ML17234A517

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Response to RAI 541-8724 Addressing Question 06.02.05-12. (Non-Proprietary Version)
ML17234A517
Person / Time
Site: 05200046
Issue date: 08/22/2017
From:
Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co, Ltd
To:
Office of New Reactors
Shared Package
ML17234A514 List:
References
MKD/NW-17-0208L
Download: ML17234A517 (9)
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Text

06.02.05 1 / 3 KEPCO/KHNP



RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION APR1400 Design Certification Korea Electric Power Corporation / Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co., LTD Docket No.52-046 RAI No.:

541-8724 SRP Section:

06.02.05 - Combustible Gas Control in Containment Application Section:

6.2.5 Date of RAI Issue:

02/21/2017 Question No. 06.02.05-12 This is a follow up question to KHNPs response to RAI 155-8167, Question 6.2.5-4, regarding passive autocatalytic recombiner (PAR) recombination rates.

10 CFR 52.44(c)(1) requires that a standard design certification applicant must ensure a mixed atmosphere in containment during design-basis and significant beyond design basis accidents.

A mixed atmosphere means that the concentration of combustible gases in any part of the containment is below a level that supports combustion or detonation that could cause loss of containment integrity.

APR1400 Design Control Document (DCD) Tier 2, Section 6.2.5 credits the passive autocatalytic recombiners (PAR) with meeting the above criteria.

However, in DCD Tier 1, Table 2.11.4-1, Containment Hydrogen Control System ITAAC, there is insufficient information to determine that the containment hydrogen control system design meets the above criteria. In DCD Tier 2, Table 6.2.5-1, Location of PARs and His, PAR and hydrogen igniters (HI) locations in containment are provided. This information should either be included in Tier 1, Table 2.11.4-1, or a link to Tier 2, Table 6.2.5-1 should be provided in Tier 1, Table 2.11.4-1.

Also, DCD Tier 2, Table 6.2.5-1 describes the PARs as small, middle, large. The actual PAR recombination rates which form the basis of the hydrogen containment analysis should be provided in the DCD.

The response stated that the equation for the recombination rate for the large (FR1-1500) PARs has the two coefficients, A and B. The staff's review indicates that these coefficients, A and B, should be larger. These coefficients were deduced by comparing the recombination rate that is predicted by the formula to the performance specifications published for an AREVA PAR.



06.02.05 2 / 3 KEPCO/KHNP



KHNPs response to RAI 472-8564, Question 6.2.5-11, confirmed the larger coefficients above were used by KHNP in their analyses. This is in agreement with the coefficients used in staff's MELCOR confirmatory calculation.

In the original RAI 155-8167, question 6.2.5-4, staff also requested the following:

DCD Tier 2, Table 6.2.5-1 describes the PARs as small, middle, large. The actual PAR recombination rates which form the basis of the hydrogen containment analysis should be provided in the DCD, either:

G Into both Tier 2, Table 6.2.5-1 and Tier 1, Table 2.11.4-1, or G

Into just Tier 2, Table 6.2.5-1, with a link to Tier 2, Table 6.2.5-1 being provided in Tier 1, Table 2.11.4-1.

Please provide the recombination rates of the three sizes of PARs which establish the capacity of the containment hydrogen control system.

Response

The performance criteria for depletion rates of PARs are provided in the following table. This information will be added to DCD Tier 2 Table 6.2.5-3 as shown in Attachment 1 Performance criteria for depletion rates of PARs Condition Size Hydrogen 4%

Hydrogen 8%

Small 0.9 kg/hr 1.8 kg/hr Medium 1.8 kg/hr 3.6 kg/hr Large 4.0 kg/hr 8.0 kg/hr Tier 1 is a standalone document that should both minimize the amount of design-level data subject to revision and not contain links to DCD Tier 2. Attachment 2 reflects these revisions.

Impact on DCD DCD Tier 2, Subsection 6.2.5.2.1 and 6.2.9 will be revised and Tier 2, Table 6.2.5-3 will be added as indicated in Attachment 1 associated with this response.

DCD Tier 1, Tables 2.11.4-1 will be revised as indicated in the Attachment 2 associated with this response.



06.02.05 3 / 3 KEPCO/KHNP



Impact on PRA There is no impact on the PRA.

Impact on Technical Specifications There is no impact on the Technical Specifications.

Impact on Technical/Topical/Environmental Reports There is no impact on any Technical, Topical, or Environmental Report.



Table 6.2.1-35 Letdown Heat Exchanger and Valve Subcompartments Vent Path Description............................................................................... 6.2-396

Table 6.2.1-36 Mass and Energy Release Data........................................................ 6.2-398

Table 6.2.1-37 Stored Energy Sources..................................................................... 6.2-403

Table 6.2.1-38 Primary Side Resistance Factors Used in FLOOD3 Code.............. 6.2-433

Table 6.2.1-39 Blowdown and Reflood Mass and Energy Release for the Minimum Containment Pressure Analysis...................................... 6.2-434

Table 6.2.2-1 Input Values Used in CSS Evaluation Calculations........................ 6.2-438

Table 6.2.2-2 Containment Spray System Design Parameters.............................. 6.2-439

Table 6.2.2-3 Containment Spray System Failure Modes and Effects Analysis........................................................................................... 6.2-441

Table 6.2.2-4 Containment Spray System Display Instrumentation...................... 6.2-446

Table 6.2.2-5 Mass Mean Diameter....................................................................... 6.2-447

Table 6.2.4-1 List of Containment Penetrations and System Isolation Positions........................................................................................... 6.2-448

Table 6.2.5-1 Location of PARs and HIs............................................................... 6.2-458

Table 6.2.5-2 Hydrogen Monitoring System Failure Modes and Effects Analysis........................................................................................... 6.2-460

Table 6.3.1-1 Responses of APR1400 to TMI Action Plan..................................... 6.3-35

Table 6.3.1-2 Responses of APR1400 to Generic Safety Issues.............................. 6.3-36

Table 6.3.1-3 Responses of APR1400 to Generic Letters....................................... 6.3-37

Table 6.3.2-1 SIS Component Parameters............................................................... 6.3-38

Table 6.3.2-2 Safety Injection System Failure Modes and Effects Analysis........... 6.3-41

Table 6.3.2-3 Safety Injection System Head Loss Requirements............................ 6.3-55

Table 6.3.2-4 Safety Injection System Flow Delivery to RCS (1)............................ 6.3-56

Table 6.4-1 The Accident Radiation Source Description and Radiation Shielding Design for MCR and TSC................................................. 6.4-15

Table 6.4-2 MCR and TSC Doses from Design Basis Accidents......................... 6.4-16

Table 6.4-3 Amounts of Hazardous Chemicals Stored Onsite............................. 6.4-17

Table 6.5-1 Engineered Safety Features Filter Systems - Component Specification...................................................................................... 6.5-24

Table 6.2.5-3 Performance Criteria for Depletion Rates of PARs APR1400 DCD TIER 2 ix 5HY

RAI 541-8724 - Question 06.02.05-12 (1/5)

The PARs in the containment and inside the IRWST vent stack, and the HIs in the containment are designed to withstand severe accident conditions. The PARs and HIs provide reasonable assurance that the equipment can perform its identified function during severe accident conditions as described in Section 19.2.

PARs are considered a 15 percent efficiency reduction for iodine vapor and 10 percent efficiency reduction for cable fire. Thus, a total 25 percent efficiency reduction for the PAR was considered for capacity reduction. The HIs include a consideration of the combustion model of the MAAP computer code.

The PARs and HIs are designed to prevent any significant pocketing of hydrogen in order to minimize the potential for localized hydrogen detonation.

The PARs and HIs are able to withstand the effects of their own operations and are designed to provide reasonable assurance that equipment necessary for achieving and maintaining a safe shutdown of the plant and containment integrity are capable of performing their functions during and after their exposure to hydrogen burning.

The PARs and HIs are located throughout the containment open volumes and compartments.

The following location criteria are used:

a.

Flow path requirements

b. Consideration of enclosed spaces
c.

Equipment performance efficiency

d. Installation and maintenance
e.

Consideration of dynamic effect For the surveillance test of PARs, a sample of the PAR cartridges or plates is selected and removed from each PAR. Surveillance bench tests are performed on the removed specimens to confirm continued satisfactory performance. The HIs are capable of attaining the surface temperature that is sufficient for igniting hydrogen gases under any environmental conditions including CS actuation. The HI configuration, including possible spray shields, is supported by combustion test data.

The performance criteria for depletion rates of PARs is provided in Table 6.2.5-3.

APR1400 DCD TIER 2 6.2-75 5HY

RAI 541-8724 - Question 06.02.05-12 (2/5)

APR1400 DCD TIER 2 Table 6.2.5-2 (6 of 6)

Name/Valve No.

Potential Failure Mode Plant Condition Symptoms and Local Effect Including Dependent Failure Method of Detection Inherent Compensating Provision Remarks and Other Effects

6. Channel B containment monitor discharge to containment CM-010 a) Fails to open on demand Detection of hydrogen in containment building x No safety-related impact on plant x Isolation is achieved by redundant valve Valve information:

x Valve position indication in MCR Isolation is achieved by redundant containment isolation valve (CM-009) x Normally closed x Fail closed b) Fails to close on demand x Loss of electrical power x Receipt of high containment pressure signal x Receipt of low pressurizer pressure signal x No safety-related impact on plant x H2 monitoring line is formed in the closed loop H2 monitoring line is formed in the closed loop 6.2-465 5HY

add Table 6.2.5-3 in next page RAI 541-8724 - Question 06.02.05-12 (3/5)

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RAI 541-8724 - Question 06.02.05-12 (4/5)

39. ASME Section III, Division 1, Article NE 2300, Fracture Toughness Requirements for Material, The American Society of Mechanical Engineers.
40. NUREG-0800, Section 6.2.1.2, Subcompartment Analysis, Rev. 3, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 2007.
41. NRC RG 1.141, Containment Isolation Provisions for Fluid Systems.
42. APR1400-E-P-NR-14003-P(Proprietary)&NP(Non-Proprietary) Severe Accident Analysis Report, Rev. 1 KHNP, February 2017.
43. FAI/12-0005, "MAAP 4.0.8 Transmittal Document," Electric Power Research Institute, February 2012.

APR1400 DCD TIER 2 6.2-93 5HY

RAI 541-8724 - Question 06.02.05-12 (5/5)

APR1400 DCD TIER 1 2.11-59

Table 2.11.4-1 Containment Hydrogen Control System Components List Component Name Item No.

Location(1)

ASME Section III Class Seismic Category Class 1E/Harsh Envir. Qual.

Display/

Control at MCR Display/

Control at RSR Control Signal Active Safety Function Loss of Motive Power Position Passive Autocatalytic Recombiner HR01A/01B ~

HR15A/15B Containment I

-/-

-/-

-/-

No Hydrogen Igniter HI01 ~ HI08 Containment I

No/-

Yes/Yes Yes/Yes No Containment Temperature Element CM-TE-031A Containment I

Yes/Yes Yes/No Yes/No No (1)

Location of PARs and His are provided in DCD Tier 2, Table 6.2.5-1 (2)

Dash (-) indicates not applicable.

5HY

Deleted RAI 541-8724 - Question 06.02.05-12 (1/1)

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