ML17194A303
| ML17194A303 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Dresden, Indian Point  |
| Issue date: | 11/24/1981 |
| From: | Jordan M, Reimann F, Tongue T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17194A301 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-010-81-14, 50-10-81-14, 50-237-81-28, 50-249-81-21, IEB-80-11, IEB-80-16, NUDOCS 8112080258 | |
| Download: ML17194A303 (11) | |
See also: IR 05000010/1981014
Text
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I I
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Report No. 50-010/81-14; 50-237/81-28; 50-249/81-21
Docket No.50-010, 50-237, 50-249
License No. DPR-02, DPR-19, DPR-25
Licensee:
Commonwealth Edison Company
Post Office Box 767
Chicago, IL
60690
Facility Name:
Dresden Nuclear Power Station,.Units 1, 2, & 3
Inspection At:
Dresden Site, Morris, IL
Inspection Conducted:
September 5 through October 2, 1981
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Inspectors:
T. M. Tonguer
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Approved By,:
F. 'w*.'* Rf!*tni:ahn, *Acting Chief,
Reactor Projects Section lC
Inspection Summary
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Inspection on September 5 - October 2, 1981 (Report No. 50-10/81-14;
50-237/81-28; 50-249/81-21)
Areas Inspected:
Routine unannounced resident inspection of Operational
Safety Verification, Monthly Maintenance Observation, Monthly Surveillance
- Observation, IE Bulletin Followup, Immediate Action Letter Followup, Plant
Trips, Inspection during long-term shutdown, GSEP Drill and concerns of
ex-security guards.
The *inspection included a total of 101 inspector-hours
onsite by two NRC inspectors including 41 hours4.74537e-4 days <br />0.0114 hours <br />6.779101e-5 weeks <br />1.56005e-5 months <br /> onsite during off-shifts.
Results:
Of the nine areas inspected, there were no items of noncompliance
in eight areas, and one item of noncompliance (Failure to follow jumper and
lifted lead procedure, Paragraph 2) in one area.
8112080258 811124
PDR ADOCK 05000010
Q
DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
i*D. Scott, Station Superintendent
- R. Ragan, Operations Assistant Superintendent
- J. Eenigenburg, Maintenance Assistant Superintendent
- D. Farrar, Administrative Services and Support Assistant Superintendent
J. Brunner, Technical Staff Supervisor
J. Wujciga, Unit 1 Operating Engineer
J. Almer, Unit 2 Operating Engineer
M. Wright, Unit 3 Operating Engineer
J. Doyle, Q.C. Supervisor
D. Adam, Waste Systems Engineer
i*G. Myrick, Rad-Chem Supervisor
B. Saunders, Station Security Administrator
B. Zank, Training Supervisor
- E. Wilmer, Q.A. Coordinator
The inspector also talked with and interviewed several other licensee
employees, including members of the technical and engineering staffs,
reactor and auxiliary operators, shift engineers and foremen, electri-
cal, mechanical and instrument personnel, and contract security per-
sonnel.
- Denotes those attending one or more exit interviews conducted on
September 25 and October 2, 1981, and informally on several occasions
throughout the report period.
2.
Operational Safety Verification
a.
The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed appli~
able logs and conducted discussions with control room operators
during the period of September 5 through October 2, 1981.
The
inspector verified the operability of selected emergency systems,
reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to service of
affected components.
Tours of Units 2 and 3 reactor buildings
and turbine buildings were conducted to observe plant equipment
conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and
excessive vibrations and to verify that maintenance requests had
been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance.
The inspector
by observation and direct interview verified that the physical
security plan was being implemented in accordance with the station
security plan.
b.
The inspector observed plant housekeeping/cleanliness conditions
and verified implementation of radiation protection controls.
During the period of September 5 through October 2, 1981, the
inspector walked down the accessible portions of the Unit 2 and
3, HPCI, LPCI, Core Spray, and Standby Liquid Control systems
to verify operability.
The inspector also witnessed portions
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- f.
of the radioactive waste system controls associated with radwaste
shipments and barreling.
These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that
facility operations were in conformance with the requirements
established under technical specifications, 10 CFR, and adminis-
trative procedures.
c.
During routine inspection of Control Room activities on
September 25, 1981, the SRI conducted a verification of the
Units 2 and 3 Jumper and and Lifted Lead Logs.
A sampling of
the log entries compared to the actual jumpers and lifted leads
were not correct.
The SRI noted several lifted leads or lifted
connectors with caution cards and one set of thermocouple leads
lifted in association with a tagged jumper, but with no identi-
fication.
The items found were as listed below:
Caution Tag Number
II-20-81
III-12-79
III-25-81
Information
Charcoal Absorber Radiation Monitor, lifted
Jumper between Recirculation loop tempera-
ture monitors OK. Lifted leads for the
affected a thermocouple had no identifica-
tion or caution card - corrected immediately
by the SCRE.
Charcoal Absorber Radiation Monitors, lifted
lead.
Items II-20-81; and III-25-81 were found in the respective unit
Caution Card Log vice the Jumper and Lifted Lead Log as required.
This is in noncompliance with the Commonwealth Edison "Quality
Assurance Program for Nuclear Generating Stations" Topical Report,
CE-1-A, January 1976, Revision 18, July 21, 1981, Section 5,
Instructions Procedures, and Drawings which states, in part,
"Generating Station operations, procedures and instructions will
be provided by the Station Superintendent and will be included
in the Station Procedures Manual in a timely manner consistent
with NRC license requirements for administering the policies,
procedures and instructions from the time that the operating
license is issued through the life of the station.
These pro-
cedures and instructions include:
Administrative Procedures, ... "
Dresden Administrative Procedure DAP7-4, Revision 5, May 1981,
states "This procedure provides guidance to assure that adequate
control of the use of jumpers or lifted leads is maintained."
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d.
Contrary to the above, the items identified by the SRI were not
listed in the Jumper and Lifted Lead Log as required.
Indepen-
dent interviews by the shift foreman, shift engineer and SCRE/STA
confirmed the findings of the SRI.
This is an item of noncompliance (50-237/81-28-01, 50-249/81-21-01).
During this report period, licensee personnel conducted a review
of the applicable Caution Card Logs to identify other items that
should be in the Jumper and Lifted Lead Log.
There were several
additional items found in addition to those found by the SRI.
These items were listed in the Jumper and Lifted Lead Log as
required and verified by the SRI.
In addition to those items listed in the citation, the Resident*
Inspector identified at least 12 leads in the panels with open
lugs and no identification tags.
These were found to be leads
left ~rom equipment removed for unit modifications, and were no
longer of use.
This was brought to the attention of station
management personnel who agreed to have the lugs removed and
the ends of the electrical leads taped as with past modifica-
tions.
This will prevent confusing the leads with those that
are intended for reuse.
This is an open inspection item
(50-237/81-28-02; 50-249/81-21-02).
During the inspection, Commonwealth Edison Company personnel
identified and logged several discrepancies found with an outage
on the 3A Reactor Feed Pump (RFP).
After the outage tags had
been placed and maintenance began, it was found that the suction
valve was not fully shut although tagged as shut, the discharge
valve was open with the breaker racked out and identified as sh~t,
and no tag was available on the discharge valve control switch
in the control room.
The licensee found that the maintenance
supervisor had not conducted a verification walk down of the
outage prior to commencing work on the affected components.
The Senior Resident Inspector expressed concern regarding this
situation as it has recently resulted in other citations for
similar problems with outage tag-outs, (see items 50-237/81-13-01;
50-249/81-02-01).
If it were a safety-related outage it is
recognized that the unit shift foreman would have conducted a
walkdown verification of the outage prior to the start of work.
In this occurrence, a minimum of three individuals including
one from management, apparently missed the discrepancies.
It
is recognized that this is a nonsafety related system, and
therefore noncitable, however, it is further evidence of a
breakd0wn in managerial control of the outage (tag-out) system.
The licensee has subsequently conducted two meetings regarding
this matter.
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In exit interviews, the licensee was requested to make a state-
ment regarding actions* taken or planned to reinforce the apparent
breakdown in management control of the outages.
This is an open
inspection item, (50-237/81-28-03, 50-249/81-21-03).
e;
While reviewing changes to plant procedures, the resident inspector
noted that the procedure for adjusting the APRM gains had been
changed due to a modification of the Technical Specification (T.S.).
This change was to increase the APRM gains by the ratio MFLPD/FRP
in lieu of adjusting the APRM flux scram trip setting by the ratio
of FRP/MFLPD, which accomplished the same degree of protection.
However, a review of the T.S. change indicated that the change had
been authorized for Unit 2 and had not been authorized for Unit 3.
The procedure was issued applicable to both Units 2 and 3.
This
was brought to the attention of the Nuclear Engineer staff who
issued a temporary procedure change restricting the new change for
APRM gains adjusted to Unit 2 only.
Discussions with Commonwealth
Edison Company management indicated that they could not explain
why the change was issued for both plants when only Unit 2 T.S. 's
had been authorized to change.
The licensee thought that both
T.S.'s had been authorized the change.
There appears to be a
breakdown in the review committee's program, a noncompliance
was not warranted as this appears to be an isolated occurrence.
The Resident Inspector also noted that when a temporary procedure
change is issued, the parent procedure is not *annotated as to
the existance of a temporary procedure change.
All temporary
procedures for operations are stored in a single notebook on the
Shift Control Room Engineer's (SCRE) desk.
However, when an
operator attempts to use an issued procedure, he may be unaware
of an existing temporary procedure, unless he goes through the
lists of existing temporary procedures for each procedure he
uses.
During an event, the operator may not have time to
research the existance of a temporary procedure change for each
procedure used.
The licensee was made aware of the inspector's concern ~nd is
in the process of developing and implementing a change whereby
a procedure that is the subject of a temporary change is identi-
fied to the operators by some conspicuous means.
This is an open inspection item, (50-10/81-14-01, 50-237/81-28-04,
50-249/81-21-04).
One item of noncompliance was identified.
3.
Monthly Maintenance Observation
Station maintenance activities of safety related systems and compon-
ents listed below were observed/reviewed to ascertain that they were
conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides,
industry codes or standards, and in conformance with technical speci-
fications.
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The following items were considered during this review:
the limiting
conditions for operation were met while components or systems were
removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the
work; activities were accomplished using approved procedu*res and were
inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were
performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality
control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by quali-
fied personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radio-
logical safety controls were implemented; and, fire pr~vention controls
were implemented.
Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs
and to assure that priority is assigned to safety related equipment
maintenance which may affect system performance.
The following maintenance activities were observed/reviewed:
Unit 2
HPCI Steam Line Repair
2A-CCSW Pump Repair
Unit 3
HPCI Steam Line Repair
Units 2 and 3
Diesel Generator*
Reactor Building Crane Repair
Following completion of maintenance on the Unit 2/3 Diesel Generator
an~ Unit 2 HPCI system, the inspector verified that these systems had
been returned to service properly.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
4.
Monthly Surveillance Observation
The inspector observed technical specifications required surveillance
testing on the Unit 2 HPCI pump operability, and verified that testing
was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that test instru-
mentation was calibrated, that limiting conditions for operation were
met, that removal and restoration of the affected components were
accomplished, that test results conformed with technical specifications
and procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than
the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified
during the testing were properly reviewed and resol~ed by appropriate
management personnel.
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The inspector also witnessed portions bf the following test activities:
Unit 2 HPCI valve operability, Main Steam Radiation Isolation and Scram
Calibration; Unit 3 Low Water Scram and Low Low Water Isolation Surveill-
ance, LPCI valve operability, LPAM Calibration, HPCI valve operability.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
5.
IE Bulletin Followup
For the IE Bulletins listed below the inspector verified that the
written response was within the time period stated in the bulletin,
that the written response included the information required to be
reported, that the written response included adequate corrective
action commitments based on information presentation in the bulle-
tin and the licensee's response, that licensee management forwarded
copies of the written response to the appropriate onsite management
representatives, that information discussed in the licensee's written
response was accurate, and that corrective action taken by the licensee
was as described in the written response.
Masonry Wall Design (Open)
Potential Misapplication of Rosemont,
Inc., Models 1151 and 1152 Pressure
Transmitters with either "A" or "D"
Codes (Closed)
Regarding IE Bulletin 80-11, the Senior Resident Inspector received
a combined Headquarters/Region III request as follows:
a.
Was the study completed to determine the seismic operability of
masonry walls in the plant completed?
b.
If any of the walls did not meet the operability for a seismic
event, was a 10 CFR 50.59 review conducted to determine if those
walls that would affect safety related equipment?
c.
If safety related equipment would be affected, was a Technical
Specification Licensee Event Report (LER) submitted?
By letter dated November 6, 1980, the licensee committed to have a
restart analysis complete by July 1981, and a complete analysis and
report by November, 1981.
Through interviews with licensee personnel, the inspector found that
the analysis and review are in progress.
The inspector informed the
licensee of the questions of the IE-HQ/RIII request.
This bulletin
remains open.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
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6.
Immediate Action Letter (IAL)
The licensee received an IAL dated September 4, 1981, discussed in
the previous inspection (50-237/81-24; 50-249/81-18).
The IAL
set forth items whereby the Unit 2 HPCI steamline would be analyzed
for damage, examined by nondestructive testing, repairs made to
damaged items (pipe hangers and whip restraints) and a long-term
study performed to determine the cause.
During the tests for damage
to the HPCI steamline, several inches of water were detected at a
horizontal portion that passes over the T~rus. This was corrected
by installation of a drain line that diverts the con'densate from
t.he low point of accumulation to a point down stream in the steam-
line for final drainage via the designed drain system.
Initial
studies by a licensee engineering contractor (E.D.S., Inc) and
by Commonwealth Edison Company, found no damage to the steamline.
After pipe hanger and whip restraint repair, and with the concurr-
ance of Region III, the HPCI steamline was unisolated, heated up
and tested by ultrasonic (UT) Technique for water accumulation with
negative results.
The HPCI was declared operable following a sat-
isfactory surveillance test.*
A similar condition was found on the Unit 3 HPCI steamline via UT
where up to four inches of water were detected and minor or question-
able whip restraint damage was found.
The HPCI was declared inoper-
able, a steam line drain similar to Unit 2 installed, and the HPCI
was tested and returned to service in about 5 days .
. Presently, the licensee is visually examining the HPCI steam lines on
both units for abnormal indications anytime the HPCI is operated and
whenever the HPCI steam line containment isolation valves are operated.
This will remain in effect until Commonwealth Edison Company provides
the detailed study of the cause and effects of this event, which is
being conducted by E.D.S., Inc.
The study results and followup action
with Region III concurrence are open inspection items (50-237/81-28-05,
50-249/81-21-05).
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7.
Plant Trips
Following the plant trips on Unit 2 on September 21 and September 23,
1981, and Unit 3 on September 26, 1981, the inspector ascertained the
status of the react6r and safety systems by observation of control room
indicators and discussions with licensee personnel concerning plant
parameters, emergency system status and reactor coolant chemistry.
The
inspector verified the establishment of proper communications and re-
viewed the corrective actions taken by the licensee.
All systems responded as expected, and the plants were returned to
operation as follows:
Unit 2 on September 23, 1981, and Unit 3 on
September 26, 1981.
- No items of noncompliance were identified.*
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8.
Inspection During Long Term Shutdown
The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable
logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during
the period of September 5 through October 2, 1981.
The inspector
verified that the surveillance tests required during the shutdown
were accomplished, reviewed tagout records, and verified applicabil-
ity of containment integrety.
Tours of Unit 1 accessible areas,
including exterior areas were made to make independent assessments
of equipment conditions, plant conditions, radiological controls,
safety, and adherence to regulatory requirements and to verify that
maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of
maintenance.
The inspector observed plant housekeeping/cleanliness
conditions, including potential fire hazards, and verified implementa-
tion of radiation protection controls.
The inspector by observation
and direct interview verified that the physical security plan was
being implemented in accordance with the station security plan.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
9. *
GSEP Drill
On September 23, 1981, the licensee conducted an assembly drill that
was observed by several Region III inspectors.
On September 30, 1981,
the licensee conducted its full scale annual GSEP drill in conjunction
with their Chicago Response Center, State of Illinois, and Grundy
County.
During the drill on September 30, 1981, the Resident Inspectors
observed activities in the Control Room and T.S.C. The response of
licensee personnel in the Control Room was excellent.
The SCRE/STA,
Operating Engineer, Shift Engineer, and Shift Foreman, and other
personnel demonstrated good team work in problem solving, respons-
iveness, etc., and recommending corrective actions in anticipation
of subsequent drill events.
If the situation had been an actual
event, they would have taken preventative steps prior to further
degradation of the original event.
The details of the NRC Region III observations will be documented
in IE Inspection Report 50-10/81-13, 50-237/81-26 and 50-249/81-19.
10.
Concerns of Ex-security Guards
On several occasions during the inspection period, the SRI spent
considerable time in telephone discussions with one of several guards
who's employment had been terminated in April, 1981, for failure to
meet firearms qualifications.
Additionally, the SRI received copies
of correspondence that had been sent from another ex-security guard
to several members of the U.S. Congress and copies of the congressmen
responses.
In each case, the ex-guards correspondence expressed
concerns that were found to be inaccurate or dissenting.
These were
or had been reviewed with licensee and NRC information and found that
the licensee and/or the NRC had previously taken appropriate action.
This information was forwarded to Region III Security Inspection Group
for future reference if necessary.
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11.
Meetings, Training and Offsite Activities
The Resident Inspectors attended a Region III "Resident Inspectors
Seminar on September 17 and 18, 1981, in Mishicot, Wisconsin.
12.
Exit Interview
The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph
1) throughout the month and at the conclusion of the inspection on
October 2, 1981, and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection
activities.
The licensee acknowledged the findings of the inspection.
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Commonwealth Edison Company
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November 24, 1981
in the NRC's Public Document Room.
If the letter or enclosures contain any
information that you or your contractors believe to be exempt from disclosure
und~r 10 CFR 9.5(a)(4), it is necessary that you (a) notify this office by
telephone within seven (7) days from the date of this letter of your intention
to file a request for withholding; and (b) submit within twenty-five (25)
days from the date of this letter a written application t6 this office to
withhold such information.
Section 2.790(b)(l) requires that any such appli-
cation must be accompanied by an affidavit executed by the owner of the
information which identifies the document or part sought to be withheld, and
which contains a full statement of the reasons which are the bases for the
claim that the information should be withheld from public disclosure.
This
section further requires the statement to address with specificity the con-
siderations listed in 10 CFR 2.790(b)(4).
The information sought to be
withheld shall be incorporated as far as possible into a separate part of
the affidavit.
If we do not-hear from you in this regard within the speci-
fied periods noted above, a copy of this letter, the enclosures, and your
response to this letter will be placed in the Public Document Room.
-t'!WC.J.
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We will gladly discuss any questions you have co~f~'.~;/m.ng this inspection.
Enclosures:
1.
Appendix A, Notice
of Violation
2.
Inspection Reports
No. 50-010/81-14, No.*
50-237/81-28 and No.
50-249/81-21
cc w/encls:
Louis 0. DelGeorge
Director of Nuclear
Licensing
D. J. Scott,
Station Superintendent
DMB/Document Control Desk (RIDS)
Resident Inspector, RIII
Mary Jo Murray, Office of
Assistant Attorney General
Sincerely,
<J? .:!. _,(/J"'>-e,-y).-;r_,.,,l-,
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R. L. Spessard, Director
Division of Resident and
Project Inspection
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