ML17202V052
| ML17202V052 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Dresden  |
| Issue date: | 03/28/1991 |
| From: | Bielby M, Jordan M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17202V051 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-237-OL-91-01, 50-237-OL-91-1, NUDOCS 9104090059 | |
| Download: ML17202V052 (17) | |
Text
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION III Report No. 50-237/0L-91-0l Docket Nos. 50-237; 50-249 Licenses No. DPR-19; DPR-25 Licensee:
Commonwealth Edison Company Opus West III 1400 Opus Place Downers Grove, IL 60515 Facility Name:
Dresden Nuclear Power Station Examination Administered At:
Dresden
- Morris, Nuclear Power Station Illinois Chief Exami~er: '-J~~ ~!11 ~ *
'ti. Biel y, Sr.
RIII Examiners:
R. Miller, SONALYST Approved By:
- c. Carroll, SONALYST 9tt au M.
~o/dan, Chief Operator Licensing Section 1 Division of Reactor Safety Examination Conducted:.
February 4 - 8, 1991 Examination Summary:
Examination Administered February 4-8, 1991 (Report No. 50-237/0L-91-01) 3/;_<{ 111 Date A total of seven Initial written and operating license examinations were administered to two Senior Reactor Operator-Upgrades (SRO-Us), two Senior Reactor Operator-Instants (SRO-Is) arid three Reactor Operators (ROs).
A Limited SRO (LSRO) written and operating license examination was administered to one candidate.
Requalif ication Retake examinations were administered to two operators as a result of unsatisfactory performance on portions of the July, 1990 Requalification examination.
One SRO was administered a dynamic simulator scenario and one RO performed 10 Job Performance Measures (JPMs).
91 04<>90059 910328 PDR ADOCK 05000010 V
Results:
All four SROs and three Ros and the one LSRO passed the Initial examination.
The Requal Retake SRO and RO passed the dynamic simulator scenario and JPM examinations, respectively.
The following is a summary of major strengths and weaknesses noted during examination administration:
STRENGTHS Operator markup of Dresden Emergency Procedure (DEOP) flowcharts (Details in Section 3)
LSRO knowledge of Refueling Equipment (Details in Section 3)
Incorporation of p*reviously NRC noted simulator fidelity deficiencies (Details in Section 4)
WEAKNESSES Operator complacency (Details in Section 3)
Examination materials (Details in Section 4)
Timely submission of candidate NRC Medical 396 forms
((Details in Section 4)
Simulator fidelity deficiencies (Details in Section 4)
Examination security (Details in Section 5)
REPORT DETAILS
- 1.
Examiners M. Jordan, Chief, Operator Licensing Branch, RIII NRC (Observing exam process, auditing M. Bielby)
M. Bielby, Chief Examiner, RIII NRC M. Leach, Examiner, RIII NRC (Observing Exit)
T. Guilfoil, Examiner, Sonalyst (Auditing c. Carroll)
R. Miller, Examiner, Sonalyst
- c. Carroll, Examiner, Sonalyst
- 2.
Persons Contacted Facility Representatives
+ E. Eenigenburg, Station Manager
+ K. Gerling, Operations Training Supervisor (PTO)
+*D. Gronek, Operations Training Group Leader
+ E. Mantel, Services Director
+ G. Smith, Assistant Superintendent of Operations
+*S. Stiles, Training Supervisor
+ R. Weidner, Dresden Simulator Supervisor (PTO)
NRC Representatives D. Hills, Dresden Senior Resident Inspector
+*M. Bielby, Chief Examiner, RIII
+*M. Leach, Examiner, RIII
- Denotes those present at the Training Staf.f pre-exit meeting on February 11, 1991.
+Denotes those present at the Management exit meeting on February 11, 1991.
- 3.
Operating/Written Examination Strengths and Weaknesses The following is a summary of generic strengths and weaknesses noted on the operating and written portions of the licensing examination.
This information is being provided to aid the licensee in upgrading Initial, Requalification and Limited license training programs.
No licensee response is require~.
Strengths Operators conscientiously marked DEOP flowcharts as they completed associated steps.
Plant parameters were
periodically elicited, updated and logged alongside appropriate DEOP entry conditions.
During administration of the operating examination the LSRO was observed to be very familiar with, and knowledgeable of Refueling Equipment.
Weaknesses Operators appeared complacent toward correcting problems, and readily accepted situations without questioning, or notifying appropriate personnel:
- 1)
Candidates were not familiar with information provided by the new DCM-90 electronic dosimeters.
All knew how to read the normal LCD display, but some were not aware of indications provided when the side button was pressed, or the meaning of a "chirping" versus a continuous audible alarm.
- 2)
An examiner observed a plant drairi "backing up" and causing a pool of water to extend beyond established radiological barriers.
The examiner questioned a candidate about the problem and allowed him the opportunity to take action to correct the situation.
The examiner eventually had to instruct the candidate to notify Radiation Protection and have them correct the problem.
- 3)
Candidates were unfamiliar with the smear and air sample symbols used on the Radiological survey maps located outside the Radiation Protection office.
These maps are checked prior to signing on the appropriate Radiation Work Permit (RWP).
- 4)
During review of the Radiological Survey maps an examiner pointed out to candidates that some surveys were over a month old and asked if that was a problem.
Candidates indicated that surveys were performed at least weekly.
Only one candidate made an effort to determine why the latest surveys were not posted.
- 5)
During performance of the JPMs several procedures were found to be inadequate, or contain errors.
Most candidates completed the JPMs but did not indicate they would take f ollowup action to correct the problems until prompted to do so by the examiner:
a)
Operators were asked to determine Off-Gas release rate (field unit 1, channel 5) with both Control Terminals A and B inoperable (DOP 1700-12, Rev.1).
Some operators were confused about which flow rate to use in Step 3, and unsure of the units on their answers once the calculation was complete in step 4.
b)
Operators were asked to perform DSSP 200-T3, Rev.2, Local Manual start of 2/3 Diesel Generator, due to a fire in the Aux Electric Room and subsequent Control Room Evacuation per DSSP 100-CR (facility JPM No.
2640100201A).
DSSP 200-T3, Steps 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 tell the operator to place specified switchboard control switches in the "appropriate position per Table 1 11
- Table 1 does not list "appropriate" switch position(s) for DSSP 100-CR.
One operator deduced that the "appropriate" switch position(s) were those listed for EPIP 200-20 (procedure replaced by DSSP 100-CR).
A f ollowup question asked operators how to perform a reset of the "Failure to Start" lockout.
Operators incorrectly depressed the local Unit 2/3 diesel generator annunciator panel alarm reset pushbutton and/or the lockout relay flag reset button, vice the Alarm Reset pushbutton on the diesel engine control panel.
(Refer to DOA 902-8,C-7; Rev.2).
Once the JPM was completed the candidates had to be prompted by the examiner to followup on correcting the procedures.
Operator action(s) for Personnel Contamination Monitor (PCM) alarm(s) on exit from the plant were inconsistent.
Some indicated they would wait for the alarm to clear, and try the same PCM a second time; some indicated they would try a different PCM; some said they would call Radiation Protection immediately.
- 4.
Training Strengths Previous NRC noted simulator fidelity deficiencies such as poorly modeled electrical distribution and ability to close individual MSIVs have been incorporated into the simulator.
Weaknesses Examination Materials:
- 1)
An incomplete set (one of three books) of
.Administrative procedures were submitted for the Initial examination.
There were no facility operator learning objectives or Job Task Analysis (JTAs) listed for administrative procedures.
Due to the absence of JTAs, the Knowledge and Abilities Catalog for Nuclear Power Plant Operators (K & A Catalog), NUREG 1123, September 198.6, was used to establish examination validity in this area.
- 2)
There currently is no formal facility training program for LSRO and as a result, no facility JTAs, learning objectives or Lesson Plans were supplied for the LSRO.
Examination questions were obtained from the one volume of Refueling procedures, Refueling Technical Specifications and RO/SRO Lesson Plans for Fuel and Refueling Equipment.
NRC examiners used guidance provided by the K & A catalog and the proposed final version of Operator Licensing Examiner Standards, NUREG 1021, Revision 6, Section ES-701, Administration of SRO Limited to Fuel Handling (LSRO) to administer the written arid operating examinations.
Pre-exam Review:
- 1)
Although the pre~exam review appeared to alleviate a number of post exam comments on the Initial RO/SRO and LSRO written examinations (see ), the facility should consider limiting the number of personnel and amount of time for future exam reviews.
The number of facility exam reviewers (nine) and time (5 days) appears to be excessive.
- 2)
Discussions about comments on the pre-exam review indicate th~ Dresden Training Staff does not feel Technical Specification and DEOP bases questions are appropriate on the Initial written examinations.
These type of questions are supported by the K & A Catalog, NUREG 1123, and are part of the facilities learning objectives._
Medical Reports:
Initial license candidates' report of medical
- examinations (NRC Forni 396) were not submitted with pre-applications (NRC Form 398) 30 days prior to the scheduled license examination date (2/4/91).
Five medical forms were received on 1/17/91, and three on 1/30/91.
Both forms need to be reviewed and approved by the region before a candidate can take the license examination.
The region required more medical information on one candidate, but insufficient time remained to review the information-before the written exam was administered.
A waiver was requested and granted per telecon with headquarters.
The Chief Examiner explained to the candidate that even though he may pass the license examination, granting of a license would be pending approval of his medical status by the NRC regional doctor.
Simulator Fidelity Deficiencies:
Although the lack of decay heat was a previous NRC noted deficiency that was incorporated into the simulator model, the amount of decay heat does not model the plant, and as such, fails to enhance scenarios which include failure(s) of Main Turbine Bypass Valves, and/or closure of MSIVs.
Also a significant number of controllers and indicators in the simulator are tagged and identified by the facility for future enchancement or replacement which potentially contribute to negative training.
The Loss of Reactor Water Level Indication malfunction is only simulated on one channel (B) which potentially allows candiates to recognize the malfunction prior to implementation.
Additionally, the simulator instructors cannot override individual alarms, controllers or indicators.
A number of deficiencies noted during this examination are listed in Enclosure 2.
Examination Security (See Section 5)
- 5.
Examination Security A facility instructor signed an exam security agreement (ES 201, Rev.6, Attachment 1) prior to exposure to Initial examination material.
This security agreement states in part "I understand that I am not to participate in any instruction involving those applicants scheduled_ to be
]_
administered the above examination from this date until after the examination has been administered."
During the week of January 21, 1991, the instructor was asked to participate in simulator validation due to recent modeling changes.
The lead instructor (also on security agreement) chose to include the Requal Retake examination scenario as one of various scenarios selected for a method of simulator validation.
The instructor was not involved with the Requal Retake examination and, therefore, not aware that any examination scenarios were being used.
He later participated in crew training which included the Requal Retake examinee.
On January 28, 1991 the lead instructor became aware of this Instructor's activities, realized a potential compromise had occurred, and notified his supervision.
Due to the late hour, the licensee promptly notified the NRC regional office early the next day (January 29, 1991) of the occurrence and the content of the training session.
As a consequence, the previously selected Requal Retake examination scenario was removed from the exam and a substitution made.
It was also determined that no Initial or Limited license scenarios, written examination questions, Job Performance Measures (JPMs) or Requal Retake JPMs compromise had occurred.
During the period of Jariuary 29, 1991, the licensee conducted a prompt and detailed investigation of the event and of the content discussed in the training period.
Following this investigation, the licensee identified methods to prevent recurrence.
As a result Training Instruction 110 was revised to include a list of examination candiates on the security agreement sheet.
- 6.
General Observations The following observations were made by the examiners while administering the examinations:
a)
Security and Radiation Protection personnel were courteous, and cooperative in assuring minimum delays when accessing the plant.
b)
Plant cleanliness was good.
c)
Operations personnel were very cooperative in assuring there were no delays in accessing locked cabinets and panels.
- 7.
Exit Meeting A pre-exit meeting with the Training Department, and a formal management exit meeting was conducted on February 11, 1991.
Those attending the meeting are listed in Section 2 of this report.
The following items were discussed during the exit meeting:
- a.
Operator and Training Department strengths and weaknesses noted during examination administration (See Sections 3, 4, and 5).
- b.
The general observations made by the examiners during examination administration (See Section 6).
- c.
Simulator fidelity deficiencies noted in Enclosure 2.
The results of the examinations were not presented at the exit meeting.
The licensee was informed that the results would be contained in the examination report which would be issued in approximately 30 working days.
ENCLOSURE 1 FACILITY COMMENTS AND NRC RESOLUTION NRC response to facility post examination comments on the LSRO written examination administered February 4, 1991.
QUESTION:
007 (2.00)
Match the Dresden Station Administrative and 10 CFR 20 designation in Column A with the correct radiation exposure limit from Column B.
(Answers in Column B may be used once, more than once, or not at all.)
Column A
- a.
Dresden Station maximum allowable exposure for personnel without an NRC Form 4.
- b.
Dresden Station maximum allowable Whole Body dose with NRC Form 4.
mrem/quarter
- c.
10 CFR 20 skin.
- d.
10 CFR 20 extremities.
ANSWER:
007 (2.00)
- a.
7
- b.
3
- c.
1
- d.
5
REFERENCE:
- 1.
Radiation Protection standards Column B
- 1.
7500 mrem/quarter
- 2.
7500 mrem/year_
- 3.
3000 mrem/quarter
- 4.
300 mrem/week
- 5.
18.75
- 6.
2400 mrem/quarter 7~
1250 mrem/quarter
- 2.
10 CFR 20, Standards for Radiation Protection K/A 294001D103 (3.8)
ENCLOSURE 1 FACILITY COMMENTS AND NRC RESOLUTION FACILITY COMMENT:
As written, the question allows Column B responses to be used once, more than once, or not at all.
This allows an item in Column A to have multiple answers, if correctly matched with multiple items in Column B.
Column A.a: answer key response is #7, Column B item #4 is also correct.
Column A.b: answer key response is #3, Column B item #4 and #7 are also correct.
Reference:
CECo Radiation Protection Standards, 2/82, p.33 -
34 NRC RESOLUTION:
Accept facility recommendation, exam answer key changed.
QUESTION: 012 (1.00)
Each of the following is correct concerning the overhead crane?
- a.
ANSWER:
- b.
REFERENCE:
The interlock prevents the occurrence of any lifting operation which would result in a high radioactive condition on the refueling floor.
012 (1.00)
- 1.
Fuel Handling & Refueling Equipment Lesson Plan, page 9 K/A 234000K501 (3.4)
FACILITY COMMENT:
Pre-exam review was "no comment".
In the preparation of the actual exam the word "Except" was omitted from the question stem.
This resulted in a stem statement vs a stem question.
Request that this question be removed from the exam.
ENCLOSURE 1 FACILITY COMMENTS AND NRC RESOLUTION NRC RESOLUTION:
Accept facility resolution, question deleted from exam.
QUESTION: 042 (.1. 00)
The following conditions exist on Unit 2 at the beginning of the current refuel outage:
Shutdown Cooling on Unit 2 is in operation.
A Fuel Cask is being moved in the Reactor Building.
Which one of the following is TRUE under the current conditions?
- a.
- one circuit of the Standby Gas Treatment System must be operable.
- b.
Unit 2/3 Diesel Generator shall be operable.
c.*
Secondary Containment integrity need NOT be maintained.
- d.
Reactor Water Temperature must be maintained below 350
°F and the Reactor Coolant Systems vented.
ANSWER:
042 (1.00) b_.
REFERENCE:
- 1.
DFP 800-1, Rev. 17, p. 8 K/A 234000G011 (3.9)
FACILITY COMMENT:
Pre-exam review comment was accepted, changing the answer key from "b." to "a. 11 *. Exam question stem reflects post-exam comment, however, answer key still lists "b." as correct vs "a. 11
- NRC RESOLUTION:
Accept facility comment, answer key changed to reflect "a." vice "b." as correct answer.
QUESTION: 047 (1.00)
ENCLOSURE 1 FACILITY COMMENTS AND NRC RESOLUTION Fuel movements are being done in the spent fuel pool.
During the withdrawal of one fuel assembly the HOIST LOADED indication is lost.
According to Fuel Movements within the Spent Fuel Pool, DFP 800-32, which ONE of the following statements is correct for
~ontinued operation?
- a.
- b.
- c.
- d.
ANSWER:
- a.
REFERENCE:
Complete movement of the fuel assembly, no further fuel assemblies may be moved until HOIST LOADED indication is repaired.
The Fuel Handling Supervisor can verbally authorize a bypass of the HOIST LOADED indication.
Movement of fuel assemblies must cease until the HOIST LOADED indication is repaired~
The HOIST LOADED indication is not required.
047 (1.00)
- 1.
Dresden Fuel Procedure, DFP 800-32, Rev.3, p. 2 K/A 295023G007 (3.6)
FACILITY COMMENT:
Pre-exam review comment was accepted, changing the "a." response.
Pre-exam comment was not complete.
Answer key also needed to be changed from 11a. 11 to "c. 11 *
Reference:
- 1.
Dresden Fuel Procedure DRP 800-32, Rev.3, p.2
- 2.
Dresden Administrative Procedure DAP 07-29, Rev.a, p.7.
NRC RESOLUTION:
Accept facility comment, changed answer key to reflect "c. 11 vice "a." as correct answer.
ENCLOSURE 2 SIMULATOR FACILITY REPORT Facility Licensee:
Commonwealth Edison Company (Dresden 2 & 3)
Facility Licensee Docket No.
50-237;50-249 Operating Test Administered on:
February 4-8, 1991 During the conduction of the simulator portion of the operating test, the following items were observed:
ENCLOSURE 2 SIMULATOR FACILITY REPORT
- 1)
RWCU blowdown
- 2)
Target Rock SRV indication
- 3)
MSL flows (and plant)
- 4)
Cannot override individual annunciators/indicators
- 5)
- 6)
- 7)
- 8)
- 9)
- 10)
- 11)
- 12)
Inaccurate decay heat Rod position indication (LEDS)
Full Core Display mimics.
Rod position indication (LED)
Demineralized water pressure Loss of reactor water level Recirc pump (RRP) Individual and Master controller deviation meters RRP "B" ammeter DESCRIPTION Cannot simulate (less than 60 psig)
Position indication light remain on after fuses pulled Oscillations when set up in IC for placing HPCI in Pressure Control (JPM)
During previous exam decay heat was not simulated Lost on Full Core Display when Select Power switch turned OFF, then back ON.
Fuel assembly/control rod numbers not properly located (different from plant)
D-12 (?) remained at "OB" after rod driven in to 11 00 11,
and after all rods *scrammed (different scenarios)
After starting the second Demin water pump for Isolation Condenser initiation the Demin water pressure goes to zero Loss of RWL indication malfunction.only on one channel (B)
No response.
Plastic cover broke, meter indicates zero (no response)
ENCLOSURE 2 SIMULATOR FACILITY REPORT
- 13)
RRP "B" pump power
- 14)
Shutdown Cooling pump pressure Plastic cover broke, meter indicates zero (no response)
SDC pump discharge pressure stays at full scale after pump is started
REQUALIFICATION PROGRAM EVALUATION REPORT REQUAL RETAKES FROM JULY, 1990 Facility:
Dresden 2 & 3 Examiners:
M. Bielby, Sr., RIII Chief Examiner R. Miller, SONALYST, Inc.
C. Carroll, SONALYST, Inc.
Dates of Evaluation:
February 5 & 8, 1991 Areas Evaluated:
Written X Oral X Simulator Examination Results:
RO Pass/Fail SRO Pass/Fail Total Pass/Fail Evaluation CS or U)
Written Examination 1/0 1/0 Operating Examination Oral (JPMs)
Simulator 1/0.
1/0 NOTE:
One SRO evaluated in both written and _oral (JPMs)
Evaluation of facility examination grading:
Crew Examination Results:
Crew 1 (Staff)
Pass/Fail
- operating Examination p
Overall Program Evaluation No major deficiencies noted.
Submitted:
RIII
.AM~o
-B'ielby/cg Examiner 03/JS' /91 Forwarded:
RIII~!
J~dan Section Chief 03/z,l/91 Evaluation CS or Ul Approved:
RIIt
\\;~~
1>h1llips s
Bra:ryph Chief 03/}:>/91 s s s