ML17179A509
| ML17179A509 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Dresden  |
| Issue date: | 10/08/1992 |
| From: | Darrin Butler, Gardner R, Winter R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17179A505 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-237-92-21, 50-249-92-21, NUDOCS 9210190084 | |
| Download: ML17179A509 (14) | |
See also: IR 05000237/1992021
Text
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
R~ports Nb. 50-237/92021(DRS); No. 50-249/92021(DRS)
Docket Nos. 50-237; 50-249
Licenses No. DPR-19; No .. DPR-25
Li.censee:
Commonwea 1th Edison Company*
Opus West III
- 1400 Opus Place
Downers Grove, IL
60515
Facility Name:
Dresden Nuclear Power Station - Units 2 and 3
insp~ction At:
Dresden Site, Morri~, IL
60450
Inspection Conducted: July 20 thro~gh October 2, 1992
Inspectors: f);Jd~ /( u~
R. Wint.fr
it!' /g &~
Date.
0 tJU16
/tJ/8 hz.
D. * Butler
Date
Approved By: ~w~~
R:N:Gardner;chie
~o I 8 ( q l.
Date
Plant Systems Section
Inspection summary
Inspection on July 20 through October 2, 1992 (Reports No.
50-237/92021CDRS) ~No. 50-249/92021(DRS))
Areas Inspected: .* Announced fo+lowup inspection .of previously
identified EDSFI items (Temporary InstruGtion 25111);
safety
r.elated contac;:t review program, calibration/setpoint program and
design changes to eliminate noise on the neutron monitoring
system (92701); post modification testing (37828); and design
~hanges and modifications (37700).
Results: One apparent violation was identified. -
a failrire to
promptly ~f fect corre6tiv~ actions regarding the identification
bf potential low voltage conditions that could have affected the
operability of safety related equipment*{Section 2.B).
One
violation was identified -
a failure to include saf~ty related
current sensing relays in the calibration program (Section 4).
One open item was identified {Section 3.2).
9210190084 921009
ADOCK 05000237
Q .
Inspection Summary
2
- buring the course of th~ inspection, .the following were noted:
o
Li_censee. progress to closeout remaining EDSFI i terns was
satisfactory ..
o
Post modification testing improved.
o .
Safety related contact review program and
calibration/setpointreview program were well planned.
o
Proposed design changes to .eliminate noise on the neutron
monitoring system app~a~ed appropriate;
1. 0
DETAILS
Principal Persons Contacted
Commonwealth Edison Company CCECol
- C. Schroeder, Station Manager.
- L. deiner, Technical Superintendent
- E.
Zebus~ Project Ma-nager, Engineering Nuclear
Constructio~
.-
- J. Gates, Assistant Technical Staff Supervisor
- D. Smythei Technical staff
- G. Eckert, Nuclear Engirieering Department (NED)
- B. Viehl, NED Site Supervisor
_#*R.
Radtk~, Supervisor, Regulatory Assurance
- E. 'Carroll, Regulatory Assurance
- *D. Lowenstein, Regulatory Assurance
- B.- Adams, Regulatory Assurance
- M. Reed, Superintendent, E/I&C, NED
- M. Strait, Technical Staff Supervisor
- S. Berg, Assistant Superintendent, Production
- P. Piet, Licensing Administrator_
U. s. Nuclear Regulatory Commission CNRC) -
- A. Hsia, NRR Project Manager
- M. Peck, -Resident Inspector
_#R. Gardner, Chief, Plant Systems Section
'*Denotes those piesent at the interim exit interview on
August 7, 1992.
- #Denotes those present at the exit interview conducted by
telecon on October 2, 1992.
The inspectors aiso contacted and interviewed other licensee
_personnel.
-
2.0
Action on Previously Identified Inspection Findings
A.
(Closed) Unresolved Item 237/91038-02CDRS); 249/91042-
02CDRS):
- Inadequate calculation to determine degr:aded voltage relay-
trip setpoint.
1)
Background
The_ electrical distribution system functional inspection
(EDS~!) team determined that the degraded voltage setpoint
was set too low to adequately protect safety related motors
duiirtg a LOCA concurrent with a degraded Voltage condition
that hoveted above the degraded voltage relay setpoint (3708
to 3784 volt~).
The licensee performed a voltage dro~
calculation for the assumed worst-case 480 volt motor load
(Unit 2, Division 2, diesel generator .cooling water pump
(DGCWP)).
The DGCWP critical starting and running voltage
requirements at the 4160 bus Meie 3960 and 3950 volts,
respectively.
Compensatory measures were initiated whi9h
directed the operators to start a diesel's DGCWP when it's
associated 4160 bus degraded to 4000 volts and to isolate
th~ affected bus from of~-site power if the voltage degraded
to 3850 volts for more than 1 minute. The compensatory
measures remained in affect until new degraded voltage
setpoints were established.
2)
De~raded Voltage Ti~e Line
O
Calculation began in early 19BO's.
o
August 18, 1980, response, CECo to*NRC (Eisenhut),
acknowledged that running voltages under certain *
scenarios could be slightly less than 90% of rated
voltage (NEMA Standard - running motor value) .
CE,Co
informed the NRC that less than 90% running voltage was
adequate~ based on assumed conservatisms in the voltage
drop calculation.
For example, a 3% voltage drop was
assumed for motors fed.from motor control centers
(MCC) .
O
March 1982,* EG&G (contractor reviewer) acc~pted the
.Dresden design and 3708 to 3784 volt setpoint.
o
May 19,
1982~ NRC approved the Dresden design and
setpo~nt. *
O
Degraded voltage system declared operable March 29,
1983, for Unit 2, and February 27, 1984, for Unit 3.
o
November 13, 1990, S&L
(a~chitect engineer) completed
the Dresden *unit 3 ELMS-AC.calculation, "Balance of
Plant AC Electrical Load Monitoring System."
(~1500
page document)
o
. November 19, 1990, S&L transmitted the calculation
which identified potential low voltage conditions to
CECo.
o
December 5, 1990,.S&L meeting with CECo Nuclear
Engineering Department, station persohnel, and system
Planning .. * S&L identified the potential for MCC
volta~es to be less than
90% of rated voltage and
identified exce~sive fault currents at the 480 volt
level.
CECo indicated_that excessive fault currents
were not a problem in past cal~ulations and believed
2
0
0
0
0
the ELMS calculation contained many errors.
Degraded
voltage was not considered an issue due to the
perception that the original degraded voltage
calculation was conservative.
February 6, 1991, verification of the ELMS calculation
.
design 'inputs was assig.ned* to various -CECo departments;*
however, the verification was given a low priority.
_July 1991, NRC EDSFI team identified the degraded
voltage issue.
July 31, 1991, CECo performed a preliminary voltage
drop calculation and concluded certain equipment.may
not operate at a degraded voltage that hovered above
th~ existing degraded voltc:tge setpo.j.nt.
Following an
operability determination, a 10CFR50.72 (4 hour)
notification was made and co~pensatory measures were
put in.place.
Decembei 31,
19~1, final calculations were completed
and new degraded voltage setpoints were established.
o
New setpoints installed:
Critical Voltage
Relay settings
2
3784
3820+/-7
Jan/1992
3
3832'
3870+/-7
Feb/1992
.3)
Equipment Operability -
Old Setpoint
a)
DGCWP
O
Licensee determined (U3 BUS 34-1) the pump would
probably start and would run at the minimum relay
setting.'
6
The starting v~ltage available to the DGCWP was 319.6
volt (69.5% of rated).
O
.Motor testing determined the DGCWP.would start at 70%
- of rated (322 .volts) with a motor starting torque of
36.9%.
o
The recommended minimum pump break away torque was 25%.
o
The licen~ee concluded the motor would start at 69.~%
of rated voltage.
3
l
\\
o
The running voltage was 83% of rated (382.5 volts);
however, the motor would hot be damaged from elevated
temperatures because the current drawn at 382.5 volts
was 121A (<129A name-plate)~
b)
_ Containment_ Cooling S.ervice Water (CCSW), Pump Vault Fans
o
Two pumps per. division (total of- four pumps)_*.-
o
One p~mp per division was located in a vault requiring
fans for cooling.
o
Safety Analysis requires one pump for safe shutdown
from a design basis accident (OBA) .
o
Vault fans will not operate at the degraded voltag~
setpoint. -
o
Assuming a single failure, one pump (non-vaulted) would
be available.
o
Pumps are normally not running and are_ manually started
when required during a OBA.
c)
Motor Starters for Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI)
__ Valves and Recirculation Pump .Discharge Valves.*
o
.Due to low st~rter voltage, the valves wbuld not
operate.*
o
All LPCI pumps would start in response to a LOCA
signal; however, inje6tion would not take ~lace.
4)
Equipment Operability -
New Setpoint
o
ccsw pump fans will still b~ operated below the NEMA
90% running valu~.
The licensee does not plan to test
these-motors; however, they believe the fans will
operate satisfactory.
Safety Analysis required only
one pump .. Procedures were in place that directed the
operators to manually start a non-vaulted CCSW pump ..
o
New motor starters were installed for the LPCI
injection and recirculation pump discharge valves in
both Units.
The new starters pick *up at a lower -
voltage and will op,rate satisfactorily at the new
setpoint. -
4
5)
Analysis of Root Cause
- The root cause may be attributed to the use of .less rigorous
calculation methods (1980 time frame) and the licensee's
fail~re tb identify, during design verification activities,
that the degrad~d voltage setpoint would result, undei
certain conditions, in safety related equipment being
Regarding enf6rcement on this matter, the EDSFI
tea~ ide~tified a significant, apparent corrective ~cticin
viola~lon (discussed in Se~tion 2.B)' ihvolving a failure to
promptly and effectively deal with information presented in
a contractor calculation which pointed to potential degtaded
voltage p*roblems.
The licensee took corrective action promptly after the EDSFI
team questioned the condition and the severity of the
d~graded ~oltage condition.
This indluded the initiation of
-degraded voltage* reviews ~t other CECo stations.
~he ne~
setp6int calctilations were developed usin~ current ~etpoint
methodology techniques.
.This item is consid~red closed.
In addition, this item also closes LER No.91-021,"Improper
Setpoint of Second Level Undervoltage Relays Due to
Management Deficiency."
B.
(Closed}
Unresolved Item 237/9103$-03 (DRS}; 249/91042-03
(DRS}:
Failure to take prompt corrective action.
1)
Background
On Nov~mber 13, 1990, S&L (architect engineer) completed the
Units 2 and 3 ELMS-AC calculation, "Balance of Plant
Electrical Lb~d ~onitoring System*
In a meeting held on
December 5, 1990, S&L identified to CECo.the potential for
MCC voltages to be less than 90% of rated voltage (414
v6lts).
On February 6, 1991, various CECo d~partments were
assigned to validate the ELMS-AC calculation data.
At this
time, CECo engineering did not believe voltages less than
90% 6f rated posed a threat.to safety related equipment~
Engineering believed there were adequate conservatisms in
the voltage drop calculation that would ensure continued
op_eration . of safety related loads.
As a consequence, a low
priority was given to the validation of the ELMS'-AC
- calculation.
However, these initial assessments of th~ low
voltage condition identified by S&L appeared to be
superficial.
They did not appear to address in a spe_cific
way consequences of low voltage conditions; instead, the
assessments appeared to rest solely on th~ general
impressions and recollections of the engineers involved.
In
addition, a deviation report was not issued to address this
issue.
In July 1991, the EDSFI team performed an
approximate dalculation and identified that degraded
5
voltages (368 to 393 volts) could be experienced at the MCC
level.
The team postulated that certain safety related
equipment, such as LPCI injection and recirculation
discharge valve motor starters, would not operate.
This
would_ occur at a 4.16 _kV bus voltage that hovered above the
existing Technical Specification (TS) setpoint (3708 to 3784
. volts)..
The licensee performed a preliminary voltage drop
calc~lation and concluded that certain equipment may not
operate at the existing degraded voltage setpoint.
- compensatory measures* were initiated at Dresden* and new
calculations were begun to determine equipment critical
operating voltages.
The licensee also initiated similar.*
actions at their other stations.-
Final calculations
performed by the licensee confirmed the inoperability of the*
LPCI injection and recirculation discharge.valve motor.
starters at a degraded voltage that.hovered above the'
existing setpoints.
2)
Safety Sign if icanc*e
Between the dates that the degraded voltage system was
declared operable and July 31, 1991, Dresden Units 2 and 3
were *operated in an unanalyzed condition.- Assuming a single
failure. (loss of one core spray (CS)
loop)~ LOCA,
an~ a
- . *
degraded voltage.condition-that hovered.above-the .setpoint,.
the LPCI system would start; however, the LPCI injection
- valves .and recirculation pump discharge valves would not
- automatically reposition in response.to.the LOCA.
The motor*
starters would have. insufficient voltage to operate.
Only
one low pressure ECCS system (the redundant cs loop) would
be available to mitigate the accident.
The.minimum low
pressure systems required in the current licensing basis
were one CS loop and two LPCI pumps plus valve realignment.
3)
statement of Violation
The licensee*failed to promptly effect corrective actions
regarding the -identification of potential low voltage
conditions that could have affected the operability of
safety related equipment.
From December 5, 1990, through
July 31, 1991 (when identified by the NRC), the licens;ee
failed to take adequate corrective actions, such as issuing
a deviation report, to promptly pursue the effects of lower
operating voltages on safety related equipment, and to
recognize the effect of the lower voltages as. they related
to the TS degraded voltage set point.
This i tern is .
. considered an apparent vio.lation (237 /92021-01 (DRS);
...
. 249/92021-0l(DRS)) of 10-CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI,
"Corrective 1\\ction".
6
C.
(Closed) Violation (237/91038-07CDRS): 249/91042-07CD~S)):
The ~DSFI team determined that post modification testing
activities did not always ensure that testing overlapped
into unmodified portions of the electrical,circuit.
In
addition, there were instances where construction testing
did not contain documented evidence that specific circuit
checkout criteria had beeri met.
The inspectors reviewed the construct.ion and post
modification testing performed in six recent modifications.
The testing performed was well docume.nted and completely
tested all portions of the modification.
The inspectors
observed def ini t.e improvement in the testing program,. such
as increased engineering involvement throughout the
modification process, concise* and clear test acceptance
criteria and increased interface betwe~n engineering,
construction and station personnel.
This item is considered
closed.
,
D..
(Closed)
Deviation . ( 237 /91038-01 (DRS)) ; C 249 / 91042-
01 (DRS.)) : . The EDSFI team ha.d determined that the 350 MVA
and 250 MVA circuit breakers, including 250 MVA safety
related.non-diesel breakers on bus Nos. 23, *24, 33, and 34
in the.4kV system could experience fault currents up to 114
percent (overduty) of tpeir, maximum interrupting rating.
The licensee committed to correct the overduty concern for
the non-safety 350 MVA buses and to upgrade the 250 MVA
.
equipment to 350 MVA switchgear.
. The.switchgear upgrade.is capable of interrupting 3 phase
asymmetric fault currents to 80,000A.
The maximum expected
~ault current. is 68,138A.
The ~roposed switchgear
replacements will take place on a bus per refueling outage
schedule starting with D3R13 (September 1993) for bu~ No.
33.
This item is considered closed.
E.
(Closed)
Unresolved Item (237/91038-04CDRS)) t (249/91042-
04CDRS)):
The EDSFI team could not determine if adequate
breaker coordination existed at the 480Vac level. The
- licensee had previously identified this co.ndition and was in
the process of resolving coordination deficiencies.
The
licensee was replacing original equipment (electro-
.
mechanical trip devices) with solid state trip .devices (RMS-
9 replacements).
The licensee prioritized the replacement
in*.the following order:
1)
2)
3)
ESS/safety related motor control center~ (MCCs) with
rionsafety related load~.
ESS/safety related main feeds.
ESS/safety related bus-tie feeds.
7
4)
Remainder of ESS/safety related trip devices.
5)
Non-ESS/safety related MCCs.
6)
Non-ESS/safety related main feeds.~
7)
Non-ESS/safety related bus-tie feeds.
8)
Remairider of non-ESS/safety related trip_ devices.
The inspectors reviewed.the proposed coorctinatidn curves and
c6ncluded adequate 6ooidination ~ould be established.
The *
licensee expects to complete the installation of the RMS-9
trip devices by the end of the Unit 2 Refueling Outage D2R14
(late 19~3) and the Unit i D3R14 (mid 1994).
This item is
considered closed.
F.
(Closed)
Open.Item C237/91031-02CDRP))
Spurious closure
of AC solenoid operated primary containment isolation valves
during fast bus transfers.
The isolatiori valves blose when
power is removed from their solenoids.
During fast bus
transfers (approximately 83.35 msec), the occurrence of
Group II isolation valves spuriously closing was increasing.
- The licensee identified that several 12HMA111B9 relays.were
dropping out during the transfer.
Testing identified the
H~ relay drop out time was approximately 100 msec.
The licensee replaced the Unit 3 HMA relays with a General
Electric 12HGA17S63 relay.
The measured drop out times of
the HGA relays were greater than 300 msec.
The Unit 2
relays will be replaced during the next refueling outage.
The station has not experienced* a fast bus trarisfer since
installing.the HGA relays.
However, there appears to be
adequate margin_in the HGA drop out time to prevent.
reoccurrence of this condition.
This item is considered
closed.
G.
(Open)
Ooen Ite~ (237/91025-0lCDRP)):
The licensee
initiated Safety Related Co_ntact Testing Program (SRCTP) was
reviewed to determine the progress and direction taken by
CECo to identify untested contacts.
Thirteen systems were
include~ in the original program scope.
This has increased
to .a tot~l of 17 systems.
The contacts were categorized' as
Technical Specification (TS), Updated Final Safety Analysis
Report (UFSAR), important to safety_, or non-safety related.
T~st requirements were reviewed agains~ ~pplicable
.surveillance and test procedures.
Multicolored logic
tracings (overlap drawings) were used to identify the
contacts that were tested.
This process identified by
category all untested contacts.
Untested TS related
contacts were immediately tested and no contact failures
8
were identified.
The remaining untested contacts with
.testing recommendations will be given to the procedure
writers and incorporated into appropriate test procedures.
In addition,* a large number. of drawing enhancements were
identified which will be incorporated orito th~ drawings.
The piogram is developing a controlled user friendly data
- base.
Transition of the information to CECols main frame*
computer will occur later this year.
The relay and contact
information is a living design document.
Changes to the
- data base will be controlled by engineering through the
design control process.
In addition, the program has been
funded to verify.any changes to the data base as a result of
the Dresden USFAR rebaseline effort.
The inspectors concluded.that CECo was progressing in the
correct dir~ction to identify untested contact$.
The
program was well managed arid should provide a useful data
base for engineering and station personnel.
This item will
remain open pending NRC review of the procedure and drawing .
~nhancements.
H.
(Coen)
Violation (237/91016-02(DRP)):
The licensee
initiated a Calibration/Setpoint Program to pioperly
classify all instruments and to provide setpoint *
justification. *The program initiated.instrument walkdowns,
created a data base, re*!:rnlved instrument labeling
. discrepancies and obtained ~11 available setpoint
calculations.
Missing setpoint calculations will be
generated first prior to reviewing available calculations.
The instrument review priority will o<:;:cur in the following*
order:
reactoi protection system, engineered safety
features, Emergency Operating Procedures and Regulatory
Guide 1.97 instruments.
Balance of Plant instrumentf? with
safety importance will be reviewed at a later\\ date.
CECo is developing*a setpoint methodology based on
- Instrument Society of America (ISA) standards and General
Electric is researching the original basis for TS numbers
and will determine whether 'the number is a safety limit or
analytical limit.
Calculation preparation, review and
approval will begin later this year.
The instrument nameplate data, safety classification,
calibration constants and setpoint information will be
transferred into a user friendly data base.
The data base
is a living document and will be controlled by engineering
through.the design cont~ol process. *A sepa~ate Instrument
.Mechanic (IM) calibration data. sheet is being developed.
The IMs will. no longer have to transfer calibration
- .information from the previous calibration record.
The
- inspectors concluded that the calibration/setpoint review
9
was an effective program.
The program was well managed and
should provide a useful data base for engineering and
station personnel.
This item will remain open pending NRC *
review of the. completed calculations.
3.0
Special Electrical Reviews
3.1
Design tontrol
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's performance and.*
programs relating to design changes and modifications.
The
inspectors reviewed six modifications.and performed a walk
down.of installed- equipment for three modifications.
Among
.. the areas checked were verification that proper ~eview and
- approval were received, associated te~t procedures and
~merg~ncy operating procedures ~~re change~, training was ..
revised to refiect the design change, that controlled
drawings either were marked up or revised, modifications
received alO CFR 50.59 review, installed hardware for the
modification conformed to the modification drawing, and that
satisfactory ~ost modification testing was-performed. The
followirtg modifications were reviewed:
1)
M12-3-91-024, Load Center 38 and 39 Load Shed Logic
Revision.
.
.
2)
M12-0~92-002, Power Feed Transfer Interlock for Diesei
Generator 2/3 Auxiliaries.
3)*
M12-2/3-87-002AB, Radwaste Turbine Building Floor Drain
sump Pump A Control, Run Times and. Indication.
4)
M12-3-91-042; *LPCI Injection Valve Control Logic for
Torus Cooling System.
5)*
M12-2-92-021, Addition of 4 Cells to Unit 2 250Vdc
Battery.
6)*
M12-3-92-022, Add Interposing.Rela~ to HPCI Valve M03-
2301-10 Clo$e Logic.
- modifications reviewed by walkdown
The inspectors concluded the licensee was adequately*
implementing the design control process.
3.2
Design Changes - Neutron Monitoring Syst~m
The insp~ctors reviewed past and proposed design changes to
eliminate noise on the neutron monitoring system~
One past
Unit 2 ~edification installed hew stainless steel jacketed
Whittaker signal cables.
This cable was installed outside
10
the existing rigid conduit .. However, the s~sceptibility to
noise appeared* to increase.
Since t~is modification,
Dresden has documented four Licensee Event Reports (LER) on
source range monitor/intermediate range monitor spiking.
Operational testing identified several motor operated valves
(MOVs) as the major contributors to electro~magnetic
interference (EMI) and.varistors were installed across the
motor shunt field of five MOVs to reduce interference.
In
addition, EMI comparisons were made_ between cab~es run
6utside of conduit, cables run in flexible conduit, and .
cables run in rigid conduit.
Rigid conduit provided the
best EM! isolation.
Evaluations were also made between the
presently *installed stainless steel jacketed Whittaker cable
and triple shielded coaxial cable.
The triple shielded
coaxial was determined to be less susceptible to noise.
The licensee plans to replace the Whittaker cable with
triple ~hielded cable routed in rigid.conduit on Unit 2
during refueling outage D2Rl3 (Januaryi 1993).
No actions
are.planned for Unit 3 since EMI noise has been acceptably
low with the present cable. configuration~
An additional
improvement will be to u~e quick disconnect, watertight Lerno
connectors which will be easier to install and maintain than
the previous*HN type connectors.
S~veral engineering issues
al!?O have to be resolved including pull.tension, the exact
grounding point and.method of grounding triple axial signal*
cable.
This item is considered open (237/92021-02(DRS); 249/92021-
02(DRS)) pending NRC review of the final modification
package and actual cable in~tallation.
4.0
SBGT System Review
The Dresden Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) starting logic was
reviewed to determine if a loss of power to the B tr~in
(when in standby), with A train in primary, could cause the
loss of both SBGT trains durin~ an Engineered Safety Feature
(ESF) actuation (Quad Cities LER 92-013).
The inspectors
- concluded that Dresden's SBGT logic was not susceptible to
the.Quad Cities design deficiency and would operate as
designed.
However, the inspectors identified that four SBGT
heater current sensing relays (two pe+ train) were not .
included in a calibration program.
Successful testing of
the SBGT system has demonstrated functional operability of
these relays.
The following relay failure modes could
occur:
o
Relay setpoint drift high could prevent the primary
train from starting; however, the standby train should
start.
11
l .
. .,
0
Relay setpoint contact fails to close; however, the
standby train should start.
O
Relay setpoint drift low could permit operation of the
primary train with impaired heat.er operation.
o
Relay.setpoint contact failed closed would permit
operation of the primary train with impaired heate~
operation.
The licensee determined the relays were in calibration and
verified proper contact operation on August 7, 1992.
Failure to include ~afety related cuirent sensing relays in*
a calibration program is a violation (237/92021-03(DRS);
249/920~1-03(DRS)) of 10 .CFR 50, Appendix B, Criteria XI,
"Test Control".
- 5.0 *open Items
.Open items are matters which have been discussed with the
lic~nsee~ which will be reviewed further by th~ inspector, *
- and which involve some action on .the part of the NRC or
licensee or both.
One open item was disclosed during ~he
inspection in Section 3.2.
6.Q Exit Interview
~he irispectors conducted an interim exit interview on
August 7, 1992, at the Dresden site ahd by telecon on
October 2, 1992, to discuss the areas reviewed during the
inspection and the inspection findings.
NRC personnel and
lic~nsee representatives who attended this meeting are
doc~mented in Section 1.0 of thi~ report.
The licensee did
no~ ~dentify any docu~ents or processes as propri~tary.
12