ML17228A238
| ML17228A238 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 07/15/1993 |
| From: | FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17228A236 | List: |
| References | |
| JPN-PSL-SENP-93, JPN-PSL-SENP-93-035, JPN-PSL-SENP-93-35, NUDOCS 9308060330 | |
| Download: ML17228A238 (19) | |
Text
FLORIDA POWER AND LIGHT SAFETY EVALUATXON EVALUATION OP INVENTORY LOSS FROM THE REFUELIN6 HATER TANK ST ~ LUCIE UNIT 1 JPN PSL-SENP-93 035 REVISION 1 **
NUCLEAR SAFETY RELATED NUCLEAR ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT PRODUCTION ENQZNEERZNC GROUP JUNO BEACHp FLORIDA Revision 1 includes a general reformatting and addresses increased leakage and repairs.
9308060330 930730 PDR ADQCK 05000335 P
l V
tJPN-PSL SENP-93-035 REVESTON 1
PAGE 2
OF 12 REVIEM AND APPROYAL RECORD PLANT ST.
LUCIE UNIT I
TITLE EVALUATION OF INVE TORY LOSS FRO T
E REFUELING WATER T K
LEAD DISCIPLINE NUCLEAR ENGINEERING ORGANIZATION PROOUCTION ENGINEERING GROUP REVIEW/APPROVAL:
INTERFACE TYPE GROUP INPUT REVIBS'/A HECH ELECT ISO CIVIL NUC" ESI FUELs HEALTH PHYSICS CHEHISTRY X
PREPAREO VER IF IEO APPROVEO FPL APPROVEO H/A H/A H/A H/A H/A H/A H/A H/A For Contractor Evals As Oetermined 8y Pro)acts Review Interface As A Hin On All IOCFR50.59 Evals and PLAs FPL PROJECTS APPROVAL:
DATE: + i<i OTHER INTERFACES
PN-FSL-SENP-93-035 EVISZON 1
PAGE 3
OF 12 I ~
PURPOSE The purpose of this evaluation is to:
Determine the functionality of the Unit 1 Refueling Water Tank (RWT) given the presence of a leak through the bottom of the tank, ZZ ~
2.
Determine a maximum allowable leakage rate.
3.
Evaluate functionality of the RWT during visual inspections and repairs requiring tank entry.
4, Provide repair recommendations.
GROUND A steady loss of Unit 1 RWT inventory has been observed for the past several weeks.
The current rate of the loss is approximately 2 gpm.
The piping systems connected to the RWT and the above ground exterior surfaces. of the tank have been inspected and have been eliminated as a source of inventory loss.
Individual isolation of all lines penetrating the tank has been performed; with no resultant decrease in tank leakage rates.
Samples from underground test wells located near the RWT have indicated both tritium and boron, Based on this evidence, it has been concluded that the inventory loss is through the bottom of the tank.
Although the exact nature of the leak is unknown, it is likely due to a single small hole (resulting from pitting or similar mechanism),
a series of small holes, or a small separation in a weld joint.
ZIZ ~
RNT PUNCTZOHALZTY er to The RWT is sized to contain sufficient water to fill the refueling canal, fuel transfer tube and refueling cavity to a depth of 24 feet above the reactor vessel ilange joint for a total volume of 500,000 gallons.
The minimum volume required by Technical Specifications is 401,800 gallons of 1720 ppm borated water which assures 371,800 gallons are available for injection during emergency core cooling (Ref 1, sect 6.3.3.5 and Ref 2, Sect 3.1.2.8).
Additionally, the RWT provides a
back up source of reactor coolant makeup and reactivity control during plant operation (Ref 2, Sect 3 '
' ').
RWT inventory is also required in conjunction with borated water from the Boric Acid Makeup Tanks, for RCS shrinkage makeup during normal plant shutdown assuming that cEAs are withdrawn (Ref 2,
Basis Section).
PN-PSL-SENP-93-035 EVISION 1 PAGE 4 0F 12 Makeup to the RWT is supplied via blended flow of reactor makeup water from the Primary Water Tank (PWT) and boric acid from the Boric Acid Makeup Tanks (BAMTs).
BAHT inventory at
=
3% boric acid is combined with reactor makeup water from the
- PWT, to yield the Technical specification required RWT concentration of 1720 ppm boron (or about 14 boric acid).
From operational experience, the maximum boric acid flow attainable from the BAMT is approximately 25 gpm.
Based on an approximate blend ratio of 2 to 1 (water to acid), the maximum total makeup flow to the RWT is = 75 gpm.
However, in practice the BAMTs could not be used continuously for RWT makeup, since they are required periodically for boron concentration adjustment in the reactor coolant system via the chemical and volume control system.
If the BAMTs are conservatively assumed to be available half of the time for RWT makeup purposes, then the practical limit on RWT makeup would be about 40 gpm.
Makeup capability is well beyond the current RWT inventory loss being experienced or anticipated and therefore, will be able to maintain technical specification required levels of RWT inventory.
With RWT inventory levels maintained, the leakage will not affect the functionality of the RWT.
In addition, there is sufficient margin between the technical specification minimum RWT level and the actual inventory required for proper operation of emergency core cooling considering continued RWT inventory loss during postulated accidents even without makeup capability being available.
ctu ua io Design:
The RWT was designed in accordance with ANSI B96,1, "Welded Aluminum Alloy Field Erected Storage Tanks",
and was fabricated using 6061-T6 aluminum alloy plate sections.
The storage tank has a height of 39'nd a diameter of 50', with'a capacity of 525,000 gallons.
The tank is supported on an 8.5'igh by 2'ide reinforced concrete ring wall foundation which has a
concrete design strength of 3 ksi.
The RWT base is anchored to the ring wall foundation with 45 two-inch diameter ASTM A36 carbon steel anchor bolts.
(Refer to Figure 1,
page 12)
The RWT is designed for all applicable normal operating loads as well as hurricane,
- tornado, and seismic events.
RWT Structural Integrity:
The RWT bottom plate is continuously supported by structural fill material.
The tank shell is supported 'directly by the concrete ring wall and does not depend on the bottom plate for structural support.
Therefore, the leakage through the bottom plate does not adversely affect the structural capability of the tank or ring wall in resisting
- normal, wind, or seismic loads Furthermore, any corrosion degradation of the bottom
- plate, due to seepage of water under it, would not, adversely
PN-PSL"SEEP-93-035 EVISION 1 PAGE 5
OF 12 affect tank structural integrity.
Step increases in inventory loss that approach a total structural failure of the RWT are not considered credible.
Review of industry data indicate that tanks with comparable leaks do not fail catastrophically (Ref.
3).
Fill Structural Integrity:
The RWT bottom plate rests on a 6" thick sand and oil cushion placed on approximately 8'f Class I fillcompacted to 954 of maximum dry density.
Underlying this is Class I fillcompacted to 984 of maximum dry density.
class I fillconsists of well graded granular clean sand and gravel with a maximum of 12%
fines (Ref 1, Sect 2.5.4.5.2)
Based on the quality, degree of compaction and the estimated percolation rate of the fill
- material, seepage of water up to 10 gpm through the fillis not considered to be a soil particle transport.
mechanism and formation pf a significant void is not considered credible.
The RWT water contains approximately 14 boric acid, Because boric acid is a
weak acid in a dilute solution, significant void formation of the fillmaterial due to chemical interaction is not considered credible.
Based on the
- above, there is reasonable assurance that formation of a significant void in the fillmaterial beneath the RWT due to the leak will not occur.
- However, should a
small void form under the foundation, structural integrity of the tank would not be compromised because the inherent strength of the ring wall enables it to span several feet.
Rad'olo ica s ects The radioactivity content in the RWT is composed of low concentrations of radionuclides.
A listing of the radionuclides and their concentrations as well as anticipated releases from a 1
gpm and a
10 gpm RNT leak are provided in Reference 4.
Test well samples have indicated that no particulate radionuclides have migrated outside the general area of the tank.
The only radionuclide detected was tritium.
In all cases the anticipated
- releases, if they were hypothetically released directly to the canal, are below their unrestricted maximum permissible concentration (MPC) values.
The total amount of activity in the RNT plus any additional low activity makeup water if released directly to the canal is expected to result in a dose that will be a small percentage (approximately 14 to 5%) of applicable limits.
Further, there are no sources of potable or irrigation water in this area.
JPN-PSL" SENP-93-035
. EVISION 1 PAGE 6
OF 12 c
ical Co rosion s ects t
Based on review of References 5,
6, and 7, the RWT fluid is not considered chemically harmful to the environment.
Potential long term corrosion associated with water seeping under the tank bottom will be evaluated after the exact nature of the leak has been determined.
This corrosion does not represent an immediate functionality concern as discussed in the structural evaluation.
Boric acid solution in contact with carbon steel may cause corrosion.
The concrete ring wall foundation prevents any lateral seepage of borated water above its base at elevation 10 ft (Ref 8).
Carbon steel structures or components are not located directly beneath the RWT or ad)acent to it below elevation 10 ft.
Accordingly, the potential for carbon steel corrosion due to borated water is not a concern.
In addition, due to the configuration of the RWT base anchorage, leaking borated water would be visible and undetected corrosion of the carbon steel anchor bolts cannot occur.
ZV.
HaXimum llowable Leaka e Rate The RWT level is being closely monitored.
A gradual increase in the leak rate will not affect functionality of the RWT.
- However, an increase in leakage rate to an amount greater than 10 gpm, or a step increase in the leakage rate, (e.g.,
a 2 gpm increase within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />) could be indicative of a change in the condition of the leak path or the underlying soil, and would require reassessment of RWT functionality.
onal u in los ections Re airs Visual inspection and repair of the RWT will involve a
submersible device and possibly one or more divers entering the tank.
The submersible is a
remote controlled device with onboard video and lighting capability.
The device is approximately 30" long, 18.5" aide and 16.5" high.
The only functionality issue related to RWT operation during the inspection is that a diver or the remote device could block flow in one of the RWT penetrations.
The penetrations to the RWT include a 24" line for the safety in)ection system, a 3" line to the
- CUCS, a 3" line to the fuel pool system, and a 3" line to the ion exchanger (Ref 9).
Flow does not occur through any of these lines during normal plant operation with the exception of possible intermittent operation of the purification system.
Accordingly, the purification system should be secured during the inspection.
Flow through the SI and CVCS suction lines would only occur if a valid Safety Injection Actuation Signal (SIAS) occurred during the inspection.
The diver/submersible would not be expected to be drawn to the pipe since the CVCS line is 3" in diameter and is low velocity due to the relatively low flow rates of the
PN-PSL-SENP-93-035 EVISION 1 PAGE 7
OF 12 charging pumps.
- However, the 24" SI suction line is of sufficient size and flow velocity to draw the diver/submersible up against it if either was close to the opening, This could block flow on a valid SIAS actuation.
The diver/submersible would not be drawn into the
- pipe, since it is covered by grating.
The frequency of a LOCA or Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR) which requires RWT flow is on the order of 1,28 E-6/Hour (Ref 10 and Ref 11).
Since the inspection and repair is anticipated to require only a matter of hours to complete, the chance that an emergency core cooling event would occur while divers ox equipment are in the RWT is remote.
Note that. this frequency does not include a spurious SIAS, however flow restriction in the SX suction line during a non-accident scenario is not a
safety concern Even though the possibility of SIAS during the inspection is remote, the following precautions vill be taken to minimize the possibility that the diver/submersible could block flaw in the 24" line.
Divers will be tethered to facilitate their removal in the unlikely event that they became caught in the SX suction line during an accident, The submexsible umbilical cable has a breaking strength of 850 lbs,and the device only weighs on the order of 75 lbs and therefore does not require an additional tether.
The maximum flow velocities inside the 24" suction pipe are estimated to be on the order of 8.5 mph assuming a maximum flow of 17,130 gpm (Ref 1, Sect 6.2).
Plow velocity during SIAS will drop off rapidly with distance from the 24" SI suction line.
Based on conservative estimates the flow outside of 6 feet will remain less than 1 mph in the worst case emergency core cooling scenario.
In accordance with the submersible technical manual, it is capable of maintaining its position in a curr~nt of 1.7 mph and will overcome a
1 mph flaw velocity.
A diver is also capable of overcoming a
flow velocity of =
1 mph.
Accordingly, time spent within 6 feet of this penetration by either the submersible or divers should ba minimized to extent practical.
Equipment brought into the tank by divers will be secured with lanyards.
VI~
Re ai Recammendat o s The RMT bottom may be repaired by the use of one of two methods:
1) apply epoxy coating directly to the tank bottom plate, or Z) use epoxy coating to adhere an aluminum plate to the tank bottom. The coating system shall be in accordance with Specification CN-2.27 (latest revision), system S4. The repair shall be made under the direction of the Nuclear Engineering Coatings Specialist.
These repair methods have been revieved and determined to be acceptable based upon the following:
- 1) The psL Unit 1 RWT was designed and built to ANSI B96.1, 1967 and is classified as Quality Group B. Per ANSI B96,1, the flat bottom of the tank is not subject to specific design rules for calculating minimum
PN-PSL-SENP-93-035 zvrsroN a
PAGE 8
OF 12 thickness and allowable stresses are not given for the tank bottom.
The function of the bottom plate is to provide a
barrier between the tank fluid and the underlying fill material.
The bottom plate does not transfer loads to the shell or the annular base plate and ring wall foundation.
Pressure stress loads are carried by the fillbeneath the tank bottom. -Therefore, the tank bottom may be considered a liner, and epoxy may be used as a sealer to preclude leakage;
- 2) The patching material and plates are galvanically compatible with the tank materials; 3)
The epoxy coating system is chemically compatible with the tank materials, does not contain significant amounts of chlorides or other impurities and will thus not adversely affect the primary water chemistry;
- 4) The epoxy coating has been successfully tested for strength and adhesion on aluminum in underwater applications (see Attachment l);
5)
Failure of the coating system is not considered credible since thermal expansion and pressure stress fluctuations are minimal and the maximum expected flow velocities (the bottom of the, tank is located 2'-6 /," below the centerline of the 24" outlet nozzle of the tank, therefore, the flow velocity at the bottom of the tank is low at maximum flov conditions, i.e.,
<2 ft. per second) vill not impose a force great enough to overcome the adhesion of the contoured coatings or exceed the stress limits of the pure material (see Attachment 1
for physical properties and adhesive test results);
and 6)
The epoxy villprovide acceptable service for a minimum of 2-3 years (Attachment 2).
The RPZ is monitored for volume per the Technical Specifications and inspection shall be specified if tank leakage is noted after the repairs are completed, RMT chemistry shall be sampled following the repair to demonstrate that
VII.
Uvre we Sa et on Dete m natio As defined in 10CFR50
~ 59I an unreviewed safety question exists; (i) if the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report (SAR) may be increased; or (ii) if a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously eValuated in the SAR may be Created; or (iii) if the margin Of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification is reduced.
En accordance with 10cFR50.59, the following evaluation serves to determine whether activities associated with an epoxy coating repair of the RNT constitutes an unreviewed safety question or requires a change to the Technical Specifications:
N-PSL-SENP-93-035 ISZON 1
PAGE 9
OF 12 Does the o osed ct'v 'r se t b
t of oc ence o
a accident eviousl valuated in t e SAR?
The probability of occurrence of an accident previously evaluated in the SAR will not increase because the recommended repair process, as evaluated in section VI of this evaluation, does not initiate an accident or affect any accident scenario,activ'rea e the conse ences of a acc d
v'ousl evaluated in the SAR?
The consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the SAR will not increase because the repair will not affect the ability of the RUT to supply borated water in the event of a SXAS.
ccu 0
v'n e se the robab' o
a o
a a function of e ui ent im ortant to t
eviousl ev uat S R?
As evaluated in section VT. the repair does not obstruct SI
- flow, or create any other adverse interaction with a
structure, system or.
component important to safety.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence of any equipment malfunction important to safety previously evaluated in the SAR will not increase.
D e
0 ct vit a
u etio of e ui me t.
lua
'n t e sA
~
e se t e co se e ces o
ortant to safet reviousl This repair wil'l not prevent the RWT or any other safety related equipment from performing its safety related functions.
Therefore, the consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the SAR is not increased.
se v't e
ossibilit o
a v ousl evaluated This repair does not change the operation, function or design bases of any structure, system or component important to safety as described in the SAR.
No new hazards are created that can be postulated to caus@
an accident different from those previously analyzed in the SAR.
Therefore, there is no possibility.that an accident may be created that. is different from any already evaluated in the SAR.
t JPN-PSL-SENP-93-035 REVISION PAGE 10 OF 12 es t e o o activit create t e ossibilit o
alfunctio of e ui ment im ortant to s t
o t
e than a
reviousl evaluated i t e SAR?
ere t The repair, as evaluated in section VX, does not create any new malfunction of equipment important to safety.
Therefore, the possibility of a malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the SAR is not increased.
Does t e o osed activit duce the a
in of safet as de ed in the basis for an Tech ica S ecification~
The repair does not change the design bases, functions'or operations of any safety related equipment and does not adversely affect any other safety related structures, systems or components.
The Technical Specification requirements for RWT inventory and boron concentration and bases are not affected by this repair, Therefore, this activity does not reduce the margin of safety as def ined in the bases for the Technical Specifications.
The repair to the RWT does not impact safe operation of the
- plant, does not constitute an unreviewed safety question and does not require a
change to the Technical Specifications.
Therefore, this activity does not require NRC approval prior to implementation.
VIZ'ONCLUSION 5 ACT ON ITEMS This evaluation has shown that; the RWT remains functional under the current leak conditions, the maximum leak allowable in the tank is 10 gpm, the tank will remain functional during inspections, and that epoxy repair of the tank is acceptable.
The following precautions shall be taken during inspection/repair of the RWT:
1.
Attach lanyards to equipment and divers.
2.
Minimize time spent in the RWT.
3.
Minimize time spent within 6 feet of the 24" supply to safety injection system piping, to the extent practical.
4.
Maintain continuous communications between the control room and the tank inspectors.
5.
Secure RWT purification and remove from service on a
clearance,
i JPN-PSL-SENp-93-035 REVISION 1
PAGE 11 QF 12 ction Items 1.
Evaluate long term radiological impacts and corrosion associated with water seeping under the tank bottom.
2.
Effectiveness of the epoxy over time will be evaluated.
This epoxy per the vendor has a minimum service application of 2 to 3 years.
3.
Remove debris found during inspections/repairs from the RWT.
4, Notify Engineering of a step change in leakage rate (e.g.,
a 2 gpm increase in less than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />).
5.
RWT chemistry shall be sampled following the repair to demonstrate that sodium, fluorides, chlorides, and sulfates are within allowable limits.
IX.
REFERENCES 1.
St Lucie Unit 1
Updated Final Safety Analysis
- Report, Amendment 11 2,
St. Lucie Unit 1 Technical Specifications, Amendment 122 3,
Nuclear Plant Reliability Data System 4.
Letter from Z.L.
Danek to K.K. Mohindroo, JNO-HP-93-029, dated July 15, 1993 5.
Material Safety Data Sheets for boric acid from U.s. Borax (MSDS 445. 00/CAS No. 10043-35-3) and ENIMQNT AMER1CA INC.
(MSDS 446.500/
CAS No.
10043-35-3) 6, The code of Federal Regulations 40CFR part 261, Subpart D.
7.
The Code of Federal Regulations 40CFR parts 302 and 304.
8.
Drawing 8770-G-671, Rev.
8; Drawing 8770-G-672, Rev.
5 9.
Drawing 8770-4544 Rev.
3 10.
EPRI TR-100380, July 1992, Pipe Failures in US Commercial Nuclear Power Plants 11.
PTN PRA 3.1 Rev.
0 (LOCA values are generic and applicable to PSI).
JlN PSL-SEND g3 035 RBVXSlON PAGE 12 OF 12 Oarne Root so'D Tank SheII
. 0'..oo.0.
Q Nloa.
Ctase l Rl Q6% OenaHy 4
er
~~30'rade EL Rehforoed Ccecrete Snp V%I RWT Cross Section Figure 1
SAR Repair L Nlaintenance Praduct V ~ I i
~ N1 Appar
~
gy Res'.
l hHac<ck i sc 1~5 Product Data Sheet SAR is designed fbr abrasive envirorrrr~c which are also subicct to alllressive cltemical anack.
Heavily 50cd with alarainvra oxide for abrasirxr resistance, this product may be built up to an inch of more ia a suocesiott of Isyera ShR can bc used tn rebuiM baQy eroded sad corrode cast iron, steel and otber rnetalHc and non-raetilbc strfsceL Itymvide! a rapid, cost c5ative repair whkh returns wore cqQrtrtcrtt to its orighaL Qectlehlons and QNtccts it $0sh Scut% degehs500 due to abr&ott, etOsl~ and Oortuarve s5sk, PEATHKS ExccHent tcistanco to entrained soMs and abrasion very Nood cbemical resistance
~
EcceHent temperature sad thctrrrsl shock resistance
~
Extended pot IHb
~
May bo apped up ro Qdckreccos of t inch or more PwCKh GING 1 kI (2.2lb) unitr, approxiraataly 31 cubic inches (4k'. units also ava0ablc)
COVElhlGE SAR is a trusrel~ tebuildirtg cocgxxrnd and can ba s~ 'V to l IndVooat, fhicker agdicstloas caa be achieved by raaltiplo layed. Tlxacaicsl coverage at 60 mUs ls 3,6 square feet per Rg.
MXXXNQRATIO 2 parts base Q) to ) pent(h) barr%acr by weight
~
1 ports bate (B) to l part (A) hLrdener by volume POT LIFE For a l ltd unit Mixst W F, pot 1 ls ~xraarnatcly $Q ruinutes.
Higher tsrrrperatrrres or larger mass willshortca this tirao. lower tcmperanrres or trn!Qef taass wH1 extend it. Pot Hto can also bc extended by tpresdiag tho mass out to dissiyatc heat.
COLORS SAR ls grey in color.
TECHNICALQATAhN9 %FORMATION Inorganic hdds Otgaok aids Sober'lhaHe Salts Alcohols Herbous Very Qoo44xcoHoat Oooo VaryQce4 Oaad Very dae4 BxceHeat Exec Octa Excellent Exodlont Density 4 SOUds Hexarsl Strength O 70 F Ten<i@ Strenyh Q 'l0 F TcnsUe Shear 4 70 F Service T~eetulo Mairrntm OperNiag pH Range 1.9$
100 20.400 psi ll,900 psi 3,000 psi 425 K SURFACE rmr~TION For medrnum adhesion, raatorisl should be qyDed to a Ann.
cioatr, dry aad abraded chloe.
Best rcsul ts willbo*tsiaod by abrasive blastiag tho ashore.
Ifbisstial is irnpgzncal. a Finding wheel, needle Nun, or very a8fwire brush msy be used.
C~+i gcsa7> oilyof waxed suxfhces utith salable sotvcat before sppging material.
MEKONG Mix~ ofPart hwit~~ofPart S. Mixiairaay be done on a largo raixiag board or coorwioor largo orrooltr ro bord bc'ho base sad hardener, Thr selected mMng surthce gall~}ge
~~~ Mix tbo material ~gag~ until ao streaks of any kind are virP'Mo. Ifmaterials aro cold, warm them to 70 F beAeo mixing.
35 Pond Psst xoeo, H(ngnam. Mh 02045 'an (dl7) 74}4992
~ FAX(41 T) 744CLt1
From:
A. Wesley Langeland To:
Garth Qolderar COmpany:
Florida Power 5 Light Oats:
July 12, 1993 Time:
6:08 9M FAX 5:
1%07-694-SOSO As per our phone conversation, attached is the Date Sheet on our SAR which can be used for undetweter seviCe or dam repair. We are presently evaluating twO Of our faster curing veraIOna fOr COepatlblllty With aluminum and unaefWater Surfaoe preparatiOn.
We haVe uSed a grinder to prepare the aluminum test surfaoes and applied the material tindetwater on the aiuminum. We willcheck the sampleS tomonow after a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Cure In a 60F water bath. We Can alaa Cheek yOur prapOSek prOCOdure fOr a pptylne the.materiel tO a aluminum plate abOve water and then pressing It onto the bottom of the tank.
I agree with you that this would be the best method of re pair.
In addition this material does not contain any significant amounts of the materials listed below nor willit be harmed by exposure to boronated water.
- 1. CI
- 2. t
- 3. br
- 6. s e.~
- 7. &
- 8. c~
9, zn
- 10. s~
11.c4
- 12. i rcO NO NO HO NO N4 ND ~ non detectable PKQNK: St 7 74MQQ2 FAX: 617-711-0021
t
m-P5L-Z&vH3-c8.
ReV. l AHas4ea+I,8y 3W From; A. Wesley Lengotand To; Garth Dotderer COmpeny:
Florida power 8 Light Dale:
July 14, )gg3 Tlrne:
4:33 PM FAX0'.
1 -407MSP288 Conforming our phone oonvorsa'alon, wo hove compteted the testing of the SAR-UVY(underwater version) on the aluminum plates.
As discussed the eatertat was apptleti underwater on an aluminum Q panel that had been wire brushed.
An aluminum test dollywas similarly p'epared and pressed Into the
$AR material, After two diys of underwater cure st 77 degrees F, vs developed a Shore 0 hardness Of QQ which reflects appmximately 70% Offull cure. We also attempted to perform e tensile adhesion lest toltowlng prescribed ASTM tBst procoduroe tet defOreed thB aluminum platO at approximstely 380 psi. The exact procedure requires that lt bs perforeed on carbon steel, However on ttM basis of this test, we feel lhal for the purpose intended that the motorlat willperform more lhsn edequetoly.
tt should be nOted thit after 7 daye Or underWater Cure 77 F, On prOperly Sandblaeted Stab(, to 8h SSPt:-S, tensile 8trBflgthS Of 1600-2700 can be achieved, based On forrnulatlon and cure schedute.
tn addition, we Oo not expect any deleterious effect betauea of tba boronoted water. The fortulatton lirated foAervice in rnildty acidic concentrations of mtnerot Golds and should pose re problem to your 2000 PPM otecontrations of boron.
lfyou have any further questions please do not hesitate to contact me.
From A. Wesley langels'o:
Garth Oolderer Company:
Florida Paver 8 Light Data:
July 15, 1993 Time:
9:37 AM FAX4 1407<94-5090 Confirming our telephone conversation of this morning, it is aN opinion that the underwater repairi to be made on your aluminum vest containing boronated water with the SAR-UW willpravids aCCeptoblo service for a minimum of 2 years ifnot longer, obviously, thQ level of cenficfenee iadapeedlahon the quality of the surface preparation Se well as the application.
Realizing that tho condTtlon6 are less than ideal, vie nevertheless expect the rnaterlal to perform effectively.
PHONF'17;,7404QQ2 FAX:N7-74040$