ML17228B272
| ML17228B272 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 09/13/1995 |
| From: | Norris J NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| To: | Goldberg J FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| References | |
| GL-88-20, NUDOCS 9509190292 | |
| Download: ML17228B272 (7) | |
Text
September 13, 1995 Hr. J.
H. Goldberg President - Nuclear Division Florida Power and Light Company Post Office Box 14000 Juno Beach, Florida 33408-0420 SUBJECT'T.
LUCIE UNITS 1
AND 2 GL 88-20, SUPPLEMENT 4 IPEEE RE(VEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
Dear Hr. Goldberg:
Based on our ongoing review of the St'. Lucie Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) submittal and its associated documentation, we have developed the attached request for additional information (RAI).
The RAI is related to the external event analyses in the IPEEE, including the seismic
- analysis, the fire, analysis, and the analyses on effects of high winds,
- floods, and others.
The RAI was developed by our contractor, Energy Research, Inc.,
and reviewed by the "Senior Review Board" (SRB).
The SRB is comprised of RES and NRR staff and RES consultants (Sandia National Laboratory) with probabilistic risk assessment expertise for external events.
Me request that you provide your response within 120 days from the date of receipt of this request.
The requirement affects nine or fewer respondents and, therefore, is not subject to the Office of Management and Budget review under P.L.96-511.
Sincerely, (Original Signed By)
Jan A. Norris, Sr. Project Manager Project Directorate II-1 Division of Reactor Projects I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket Nos.
50-335 and 50-389
Enclosure:
As stated cc w/enclosure:
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Hr. J.
H. Goldberg Florida Power and Light Company St. Lucie Plant CC:
Jack Shreve, Public Counsel Office of the Public Counsel c/o The Florida Legislature ill West Madison Avenue, Room 812 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1400 Senior Resident Inspector St. Lucie Plant U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 7585 S.
Hwy AIA Jensen
- Beach, Florida 34957 Joe Hyers, Director Division of Emergency Preparedness Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 J.
R.
Newman
- Morgan, Lewis 5 Bockius 1800 H Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036 John T. Butler, Esquire
- Steel, Hector and Davis 4000 Southeast Financial Center Miami, Florida 33131-2398 Hr. Thomas R.L. Kindred County Administrator St. Lucie County 2300 Virginia Avenue Fort Pierce, Florida 34982 Mr. Charles
- Brinkman, Manager Washington Nuclear Operations ABB Combustion Engineering, Nuclear Power 12300 Twinbrook Parkway, Suite 330 Rockville, Maryland 20852 Mr. Bill Passetti Office of Radiation Control Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1317 Winewood Blvd.
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Regional Administrator, Region II U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 101 Marietta Street, N.W. Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323 H. N. Paduano, Manager Licensing 5 Special Programs Florida Power and Light Company P.O.
Box 14000 Juno
- Beach, Florida 33408-0420 D. A. Sager, Vice President St. Lucie Nuclear Plant P. 0.
Box 128 Ft. Pierce, Florida 34954-0128 Hiami, Florida 33102 J. Scarola Plant General Manager St. Lucie Nuclear Plant P.O.
Box 128 Ft. Pierce, Florida 34954-0128
ENCLOSURE RE(VEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON ST.
LUCIE IPEEE SUBMITTAL Seismic Please provide a list of components that were (would be) considered in the containment performance walkdown for the St. Lucie Nuclear Plant,
,describe the basis for developing this list, and provide the walkdown results.
Please provide a discussion of the process for addressing seismic-fire interaction concerns at the St. Lucie Nuclear Plant.
List all walkdown-related findings pertaining to potential seismic-fire interactions involving IPEEE components.
Please provide a discussion of your resolution pertaining to GI-131, with respect to potential seismic vulnerabilities (or interaction concerns) associated with the in-core flux mapping system.
Please describe the configuration of the flux mapping systems at St. Lucie, a
demonstration of adequacy of lateral restraint of the systems, and evaluation findings pertaining to potential'seismic interactions.
For all instances of seismic interaction concerns related to block walls that were noted by the seismic review team, please provide calculations which demonstrate adequate seismic capability of these walls.
The peer review report by Dr. Paul Smith, pertaining to the St. Lucie Unit 2 seismic adequacy evaluation, noted that additional seismic interaction concerns were identified during the peer review walkdown.
Please list these other seismic interaction concerns, and explain their disposition status.
fire Did the analysis team conduct a walkdown of the plant prior to the completion of the fire analysis portion of the IPE? If a walkdown was conducted, provide information regarding team composition, areas
- surveyed, scope of the walkdown, and a summary of the walkdown findings.
The IPEEE submittal indicates that only selected areas were visited and r'eviewed.
Please provide the list of areas that were visited.
What was the basis for not visiting other areas of the plantf The IPEEE does not address the initiating events (e.g.,
loss of cooling accidents, loss of offsite power, etc.)
as a separate subject.
No list is provided as to which initiating events were analyzed and no description is provided concerning final conclusions as to which initiating events are possible.
Provide the list of initiating events-that were addressed, as well as the conclusion and basis as to which initiating events could occur from which compartment.
A plant-specific fire events data base has not been used.
This can be an optimistic practice if the St. Lucie Plant has experienced fire events in safety-related areas.
If such events have taken place in any safety related area since initial commercial operation, provide an assessment of the effect of these events on the fire frequencies.
Please provide an analysis of the effect on fire-induced core damage frequency if the potential for the failure of active barrier components such as doors and dampers for all fire areas, and the potential for cross-zone fire propagation is considered for high hazard areas such as the turbine building, diesel generator room, cable spreading
- room, switchgear
- rooms, and lube oil storage areas.
On page 17 of the IPEEE submittal, it is claimed that credit was taken for the installed preaction suppression system in screening out two Unit 2 compartments.
Does this mean that it was assumed that the preaction suppression system will work perfectly, and therefo} e no fire propagation will take place2 If it is assumed that it is not perfect, provide further information as to how the system was modelled in the fire analysis.
If it is assumed as a perfect system, what would the core damage Frequency be if the suppression system is assumed to be non-existent7 A single value is used to model the possibility of detection and suppression failure; for the majority of cases, a probability of 0. 1 is used.
It is not apparent that this method addresses all the factors that affect the likelihood of failure to suppress the fire before critical damage has occurred using area specific information.
For example, if cables and equipment are in close proximity, fire may cause critical damage before successful suppression.
Provide justification for using the specific probability values.
There is no discussion in the IPEEE of fire-suppression-induced damage in any of the phases of the analysis (i.e.,
damage to equipment as a
result of the activation of the fire suppression system in extinguishing a small fire in a given area).
Are there any compartments where equipment (e.g.,
motors and electrical cabinets) are susceptible to water damage, and yet the fire impact analysis has consider ed these equipment as available after the successful operation of the fire suppression system?
Provide a summary discussion on how this issue has been addressed.
Human recovery actions are identified as one of the most critical event in the fire scenario importance ranking list provided in the IPEEE submittal report.
- However, no details are provided concerning how probabilities of recovery failure were assessed.
Provide a detailed description of how fire event recovery actions were assessed, including
'how factors such as sequence timing, elevated environmental stressors (e.g.,
reduced visibility, impaired communications, and impaired accessibility) were accounted for. If IPE values were
- assumed, were they adjusted to reflect reduced reliability during a fire event and, if
so, how were they adjusted'f IPE values were used directly, provide a
justification for not having adjusted the values.
10.
Credit has been taken for the activation of a cross-tie breaker connecting the electric power of one unit to the other unit.
As stated in the preceding RAI, has the evaluation of recovery action failure probability addressed the possibility of interference by the fire and smoke?
Provide a description of the analysis, if smoke egress phenomenon has been considered.
Otherwise, provide the basis for not including it in the analysis.
12.
13.
The licensee has not demonstrated and summarized how the core damage frequency is estimated for each fire scenario.
Provide a set of typical calculations supporting the estimated Pz values.
Fire modeling is used as the basis for concluding that the B Switchgear room does not pose a fire vulnerability.
Provide a sample set of the calculations used to reach this conclusion.
In the sample
- package, include a drawing of the area, location of the postulated pilot fires, and locations of target cables and equipment.
Also, include criteria used for equipment and cable failures.
Provide accident sequence related information per Appendix 3 of GL 88-20, Supplement 4.
As a minimum, such information should be made available for all compartments for which core damage frequency is greater than 10 /yr.
14.
Does Intake Cooling Mater (ICW) System failure lead to component cooling water (CCW) failure2 If yes, provide a list of area where a fire can cause loss of ICW and an assessment of their impact on core damage frequency.
If not, what systems can cause the failure of CCW, and how have those systems been accounted for in the fire analysis.
15.
The results of the screen-out computations for fire compartments listed in Table 4-2 have not been provided in the IPEEE submittal.
Please provide a summary of the computed results for each of those fire zones with screening criteria "C," "D" and "E" (per Table 4-2 definition).
d oods d 0th None.
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