ML17215A410
| ML17215A410 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 01/23/1984 |
| From: | Flugger F, Oneill J, Toscano R FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17215A409 | List: |
| References | |
| JPE-L-83-1, JPE-L-83-1-R02, JPE-L-83-1-R2, NUDOCS 8405310312 | |
| Download: ML17215A410 (29) | |
Text
EVALUATIONOF SURVEILLANCEFREQUENCY OF ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATIONSYSTEM (ESFAS)
SUBGROUP RELAYS JPE-L-83-1 Rev. 2 POWER PLANT ENGINEERING JUNO BEACH, FLORIDA PREPARED BY:
. O'N ', Jr. Cogn t Engineer APPROVED BY!
~ C Ci~
R. P. Toscano, Supervising Engineer APPROVED BY:
G. Flugger, M ger Date Zo JADH
~ZJR Date Issue Date: January, 1984 Page 1 of 14 84053i0312 840522
'DR ADOCK 05000389 PDR
I JPE-L"83"1 Rev.
2 Page 2 of 14 NUCLEAR SAFETY CLASSIFICATION QL"1 X
QL-g Not Safety Related QA Requested Vecified by
/
glgbtl.
D.A. Verduin, Verifying Engineer Date ao ltc7+
NO EPP INTERFACES........
Yes Non-Lead Lead Initials/Date Mechanical/Nuclear Electrical Instrumentation Control Civil X
za 8'g i'go g
?ecbnicel Licensing X
EXTERNAL Islam ACES (
)
No External Interfaces GeneralEngineering Nuclear.,Energy Nuclear Plant Quality Assurance Nuclear Analysis Security Nuclear Mutual Limited (NML)
Othersg Construction
JPE-L-83 "1 Rev. 2 Page 3 of 14 ABSTRACT The St. Lucie Plant Unit No. 2 is provided with an Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) designed to automatically actuate plant protective systems in the event of Loss of Coolant, Steam Generator Tube Rupture and Steam or Feedwater Line Break Accidents.
The current Technical Specifications require a semiannual test of the ESFAS subgroup relays.
This analysis compares the change in availability of the system resulting from an extension of the subgroup relay test from once per six months to once per refueling outage (18 months).
The analysis models a typical actuation channel (Safety Injection Actuation Signal (SIAS)) utilizing standard reliability techniques and published component failure rates.
The results indicate that the availability of an SIAS channel is insensitive to the change in test intervaL The 12 month change in test interval results in a 0.03% change in availability.
The ESFAS system, with the exception of the Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation System (AFAS), was designed under contract to Florida Power 4 Light and built by Consolidated Controls Corporation.
The AFAS was provided by the NSSS vendor, Combustion Engineering.
This analyses does not address the AFAS.
JPE-L-83 "1 Rev. 2 Page 4 of 14 SECTION TABLE OF CONTENTS TITLE PURPOSE METHODOLOGY PAGE
SUMMARY
OF RESULTS 2
DETAILEDANALYSIS REFERENCES APPENDIX TITLE PAGE SIAS COMPONENT DATAAND A1 UNAVAILABILITYCALCULATIONS
JPE-L-83-1 Rev. 2 Page 5 of 14 LIST OF FIGURES FIGURE TITLE CONTAINMENTPRESSURE MEASUREMENT LOOP BLOCK DIAGRAM PRESSURIZER PRESSURE MEASUREMENT LOOP BLOCK DIAGRAM SIAS ACTUATIONLOGIC SIAS RELIABILITYBLOCK DIAGRAMLPSI PUMP 2A ACTUATION PAGE
JPE-L;83-1 Rev. 2 Page 6 of 14 I.
P URPOSE The analysis contained herein demonstrates quantitatively the effect of ESFAS subgroup relay testing frequency on the ESFAS availability.
This analysis intentionally overestimates ESFAS availability by not evaluating
'all possible failure modes for portions of the system other than the subgroup relays and by not including, common cause failure.
This is conservative in that the relative importance of the subgroup relays to the calculated system availability is maximized.
II.
METHODOLOGY This evaluation was performed using standard reliability/availability modeling and estimation techniques.
A typical subsystem of the ESFAS, the Safety Injection Actuation Signal (SIAS) was chosen as the protection system to be analyzed.
From plant drawings and the St. Lucie Unit 2 Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) block diagrams of the measurement channel instrument loops and actuation logic were developed.
The FSAR provided information on component failures which could affect system operation.
Additional Failure Modes and Effects Analysis was performed as necessary.
A reliability block diagram was created to show the interrelation of the components.
The Boolean expression representing the reliability diagram was written as well as the resulting probability expression for system unavailability.
The component unavailabilities were calculated and combined in the system unavailability expression.
The unavailability calculation was repeated for the current (semimnnual) interval and the proposed (refueling outage) surveillance interval for the subgroup relays.
Specific assumptions are identified in Section IV, DETAILEDANALYSIS.
General assumptions made are listed below:
A.
Faults in wires or cables connecting SIAS components were not considered.
Their contribution to system failure is assumed to be negligible.
Note that this is a conservative for the reason stated in Section I.
B.
Contributions to SIAS unavailability due to test or maintenance were not considered.
This, again, is a conservative assumption.
C.
Only the automatic actuation circuitry was considered.
Manual actuation was not modeled.
D.
For components whose Failure rates are listed per hour of operation a "mission time" of 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> is assumed.
That is, the component must be operable at the start of the transient and for the first 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> of the transient.
This assumption does not influence the unavailability calculations greatly, since it is applied mainly to the measurement channel components.
These components are not large contributors to system unavailability.
JP E-L-83"1 Rev. 2 Page 7 of 14 E.
SIAS is initiated by either low Pressurizer pressure or high Containment pressure.
Both of these conditions are assumed present for purposes of the modeL HL
SUMMARY
OF RESULTS The Safety Injection Actuation Signal (SIAS) was modeled as typical ESFAS subsystem.
Faults contributing to the failure of one of the two actuation
~
channels were identified.
The availability of the actuation channel with semi-annual testing of the subgroup relays is estimated to be 0.9987.
For testing on a refueling outage
- basis, the estimated channel availability is 0.9984.
The extension of the surveillance interval has the effect of decreasing actuation channel availability by 0.03%.
This represents a
statistically insignificant change in the ability of the system to perform its function.
IV.
DETAILEDANALYSIS A.
System Description
A complete description of St. Lucie Unit 2 ESFAS appears in Section 7.3 of the St. Lucie Unit 2 Final Safety Analysis Report.
A brief description of the SIAS subsystem is presented here.
The SIAS is initiated by either 2 low Pressurizer pressure signals or 2
high Containment pressure signals.
Figures 1 and 2 show the measurement instrument loops for these parameters.
There are four independent measurement channels.
One channel may be bypassed for test or maintenance.
Bistable modules condition these signals and, through isolation modules, provide inputs to the actuation modules.
Upon a valid trip signal, the actuation modules'elay drivers d~nergize the SIAS subgroup relays which actuate safeguards equipment.
The ESFAS is provided with'an automatic test circuit as well as manual test capability.
Figure 3 shows the actuation logic for the SIAS subsystem.,
I B.
SIAS Model Description A reliability block diagram (Figure 4) was constructed for SIAS. The system boundaries were chosen in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.22 definitions of Protection System and Actuation Device.
Included in the model are the measurement
- channels, bistable, isolation and actuation modules, associated power supplies, subgroup relay, control circuit and circuit breaker for the Low Pressure Safety Injection (LPSI) Pump 2A, a typical safeguard equipment.
The pump and its motor driver are not included in the model since the system boundary occurs at the motor circuit breaker, a part of the actuation device.
The component identifiers shown on Figure 4 may be matched to their associated components on Figures 1, 2, and 3.
C.
SIAS Boolean and Probability Expressions The SIAS reliability block diagram may be translated directly into a Boolean expression.
The event described by the block diagram is
JPE-L "83"1 Rev. 2 Page 8 of 14 "Failure to automatically close LPSI Pump 2A circuit breaker, given the occurrence of low pressurizer pressure and high containment pressure conditions." The Boolean expression for this event is:
Fail to close LPSI 2A Circ Bkr. = 52- +
LPSI 2A Cont. Cir. + K 501 B + Auct. Circuit+
(PS-L-I-A x PS-L-2-A) + AM 501 +
(Failure of 3 of 4 Pressurizer Press. Channels x Failure of 3 of 4 Containment Press.
Channels)
Failure of a Pressurizer Pressure Channel (FPMA) is expressed as:
FPMA = IM 106 A+ PS-4-MA+ BA"106+ R-5A+ PS
+ PY-1102 A"2 + PY"1102 A + PT"1102 A Failure of a Containment Pressure Channel (FCMA) is expressed as:
FCMA = IM 101 A+ PS-1"MA+ BA-101+ R-8A+
PS
+ P Y"OV-2A"2+ P Y"OV-2A+
PTWV-2A Since all measurement channels are identical and no common mode failures are postulated, the failure of 3 of 4 measurement channels can be written as:
Prxr.
(4/(FPMA x FPMA x PPMA) =
4!
(FPMA x FPMA x FPMA)
Press.
(3j 3(] I
= 4 (FPMA x FPMA x FPMA)
Cont.
(4)(FCMA x FCMA x FCMA) = 4 (FCMA x FCMA x FCMA)
Press..
(3I Note that this is a conservative assumption for this analysis.
The ESFAS may be operated for extended periods with one measurement channel in bypass, in which case only two of three channels must fail to cause the event being modeled.
This assumption wiQ tend to increase the importance of the subgroup relay by minimizing the contributions of other SIAS system components.
. The;system unavailability (Q sys) expression is written directly from the Boolean expression:
@sys = @52- + @LPSI 2A +
Cont. Cir.
@K501B + QAuct.
+
Circuit
JP E-L-83-1 Rev. 2 Page 9 of 14
'(QPS-L-1-A x QPS-L-2-A) + 'QAM 501+
3 3
(4 QFPMA x
4 QFCMA)
Q xxx = Unavailability of Component xxx Note that the rare event approximation is made for the measurement channel unavailabilities.
D.
Availability Calculations j
Appendix A to this attachment contains the individual component unavailability calculations.
The individual components of the Containment pressure measurement channels are essentially the same as those of the Pressurizer pressure channeL The unavailability value calculated below for the Pressurizer pressure channel is thus valid for Containment pressure.
QFPMA = QPT 1102 A + QPY 1102 A + QPY-1102 A"2
+ QPS
+ QR-5A + QBA-106
+ QPS-4"MA + QIM-106A 3.4 x 10 4+ 1 x 10 5+ 1 x 10 5
+
2.5 x 164 + 1 x 105 + 8 x 10"4
+
2.5 x 10 5 + 9 x 106 1.4 x 10 3 / Channel The SIAS system unavailability is calculated:
Qsys=
1x10 3
+ 6x10 8xT
+
2.5 x 105
+ (2.5 x 10 4)
+
2 x10 4 + 4(1.4x10 3) x 4(1.4 x 10 3).
Qsys =
1.2 x 10 3
+
6 x 10 8'Includes QLPSI 2A + Q52 Cont Cir The variable T is the fault exposure time (FET) for the subgroup relay K 501 B.
Th'e FET depends on the interval between testing of the relay. The FET is calculated by-T = TEST INTERVAL
JPE-L-83-1 Rev. 2 Page 10 of 14 The table shown below calculates SIAS actuation channel availability for the semi-annual (4380 HR) and refueling outage (13140 HR) surveillance intervals.
SURVEILLANCE INTERVAL
@K501B Qsys Asys (1&sys) 4380 HR 13140 HR 1.3 x10 4 3.9x10 4
1.3 x 10-3 1.6 x 10"3
.9987
.9984 This represents a decrease in SIAS actuation channel availability of 0.03%.
E.
Conclusion The proposed increase in surveillance interval for the subgroup relays has a negligible effect on system availability.
In addition, the increased interval should result in a
decrease in the risk of inadvertent plant trips due to ESFAS testing.
V.
REFERENCES A.
PRA Procedures
- Guide, NUREG/CR-2300, Final Report, January 1983.
B.
Reliability Analysis of Engineered Safeguard Panels for St. Lucie Nuclear Power
- Station, Unit 02, Engineering Report No.
- 1213, Consolidated Controls Corp., April 26, 1978.
C.
St. Lucie Unit 42 Final Safety Analysis Report, Section 7.3.
D.
Component Failure Rates for Nuclear Plant Safety System Reliability
- Analysis, Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Draft Report issued 9/23/80 for Interim Reliability Evaluation Program use).
E.
Reactor Safety Study, WASH-1400, Rasmussen et al; October, 1975.
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JPE-L"83-1 Rev. 2 Page A1 of 15 APPENDIX A SIAS COMPONENT DATA AND UNAVAILABILITYCALCULATIONS
JP E-L-83-1 Rev. 2 Page A2 of 15 LPSI 2A Cont. Cir.
LPSI PUMP 2A Control Circuit COMPONENT:
DESCRIPTIO¹ FAILURE MODE(S)i a) Opens, shorts, various component failures DETECTION:
EFFECT:
a) monthly pump test a) Failure to auto actuate LPSI 2A pump FAILURE RATE:
1 x 10 3 /demand (Wash-1400, APP. IIS. 5)
FAULTEXPOSURE TIME:
a) 1 month UNAVAILABILITY:
1x10 3
NOTE:
This value includes failure of the circuit breaker.
See WASH-1400, Figure II 5-17 for fault tree evaluation of control circuit faults
JPE-L "83-1 Rev. 2 Page A3 of 15 COMPONENT:
DESCRIPTION:
FAILURE MODE(S):
DETECTION:
EFFECT:
52-LPSI 2A Circuit Breaker a) Fails to close b) Fails to remain closed a) monthly pump test b)
It tt It a) No power to LPSI 2A Pump b) Loss of power to LPSI 2A Pump FAILURE RATE:
See note below FAULT EXPOSURE TIME:
a) 1 month b) 1 month UNAVAILABILITY:
See note below NOTE:
The failure probability of the Circuit Breaker is included in the Control Circuit value.
JPE-L-83-1 Rev. 2 Page A4 of 15 COMPONENT:
DESCRIPTION:
FAILURE MODE(S):
DETECTION:
EFFECT:
FAILURE RATE:
K501B (cont. 4,11)
Subgroup actuation relay (contact 4, ll) a) coil fails to de-energize b) contacts fail to close a) Channel functional test b) Channel functional test a) Failure of component (LPSI PP 2A) to actuate b) Failure of component (LPSI PP 2A) to actuate 6E-8/hr (See Note 1)
FAULTEXPOSURE TIME:
a) variable-T (see Note 2) b) variable - T (see Note 2)
UNAVAILABILITY:
NOTE:
20 6E-8/hr x T Unless otherwise noted the failure rates listed are obtained from Consolidated Controls Corporation Engineering Report No. 1213 (April26, 1978).
The values therein are obtained from MIL-Handbook 217 B, June 1977.
The fault exposure time depends on the test interval.
Two cases are evaluated:
a) T1 = 4380 HR (Semi-Annual Interval) 2 b) T2 = 13140 HR (Refueling Outage Interval) 2
JPE-L-83 "1 Rev. 2 Page A5 of 15 COMPONENT:
DESCRIPTION:
Auct. Circuit Power supply auctioneering circuit FAILURE MODE(S):
a) High DETECTION:
EFFECT:
FAILURE RATE:
a) Alarms a) causes Act. module failure to trip 2.5 x 106/Hr.
FAULTEXPOSURE TIME:
a) immediate UNAVAILABILITY:
2.5 x 106/hr x 10 hr (see Note 1)
=2.5 x10 5 NOTE:
1.
The only unavailability contribution is that due to failure of the circuit during the transient.
Failure during standby
'onditions is alarmed.
JP E-L-83-1 Rev. 2 Page A6 of 15 COMPONENT:
DESCRIPTION:
PS"L-l,2&A Actuation module power supply -1,2 FAILURE MODE(S):
a) High DETECTION:
EFFECT:
FAILURE RATE:
a) Alarms a) causes Act. module failure to trip 2.5 x 105/Hr/Power Supply FAULT EXPOSURE TIME:
a) immediate UNAVAILABILITY:
NOTE:
2.
2.5 x 10 5/hr x 10 hr (see Note 1)
= 2.5 x 10 4/Power Supply Failure during standby condition is alarmed.
Only unavailability contribution is due to failure dur ing transient.
Failure rate obtained from Consolidated Controls Corp.
Engineering Report No. 1213 (CCC-ER1213).
JPE-L-83-1 Rev. 2 Page A7 of 15 COMPONENT:
DESCRIPTION:
FAILURE MODE(S):
AM 501 SIAS Actuation module a) Non-trip condition DETECTION:
a) immediate - auto test alarm EFFECT:
a) Failure to actuate ESFAS components FAILURE RATE:
2 x 105/Hr FAULTEXPOSURE TIME:
a) immediate UNAVAILABILITY:
2 x 10 5/hr x 10 hr
=2 x10 4 NOTE:
1.
Failure rate obtained from CCC-ER 1213.
JPE-L-83-1 Rev. 2 Page A8 of 15 COMPONENT:
DESCRIPTION:
FAILURE MODE(S):
DETECTIO¹ EFFECT:
PT-1102 A, B, C, D Pressure transmitter a) ASIS, DRIFT b) HIGH a) comparison with remaining channels b) RPS pretrip, trip alarms a) Actuation logic becomes 2 of 3 or 2 of 2 (with 1 channel bypassed) b) Same as above FAILURE RATE:
3.4 x 10 5/Hr (see Note 1)
FAULTEXPOSURE TIME:
a) 8HR/2 Shift channel check b) immediate UNAVAILABILITY:
3.4x10 5/hr x10 hr
=3.4x10 4
Notes:
1.
Value obtained from Interim Reliability Evaluation Program (IREP) Data Base.
JPE-L-83-1 Rev. 2 Page A9 of 15 COMPONENT:
DESCRIPTION:
FAILURE MODE(S):
DETECTION:
EFFECT:
FAILURE'RATE:
PY"1102 A, B, C, D Current/voltage converter a) HIGH b) As is, Drift a) immediate b) comparison with other channels a) RPS Hi-Przr. trip (1 channel), Alarms b) Failure of 1 channel to trip; logic =
2 of 3 or 2 of 2 (if one channel bypassed) 1 x 10 6/Hr (see Note 1)
FAULT EXPOSURE TIME:
a) immediate b) 8/hr/2'- shift Ch. Chk.
UNAVAILABILITY:
1 x 106/hr x 10 hr
=1x10 5
Notes:
1.
Value obtained from IREP Data Base.
JPE-L-83 "1 Rev. j2 Page~A10 of 15 COMPONENT:
DESCRIPTION:
FAILURE MODE(S):
DETECTION:
EFFECT:
FAILURE RATE:
P Y>>1102 A"2 (1102 B, C, D also)
Voltage to current converter a) HIGH b) As is, Drift a) immediate b) comparison with other channels a) Alarms (P1A1102 All,B, C, D; PI 1102 A, B, C, D) b) Failure of 1 channel to trip; logic = 2 of 3 or 2 of 2 (ifone channel bypassed) 1 x 10 6/Hr (see Note 1)
FAULT EXPOSURE TIME:
a) immediate b) 8/hr/2 - shift Ch. Chk.
UNAVAILABILITY:
1x10 6/hr x10 hr
=1x10 5
Notes:
1.
Value obtained from IREP Data Base.
JP E-L-83-1 Rev. 2 Page Allof 15 COMPONENT:
DESCRIPTION:
FAILURE MODE(S):
PS DC Power Supply to Converters a) HIGH DETECTION:
a) immediate EFFECT:
a) SIAS channel fails to trip FAILURE RATE:
2.5 x10 5/Hr FAULT EXPOSURE TIME:
a) immediate UNAVAILABILITY:
'2.5 x10 5/hr x10 hr
= 2.5 x10 4 NOTE:
1.
Failure rate obtained from CCC-ER1213.
JPE-L-83-1 Rev. 2 Page A12 of 15 COMPONENT:
DESCRIPTION:
FAILURE MODE(S):
R-5A Precision Resistor (250Q) a) Open DETECTION:
a) Manual Test, alarms, possible immediate detection EFFECT:
a) Bistable "HP', Channel fails to trip FAILURE RATE:
1 x 106/Hr (see Note 1)
FAULTEXPOSURE TIME:
a) immediate UNAVAILABILITY:
1 x 106/hr x 10 hr NOTE:
=,1 x10 5 1.
Failure rate obtained from CCC-ER 1213
JPE-L "83-1 Rev. 2 Page A13 of 15 COMPONENT:
DESCRIPTION:
FAILURE MODE(S):
BA-106 Lo Przr Pr. Bistable a) Non-trip condition DETECTION:
a) Manual and Auto test EFFECT:
a) 1 Ch. fails to trip, logic = 2of3 or 2of2 (if one channel bypassed)
FAILURE RATE:
8 x10 5/Hr FAULT EXPOSURE TIME:
a) immediate (Auto Test)
UNAVAILABILITY:
8 x10 5/hrx10 hr
=8 x10 4 NOTE:
1.
Failure rate obtained from CCC-ER 1213.
JP E-L-83-1 Rev. 2 Page A14 of 15 COMPONENT:
DESCRIPTION:
FAILURE MODE(S):
PS-4-MA Przr Press..Bistable Power Supply a) High DETECTION:
a) Alarms EFFECT:
a) Causes high bistable output, fails bistable circ.,
logic = 2of3 or 2of2 FAILURE RATE:
2.5 x 106/Hr FAULTEXPOSURE TIME:
a) immediate UNAVAILABILITY:
2.5 x 10 6/hr x 10 hr
= 2.5 x 105 NOTE:
1.
Failure rate obtained from CCC-ER 1213.
JPE-L-83 "1 Rev. 2 Page A15 of 15 COMPONENT:
DESCRIPTION:
FAILURE MODE(S):
IM-106A "A": Channel Isolation Module a) Non-trip condition DETECTION:
EFFECT:
a) Automatic and manual test, auto test light and alarm a) Failure of 1 ch. to trip; logic = 2 of 3 or 2 of 2 (ifone channel bypassed FAILURE RATE:
9 x10 7/Hr FAULTEXPOSURE TIME:
a) immediate UNAVAILABILITY:
9 x 10 7/hr x 10hr
=9x'10 6 NOTE:
1.
Failure rate obtained from CCC-ER 1213.
2.
Failure of isolation module is assumed to be detected by automatic test circuitry.