ML17256A969
| ML17256A969 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Ginna  |
| Issue date: | 05/22/1982 |
| From: | Crutchfield D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17256A970 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8205280264 | |
| Download: ML17256A969 (14) | |
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISStON WASHINGTON, D. Cs 20555
. ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION-DOCKET NO. 50-244 R.
E.
GINNA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT AMENDMENT TO PROVISIONAL OPERATING LICENSE 1.
The A.
B.
C.
Amendment No.
5O License No. DPR-18 Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
The application for amendment by Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation (the licensee) dated April 16, 1982 (transmitted by letter dated April 22, 1982), complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, "and the rules and regulations of the Commission; There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.
The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2.
Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and by changing Paragraph 2.C(2) of Provisional Operating License No. DPR-18 to read as'follows:
(2)
Technical S ecifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 50, are hereby incor-porated in the license.
The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.
3.
This license amendment is effective as of the date of issuance.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Dennis M. Crutchfield, C
ef Operating Reactors Bran 85 Division of Licensing
Attachment:
Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance:
May 22,
- 1982,
ATTACHNENT TO LICENSE AMENDNENT NO.
PROVISIONAL OPERATING LICENSE HO. DPR-18 DOCKET NO. 50-244 Revise Appendix A Technical Specifications by removing the pages identified below and inserting the enclosed pages.
The revised pages contain the captioned amendment number and marginal lines which indicate the area of changes.
, REMOVE 3.6-4 through 3.6-8 3.6-10 INSERT 3.6-4 through 3.6-8 3.6-10
- 3. 6-11
TABLE 3.6-1
~AI~ ISOIATION VALVES EM NO.
IDENTIFICATION/DESCRIPZION ISOLATION BOUNIMQC MAXIM%
ISOLATION ISOIATION TIME *(SK,') BOUNQMK'AXIMN ISOLATION TIME *(SEC) 29 100 101 102 103 105 106 107 108 109 110 110ill g
112 O
113 120 120
&el transfer tube charging line to "B" locg SI Puap 1B discharge Alternate charging to "A" cold leg Construction ire Service Water Contairaent Spray Pmp 1A "A" Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) seal water
~inlet Ranp A discharge to Waste Holdup Tank RCP seal water out and excess letdown to VCP Contaianent Spray. Plnp 1B "B" RCP seal water inlet SI test line RHR to "B" coId leg letdown to'Non-regen.
Heat exchanger SI Putp 1A. discharge Nitrogen to Accunulators Pressurizer Relief Tank (PRT) to Gas Analyzer (GA.)
'lange CV 370B CV 889B CV 870B CV 383B welded flange cV 862A CV 304A AOV 1728 MN 313 cv 8628 CV 304B MV 879 NN 720(20)
PDV 371 CV 889A CV 870A CV 8623 AOV 539 60 60 60.
60 (1)
(2)
(5)
(5)
(2)
Mv 5129 (3)
(2)
AOV 1723 (4)
(3)
(2)
(5)
(6)
MV 204A MV 820 (14)(17)
(5)
(5)
NN 846 MV 546(7) 60 NK 60
PBfP.
NO.
IDEMPIFICATION/DESCRIFPION ISOIATION KtUNLMQf lSXINlN ISOIATION TIME *(SE.')
MMGMUM ISOIATION ISOIATION EGUNDUUf TIME *(SEC) 121 121 121 121 123 124 124 Nitrogen to PRT Reactor Makeup mter to PRP Cont. Press.
transmitter PT-945 (10)
-.Cont. Press.
transmitter PT-946 (10)
Reactor Coolant Drain Tank (RCDP) to GA, Excess letdown supply and return to heat exchanger Post Accident air santple "C" fan CV 529 FP 945 PP 946 Pd& 1789 AOV 745 CV 743 MV 1569 MV 1572 125 126 I
127
~
Cattponent (holing Mater (CCW)
CCN fran 1A.RCP CCM to IA RCP fran lB RCP N% 759B M)V 759A CV 750A 128 CCW to lB RCP 129 RCDP & PRT to Vdnt Header CV 750B mXr 1787 130 131 132 140 o
141 142 143 CJlO
~
CA/ to reactor support cooling CQl to reactor support cooling Depressurimtion at pcaer MiR pump suction fran "A" Hot leg RHR-gl puttp suction fratl Satp B RlK-g2 pump suction fran Sanp B RCDP pmp suction CV 1713 N% 813 KtV 814 NN 7970 K)V 701(20)
NN 850A(13)
M)V 850B(13)
AOV 1721 MV 4757(16)
MV 4636(16)
MV 1076B
'V 10848 201.
Reactor CatIpart. cooling Unit A & B 202 "0" tlydrogen recanbiner (pilot & aain) 60 NA NA 60 60 60 60 NA 60 MV 547(8)
NN 508 MV 1819A MV 1819B MV 1655(7)
(ll)
(>>)
MV 1571 MV 1574 (12)
(12)
N% 749A N)V 749B AOV 1786 (19)
(19)
AOV 7971 (6) mV 851A(13)
M)V 851B(13)
(11)
SOV IV-3B SOV IV-5B 60 60 60 60 NA NA 60 60 NK NA I
NA Normally Closed NA Normally Closed
203 205 206 206 207 207 209 Post accident air sample to "B" fan Purge Supply Duct R)t leg loop sample Przr. liquid space sample "A" S/G sample Przr.
Steam space sample
~ "B" S/G sample Reactor Canpart. cooling Units A 6 B 210 Oxygen makeup to A 6 B recanbiners 300 ro 301 303 c+
304 O
305 305 C) 305 Purge Exhaust Duct Aux. steam supply to contaianent Aux. steam condensate return "A" Hydrogen reccmbiner (pilot and aain)
Radiation Monitors R-ll, R-12 6 R-lOA Auto Inlet Isol.
R-ll, R-12 6 R-10A Outlet Post Accident air sample (contaimant) 307 Fire Service Water PE%
NO.
IDEN1'IFICATION/DEKRIPj.'ION 203 Contain. Press.'transmitter PT-947
& 948 ISO?ATION BOUNQARY PP 947 PF 948 MV 1563 MV 1566 AOV 5870 AOV 966C AOV 966B M)V 5735 AOV 966A PDV 5736 MV 4758(16)
MV 4635(16)
MV 1080A mW 5878 MV 6151 MV 6175 MV 1084A MV 1076A AOV 1597 CV 1599 MV 1554
'V 1557 MV 1560 CV 9229 5
60 60 60 60 60 Nh 60 MV 1819C MV 18190 Nr 1565 Nr 1568 MN 5869 MV 9560(14)
MV 956E(14)
Nr 5733(7)
MV 956F HV 5734(7)
(11)
(11)
SOV IV-2A SOV IV-2B mr 5879 MV 6165(15)
MV 6152(15)
SOV IV-5A SOV IV-3A MV 1596 NK NA NK Normally Closed, NA Normally Closed Nh Normally Closed NK Normally Closed NA PQV 1598 Nr 1556 MV 1559 MV 1562 MV 9227 60
?R, NK NA (18),
MAXIMUM MAXINM ISOLATION ISOrATION ISOIATION TIME <<(SEC)
BOUNDARY TIME *(SEC)
PENT.
NO IDENPIPICATION/DESCRIPFION ISOIATION
.EGUNOhRY MAXINM ISQlATION TIME)*(SEC)
ISOIATION BOUNQMK MhXENM ISOLATION TIME *(SEC) 308 309 310 310 311 Service Hater to "A" fan cooler Leakage test depressurization Service Air to Contain.
.Instrunent Air to Contain.
Service Hater fran "B" fan cooler 316 317 318 319 320 321 322 323 324 l+
~
332 O
CJl C)
.Service Hater to "B" fan cooler Leakage test supply Dead weight tester (decmmissioned)
Service Mater fran "A" fan cooler Service water to "C" fan cooler A S/G Blcadown B S/G Bio@down Service Hater fran "D" fan cooler Demineralized water to Containm nt Cont. Press.
Trans.
ET-944, 949 6 950 Leakage test and hydrogen sonitor ins trunentation lines 312 Service Hater to "D" fan cooler 313 Leakage test degressurization 315 Service Hater frcm "C" fan cooler Nf 4627(16) flange CV 7226 CV 5393 MV 4630(16)
Nr 4642(16) flange MV 4643(16)
MV 4628(16) flange welded shut MV 4629(16)
MV 4641(16)
CV 8419 Pl'44 Pl'49
-Pl'50
~ MV 7448 MV 7452 MV 7456 SN 921 SOV 922 SQV 923 SOV 924 60 60 (ll)
N)V 7445 Nf7141 M)V 5392 (11)
(11) mr 7444 (ll)
(11) mv 7443 welded shut (11)
(U.)
MV 5701(7)
Nf 5702(7)
(>>)
AOV 8418 Nf 1819G Nf 1819P Nf 18198 cap cap (21)
(21)
(21)
NA Normally Closed NA 60 NK Normally Closed NA NK Normally Closed Nh 60 NK
ÃL NK Hh NK
Ãi NA NK.
PENT.
NO.
IDENTIFICATION/DESCRIPTION ISOIATION EGUhlDMK MAXIM@
MAXINN ISOLATION ISOIATION ISOLATION TIME:,*(SK.) BOUNDAZC TIME: *(SEC) 401 403 404 1000 Main steam frcm A 8/G Main steam fran B S/G Feedmter line to A S/G Feedmter line to B S/G Personnel 8",tch 2000 Equipnent Hatch The maximun isolation time does not include diesel start time.
- ~The MsIVs and feaster isolation valves are not considered to be containment isolation valves.
The containment boundary is the steam generator secondary side and tubes.
MV'- Manual Valve MN Motor Operated Valve AOV>> Air Operated Valve CV Check Valve SCV - Solenoid Operated \\lalve N
CL A)
O
i (10) The pressure transmitter provides a boundary.
II (ll) Normally operating incoming and outgoing lines which are connected to closed systems inside containment and protected against missiles throughout their length, are provided with at least one manual isolation valve outside containment.
(FSAR 5.2.2 pg. 5.2.2-2).
(12)
(13)
(14)
The single remotely controlled containment isolation valve is normally open and motor operated.
The cooling water return line is not directly connected to the. reactor coolant system
- and, should remain open while the coo3.ant pump is running.
A second, automatic isolation barrier is provided by the component cooling water loop, a closed system.
(FSAR 5.2.2 pg. S.2.2-1a)
See FSAR Table 5.2.2-1 and Figure 5.2.2-2.
Sump lines are in operation and filled with fluid following an accident.
Containment leakage testing is not required.
The valves are subjected to RHR system hydrostatic test.
Noxmally operating outgoing lines connected to the Reactor Coolant System axe provided with at least one automatically operated txip valve and one manual isolation valve in series located.outside the containment.
Xn addition to the isolation
- valves, each line connected to the Reactor Coolant System is provided with a remote operated root valve located near its connection to the Reactor Coolant System.
(FSAR 5.2.2 pg.
- 5. 2. 2-1 )
(15)
(16)
(17)
See FSAR Table 5.2.2-1 and Figure 5.2.2-17.
The Service Water system operates at a pressure higher than the containment accident pressure and is missile protected inside containment'.
Therefore, these valves are used for f3ow control only and need not be 3.eak tested.
A manual valve outside containment in series with an automatic valve is provided for normally operating outgoing RCS 3.ines (FSAR pg.
5'.2-1).
(18) Fire Service Watex will be used only to fight fires inside containment.
AOV 9227 is closed during power operation.
A containment isolation signal to automatically close this valve is not required because a spurious. signal during a fire may be hazardous to personnel and may impede fire suppression activities.
(19)
See FSAR Table 5.2.2-1 and Figure S.2.2-16.:
(20) Containment.
leakage testing is not required per L. D. White, Jr.
letter to Dennis L. Ziemann, USNRC dated September 21, 1978.
3.6-10 Amendment No. + 5p
(21) Acceptable isolation capability is provided for instrument lines by two isolation boundaries outside containment.
One of the boundaries outside containment may be a Seismic Class 1 closed system which is subjected to Type C leak rate testing.
3.6-ll Amendment, No.
50
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VNITE D STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY, COMMISSION WASHINGTOhl, D. C: 20555 E
t SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO. 50 TO PROVISIONAL OPERATING LICENSE NO.
DPR-18 ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION R. E.
GINNA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT DOCKET NO. 50-244 1.0 '~BL 1
On April ZZ, 198Z the licensee* submitted proposed changes to the Ginna Technical Specifications (Reference 1).
These changes involved modifications to Technical Specification Table 3.6-1'hich identifies containment isolation valves.
Containment isolation provisions for containment piping penetrations are found in General Design Criteria 54 through 57 of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A.
Although the GDC provides examples of acceptable isolation provisions for containment piping penetrations, flexibility is permitted if acceptability can be found on "some other defined basis."
The licensee's submittal proposes other defined bases for three piping penetrations into containment.
2.0 2.1 Evaluation Penetration 318 Deadwei ht Tester V
The deadweight tester is no longer used to calibrate pressurizer instrumentation, The 1/8". tube penetration has been decommissioned and is currently bounded by a screw-type cap inside containment and a closed manual valve outside containment.
Local leak testing is currently performed on the valve outside containment.
The licensee has proposed removing the manual valve outside containment and replacing it with a screw type cap similar to the barrier found inside containment.
The licensee's basis for this modification is that (1) a capped barrier is a less likely leak path than a manual valve and (2) capping both ends of the penetration eliminates the need for local leak testing.
The staff, however, is concerned over the use of screw type caps and the elimination of local leak testing.
Elimination of the local leak tests prevents periodic verification that the pipe caps remain secure and intact.
Due to this concern the licensee has proposed cutting the 1/8" tube off at both ends of the containment penetration and then seal weld over the penetration can.
This will essentially eliminate the piping penetration and provide a permanent leak tight barrier.
'We find this proposal acceptable.
ochester Gas an E ectrsc Corporation SI05 s8@Y: -:i
2.2 Penetration
- 332, Leaka e Test Instrumentation Lines The three leakage test instrumentation lines that enter penetration 332 are only used f'r the integrated leak rate tests required by Appendix 0 to 10 CFR 50.
During normal operation they are bounded by screw-type caps inside containment and normally closed manual valves outside containment.
The licensee has proposed modifying these lines to include installation of contain-ment hydrogen'onitors as required by NUREG-0737.
Hydrogen monitor lines will branch off the leakage test instrumentation lines between the containment wall and the existing manual valves.
The two barriers for the hydrogen monitor lines will consist of a normally closed remote manual isolation valve and the hydrogen monitor.
The hydrogen monitors, which act as closed
- systems, are designed and installed to meet Seismic Category 1 criteria and 'will be leak tested to Appendix 0 Type C standards.
The modified configuration requires removal of the pipe caps inside containment.
Caps will be placed on each of the leakage test instrumentation lines just outside of the manual valves.
Caps will serve as the second barrier for the leakage test instrumentation lines.
The two isolation barriers for both the leakage test instrumentation
'lines and the hydrogen monitor lines are located outside containment.
Plant safety is enhanced
-by placing both of the isolation barriers of the hydrogen monitors outside
~ containment.
Similarly both isolation bar riers of the leakage test instrumentation lines are located outside containment so as not to interfere with operation of the safety related hydrogen monitor lines.
Since both of these lines have two containment isolation barriers and a basis exists to locate the isolation barriers outside containment, we find the licensee's proposal acceptable.
2.3 Penetration 307, Fire Service Water The fire service water penetration currently has a check valve inside containment and an air operated valve outside containment that receives an automatic contain-ment isolation signal.
The outside valve has position indication and tamper indication in the control room and is remote manually controlled from the control room.
3.0 The licensee has proposed removing the, automatic containment isolation signal from the normally closed outside valve.
The valve is only open when firefighters are putting out fires inside containment.
The licensee has noted that a spurious isolation signal generated due to a fire in containment could cause a loss of-fire t
t the firefighters.
The potential hazard to the firefighters is an unacceptable personnel risk and is a greater nsk than that po y
p sed b
a otential leakage path through two normally closed valves following a LOCA.
We concur with the licensee that an undue risk exists with respect to plant personnel.
8ased on our evalaution, we have determined that the 'control room position indication and"tamper indication for the outside air operating valve along with the valve alignment checks provided to verify valve position,
. provide an acceptable defined basis for assuring containment isolation, in accordance with GDC 56, without the need for automatic containment isolation.
On the basis, and with the control room valve position and tamper indication and the valve alignment checks, we find the licensee's proposal to remove automatic containment isolation for the fire service water line to be acceptable.
~Summar General Design Criteria 54 through 57 of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A describes the containment'isolation provisions required of piping penetrations entering containment.
Alternatives to that found in the GDC can be permissible if it can be 'found acceptable on some other defined bases.
We conclude that the licensee has provided acceptable bases for the proposed containment isolation modifications.
Therefore we find the proposed modifications to the plant's Technical Specifications to be acceptable.
4.0 Environmental Consideration We have determined that the amendment does not authorize a change in effluent
- types, increase in. total amounts of effluents, or an increase in power level, and will not result in any significant environmental impact.
Having made this determination, we have concluded that the amendment involves an action which is insignificant from the standpoint of environmental
- impact, and pursuant to 10 CFR 51.5(d)(4), that an environmental impact statement or negative declaration and environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.
5.0 Conclusion We also conclude, based on the considerations discussed above, that:
(1) because the amendment does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of accidents previously considered'and does not involve a significant decrease in a safety margin, the amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration; (2) -there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner; and (3) such activities wi 11 be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or the health and safety of the public.
This safety evaluation was prepared by Doug Pickett 7.0 References l.
Letter from LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae (counsel for Rochester Gas Electric Corporation) to U.S.N.R.C.
(F. Frank Lyman to Harold R. Denton) dated April 22, 1982.
2.
Robert E. Ginna Technical Specifications 3.
General Design Criteria 54-57, 10 CFR 50, Appendix A Date:
May 22, 1982