Proposed Tech Specs,Revising Surveillance Frequency for Tripping Plant to Demonstrate Insertability of Control Element Assembly from within 24 H to within 7 Days Prior to Reducing Shutdown MarginML17221A328 |
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Saint Lucie ![NextEra Energy icon.png](/w/images/9/9b/NextEra_Energy_icon.png) |
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Issue date: |
08/17/1987 |
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From: |
FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
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Shared Package |
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ML17221A327 |
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NUDOCS 8708240111 |
Download: ML17221A328 (12) |
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Category:TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS
MONTHYEARML17241A3541999-06-0101 June 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Section 3.5.2,allowing Up to 7 Days to Restore Inoperable LPSI Train to Operable Status ML17241A3451999-05-24024 May 1999 Proposed Tech Specs 3/4.5.1 Re Safety Injection Tanks ML17229B0711999-03-19019 March 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Pages Requested by NRC for Use in Issuance of Proposed License Amend Re SFP Storage Capacity, Per Soluble Boron Credit ML17229B0201999-02-23023 February 1999 Proposed Tech Specs 3/4.1.2.9 Re Reactivity Control sys- Boron Dilution ML17229A9551998-12-16016 December 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Pages Revising Administrative Controls & Incorporating Specific Staff Qualifications for Multi- Discipline Supervisor Position ML17229A9161998-11-25025 November 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Pages,Replacing Insert-A,attachment to 971231 Submittal & Revises LCO 3.4.9.11 & Associated Bases ML17229A9251998-11-22022 November 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Revising Thermal Margin SL Lines of TS Figure 2.1-1 to Reflect Increase in Value of Design Min RCS Flow from 345,000 Gpm to 365,000 Gpm & Change Flow Rates Stated in Tables 2.2-1 & 3.2-1 ML17229A9131998-11-19019 November 1998 Proposed Tech Specs,Revising Administrative Contols TS 6.3, Unit Staff Qualifications & Incorporating Specific Staff Qualifications for Multi-Discipline Supervisor (MDS) Position ML20155C3061998-10-29029 October 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Pages Revising Terminology Used in Notation of TS Tables 2.2-1 & 3.3-1 Re Implementation & Automatic Removal of Certain Reactor Protection Sys Trip Bypasses ML17229A8441998-08-24024 August 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Removing Obsolete License Conditions & Incorporating Revs Which Clarify Component Operations That Must Be Verified in Response to Containment Sump Recirculation Actuation Signal ML17229A7731998-06-15015 June 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Pages 6-20,6-20a & 6-20c,correcting Info Supplied by Fuel Vendor Relative to Titles of Approved TRs That Are Referenced in Proposed TS 6.9.1.11.b ML17229A7601998-06-0303 June 1998 Proposed Marked Up TS Pages Modifying Explosive Gas Mixture Surveillance Requirement 4.11.2.5.1 to Provide for Use of Lab Gas Partitioner to Periodically Analyze Concentration of Oxygen in Svc Waste Gas Decay Tank ML17229A7511998-05-27027 May 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Section 6.2.2.f,revised to Allow for Use of Longer Operating Shifts of Up to Twelve Hours Duration by Plant'S Operating Crews ML17229A7481998-05-27027 May 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Section 3.5.1,removing Requirement for SITs to Be Operable in Mode 4,which Will Minimize Potential for Inadvertent SIT Discharge During RCS Cooldown/ Depressurization Evolutions ML17229A7441998-05-27027 May 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Providing for More Efficient Use of on- Site Mgt Personnel in Review & Approval Process for Plant Procedures ML17229A6501998-03-0303 March 1998 Proposed Tech Specs 3.4.7 Re RCS Chemistry/Design Features/ Administrative Controls ML17229A5691997-12-31031 December 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Pages Modifying TS 5.6.1 & Associated Figure 5.6-1 & TS 5.6.3 to Accomodate Increase in Allowed SFP Storage Capacity ML17309A9131997-12-29029 December 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Modifying Specifications for Selected cycle-specific Reactor Physics Parameters to Provide Reference to St Lucie Unit 2 COLR for Limiting Values ML17229A5491997-12-0101 December 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Revising Units 1 & 2 EPP Section 4, Environ Conditions & Section 5, Administrative Procedures to Incorporate Proposed Terms & Conditions of Incidental Take Statement Included in Biological Opinion ML17229A4621997-08-22022 August 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Pages,Revising Specification 4.0.5 Surveillance Requirements for ISI & Testing of ASME Code Class 1,2 & 3 Components,To Relocate IST Program Requirements to Administrative Control Section 6.8 ML17229A4341997-08-0101 August 1997 Proposed Tech Specs,Extending semi-annual Surveillance Interval Specified in Table 4.3-2 for Testing ESFAS Subgroup Relays to Interval Consistent W/Ceog Rept CEN-403,Rev 1-A for March 1996 & Associated SE ML17229A3601997-05-29029 May 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Incorporating Administrative Changes That Improve Consistency Throughout TSs & Related Bases ML17229A1831996-12-20020 December 1996 Proposed Tech Specs Re Safety Limits & Limiting Safety Sys Settings ML17229A1611996-12-0909 December 1996 Proposed Tech Specs 1.9a Re Core Operating Limits Rept ML17229A1191996-10-31031 October 1996 Proposed Tech Specs 6.0 Re Administrative Controls ML17229A1111996-10-30030 October 1996 Proposed Tech Specs 3/4.9.9 Re Containment Isolation Sys & 3/4.9.10 Re Water level-reactor Vessel ML17229A1091996-10-28028 October 1996 Proposed Tech Specs Rev to Allow Type A,B & C Containment Leakage Tests to Be Conducted at Extended Intervals Determined by performance-based Criteria ML17229A1061996-10-28028 October 1996 Proposed Tech Specs 1.6 Re Channel Functional test,1.7 Re Containment Vessel integrity,1.8 Re Controlled leakage,1.9 Re Core alteration,3/4.6 Re Containment Systems & 3/4.6.1 Re Containment Vessel ML17228B5641996-07-15015 July 1996 Revised Tech Specs Re Core Alteration Definition ML17228B5041996-06-0101 June 1996 Proposed Tech Specs Re Thermal Margin & RCS Flow Limits ML17228B3761996-01-0404 January 1996 Proposed Tech Specs Rectifying Discrepancy for Each St Lucie Unit & Providing Assurance That Admin Controls for Hpsip Remain Effective in Lower Operational Modes ML17228B3361995-11-22022 November 1995 Proposed TS 3/4.4.6.1 for RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation,Adapting STS for C-E Plants (NUREG-1432) Spec 3.4.15 ML17228B2451995-08-16016 August 1995 Proposed TS 3.6.6.1, Sbvs. ML17228B2421995-08-16016 August 1995 Proposed Ts,Reflecting Relocation of Selected TS Requirements Re Instrumentation & Emergency & Security Plan Review Process,Per GL 93-07 ML17228B1891995-06-21021 June 1995 Proposed Tech Specs Re Safety Injection Tank Surveillances ML17228B1811995-06-21021 June 1995 Proposed Tech Specs Re Time Allowed to Restore Inoperable LPSI Train to Operable Status ML17228B1791995-06-21021 June 1995 Proposed Tech Specs Re Extended Allowed Outage Time for EDGs ML17228B1471995-05-17017 May 1995 Proposed Tech Specs,Extending Applicability of Current RCS Pressure/Temp Limits & Maximum Allowed RCS Heatup & Cooldown Rates to 23.6 Effective Full Power Yrs of Operation ML17228B1441995-05-17017 May 1995 Proposed Tech Specs Re Administrative & Conforming Update ML17228B0901995-04-0303 April 1995 Proposed Tech Specs Re Incorporation of line-item TS Improvements to TSs 3/4.8.1 & 4.8.1.2.2 for Licenses DPR-67 & NPF-16 ML17228B0591995-02-27027 February 1995 Proposed TS Re Sdcs Min Flow Rate Requirements ML17228B0521995-02-27027 February 1995 Proposed Tech Spec Tables 3.3-3 & 3.3-4 to Accommodate Improved Coincidence Logic & Relay Replacement for 4.16 Kv Loss of Voltage Relays ML17228B0331995-02-22022 February 1995 Proposed TS 4.6.1.3,reflecting Deletion of Refs to Automatic Tester for Containment Personnel Air Lock ML17228A9921995-01-20020 January 1995 Proposed Tech Specs,Relocating Operability Requirements for Incore Detectors to (TS 3/4.3.3.2) to Updated FSAR & Revising Lhr Surveillance 4.2.1.4 & Special Test Exceptions Surveillance 4.10.2.2,4.10.4.2 & 4.10.5.2 ML17228A9031994-11-0202 November 1994 Proposed Tech Specs 3/4.6.2.1 & 3/4.6.2.3,adapting Combined Spec for Containment Spray & Cooling Sys Contained in Std TS for C-E Plants ML17228A8911994-10-27027 October 1994 Proposed Tech Specs,Incorporating Administrative Changes ML17228A6521994-07-28028 July 1994 Proposed Tech Specs Re LTOP Requirements for Power Operated Relief Valves,Per GL 90-06 ML17228A6591994-07-25025 July 1994 Proposed Tech Specs Implementing Enhancements Recommended by GL 93-05, Line-Item TS Improvements to Reduce SR for Testing During Power Operation. ML17228A6561994-07-25025 July 1994 Proposed Tech Specs for Main Feedwater Line Isolation Valves to Be Consistent w/NUREG-1432,standard TS for C-E Plants ML17228A5771994-05-23023 May 1994 Proposed Tech Specs Removing Option That Allows HPCI Pump 1C to Be Used as Alternative to Preferred Pump for Subsystem Operability 1999-06-01
[Table view] Category:TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS & TEST REPORTS
MONTHYEARML17309A9961999-06-30030 June 1999 Rev 35 to HP-90, Emergency Equipment. ML17309A9941999-06-17017 June 1999 Rev 1 to COP-06.06, Guidelines for Collecting Post Accident Samples. ML17241A3541999-06-0101 June 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Section 3.5.2,allowing Up to 7 Days to Restore Inoperable LPSI Train to Operable Status ML17309A9951999-05-27027 May 1999 Rev 0 to COP-06.11, Establishing Remote Lab for Analyses of Accident Samples. ML17241A3451999-05-24024 May 1999 Proposed Tech Specs 3/4.5.1 Re Safety Injection Tanks ML17229B0711999-03-19019 March 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Pages Requested by NRC for Use in Issuance of Proposed License Amend Re SFP Storage Capacity, Per Soluble Boron Credit ML17229B0441999-03-0202 March 1999 Cycle 11 Reactor Startup Physics Testing Rept. with 990304 Ltr ML17229B0201999-02-23023 February 1999 Proposed Tech Specs 3/4.1.2.9 Re Reactivity Control sys- Boron Dilution ML17229B0361998-12-22022 December 1998 Rev 20 to Procedure C-200, Odcm. ML17229A9551998-12-16016 December 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Pages Revising Administrative Controls & Incorporating Specific Staff Qualifications for Multi- Discipline Supervisor Position ML17229A9161998-11-25025 November 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Pages,Replacing Insert-A,attachment to 971231 Submittal & Revises LCO 3.4.9.11 & Associated Bases ML17229A9251998-11-22022 November 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Revising Thermal Margin SL Lines of TS Figure 2.1-1 to Reflect Increase in Value of Design Min RCS Flow from 345,000 Gpm to 365,000 Gpm & Change Flow Rates Stated in Tables 2.2-1 & 3.2-1 ML17229A9131998-11-19019 November 1998 Proposed Tech Specs,Revising Administrative Contols TS 6.3, Unit Staff Qualifications & Incorporating Specific Staff Qualifications for Multi-Discipline Supervisor (MDS) Position ML20155C3061998-10-29029 October 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Pages Revising Terminology Used in Notation of TS Tables 2.2-1 & 3.3-1 Re Implementation & Automatic Removal of Certain Reactor Protection Sys Trip Bypasses ML20153G0781998-08-26026 August 1998 Rev 19 to Plstqp, Guard Training & Qualification Plan ML17229A8441998-08-24024 August 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Removing Obsolete License Conditions & Incorporating Revs Which Clarify Component Operations That Must Be Verified in Response to Containment Sump Recirculation Actuation Signal ML17229A7731998-06-15015 June 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Pages 6-20,6-20a & 6-20c,correcting Info Supplied by Fuel Vendor Relative to Titles of Approved TRs That Are Referenced in Proposed TS 6.9.1.11.b ML17229A7601998-06-0303 June 1998 Proposed Marked Up TS Pages Modifying Explosive Gas Mixture Surveillance Requirement 4.11.2.5.1 to Provide for Use of Lab Gas Partitioner to Periodically Analyze Concentration of Oxygen in Svc Waste Gas Decay Tank ML17229A7441998-05-27027 May 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Providing for More Efficient Use of on- Site Mgt Personnel in Review & Approval Process for Plant Procedures ML17229A7481998-05-27027 May 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Section 3.5.1,removing Requirement for SITs to Be Operable in Mode 4,which Will Minimize Potential for Inadvertent SIT Discharge During RCS Cooldown/ Depressurization Evolutions ML17229A7511998-05-27027 May 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Section 6.2.2.f,revised to Allow for Use of Longer Operating Shifts of Up to Twelve Hours Duration by Plant'S Operating Crews ML17229A6751998-03-27027 March 1998 Cycle 15 Reactor Startup Physics & Replacement SG Testing Rept. W/980402 Ltr ML17229A6501998-03-0303 March 1998 Proposed Tech Specs 3.4.7 Re RCS Chemistry/Design Features/ Administrative Controls ML17229A6381998-02-12012 February 1998 Rev 19 to C-200, Offsite Dose Calculation Manual. ML17229A6151998-01-12012 January 1998 Rev 0 to ISI-PSL-1, St Lucie Nuclear Plant Unit 1 ISI Plan. ML17229A6141998-01-12012 January 1998 Rev 0 to ISI-PSL-1, Third Interval ISI Program for St Lucie Nuclear Power Plant,Unit 1. ML17229A5691997-12-31031 December 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Pages Modifying TS 5.6.1 & Associated Figure 5.6-1 & TS 5.6.3 to Accomodate Increase in Allowed SFP Storage Capacity ML17309A9131997-12-29029 December 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Modifying Specifications for Selected cycle-specific Reactor Physics Parameters to Provide Reference to St Lucie Unit 2 COLR for Limiting Values ML17229A5851997-12-12012 December 1997 Rev 0 to ADM-29.01, IST Program for Pumps & Valves. ML17229A5491997-12-0101 December 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Revising Units 1 & 2 EPP Section 4, Environ Conditions & Section 5, Administrative Procedures to Incorporate Proposed Terms & Conditions of Incidental Take Statement Included in Biological Opinion ML17309A9171997-11-26026 November 1997 Rev 0 to PSL-ENG-SENS-97-068, Spent Fuel Pool Dilution Analysis. ML17229A5931997-09-26026 September 1997 Rev 4 to Procedure QI-5-PSL-1, Preparation,Rev,Review/ Approval of Procedures. ML17229A5921997-09-18018 September 1997 Rev 0 to Procedure ADM-17.11, 10CFR500.59 Screening. ML20211Q5841997-09-10010 September 1997 Rev 18 to Training & Qualification Plan ML17229A4621997-08-22022 August 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Pages,Revising Specification 4.0.5 Surveillance Requirements for ISI & Testing of ASME Code Class 1,2 & 3 Components,To Relocate IST Program Requirements to Administrative Control Section 6.8 ML17229A4341997-08-0101 August 1997 Proposed Tech Specs,Extending semi-annual Surveillance Interval Specified in Table 4.3-2 for Testing ESFAS Subgroup Relays to Interval Consistent W/Ceog Rept CEN-403,Rev 1-A for March 1996 & Associated SE ML17309A8951997-06-11011 June 1997 Rev 0 to PL-CNSI-97-004, Transportation & Emergency Response Plan for St Lucie Unit 1 SG Project. ML17229A3601997-05-29029 May 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Incorporating Administrative Changes That Improve Consistency Throughout TSs & Related Bases ML17229A2981997-03-0606 March 1997 Final Analysis of Radiological Consequences of Main Steam Line Break Outside Containment for St Lucie Unit 1 NPP Using NUREG-0800 Std Review Plan 15.1.5 App A. ML17229A1831996-12-20020 December 1996 Proposed Tech Specs Re Safety Limits & Limiting Safety Sys Settings ML17229A1611996-12-0909 December 1996 Proposed Tech Specs 1.9a Re Core Operating Limits Rept ML17229A1191996-10-31031 October 1996 Proposed Tech Specs 6.0 Re Administrative Controls ML17229A1111996-10-30030 October 1996 Proposed Tech Specs 3/4.9.9 Re Containment Isolation Sys & 3/4.9.10 Re Water level-reactor Vessel ML17229A1061996-10-28028 October 1996 Proposed Tech Specs 1.6 Re Channel Functional test,1.7 Re Containment Vessel integrity,1.8 Re Controlled leakage,1.9 Re Core alteration,3/4.6 Re Containment Systems & 3/4.6.1 Re Containment Vessel ML17229A1091996-10-28028 October 1996 Proposed Tech Specs Rev to Allow Type A,B & C Containment Leakage Tests to Be Conducted at Extended Intervals Determined by performance-based Criteria ML17229A0951996-10-24024 October 1996 Rev 0 to 00000-OSW-16, In-Situ Pressure Test Results for St Lucie Unit 1 Spring 1996 Outage. ML17229A0861996-10-18018 October 1996 Startup Physics Testing Rept. W/961018 Ltr ML17229A2441996-09-23023 September 1996 Rev 18 to Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (Odcm). ML17228B5641996-07-15015 July 1996 Revised Tech Specs Re Core Alteration Definition ML17229A0961996-06-12012 June 1996 Rev 0 to TR-9419-CSE96-1101, Test Rept - SG Tube In-Situ Hydrostatic Pressure Test Tool Hydro Chamber Pressure Determination. 1999-06-30
[Table view] |
Text
ATTACHMENT I ST. LUCIE UNIT I Marked-up Technical Specification Page:
3/4 I O-l pDR ADDCK 05000335, E JW3/008/3
3/4.10 SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS SHUTDOWN MARGIN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.10.1 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirement of Specification 3.1.1.1 may be suspended for measurement of CEA worth and shutdown margin provided reactivity equivalent to at least the highest estimated CEA worth is available for trip insertion from OPERABLE CEA(s).
APPLICABILITY: MODE 2.
ACTION:
- a. With any full length CEA not fully inserted and with less than the above reactivity equivalent available for trip insertion, imediately initiate and continue boration at > 40 gpm of 1720 ppm boric acid solution or its equivalent until the SHUTDOWN MARGIN required by Specification 3. l. 1. l. is restored.
- b. With all full length CEAs inserted and the reactor subcritical by less than the above reactivity equivalent, iamediately.
initiate and continue boration at > 40 gpm of 1720 ppm boric acid solution or its equivalent until the SHUTDOWN MARGIN required by Specification 3.1. 1. 1 is restored.
SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS 4.10.1.1 The position of each full length CEA required either partially or fully withdrawn shall be determined at least once per 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.
4.10.1.2 Each CEA not fully inserted shall be demonstrated capable of full insertion when tripped from at least the 50K withdrawn position within 4-horns prior to reducing the SHUTDOWN MARGIN to less than the limits of Specification 3. 1.1.1.
ST. LUCIE - UNIT 1 3/4 10-1 Amendmdnt No. ~ 7
ATTACHMENT2 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 Marked-up Technical Specification Page:
3/4 I O-I E JW3/008/4
3/4.10 SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS 3/4. 10. 1 SHUTDOWN MARGIN LIMITIHG CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.10.1 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirement of Specification 3.1.1.1 may be suspended for measurement of CEA worth, MTC, and SHUTDOWN MARGIN provided reactivity equivalent to at least the highest estimated CEA worth is available for trip insertion from OPERABLE CEA(s).
APPLICABILITY: MODES 2 and 3".
ACTION
- a. With any full-length CEA not fully inserted and with less than the above reactivity equivalent available for trip insertion, immedi-ately initiate and continue boration at greater than or equal to 40 gpm of a solution containing greater than or equal to 1720 ppm boron or its equivalent until the SHUTDOWN MARGIN required by Specification 3.1.1.1 is restored.
- b. With all full-length CEAs fully inserted and the reactor subcritical by less than the above reactivity equivalent, immediately initiate and continue boration at greater than or equal to 40 gpm of a solution containing greater than or equal to 1720 ppm boron or its equival'ent until the SHUTDOWN MARGIN required by Specification 3.1.1.1 is restored.
SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMEHTS 4.10.1.1 The position of each f'ull-length CEA required either partially or fully withdrawn shall be determined at least once per 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.
- 4. 10. 1.2 Each CEA not fully inserted shall be demonstrated capable of full insertion when tripped from at least the 50~ withdrawn position within V~ pecs prior to reducing the SHUTDOWN MARGIN to less than the limits of ication 3.1.1.1.
Operation in MODE 3 shall be limited to 6 consecutive hours.
ST. LUCIE - UHIT'2 3/4 10-1
ATTACHMENT 3 SAFETY EVALUATION The proposed amendment would revise the Technical Specification 4.10.1.2, Special Test Exceptions-Shutdown Margin, Surveillance Requirement which requires that each control element assembly (CEA) not fully inserted shall be demonstrated capable of full insertion, when tripped from at least the 50% withdrawn position, within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> prior to reducing the shutdown margin to less than the limits specified by Technical Specification 3.1.1.1.
The proposed change would revise the surveillance frequency for tripping the plant to demonstrate insertability of CEAs from "within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />" to "within seven days" prior to reducing the shutdown margin to less than the limits of Technical Specification 3.1.1.1.
During low power physics testing, following a refueling outage, tests are performed to verify physics parameters. The tests to determine theMEA group worths may result in a reduction of the shutdown margin below thaC normally required for MODES 2 and 3.
Prior to reducing shutdown margin below the Technical Specification limit, any CEA that is not fully inserted is required to have been demonstrated capable of full insertion within the past 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. The group worth tests typically commence more than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after initial criticality.
Therefore, an additional scram is required to comply with the present surveillance requirement. This additional scram causes increased component wear, complicates and delays completion of the low power physics tests, and results in decreased plant availability. A change is proposed to extend the time prior to the reduction of shutdown margin such that CEA insertion capability be demonstrated within the previous seven days, rather than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> as is presently required by Technical Specification 4.10.1.2.
The requirement to demonstrate CEA insertability is based on crediting each CEA's reactivity worth for shutdown margin. It should be noted that the requirements of Technical Specification 3.134 "CEA Drop Time" continue irrespective of the proposed change described herein. That is, CEA drop time will be verified: a) for all CEAs following each removal of the reactor vessel head, b) for specifically affected individual CEAs following any maintenance on or modification to the CEA drive system which could affect the drop time of those specific CEAs.
Therefore, during the proposed seven day Surveillance Requirement of 3.10.1 there cannot be maintenance activity on the CEAs without requiring drop time testing prior to entering the Special Test Exception on Shutdown Margin. The proposed Technical Specification 3.10.1 modif ication of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> to seven days, therefore, does not produce any change which could directly affect CEA response to a scram signal.
~ ~
The proposed Technical Specif ication modif ication would change the probability of a stuck CEA occurring between the time when the CEAs are demonstrated capable of full insertion and the time of the physics tests by 1.3 x 10 based on site operating data.
This small effect will have an insignificant impact to the combined probability of a positive reactivity insertion event occurring and a CEA not inserting due to the change in the Surveillance requirements. Even though the change in combined probability is small, a transient by transient review has been performed to document the effects of the proposed Technical Specification change.
Accident analyses are not performed specifically for the period of time during physics testing when the Special Test Exception for Shutdown Margin is applicable. A review of the transients which can cause positive reactivity insertion during operation in Modes 2 and 3 indicates that the events to be addressed are:
uncontrolled CEA withdrawal, inadvertent boron dilution, and CEA ejection and cooldown events Heatup events at beginning of cycle conditions can produce positive reactivity under positive Moderator Temperature Coefficient (MTC) conditions. However, with significant CEA insertion it is anticipated that the MTC at the condition of interest would be negative and would result in a negative reactivity insertion during a heatup event.
In the case of the uncontrolled CEA withdrawal event, the reactor protective system (RPS), through operation of the Variable High Power or Rate of Change of Power trips, provides protection against the consequences of this event. Furthermore, no failure which can cause CEA withdrawal can prevent insertion of a CEA group upon receipt of any RPS trip signal since the CEAs insert as a result of gravitational forces after removal of power to the control element drive mechanism system. Therefore, no significant change in the results and consequences of this event would be expected based on the proposed change.
The inadvertent boron dilution analysis at critical conditions is bounded by the uncontrolled CEA withdrawal event. It should be noted that during physics testing operators are required to maintain operating conditions stable. Therefore, as a result of this heightened attention, an inadvertent boron dilution would be terminated quickly with little positive reactivity insertion.
Since this transient is bounded by the uncontrolled CEA withdrawal, operator action would be expected quickly during physics testing, and there is no signif icant change anticipated in the available shutdown margin due to the proposed change it is concluded that the results and consequences of this type of event have not been significantly altered.
The CEA ejection event from Hot Zero Power (HZP) conditions results in a significant power increase for a brief period. The power increase is terminated by the negative reactivity produced by the Fuel Temperature Coeff icient. Reactor shutdown is initiated by the high power level trip. As shown by the HZP CEA ejection power trace from the St. Lucie Unit 2 FSAR (Figure 1),
the power level is minimal when the CEAs are predicted to begin insertion. A conservative calculation of the increased probability of a CEA ejection event from HZP with a stuck CEA has been per formed. It has been determined that the change in probability of a CEA ejection with a stuck CEA is 1.0 x 10 when the requirement for trip testing is extended from 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> to seven days. This increase represents a negligible increase in the risk to the public when compared to the safety goal proposed by the NRC in NUREG-0880. Therefore, it is concluded that the results and consequences of this type of event have not significantly changed due to the proposed Technical Specification change.
The events leading to possible overcooling of the reactor coolant system (RCS) include: Main Steam Line Break, Main Feedwater Line Break, Main Steam Safety Valve (MSSV) Spuriously Open, and Inadvertent Opening of the Atmospheric Dump Valve (ADV) . A limiting RCS overcooling event may in general result in a post-trip return to power, due to accompanying moderator cooldown, if sufficient shutdown rod worth is not available. However, it has been conservatively determined that the probability of an RCS overcooling event with a stuck CEA has increased by 7.4 x 10 when the requirement for trip testing is extended from 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> to seven days. Therefore, it is concluded that the results and consequences of this type of event have not significantly changed due to the proposed Technical Specification change.
The transients which can insert positive reactivity under the conditions applicable to startup physics testing have been reviewed and evaluated. It has been demonstrated that the proposed Technical Specification change has no significant impact on the results and consequences of these events.
FLORIDA POWER 4 .LIGHT COe M'PKL BBBfl ASSPHLY EJEG Im 8/BT St. Luck e 2 CQfK K'P 4 TIPE Nuclear Power Plant 2l 2
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ATTACHMENT 4 DETERMINATION gF NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS The standards used to arrive at a determination that a request for amendment involves no significant hazards consideration are included in the Commission's regulations, 10CFR50.92, which states that no significant hazards considerations are involved if the operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. Each standard is discussed as follows:
(1) Operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
The plant is essentially operated in the same manner as before and no change in plant configuration has occurred.
Therefore, there is no increase in the probability of accidents previously evaluated.
The proposed Technical Specification change modifies the Surveillance Requirements prior to entry into the Special Test Exception for Shutdown Margin. The safety evaluation has been performed to demonstrate that the proposed change in Surveillance Requirements provides essentially the same assurance that the requirement to provide the reactivity equivalent to at least the highest estimated CEA worth is available for trip insertion from OPERABLE CEAs described in the Technical Specifications is fulfilled. Therefore, it is determined that the consequences of an accident previously evaluated has not significantly increased.
(2) Use of the modified specification would not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously analyzed.
The plant is operated essentially in the same manner as before and no change in plant conf iguration is involved.
Therefore, there will be no possibility of a new or different accident.
(3) Use of the modified specification would not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
The Technical Specification for the minimum required Shutdown Margin during the Special Test Exception has not been modif ied. The proposed change only addresses the Surveillance Requirement of trip testing of CEAs 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> prior to entering the Special Test Exception. The safety evaluation has determined that the change in Surveillance Requirement will have no significant change in the probability that sufficient CEA worth is available in the event of a transient. Therefore, the proposed change will not cause a significant reduction in any margin of safety.
Based on the above, we have determined that the amendment request does not (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, (2) create the probability of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated, or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety; and therefore does not involve a signif icant hazards consideration.
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