environmental conditions are enveloped by the Large break LOCA environmental conditions.
The staff assumed and requires that the Licensee verifies~ that the containment spray system-is not subjected to a disabling single component failure and therefore s tisfies the DOR Guideline requirements of Section 4.2.1.
Equipment submergence has also been addressed where the possibility exists that flooding of equipment may resuLt from high energy Line breaks (HELB).
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TEMPERATUREr PRESSUREs AND HUMIDITY CONDITIONS INSIDE CONTAINMENT The Licensee has provided the results of accident analyses as foLLows:
Max. Temp. (')
Max. Press.
(psig)
Humidity LOCA 286 60 100%
MSLB (not provi ded)
The staff has concluded that the minimum temperature profile for equipment qualification purposes should include a margin to account for higher than average temperatures in the upper regions of the containment that can exist due to stratification especially following a postulated MSLB.
Use of the steam saturation temperature corresponding to the totaL bui lding pressure (partial pressure of steam plus partial pressure of air) versus time untiL the sprays become effective wiLL provide an acceptable margin for either a postuLated LOCA or MSLB, whichever is controlling as to potential adverse a
environmentaL effects on equipment.
The Licensee's specified temperature (service condition) of 286'F does not satisfy the above requirement.
A saturation temperature corresponding to the pressure profile (307'F peak temperature at 60 psig) should be used instead.
The Licensee should update his equipment summary tables to reflect this change.
If there is any equipment that does not meet the staff position, the Licensee must provide either justification that the equipment wilL perform its intended function under the specified conditions or propose corrective action.
3.4 TEMPERATURES PRESSURE AND HUMIDITY CONDITIONS OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT The Licensee has provided the temperature
- pressure, humidity and applicabLe environmentaL values associated with a HELB outside containment in the foLLowing plant areas:
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Auxiliary Building 2.
Intermediate building and cable tunneL 3.
Diesel generator rooms 4.
Screen house 5.
Auxiliary building addition 6.
Turbine bui Lding 7.
Relay and battery rooms 8.
Nechani ca L equipment room 9.
Control room The staff has verified that the parameters identified by the Licensee for the MSLB are acceptable.
3.5 SUBMERGENCE 0
The maximum submergence Levels have been established and assessed by the Licensee.
The staff assumed for this review, unless otherwise noted, that the methodology employed by the Licensee is in accordance with the appropriate criteria as established by the Commission Nemor-andum and Order (CLI-80-21), dated Nay 23~ 1980.
The Licensee's value for maximum submergence is 7 feet.
The elevation LeveL was not stated.
The Licensee should provide this information.
, The licensee should provide an assessment of the failure modes associated with the submergence of equipments Assurance should also be provided that the subsequent fai Lure of this equipment wiLL not adversely affect any other safety functions or mislead an operator.
Additionally, the
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Licensee should discuss operating time, across the spectrum of events, in relation to the time of submergence.
If the resuLts of the Licensee's assessment are acceptable~
then the equipment may be exempt from the submergence parameter of quaLification.
3.6 CHENICAL SPRAY The Licensee's FSAR value for the chemical concentration is 2000-3000 PPM boric acid solution.
The exact volume percent used by the vendors for qualification testing should be verified by the Licensee.
Therefore for the purpose of this review~ the effects of chemicaL spray wiLL be cons ide red unre so Lve1.
3.7 AGING The DOR GuideLines, section 7, does not require a qualified Life to be established for aLL safety related electricaL equipment,
- however, the foLLowing actions are required:
1.
Detailed comparison of existing equipment to the materials identifed in Appendix C of the DOR guidelines.
The first supplement to IEB-79-01B requires the Licensees to utilize the table and identify any additionaL materials as a result of their effort.
2.
Establish an ongoing program to review surveillance and maintenance records to identify potentiaL age related degradations.
3.
Establish component maintenance and replacement schedules which include considerations of aging characteristics of the installed components.
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For this review the staff requires that the Licensee submit supplementaL information to verify and identify their degree of conformance to the above requirements.
The response, should be inclusive of aLL the equipment identified as required to maintain their functional operability in harsh environments.
The staff wiLL review the Licensees
- response, when submitted, and report its evaluation in a supplementaL report.
3.8 RADIATION (INSIDE AND OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT)
The Licensee has provided values for radiation Levels postulated to exist foLlowing a LOCA event.
The application and methodology empLoyed to determine these values have been presented to the Licensee as part of the NRC staff criteria contained in the DOR Guidelines, NUREG-0588 and the guidance provided in IEB-79-018, Supplement 2.
Therefore, for this review, the staff has assumed that the values provided, unless otherwise
- noted, have been determined in accordance with the prescribed criteria.
The staff's review assessed that the values to which equipment was qualified, enveloped the requirements identified by the Licensee.
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value established by the Licensee is 1.6 x 10 RADS for the integrated dose inside containment.
This value envelopes the DOR GuideLines require-ments and is therefore acceptable.
A typicaL value outside containment 6
of 2.8 x 10 RADS has been used by the Licensee to specify Limiting radiation Levels within the areas containing RHR and SI pumps in the auxiliary building.
This value appears to consider the radiation Levels influenced by the source term methodology associated with post-LOCA recirculation fLuid Lines and is therefore acceptable.
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4.0 QUALIFICATION OF EQUIPMENT The foLLowing subsections are the staff's assessment, based on the Licensee's submittaL, and the Franklin TER of the qualification status. of, safety-reLated eLectricaL equipment.
The staff has separated the safety-related equipment into three categories (1) equipment requiring immediate corrective action, (2) equipment requiring additionaL quaLification information and/or corrective action, and (3) equip-ment considered acceptabLe conditioned only on the satisfactory resolution of the staff's concern identified in Section 3.7.
The NRC staff in its assessment of the Licensees submittaL and the TER did not review the methodoLogy empLoyed to determine the values estab-Lished by the Licensee.
However, in reviewing the TER a determination was made by the staff as to the stated conditions presented by the Licensee.
Additionally, the detailed review of supporting documentation referenced by the Licensee (e.g., test reports) has been completed by FRC.
The environmentaL qualification data bank to be estabLished by the staff wiLL provide the means to cross reference each supporting docu-ment to the referencing Licensee.
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Where supporting documents were found to be unacceptable, the Licensee wiLL be required to take additional corrective actions to either establish qualification or replace the item(s) of concern.
An appendix for each subsection is attached which provides a List of equip-ment which requires additional information and/or corrective action.
Where appropriate, a reference is provided in the appendices to identify deficiencies.
It should be noted, as in the Commission Memorandum and Order, that the deficiencies identified do not necessarily mean that equipment is unqualified.
However, they are cause for concern and may require further case-by-case evaluations.
4.1 EQUIPMENT REQUIRING IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION Appendix A identifies equipment (if any) in this category.
The Licensee
,E was requested to perform a review of the facilities safety-related electrical equipment.
The Licensees review of this equipment has not identified any equipment requiring immediate corrective. action and therefore no Licensee event reports were submitted.
In addition the staff, in this review, has not"identified any safety-related electricaL
~equipment which is known not to be able to perform its intended safety function during
'he-Mme-period-in-which itis-required to operate.
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4.2 EQUIPMENT REQUIRING ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND/OR CORRECTIVE ACTION Appendix B identifies equipment in this category, including the tabulation of their deficiencies.
The deficiencies are noted by a Letter relating to the Legend, identified below, indicating that insufficient information has been provided for the qualification parameter or condition.
R Radiation T Temperature QT Qualification Time RT Required Time P - Pressure H - Humidity CS - Chemical Spray A Material Aging Evaluation, Replacement
- Schedule, Ongoing Equipment Surveillance S Submergence M Margin I HELB Evaluation Outside Containment Not Completed QM - Qua lificat ion Method RPN " Equipment Relocation or Replacement, Adequate Schedule Not Provided EXN " Exempted Equipment Justification Inadequate SEN - Separate Effects Qualification Justification Inadequate QI Qualification Information Being Developed RPS - Equipment Relocation or Replacement ScheduLe Provided.
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As noted in Section 4.0~ these deficiencies do not necessariLy mean that the equipment is unqualified.
However, they are cause for concern and require further case-by-case evaluations.
The staff has determined that an acceptable basis to exempt equipment from qualification, in whole or part, can be established provided the foLLowing can be estab-Lished and verified by the Licensees:
(1)
Equipment does not provide essential safety functions in the harsh environment and failure of it in the harsh environment wiLL not impact safety related, functions or mislead an operator.
(2a)
Equipment performs its function prior to its exposure to the harsh environment and the adequacy for the time margin provided is adequately justified, and (2b)
Subsequent fai Lure of the equipment as a result of the harsh environment does not degrade other safety functions or mislead the operator.
(3)
The safety-reLated function can be accomplished by some other designated equipment that has been adequately qualified and satisfies the single failure criteria.
(4)
Equipment not subjected to a harsh environment as a result of the postulated accident.
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The Licensee is therefore required to supplement the information presented by providing their resolutions to the deficiencies identified which should include a description of the corrective action and schedules for its completion (as applicable),
etc.
The staff wiLL review the Licensees
- response, when submitted, and report on the resolution in a supplementaL report.
It should be noted that where testing is presently being conducted, a
condition may arise which results in a determination by the Licensee that the equipment does not satisfy the qualification test requirements.
For that equipment the Licensee wiLL be required to provide their proposed corrective action, on a timely basis, to assure that qualifi-cation can be established by June 30, 1982.
4.3 EQUIPNENT CONSIDERED ACCEPTABLE OR CONDITIONALLY ACCEPTABLE Based on the staffs review of the Licensees submittaL and the TER the staff identified the equipment in Appendix C (1) as acceptable on the basis that the qualification program adequately enveloped the specific environ-mentaL plant parameters, or (2) conditionalLy acceptable subject to the satis-factory resolution of the staff concern identified in Section 3.7.
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For the equipment identified as conditionaLLy acceptable the staff deter-mined that the Licensee di d not clearly:
(1) state that a materiaL evaluation on their equipment was conducted to assure that no known materials susceptible to degradation due to aging have been used in their equipment.
(2) establish an ongoing program to review the surveiLLance and maintenance records of their plant in order to identify equipment degradation which may be age related~
and/or (3) propose a maintenance program and replacement schedule for equipment identified in item 1 or equipment that is qualified for Less than the Life of the plant.
The Licensee is therefore required to suppLement the information presented for equipment in this category before fuLL acceptance of this equipment can be established.
The staff wiLL review the Licensees
- response, when submitted~
and report on the resolution in a supplemental report
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5.0 DEFERRED REQUIREMENTS IE Bulletin 79-01B, Supplement 3 has relaxed the time constraints for the submission of the information associated with cold shutdown equipment.and TMI Lessons Learned modifications.
To permit a uniform program schedule the SEP plant reviews have been amended.
The staff required that this information be provided by February 1,
1981.
The.staff wi 11 provide a supplemental evaluation addressing these concerns.
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APPENDIX B, List of Equipment in Section 4.2/ Equipment Requiring Additional Information And/Or Corrective Action LEGEND:
DESIGNATION FOR Deficiency NOTE:
(R) Licensee has committed to replace equipment
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S Radiation Temperatur e Qua lificat ion Tine Required Time Pressure Humidity Chemical Spray Material Aging Evaluation/
.Replacement Schedule/
Ongoing Equipment Survei l lance Submergence M - Margin I HELB Evaluation Outside Cont a i nment Not Comp le ted QM Qua lificati on Method RPN Equipment Re location or Rep la cement/
Adequate Schedule Not Provided EXN Exempted Equipment Justification Inadequate SEN Separate Effects Qualification Justi fication Inadequate QI Qualification Information Being Developed RPS - Equipment Relocation or Replacement Schedul Provided TER Item No.
Equipment Description Manufacturer Model/
Type Deficiencies (R) 1A SOV Operator ASCO LB 8300 B6IU QI/QM/A/T/P/QT (R)'B SOV Operator ASCO LB 8300
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B64RU QI/QM/A/T/P/QT 1C 15A 15B 16A 17A 17B 17C (R)19 SOV Operator Cables Cables Cables Cables Cables Cables Level transmitter ASCO Kerite.
Kerite Coleman Coleman Rone General Cable Barton LBX831616 Type HT Type HT UNK UNK UNK UNK 289 QI/QM/A/T/QT A/R A/R A/R A/R A/R A/R QI/A
TER Item No.
21A Equipment Description Pressure transmitter Nanufacturer Barton Node l/
Type 332 Deficiency QI/A 30 34 3A 3B (R) 4 (R) 6A Notor Splice Solenoid Solenoid Solenoid Solenoid Westinghouse Raychem Lawrence Lawrence Versa Versa 588.5-CSP Type WCSF-N 110114W 125434W VSG VSG-3731 QI/QN/A/T/CS/R/
QI/QN/ArTrPr QT QI/QNrArT/PrQT QI/QMJA/T/P/QT QI/A/QN/T/P/QT/
CS/R (R) 6B 13B=
14 Solenoid Notor E lectrica l Penetration Terminal Block Versa Westinghouse Westinghouse Westinghoue VSG-3421 505USABDP UNK 542247 QI/A/QN/T/P/QT/
CS/R QI A/QN/R A/S/CS/R (R) 20 (R) 21B Pressure transmitter Barton Flow transmitter Barton 332 332 QI QI (R) 22 (R) 24 (R) 26 Pressure transmitter Level transmitter Level transmitter Foxboro
,Foxboro Foxboro 611-GN-DSI A/S/CS/ R/QN (Nodified)
A S CS R
QN 613-N-NDL 613 "HN-HSI QI (R) 27 Temperature Detector Elements Rosemount 176J A QIrArQNrTrP/QT/R B-2
Appendi.x 8 Continued TER Item No.
Equipment Description Nanuf acturer NodeL/
Type Defici ency 31 Swit chgear Westinghouse D8"50Ai 1600A QIrArQNrT 35 SoLenoid Valcor V57300 QI~QN~A~T~P~QT~CS ~
R 41 Switchgear Westinghouse D H-350Ei 1200A QI~A~QN~T 8-3
APPENDIX C
'ist of Equipment in Section 4.3, Equi'pment Considered Acceptable or Conditionally Acceptable TER ITEN NO.
13A (R) '18 (R) 23 25 Equipment Description E lect ri ca L Penetrations NOV Leve L'ransmitters Pressure Transmitter Leve L Transmitter Manufacturer Crouse"Hinds LINITORQUE Foxboro Foxboro Foxboro Node Ll Type UNK SNB-00 611-GN-ASI 611-GN-DSI 613-DN-NS I Defici enci es 8D 15C 5A 8A 8F 8G NOV NOV NOV Cable SOV Operator" Damper NOV NOV NOV LINITORQUE LINITORQUE LINITORQUE Kerite ASCO UNK LIMITORQUE LINITORQUE LINI TORQUE SNB-00 SMB-00 SNB"1 Type HT UNK UNK SNB-2 SNB-00 SNB-00
Appendi x D
PLant Safety-Related Systems and Display Instrumentation A.. Safe Shutdown Systems System Term Function Reactor Protection/Trip System*
Trips reactor when predetermined set points are exceeded
'ain Steam (NSIVs~ Safeties J Atmospheri c Reliefs)*
Releases energy (steam) for plaqt cooldown/isolates NS during NSLB/
HELB accidents Auxi Liary Feedwater*/Standby Auxi Liary I/L Provides steam gen.
makeup water for decay heat removaL 8 plant cooldown Chemical
& Volume Control (Charging L
Portions)*
Provides reactor makeup water during coo Ldown/Long term chemi ca L cont ro L Residual Heat Removal+
Component Cooling I
L Long term heat removal capability Removes heat from RHR heat exchanger/
transfers heat to the service sys.
Servi ce Water Transf ers heat from the component cooLing heat exc. to heat sink Diesel Generator*
S/I Emergency electricaL power source for vital equipment
'125-V dc Power Supply System*
DieseL Oil*
Vital Instrument Power Supply*
Auxiliary Power Distribution System Primary Auxiliary Building Ventil-ation System**
I Backup power to vitaL equip.
5 circuits S/I Lubrication for emerg. diesels SeLf explanatory L
Power to various elec.
equipment I/L Self explanatory Control Bui ldi ng H.V.C. Systems**
Diese l Room Vent i lation Systems**
I/L SeLf explanatory Self explanatory
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Appendix D., Continued PLant Safety-Related Systems and Disp lay Inst rument at ion B.
Accident Nitigating Systems (LOCA~ NSLB~
FWLB)
System Term Function Pressuf izer Pressure Relief Power operated relief vaLves for relievin RCS pressure.
Containment Iso lat ion System*
Reactor Containment Fan Coolers~
Hydrogen Purge and Hydrogen Recombiners Isolates containment penetrations in case of accident
'I Post LOCA containment heat removaL 'L hydrogen controL Safety Injection and Accumulators S/I Provides cooling water to the core post-accident Post-Accident Sampling 5 Nonitor ing L
Containment Radiation Nonitor Self explanatory Containment Spray Post accident containment pressure 8
iodine control Feedwater Control 5 Bypass Valves/
'eedpump trip/Feedpump Discharge...
Va Lves Isolates feedwater Lines in case of Line break Pump Room Ventilation coolers (RHR/SI/
I/L Cooling for motor of certain vitaL I/L/CS/CCP)
PUIIIP S Control Room Ventilation Nain Steam IsoLation valves L
Redundant~
vitaL vent sys.
Automatically isoLates the main steam Lines in case of Line break LEGEND:
I
- Systems which function both for safe shutdown and also for acci'dent mitiga-tion.
- Review of these systems deferred unti L after February 1~
1981 as referenced in Section 2.2.2. of TER.
. +System required for cold shutdown only.
(S) Short Term (I) Intermediate Term (L) Long Term Less than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Up to 30 days 30 days plus D-2
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Appendix D,'ontinued C.
Accident Nitigating and Safety Shutdown Instrunents (LOCA~ NSLBi FWLB)
TERN Pressurizer Level Pressurizer Pressure RCS Temperature L
L Containment Pressure*++
'Steam Line Pressure Steam Line Flow Safety Injection Flow***
Sump '.eve l***
Steam generator Level Auxiliary Feed System Flow Chemical and volume control flow RWST Level BAST Level***
Residua l Heat Removal F low Component Cooling Mater Flow Service Water System Diesel Generator Emergency AC Power Emergency DC Power
- Instruments required only for accident mitigation purposes.
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