Text

Amends 131 & 70 to Licenses DPR-67 & NPF-16,respectively, Clarifying Actions Required in Event of Inoperable Equipment Associated W/Containment Depressurization & Cooling Sys & Provide Consistency Between Units 1 & 2 Requirements
	ML17228A981
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Site:	Saint Lucie
Issue date:	01/18/1995
From:	Matthews D; NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned)
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ML17228A982	List: ML17228A981; ML17228A983;
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	NUDOCS 9501240167
	Download: ML17228A981 (43)
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSlON WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 ORIDA POWE

& LIG CO NY

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ST.

LUCIE PLANT UNIT 0.

1 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OP RATING LICENSE Amendment No.

131 License No. DPR-67 The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A.

B.

C.

D.

E.

The application for amendment by Florida Power

& Light Company, et al. (the licensee),

dated November 2,

1994, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; d

The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the publ,ic; and The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

9501240167 950118 PDR ADOCK 05000335l PDR.I

'4

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2.

3.

Accordingly, Facility Operating License No. DPR-67 is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and by amending paragraph 2.C.(2) to read as follows:

(2)

Technical S ecifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and 8, as revised through Amendment No. 131, are hereby incorporated in the license.

The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Attachment:

Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance:

January 18, 1995 David B. Matthews, Director Project Directorate II-2 Division of Reactor Projects I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

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M NT TO ICENSE AMENDME T NO.

131 TO CILITY 0 RATING LICENSE NO.

DPR-67 DOCKET NO. 50-335 Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages.

The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change.

The corresponding overleaf pages are also provided to maintain document completeness.

emove P

es VI 3/4 6-15 3/4 6-16 3/4 6-17 8 3/4 6-2 8 3/4 6-3 sert Pa es VI 3/4 6-15 3/4 6-15a 3/4 6-16 3/4 6-17 8 3/4 6-2 8 3/4 6-2a 8 3/4 6-3

INDEX LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS SECTION 3/4.4.4 PRESSURIZER

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PAGE 3/4 4-4 3/4.4.5 STEAM GENERATORS.......................................

3/4 4-5 3/4.4.6 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAKAGE.........................

3/4 4-12 3/4.4.7 Leakage Detection Systems.......

Reactor Coolant System Leakage..

HEMISTRY..............................................

C 3/4.4.8 SPECIFIC ACTIVITY............................. -........

3/4 4-12 3/4 4-14 3/4 4-15 3/4 4-17 3/4.4.9 PRESSURE/TEMPERATURE LIMITS............................

3/4 4-21 Reactor Coolant System..........

Pressurizer.....................

3/4 4-21 3/4 4-26 3/4.4.10 STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY...................................

3/4 4-26 3/4.4.11.

Safety Class 1 Components.......

Safety Class 2 Components.......

Safety Class 3 Components.......

ELETED............................

D 3/4.4.12 PORV BLOCK VALVES......................................

3/4.4.13 POWER OPERATED RELIEF VALVES........................

3/4 4-26 3/4 4-37 3/4 4-53 3/4456 I

3/4 4-58 3/4 4-59 3/4.4.14 REACTOR COOLANT PUMP - STARTING......................

3/4 4-60 3/4.4.15 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM VENTS...........................

3/4 4-61 3 4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS ECCS 3/4.5.1 SAFETY INJECTION TANKS.................................

3/4 5-1 3/4.5.2 3/4.5.3 3/4.5.4 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS Tavg > 325 F ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

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~ 3/4 5, 3 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS Tavg

< 325 Fo ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

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7 REFUELING WATER TANK...................................

3/4 5-8 ST. LUCIE-UNIT 1 V

Amendment No. gg, gg,', 80

INDEX LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS SECTION PAGE 3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3/4.6.1 3/4.6.2 Containment Spray and Cooling Systems....

Spray Additive System....................

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CONTAINMENT VESSEL...................................

Containment Vessel Integrity.............

Containment Leakage......................

Containment Air Locks................................

Internal Pressure..................... ".".."."."

Alr Temperature.................... "....

Containment Vessel Structural Integrity..

DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS.....

3/4 6-1 3/4 6-1 3/4 6-2 3/4 6-10 3/4 6-12 3/4 6-13 3/4 6-14 3/4 6-15 3/4 6-15'.

3/4 6-16a 3/4.6.3 3/4.6.4 3/4.6.5 3/4.6.6 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES.........................

COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL..............................

Hydrogen Analyzers...................................

Electric Hydrogen Recombiners -

M...................

VACUUM RELIEF VALVES.................................

SECONDARY CONTAINMENT................................

Shield Building Ventilation System...................

Shield Building Integrity............................

Shield Building Structural Integrity.................

3/4 6-18 3/4 6-23 3/4 6-23 3/4 6-24 3/4 6-26 3/4 6-27 3/4 6-27 3/4 6-30 3/4 6-31 3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.1 TURBINE CYCLE................................

Safety Valves.................................

Auxiliary Feedwater System...........-..... ".

Condensate Storage Tank.......................

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Main Steam Line Isolation Valves..............

3/4 7-1 3/4 7-1 3/4 7-4 3/4 7-6 3/4 7-7 3/4 7-,9 Secondary Mater Chemistry............................

3/4 7-,10 ST.

LUCIE - UNIT 1

VI Amendment No.jfj. 131

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CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS T

YA CO LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.2.1 Two containment spray trains and two containment cooling trains shall he OPERABLE+

/~~ONi Pressurizer Pressure 2 1750 psia.

Containment Cooling Systems MODES 1,2, and 3.

e 3 w t ess ze e

u 75

a. With one containment spray train inoperable, restore the inoperable spray train to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months and within 10 days from initial discovery of failure to meet the LCOy otherwise he in MODE 3 within tho next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in MODE 4 within the following 54 hours6.25e-4 days 0.015 hours 8.928571e-5 weeks 2.0547e-5 months .

b. With one containment cooling train inoperable, restoro the inoperable cooling train to OPERABLE status within'7 days and within 10 days from initial discovery of failuro to meet the LCOg othorwise he in MODE 3 within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in MODE 4 within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

c. With one containment spray train and one containment cooling train inoperable, concurrently implement'ACTIONS a. and b. The completion intervals for ACTION a.

and ACTION b. shall be tracked separately for each train starting from tho time each train was discovered inoperable.

d. With two containment cooling trains inoperable, restore one cooling train to OPERABLE status within 72 bourse'therwise be in MODE 3 within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in MODE 4 within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

~. With two containment spray trains inoperable or any combination of three or more trains inoperable, enter LCO 3.0.3 immediately.

2~

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7

a. With one containment cooling train inoperable, rostoro tho inoperable cooling train to OPERABLE status within 72 bourse'therwise be in MODE 4 within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

b. With two containment cooling trains inoperable, entor LCO 3.0.3 immediately.

ST.

LUGIE - UNIT 1

3/4 6-15 Amendment No. 95, 131

SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS 4.6.2.1 Each containment spray system shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a e b.

At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power operated or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is positioned to take suction from the RMT on a Containment Pressure -- H~gh High test signal.

By verifying that on recirculation flow, each spray puip develops a disdharge pressure of > 200 psig, when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.

ST.

LUCIE - UNIT 1

3/4 6-15a Amendment No. i3~

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE UIREMENTS Continued c.

At,least once per 18 months, during shutdown, by:

l.

Verifying that'each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on a

CSAS test signal.

2.

Verifying that each spray pump starts automatically on a

CSAS test signal.

3.

Verifying that upon a recirculation actuation signal, the containment sump isolation valves open and that a recirculation mode flow path via an OPERABLE shutdown cooling heat exchanger is established.

d.

At least once per 10 years by performing an air or smoke flow test through each spray header and verifying each spray nozzle is unobstructed.

4.6.2.1.1 Each containment cooling train shall be demonstrated OPERABLE<

At least once per 31 days bye

1. Starting each cooling train fan unit from the control room and verifying that each unit operates for at least 15 minutes, and

2. Verifying a cooling water flow rate of greater than or equal to 1200 gpm to each cooling unit.

b.

At least once per 18 months, during shutdown, by verifying that each containment cooling train starts automatically on an SM test signal.

ST.

LUGIE UNIT 1 3/4 6-16 Amendment No., ~, 131

DELETED ST.

LUGIE - UNIT 1

6-17 Amendment No.

gj5, 131

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CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3/4.6. 3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.3.1 The containment isolation valves specified in Table 3.6-2 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

With one or more of the isolation valve(s) specified in Table 3.6-2 inoperable, either:

a ~

b.

C.

d.

Restore the inoperable valve(s) to OPERABLE status within 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months s~ or Isolate each affected penetration within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months by use of at least one deactivated automatic valve, secured in the isolation position, or Isolate each affected penetration within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months by use of at least one closed manual valve or blind flange; or Be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS 4.6.3.1.1 The isolation valves specified in Table 3.6-2 shall be demonstrated OPERABLE prior to returning the valve to service after maintenance, repair or replacement work is performed on the valve or its associated

actuator, control op pqwer circuit by-performance of the cycling test, and verification of isolation ttme.

ST.

LUCIE - UNIT 1

3/4 6-18 Aiiendment Ho.

90

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.6.1.4 INTERNAL PRESSURE The limitations on containment internal pressure ensure that 1) the containment structural is prevented from exceeding its design negative pressure differential with respect to the annulus atmosphere of 0.70 psi and 2) the containment peak pressure does not exceed the design pressure of 44 psig during steam line break accident conditions.

The maximum peak pressure obtained from a steam line break accident is 41.6 psig.

The limit of 2.4 psig for initial positive containment pressure will limit the total pressure to 44.0 psig which is the design pressure and is consistent with the accident analyses.

3/4.6.1.5 AIR TEMPERATURE The limitation on containment air temperature ensures that the containment vessel temperature does not exceed the design temperature

'f 264'F during LOCA conditions.

The containment temperature limit is consistent with the accident analyses.

3/4.6.1.6 CONTAINMENT VESSEL STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY This limitation ensures that the structural integrity of the con-tainment steel vessel will be maintained comparable to the original design standards for the life of the facility.

Structural integrity is required to ensure that the vessel will withstand the maximum pressure of 41.6 psig in the event of a steam line break accident.

A visual inspection in conjunction with Type A leakage test is sufficient to demonstrate this capability.

ST.

LUCIE - UNIT 1

B 3/4 6-2 Amendment Ho.

131

3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS 3/4.6.2.1 C

NG SYST Tho OPERABILITY of the containment spray and cooling systems ensures that depressurisation and cooli.ng capability willbe available to limit post-accident pressure and temperature in the containment to acceptable values. During a Design Basis Accident (DBA), at least two containment cooling trains or two containment spray trains, or one of each, is capable of maintaining tho peak pressure and temperature within design limits. One containment spray train has the capability, in con)unction with the Spray Additive System, to remove iodine from the contai.nment atmosphere and maintain concentrations below those assumed in the safety analyses.

To ensure that these conditions can be met consi.dering single-failure criteri.a, two spray trains and two cooling trains must be OPERABLE.

The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months action interval specified in ACTION l.a and ACTION l.d, and the 7 day action interval specified in ACTION l.b take into account the redundant heat removal capability and the iodine removal capability of tho remaini.ng operable

systems, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.

The 10 day constraint for ACTIONS l.a and l.b is based on coincident entry into two ACTION conditi.ons (specified in ACTION l.c) coupled with the low probabi.lity of an accident occurring during this time. If the system(s) cannot be rest@rod to OPERABLE status within the speci. fied completion time, altornate actions are designed to bring the unit to a mode for whi.ch the LCO does not apply.

The extended i.nterval (54 hours6.25e-4 days 0.015 hours 8.928571e-5 weeks 2.0547e-5 months ) specified in ACTION l.a to be in MODE 4 includes 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months of additional time for restorati.on of the inoperable CS train, and takes into consideration the reduced driving force for a release of radioactive material from the RCS when in MODE 3. With two containmont spray trains or any combination of three or moro containment spray and containment cooling trains inoperable in MODES 1,2, or Mode 3 with Pressuriser Pressure 2 1750 psia, the unit is in a condition outside the accident analyses and LCO 3.0.3 must be entered immediately.

In MODE 3 with Pressurisor Pressure c

1750

psia, contai.nment spray is not required.

Tho specifications and bases for LCO 3.6.2.1 are consi.stont with NUREG-1432, Revision 0

(9/28/92),

Specification 3.6.6A (Containment Spray and Cooling Systemsy Crodit taken for iodine removal by tho Containment Spray System),

and the plant safety analyses.

ST.

LUGIE - UNIT 1

8 3/4 6-2a Amendment No. 131

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS BASES 3 4.6.2.2 SPRAY ADDITIVE SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the spray additive system ensures that suffi-cient NaOH is added to the containment spray in the event of a LOCA.

The limits on NaOH volume and concentration ensure a

pH value of between 8.5 and 11.0 for the solution recirculated within containment after a

LOCA.

This pH band minimizes the evolution of iodine and minimizes the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components.

The contained water volume limit includes an allowance for water not usable because of tank discharge line location or other physical characteristics.

These assumptions are consistent with the iodine removal efficiency assumed in the accident analyses.

~34. 3. 2. 3 3 4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES The OPERABILITY of the containment isolation valves ensures that the containment atmosphere will be isolated from the outside environment in the event of a release of radioactive material to the containment atmos-phere or pressurization of the containment.

Containment isolation within the time limits specified ensures that the release of radioactive material to the environment will be consistent with the assumptions used in the analyses for a LOCA.

This includes the containment purge inlet and outlet valves.

3 4.6.4 COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL The OPERABILITY of the equipment and systems required for the detection and control of hydrogen gas ensures that this equipment will be available to maintain the hydrogen concentration within containment below its flammable limit during post-LOCA conditions.

Either recombiner unit is capable of controlling the expected hydrogen generation associated with 1) zirconium-water reactions,

2) radiolytic decomposition of water and 3) corrosion of metals within containment.

The containment fan coolers are used in a secondary function to ensure adequate mixing of the containment atmosphere following a LOCA.

This mixing action wi 11 prevent localized accumulations of hydrogen from exceeding the flammable limit.

ST.

LUGIE - UNIT 1

B 3/4 6-3 Amendment No. Z6',

131

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS BASES 3 4.6.5 VACUUM RELIEF VALVES The OPERABILITY of the containment vessel to annulus vacuum relief valves ensures that they will open at a pressure differential of 2.25 + 0.25 inches Water Gauge.

This condition is necessary to prevent exceeding the containment design limit for internal pressure differential of 0.70 psi.

3 4.6.6 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT 3 4.6.6.1 SHIELD BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the shield building ventilation systems ensures that containment vessel leakage occurring during LOCA conditions into the annulus will be filtered through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber trains prior to discharge to the atmosphere.

This requirement

's necessary to meet the assumptions used in the accident analyses and limit the site boundary radiation doses to within the limits of 10 CFR 100 during'LOCA conditions.

3 4.6.6.2 SHIELD BUILDING INTEGRITY SHIELD BUILDING INTEGRITY ensures that the release of radioactive materials from the primary containment atmosphere will be restricted to those leakage paths and associated leak rates assumed in the accident analyses.

This restriction, in conjunction with operation of the shield building ventilation system, will limit the site boundary radiation doses to within the limits of 10 CFR 100 during accident conditions.

3/4.6.6. 3 SHIELD BUILDING STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY This limitation ensures that the structural integrity of the con-tainment shield building will be maintained comparable to the original design standards for the life of the facility.

Structural integrity is required to provide 1) protection for the steel vessel from external

missiles,

2) radiation shielding in the event of a LOCA, and 3) an annulus surrounding the steel vessel that can be maintained at a negative pressure within two minutes after a LOCA.

ST.

LUCIE - UNIT 1

B 3/4 6-4 Amendment No.

26

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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 205554001 D

OW LIG CO ORLANDO UTILITIES COMMISSION OF THE CITY OF ORLANDO FLORID

~ND LORIDA MUNICIPAL POWE AGE CY DOCKET NO. 50-389 ST.

LUCIE PLANT UNIT NO.

2 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE A

Amendment No. 70 License No. NPF-16 The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A.

The application for amendment by Florida Power 5 Light Company, et al. (the licensee),

dated November 2,

1994, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.

C.

D.

E.

The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

'P I

il

2.

Accordingly, Facility Operating License No. NPF-16 is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications, as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and by amending paragraph 2.C.2 to read as follows:

2.

echnical S ec'c ti s

3.

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B,

as revised through Amendment No.

70, are hereby incorporated in the license.

The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION David B. Matthews, Director Project Directorate II-2 Division of Reactor Projects - I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance:

January 18, 1995

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ATT CHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO.

70 TO ACI TY 0 ERA G LICENSE 0.

NP -16 DOCKET NO. 50-389 Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages.

The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change.

The corresponding overleaf pages are also provided to maintain document completeness.

emo e

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VII 3/4 6-15 3/4 6-16 3/4 6-18 B 3/4 6-2 B 3/4 6-3 sert es VII 3/4 6-15 3/4 6-15a 3/4 6-16 3/4 6-18 B 3/4 6-2 B 3/4 6-2a B 3/4 6-3

0

INOEX LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE Rf UIREMENTS SECTION 3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3/4. 6. 1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY............

CONTAINMENT LEAKAGE...............

CONTAINMENT AIR LOCKS.....

INTERNAL PRESSURE.

AIR TEMPERATURE......................................

CONTAINMENT VESSEL STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY.

CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM..........

PAGE 3/4 6-1 3/4 6-2 3/4 6-9 3/4 6-11 3/4 6-12 3/4 6-13 3/4 6-14 3/4. 6. 2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS CONTAINMENT SPRAY AND COOLING SYSTEMS................

3/4 6"15 IODINE REMOVAL SYSTEM................................

3/4 6-17 3/4. 6. 3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES 3/4. 6.4 COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL

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3/4 6 19 HYDROGEN ANALYZERS...............................

3/4 6-24 ELECTRIC HYDROGEN RECOMBINERS - W.

3/4 6"25 3/4. 6. 5 VACUUM RELIEF VALVES...................

3/4 6"26 3/4. 6. 6 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT SHIELD BUILDING VENTILATIONSYSTEM...................

3/4 6-27 SHIELD BUILDING INTEGRITY............................

3/4 6-30 SHIELD BUILDING STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY.................

3/4 6"31 ST.

LUCrE - UNIT 2 VII Amendment No.

70

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BASES INDEX CE - DUAL TYPE CONTAINMENT SECTION 3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3/4.6.

1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT.......................

3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS 3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES................

3/4.6.4 COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL.......

3/4.6.5 VACUUM RELIEF VALVES..................................

3/4.6.6 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT PAGE 8 3/4 6-1 8 3/4 6-2 B 3/4 6-4 B 3/4 6-4 8 3/4 6"4 B 3/4 6-.5 ST.

LUCIE - UNIT 2 XIII

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3/4. 6. 2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS CNTIK TS YADCOO ING YT S

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.2.1 Two containment spray trains and two containment cooling trains shall be OPERABLE'ressurizer Pressure h 1750 psia.

Containment Cooling Systems MODES 1,2, and 3.

odes a

w ress e

r ssu 75 a

With one containment spray train inoperable, restore the inoperable spray train to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months and within 10 days from initial discovery of failure to meet the LCOg otherwise be in MODE 3 within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in MODE 4 within the following 54 hours6.25e-4 days 0.015 hours 8.928571e-5 weeks 2.0547e-5 months .

b. With one containment cooling train inoperable, restore the inoperable cooling train to OPERABLE status within 7 days and within 10 days from initial discovery of failure to meet the LCOg otherwise be in MODE 3 within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in MODE 4 within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

c. With one containment spray train and one containment cooling train inoperable, concurrently implement ACTIONS a. and b. The completion intervals for ACTION a.

and ACTION b. shall be tracked separately for each train starting from the time each train was discovered inoperable.

d. With two containment cooling trains inoperable, restore one cooling train to OPERABLE status within 72 bourse'therwise be in MODE 3 within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in MODE 4 within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

e. With two containment spray trains inoperable or any combination of three or more trains inoperable, enter LCO 3.0.3 immediately.

2 ~

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7 2

a. With one containment cooling train inoperable, restore the inoperable cooling train to OPERABLE status within 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months sg otherwise be in MODE 4 within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

b. With two containment cooling trains inoperable, enter LCO 3.0.3 immediately ST.

LUCIE - UNIT 2 3/4 6-15 Amendment No.

2$, 7O

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SURVEILLANCE RE UIREHENTS

4. 6. 2.1 a.

b.

C.

Each containment spray system shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated, or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked,

sealed, or. otherwise secured in position, is positioned to take suction from the RMT on a Containment Pressure High-High test signal.

By verifying, that on recirculation flow, each pump develops a

discharge pressure of greater than or equal to 200 psig when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.

At least once per 18 months, during shutdown, by:

l.

Verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on a CSAS test signal.

2.

Verifying that upon a Recirculation Actuation Test Signal (RAS),

the containment sump isolation valves open and that a recircula-tion mode flow path via an OPERABLE shutdown cooling heat exchanger is established.

ST.

LUGIE - UNIT 2 3/4 6-15a Amendment No.

CONTAINMENT SYSTBlS SURVEILLANCE RE UIREHENTS Continued 3.

Verifying that each spray pump starts automatically on a CSAS test signal.

d.

At least once per 10 years by performing an air or smoke flow test through each spray header and verifying each spray nozzle is unobstructed.

4.6.2.1.1 Each containment cooling train shall be demonstrated OPERABLBc a.

b.

At least once per 31 days by<

1. Starting each cooling train fan unit from the control room and verifying that each unit operates for at least 15 minutes, and

2. Verifying a cooling water flow rate of greater than or ecpal to 1200 gpm to each cooling unit.

At least once per 18 months, during shutdown, by verifying that each containment cooling train starts automatically on an SIAS test

~ignal.

ST.

LUCIE UNIT 2 3/4 6-16 Amendment No. ~i

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'ONTAINMENT SYSTEMS IODINE REMOVAL SYSTEM (IRS)

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.2.2 The Iodine Removal System shall be OPERABLE with:

a.

A hydrazine storage tank containing a minimum volume of 675 gallons of > 25.4X by weight N2H< (Hydrazine) solution, and b.

Two iodine removal pumps each capable of adding NzH~ solution from the hydrazine storage tank to a containment spray system pump flow.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, and 3".

ACTION:

With the Iodine Removal System inoperable restore the system to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months ; restore the Iodine Removal System to OPERABLE status within the next 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS 4.6.2.2 The Iodine Removal System shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a.

b.

C.

d.

At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated, or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked,

sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.

The above required iodine removal pumps shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying a.flow rate of between 0.71 gpm and 0.82 gpm when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.

At least once per 6 months by:

l.

Verifying the contained solution volume in the tank, and 2.

Verifying the concentration of the N2H~ solution by chemical analysis.

At least once per 18 months, during shutdown, by verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on a CSAS test signal.

Applicable only when pressurizer pressure is > 1750 psia.

ST.

LUCIE - UNIT 2 3/4 6-17

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DELETED ST. LUCIE'- UNIT 2 3/4 6-18 Amendment No. 70

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.6.1.5 AIR TEMPERATURE The limitation on containment average air temperature ensures that the containment temperature does not exceed the design temperature of 264 F

during steam line break conditions and is consistent with the safety analyses.

3/4.6. 1.6 CONTAINMENT VESSEL STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY This limitation ensures that the structural integrity of the containment steel vessel will be maintained comparable to the original design standards for the life of the facility.

Structural integrity is required to ensure that the vessel will withstand the maximum pressure of 44.0 psig in the event of a steam line break accident.

A visual inspection in conjunction with Type A

leakage test is sufficient to demonstrate this capability.

3/4.6. 1. 7 CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM The 48-inch containment purge supply and exhaust isolation valves are required to be closed during plant operation since these valves have not been demonstrated capable of closing during a

LOCA or steam line break accident.

Maintaining these valves closed during plant operations ensures that excessive quantities of radioactive materials will not be released via the containment purge system.

To provide assurance that the 48-inch valves cannot be inadvertently

opened, they are sealed closed in accordance with Standard Review Plan 6.2.4 which includes devices to lock the valve closed, or prevent power from being supplied to the valve operator.

The use of the containment purge lines is restricted to the 8-inch purge supply and exhaust isolation valves since, unlike the 48-inch valves, the 8-inch valves wi 11 close during a LOCA or steam line break accident and therefore the site boundary dose guidelines of 10 CFR Part 100 would not be exceeded in the event of an accident during purging operations.

Leakage integrity tests with a maximum allowable leakage rate for purge supply and exhaust isolation valves will provide early indication of resilient material seal degradation and will allow the opportunity for repair before gross leakage failure develops.

The 0.60 L

leakage limit shall not be exceeded when the leakage rates determined ly the leakage integrity tests of these valves are added to the previously determined total for all valves and penetrations subject to Type B and C tests.

ST.

LUCIE - UNIT 2 B 3/4 6-2 Amendment No. 70

3/4. 6. 2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS 3/4 6 2.l C

The OPERABILITY of the containment spray and cooling systems ensures that depressurisation and cooling capability willbe available to limit post-accident pressure and temperature in the containment to acceptable values. During a Design Basis Accident (DBA), at least two containment cooling trains or two containment spray trains, or one of each, is capable of maintaining the peak pressure and temperature within design limits. One containment spray train has the capability, in con)unction with the Iodine Removal

System, to remove iodine from the

'ontainment atmosphere and maintain concentrations below those assumed in the safety analyses.

To ensure that these conditions can be met considering single-failure criteria, two spray txains and two cooling trains must be OPERABLE.

The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months action interval specified in ACTION l.a and ACTION l.d, and the 7 day action interval specified in ACTION l.b take into account the redundant heat removal capability and the iodine xemoval capability of the remaining operable

systems, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.

The 10 day constraint for ACTIONS l.a and l.b is based on coincident entry into two ACTION conditions (specified in ACTION l.c) coupled with the low probability of an accident occurring during this time. If the system(s) cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the specified completion time, alternate actions are designed to bring the unit to a

mode for which the LCO does not apply.

The extended interval (54 hours6.25e-4 days 0.015 hours 8.928571e-5 weeks 2.0547e-5 months ) specified in ACTION l.a to be in MODE 4 includes 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months of additional time for restoration of the inoperable CS train, and takes into consideration the reduced driving force for a release of radioactive material from the RCS when in MODE 3. With two containment spray trains or any combination of three or more containment spray and containment cooling trains inoperable in MODES 1,2, or Mode 3 with pressurizer Pressure t 1750 psia, the unit is in a condition outside the accident analyses and LCO 3.0.3 must be entered immediately.

Zn MODE 3 with Pressurixer Pressure c

1750

psia, containment spray is not required.

The specifications and bases for LCO 3.6.2.1 are consistent with NUREG-1432, Revision 0

(9/28/92),

Specification 3.6.6A (Containment Spray and Cooling Systemsp Credit taken for iodine removal by the Containment Spray System),

and the plant safety analyses.

ST.

LUGIE - UNIT 2 B 3/4 6-2a Amendment 'No.7O

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4. 6.2.'2 IODINE REMOVAL SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the Iodine Removal System ensures that sufficient N>H4 is added to the containment spray in the event of a LOCA.

The limits on NzH<

volume and concentration ensure a minimum of 50 ppm of NzH~ concentration available in the spray for a minimum of 6.5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months per pump for a total of 13 hours1.50463e-4 days 0.00361 hours 2.149471e-5 weeks 4.9465e-6 months to provide assumed iodine decontamination factors on the containment'-

atmosphere during spray function and ensure a pH value of between 7.0 and 8;0 for the solution recirculated within containment after a

LOCA.

This pH band minimizes the evolution of iodine and minimizes the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components.

The contained water volume limit includes an allowance for water not usable because of tank discharge line location or other physical char acteristics.

These assumptions are consistent with the iodine removal efficiency assumed in the safety analyses.

3/4.6.2.3 DELETED ST.

LUGIE - UNIT '2 B 3/4 6-3 Amendment No.

$9, 70

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CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4. 6. 3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES The OPERABILITY of the containment isolation valves ensures that the

'containment atmosphere will be isolated from the outside environment in the event of a release of radioactive material to the containment atmosphere or pressurization of the containment and is consistent with the requirements of GDC 54 through GDC 57 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50.

Containment isolation within the time limits specified for those isolation valves designed to close automatically ensures that the release of radioactive material to the environ-ment will be consistent with the assumptions used in the analyses for a LOCA.

3/4. 6. 4 COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL The OPERABILITY of the equipment and systems required for the detection and control of hydrogen gas ensures that this equipment will be available to maintain the hydrogen concentration within containment below its flammable limit during post-LOCA conditions.

Either recombiner'unit is capable of con" trolling the expected hydrogen generation associated with 1) zirconium-water reactions,

2) radiolytic decomposition, of water and 3) corrosion of metals'ithin containment.

These hydrogen control systems are consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.7, "Control of Combustible Gas Concentrations in Containment Following a LOCA", March 1971.

The containment fan coolers and containment spray ensure adequate mixing of the containment atmosphere following a LOCA.

This mixing action will prevent localized accumulations of hydrogen from exceeding the flammable limit.

3/4.6.5 VACUUM RELIEF VALVES The OPERABILITY of the primary containment to atmosphere vacuum, relief valves ensures that the containment internal pressure differential does not become more negative than 0.615 psi.

This condition is necessary to prevent exceeding the containment design limit for internal pressure differential of 0.7 psi.

ST.

LUCIE - UNIT 2 B 3/4 6-4

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