ML17258A355
| ML17258A355 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Ginna  |
| Issue date: | 11/27/1981 |
| From: | Crutchfield D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Maier J ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP. |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17258A356 | List: |
| References | |
| CON-FIN-A-6425, TASK-06-07.C1, TASK-6-7.C1, TASK-RR LSO5-81-11-066, LSO5-81-11-66, NUDOCS 8112030314 | |
| Download: ML17258A355 (5) | |
Text
0 November 27, 1981 Docket No. 50-244 LS05 11-066 8>5!.
4O Mr. John E. tlaier Vice President Electric and Steam Production Rochester Gas 8 Electric Co} poration 89 East Avenue Rochester, New York 14649
Dear ter. Maier:
SUBJECT:
SEP TOPIC VI-7.C.1. APPENDIX K - ELECTRICAL INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL (EI8C) RE-REVIEWS, SAFETY EVALUATION FOR R.
E.
GINNA Enclosure 1 is our contr actor's final evaluation of this topic.
The eval-uation has been revised to reflect the additional information provided in your July 14, 1981 letter.
Enclosure 2 is the staff safety evaluation that is based upon Enclosure 1,
. and your letter, and supplements our contractor's evaluation.
Enclosure 2
notes that your design provides an acceptable alternative to current criteria.
Accordingly, the staff considers Topic VI-7,C.l for your plant to have been completed acceptably.
Sincerely, g Eo+
II(
Dennis H. Crutchfield, Chief
,-Qo7)
Operating Reactors Branch No.5 Division of Licensing
Enclosures:
As stated cc w/enclosures:
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Mr. John E. Maier CC Harry H. Voigt, Esquire
- LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby and MacRae 1333 New Hampshire Avenue, N.
W.
Suite 1100 Washington, D. C.
20036 Mr. Michael Slade 12 Trailwood Circle Rochester, New York 14618 Ezra Bialik Assistant Attorney General Environmental Protection Bureau New York State Department of Law 2 World Trade Center New York, New York 10047 Jeffrey Cohen New York State Energy Office Swan Street Building Core 1, Second Floor Empire State Plaza
- Albany, New York 12223 Director, Bureau of Nuclear Operations State of New York Energy Office Agency Building 2 Empire State Plaza'lbany, New York 12223 Rochester Public Library 115 South Avenue Rochester, New York 14604 Supervisor of the Town of Ontario 107 Ridge Road West
- Ontario, New York 14519 Resident Inspector R.
E'. Ginna Plant c/o U. S.
NRC 1503 Lake Road
- Ontario, New York 14519 Mr. Thomas B.'Cochran Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
1725 I Street, N.
W.
Suite 600 Washington, D. C.
20006 U. S. Environmental Protection Agency Region II Office ATTN:
EIS COORDINATOR 26 Federal Plaza New York, New York 10007 Herbert Grossman, Esq.,
Chairman Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comnission Washington, D. C.
20555 Dr.. Richard F. Cole Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Coamission Washington, D. C.
20555 Dr. Eneeth A. Luebke Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comnission Washington, D. C.
20555
fOPIC:
VI-7.C.1 APPENDIX K - ELECTRICAL INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL 1&C RE-REVIEWS INTRODUCTION During the Appendix K reviews of some facilities initially considered, a detailed EI&C review was not performed.
Accordingly we intended to re-review the modified ECCS of these facilities to confi rm that it is designed to meet the most limiting single failure.
Several types of failure were considered as candidates for designation as the most limiting.
Because of the scope of the other SEP Topics, it was decided that, for the purpose of this study (and to reduce replication of effort on other SEP Topics),
the loss of a single ac or dc onsite power system was the most limiting failure.
Accordingly, this topic was limited to an evaluation of the independence between the onsite power systems.
REVIEW CRITERIA The review criteria are presented in Sectior, 2 of EG&G Report EGG-EA-5641 "Independence of Redundant Onsite Power Systems."
RELATED SAFETY TOPICS AND INTERFACES The scope of review for this topic was limited to avoid duplication of effort since some aspects of the review were performed under related topics.
The related topics and the subject matter are identified below.
Each of the related topic reports contain the acceptan'ce criteria and review guidance for its subject matter.
YI-4 VI-7.A.3 YI-7.B VI-7.C.2 VI-7.D YI-10.A VII-l.A VII-3 VIII-2 VIII-3 VIII-4 IX-6 Bypass
=and Reset of Engineered Safety Features (B-24)'CCS Actuation System ESF Switchover from Injection to Recirculation Failure Node Analysis-ECCS Lohg Term Cooling Passive Failures (e.g., flooding)
Testing of Reactor Protection Systems Reactor Trip System Isolation Systems Required for Safe Shutdown Onsite Emergency Power Systems Emergency dc Power Systems Electrical Penetrations Fire Protection The conclusion that suitable isolation devices are provided is a basic assumption for Topics VI-7.C.2 and YII-3.
IV.
REVIEW GUIDELINES The review guidelines are presented in Section 3 of Report EGG-EA-5641 "Independence of Redundant Onsite Power Systems".
V.
EVALUATION As noted in Report EGG-EA-5641, "Independence of Redundant Onsite Power Systems",
the separation between-redundant systems does not satisfy the review criteria.
However, the short circuit analysis provided in the licensee's July 14, 1981 letter shows that (1) fusing has been coordinated so that faults will be cleared prior to dc bus transfer; (2) the automatic transfer schemes for buses 14, 16, 17, and 18, DG1A control panel and DGlA control-panel have electrical interlocks to prevent the paralleling of the two dc systems; (3) the two 'dc systems can be paralleled when the two systems are purposely tied together during the test of one set of batteries or during the maintenance or repair of a main 150 ampere charger unit; (4) no credible component failure can cause the paralleling of the two dc systems through the manual switches on the 4KV non-class IE buses;
- and, (5) the automatic transfer scheme used for the main control board annunci-ators is designed so that only one of the two dc sources can be connected.
VI.
CONCLUSION As a result of our review of our contractor's work the staff concludes that the subject ac and dc onsite systems do not satisfy the review criteria.
From our review of the licensee's calculations and after consultation with our contractor, we also conclude that the present design and administrative controls provide an acceptable alternative to our criteria provided that fuse types and sizes, battery capacity, and electrical loads are not changed.