ML17158A499
| ML17158A499 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Susquehanna  |
| Issue date: | 09/27/1994 |
| From: | Jason White NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17158A497 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-387-94-16, 50-388-94-17, NUDOCS 9410050062 | |
| Download: ML17158A499 (14) | |
See also: IR 05000387/1994016
Text
Inspection
Report Nos.
License
Nos.
Licensee:
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
50-387/94-16;
50-388/94-17
Power
and Light Company
2 North Ninth Street
Allentown, Pennsylvania
18101
Facility Name:
Susquehanna
Steam Electric Station
Inspection At:
Inspection
Conducted:
Salem Township,
July 19,
1994
September
5,
1994
Inspectors:
Approved By:
D. J. Mannai,
cting Seni
esident
Inspector,
t/zv/>>
e,
C
>e
Reactor Projects
Section
No. 2A,
ate
Scope:
Resident
Inspector safety inspections
were performed in the areas of
plant operations;
maintenance
and surveillance;
engineering;
and plant
support.
Initiatives selected for inspection
were fire protection,
Nuclear
System Engineering
System
Review meeting,
and
Emergency Diesel
Generator
maintenance.
Findings:
Performance
during this inspection period is summarized
in the
Executive
Summary.
Details are provided in the full inspection report.
Violations:
Fire doors were blocked
open without the required administrative
approval.
The failure to establish
continuous fire watches for degraded fire
protection
systems
were identified as apparent violations.
One non-cited
violation was identified during Licensee
Event Report
(LER) review.
It
concerned
the inadequate
establishment
of alternate
sample for an inoperable
turbine building sampler
(LER 94-005-00).
Unresolved
Items:
One unresolved
item regarding the inadvertent
High Pressure
Coolant Injection (HPCI) system
steam supply isolation was identified.
9410050062
940927
ADOCK 05000387
8
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Operations
Susquehanna
Inspection
Reports
50-387/94-16;
50-388/94-17
July 19,
1994
September
5,
1994
During the period,
a lightning strike rendered
the Simplex fire protection
system inoperable
on two occasions.
Consequently, fire detection
and
suppression
capabilities
were impacted in safety-related
areas of the reactor
building, control structure
and
common plant areas of both units.
Following
the first event,
Technical Specification requirements
were not met when
continuous fire watches
were not implemented within one hour.
Although
several
actions
were taken in response
to the event,
actions to establish
continuous fire watches
was not implemented for several
hours.
Inadequate
communications
were
a significant contributor.
Following the second
event,
the plant staff rigorously pursued
compliance with Technical Specifications.
A Notice of Violation is being issued
as
a result of the occurrence
and the
performance
weaknesses it represents.
Section 2.2 pertains.
Maintenance/Surveillance
During restoration
from the five year overhaul of the 'B'mergency Diesel
Generator,
the water was discovered
Maintenance
personnel
determined
the source of water was
a leak internal to
the turbocharger.
The refurbished turbocharger
was installed
as part of the
five year overhaul.
The licensee
is working with the vendor to determine the
root cause.
The licensee
is rigorously pursuing root cause.
The inspector
will evaluate licensee resolution of the turbocharger
leak during ongoing
inspection activities.
Section 3. 1.1 pertains.
During the inspection period, the high pressure
coolant injection (HPCI)
system
became
when the
HPCI system outboard
steam supply isolation
valve unexpectedly
stroked closed
when Instrumentation
and Control
(IEC)
technicians
performed
a residual
heat
removal
(RHR) equipment
area
differential temperature
high channel calibration
and connected
a multimeter
to the wrong terminals.
This human error caused
the valve closure.
This item
will remain unresolved
pending
NRC review of PP&L's completed investigation,
including root cause of the event
and corrective actions.
Section 3.2.1
pertains.
Engineering/Technical
Support
The inspector
attended
the Nuclear System Engineering
(NSE) weekly system
review meeting for the Standby
Gas Treatment
System
(SGTS).
The system
engineer
presented
the system review information in a clear
and effective
manner.
Nuclear Engineering
management
was actively involved.
The inspector
considered
the system review meeting
a strength of the engineering
organization.
Plant Support
During the period, the inspector identified,
on two separate
occasions,
that
a
fire door was blocked
open without the required administrative
approvals.
The
inspector also noted that there were several
licensee identified and
documented
examples of blocked
open fire doors without required administrative
approvals
since January
1994.
The instances
indicate weaknesses
in the
implementation of the fire protection
program
and corrective action process.
The recurring nature of this problem appears
to indicate
a lack of sensitivity
to the safety function of fire doors.
A Notice of Violation was issued
as
a
result of these repetitive occurrences
'and the associated
programmatic
weaknesses
they represent relative to plant safety.
Section 5.3 pertains.
Safety Assessment/Assurance
of guality
The inspector reviewed two Licensee
Event Reports
(LERs) during the period.
One non-cited violation was identified regarding
a condition prohibited by
Technical Specifications
involving inoperable turbine building sampling
system.
Section
6. 1 pertains.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY............................
ii
1.
SUMMARY OF FACILITY ACTIVITIES ..................
1
2.
PLANT OPERATIONS (71707,
92901,
93702,
40500)
2.1
Plant Operations
Review
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
2.2
Simplex Fire Protection
System Failures
.
1
1
~
~
2
3.
MAINTENANCE AND SURVEILLANCE (62703,
61726,
92902,
40500)
3. 1
Maintenance
Observations
3. 1. 1 'B'mergency
Diesel
Generator
Problem
3.2
Surveillance Observations
.
.
.
.
.
3.2.1
HPCI Isolation Caused
by Human Error
3
3
4
5
5
4.
ENGINEERING (71707,
37551,
92903,
40500) .............
5
4.1
Nuclear System Engineering
System
Review Meeting
.
.
.
.
.
.
5
5.
PLANT SUPPORT
.
5. 1
Radiological
and Chemistry Controls
502
Secur ity
0
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
5.3
Fire Door Blocked Open
~
~
~
6
~
~
~
6
~
~
6
~
~
~
6
6.
SAFETY ASSESSMENT/OUALITY VERIFICATION (40500,
90700,
90712,
92700)
7
6.1
Licensee
Event Reports
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
7
7.
MANAGEMENT AND EXIT MEETINGS
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
8
7.1
Resident Exit and Periodic Meetings
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
8
7.2
Other
NRC Activities
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
8
Detail s
l.
SUNSLRY OF FACILITY ACTIVITIES
Susquehanna
Unit
1 Summary
Throughout the inspection period Unit
1 operated
at essentially
100X of rated
thermal
power with the exception of minor power reductions for surveillance
testing
and reduced electrical
demand
due to cool weathe'r.
On August 2,
a
lightning strike caused
a failure of the Simplex Fire Protection
system.
Section 2.2 pertains.
On August 9,
a one hour emergency notification was
made
to the
NRC when all offsite emergency notification sirens
were inoperable
due
to telephone line problems.
The sirens
were inoperable
from 2:05 p.m. until
6:16 p.m.
Manual actuation of the sirens
was possible
by 2:35 p.m.
The
system
was restored
and successfully tested
by 6:16 p.m.
The
NRC will
evaluate
the licensee's
corrective actions
as part of a future inspection.
On August 18, another lightning strike rendered
the Simplex Fire Protection
system inoperable.
Section 2.2 pertains.
On August 26, while pe}forming
residual
heat
removal
(RHR) equipment
area high differential temperature
channel calibrations,
technicians
connected
a multimeter across
incorrect
terminals causing the high pressure
coolant injection (HPCI) system
steam
supply outboard isolation valve to close.
The licensee
made the required four
hour
NRC notification per
Section 3.2.1 pertains.
On September
1 and again
on September
2, reactor
power was reduced to 80X to investigate
and repair
a suspect vibration probe
on the 'A'eactor feed
pump turbine
(RFPT).
Susquehanna
Unit 2 Summary
Unit 2 operated
at full power throughout the inspection period with the
exception of one planned
and minor power reductions for surveillance
testing
and reduced electrical
demand
caused
by cool weather.
The planned
downpower to 40X was for condenser
maintenance,
reactor recirculation motor
generator
set '2B'aintenance,
single loop testing
and
a control rod sequence
exchange.
2.
PLANT OPERATIONS (71707,
92901,
93702,
40500)
2.1
Plant Operations
Review
The inspectors
observed
the conduct of plant operations
and independently
verified that the licensee
operated
the plant safely
and according to station
procedures
and regulatory requirements.
The inspectors
conducted regular
tours of the following plant areas:
~
Control
Room
~
Control Structure
~
~
Unit
1 and
2 Reactor
Buildings
~
~
Unit
1 and
2 Turbine Buildings
~
Engineered
Safeguards
Bays
Protected
Area Perimeter
Security Facilities
Pump House
Control
room indications
and instrumentation
were independently
observed
by
NRC inspectors
to verify plant conditions were in compliance with station
operating procedures
and Technical Specifications.
Alarms received in the
control
room were reviewed
and discussed
with operators;
and operators
were
found cognizant of control board
and plant conditions.
Control
room and shift
manning were in accordance
with Technical Specification requirements.
During plant tours,
logs
and records
were reviewed to ensure
compliance with
station procedures,
to determine if entries
were correctly made,
and to verify
correct communication of equipment status.
These records
included various
operating logs, turnover sheets,
blocking permits,
and bypass logs.
The
inspector observed plant housekeeping
controls including control
and storage
of flammable material
and other potential safety hazards.
Inspections
were performed
on backshifts during July 19,
22, 26, 27,
1994
and
August 5,
18,
20 and 22,
1994.
Deep backshift inspections
were conducted
on
July 20-21,
1994 (10:00 p.m. - I:00 a.m.),
August 27 (ll:45 a.m. - 7:45 p.m.),
and August 28 (10:15 a.m. - 4:15 p.m.)
2.2
Simplex Fire Protection
System Failures
On August
2 at 9:31 p.m.,
a lightning strike rendered
the Simplex fire
protection
system inoperable.
As a result, fire suppression
and detection
capabilities
were impacted in safety-related
areas of both units
and
common
areas.
The licensee
entered
Technical Specification
(TS) Limiting Condition
for Operation
(LCO) Action Statements
for TS 3.3.7.9, 3.7.6.2,
and 3.7.7.
Significant Operating Occurrence
Report
(SOOR)94-545 documented
the event.
Subsequent
to declaring the Simplex fire protection
system inoperable,
the
licensee
began to implement compensatory
measures
per TS requirements,
which'equired
the establishment
of continuous fire watches within one hour.
The
site fire protection
system engineer
and
I8C technicians
were called in to
support problem resolution.
Shift supervision notified operations
and station
management
that continuous fire watches
could not be established
in the one
hour required
by Technical Specifications.
Roving fire watches
were
implemented while the list of affected fire zones requiring continuous fire
watches
was being prepared
in parallel with troubleshooting to restore
the
Simplex panel to an operable status.
At shift turnover time the next day,
approximately
10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> after the simplex fire panel
was declared
the inspector discovered that the continuous fire watches
required
by TS were
not established.
Contrary to management
expectations,
operations failed to
vigorously implement the required continuous fire watches.
The inspector
expressed
concern to the licensee that actions to establish
continuous fire
watches
had ceased.
Following management
involvement, the shift began
rigorously establishing
the required continuous fire watches to comply with
Technical Specifications.
At 11:00 a.m.
on August 3, the licensee
began to
post the continuous fire watches.
Subsequently,
the simplex system
was
restored at ll:45 a.m.
The licensee initiated a comprehensive
review of the event.
Four previous
Simplex system failures were identified since
1988.
After these resulted in
failure to comply with Technical Specification requirements.
Two were due to
lightning strikes.
The last reportable
event
was
on August 13,
1993 when the
-Simplex panel
was lost due to a lightning strike.
Prior to permanent corrective a'ctions
being impl'emented for the August 2,
1994
event,
another lightning strike rendered
the system inoperable
on August 18,
1994 at 7:00 a.m.
The plant staff aggressively
pursued
implementation of
compensatory
measures.
A draft response
procedure
being developed following
the August 2,
1994 event
improved implementation of compensatory
measures.
On August 29, the licensee
established
a formal Event Review Team
(ERT) to
broadly review the Simplex failure events
and to determine
comprehensive
corrective actions to prevent recurrence.
The Event Review Team investigation
was not fully completed at the end of the report period.
The team did,
however, determine initial root causes.
They were:
1) inadequate
corrective
actions
and actions to prevent recurrence for previous events,
2) inadequate
communications
between shift supervision
and plant management,
and 3)
miscommunications
between shift supervision
and the site fire protection
engineer.
The inspector determined that actions to comply with Technical Specifications
were not rigorously pursued to completion
by the operating shift.
When plant
management
became fully aware that the required continuous fire watches
were
not yet established,
plant staff was directed to aggressively
pursue
resolution of the issue.
The inspector
noted that the licensee's
response
procedures
for loss of the Simplex system were not detailed
enough to
implement numerous
continuous fire watches in a timely manner,
given the
magnitude of the simplex fire protection system failure.
This was contrary to
licensee
management
expectations for the corrective actions associated
with
the August
1993 event.
Notwithstanding response
procedure
inadequacies,
the
failure of the operating shift to establish
any continuous fire watches
was
a
significant weakness.
Actual safety significance of the events
was low since
roving fire watches
were established,
and, if needed,
suppression
systems
affected
by this event could be manually initiated.
The formation of an
ERT
and their initial conclusions
were considered
a strength.
Although system modifications were implemented to harden the system in 1990,
lightning strikes continue to affect system operability.
The inspector
was
concerned,
given the failure history, that compensatory
measures
were not
effectively proceduralized
to allow a timely determination of affected fire
zones
and, thus, timely implementation of fire watches.
The ineffective
communications that occurred during the operating shift's response
to the
event
was also
a contributor.
The plant staff's failure to implement
continuous fire watches
required
by TS is an apparent violation
(VIO 50-387/94-16-01
Common).
3.
MAINTENANCE AND SURVEILLANCE (62703,
61726,
92902,
40500)
3. 1
Naintenance
Observations
The inspector
observed
and/or reviewed selected
maintenance activities to
determine that the work was conducted
in accordance
with approved procedures,
regulatory guides,
Technical Specifications,
and industry codes or standards.
The following items were considered,
as applicable,
during this review:
Limiting Conditions for Operation were met while components
or systems
were
unremoved
from service;
required administrative approvals
were obtained prior to
initiating the work; activities were accomplished
using approved
procedures
and quality control hold points were established
where required; functional
testing
was performed prior to declaring the involved component(s)
activities were accomplished
by qualified personnel;
radiological controls
were implemented; fire protection controls were implemented;
and the equipment
was verified to be properly returned to service.
Maintenance
observations
and/or reviews included:
WA 43131,
Support
CRD Pump '2A'epair,
dated July 20,
1994.
WA 43030,
Fuel Line Component
Replacement
on the 'B'mergency
Diesel
Generator,
dated July 26.
WA 43356,
Remove
Resin
Heel
From 'C'ondensate
Deminer alizer, dated
August 17.
WA 44057,
Remove/Reinstall
on the 'B'mergency
Diesel
Generator,
dated August 26.
3.1. 1 'B'mergency Diesel Generator
Problem
On August 24, during restoration
from a five year overhaul,
water was
discovered
in the 'B'mergency
Diesel
Generator
performing
a jacket water flush.
The licensee
determined
the source of water
was
a leak internal to the turbocharger.
The turbocharger,
which was
refurbished
by the vendor,
was installed
as part of the five year overhaul of
the engine.
The 'B'DG had not yet been run with the refurbished
SOOR 94-477 documented
the event.
Maintenance
personnel
removed the water from the lube oil system.
The
refurbished turbocharger
has
been
removed
and returned to the vendor for a
failure analysis.
The old turbocharger
has
been reinstalled.
The licensee,
in concert with the vendor, is performing
a root cause investigation of the
failure.
The inspector expressed
concern to licensee
management
regarding the potential
for common
mode failure of the
EDGs pending the final bounding determination
of root cause.
The licensee,
based
on successful
surveillance tests,
system
logs, lube oil analysis
and operator rounds,
concluded
the other
EDGs do not
presently
have water contamination of the lube oil system.
The licensee
is
rigorously pursuing root cause.
The inspector will continue to evaluate
licensee resolution of the turbocharger malfunction as part of the
SOOR
resolution process.
3.2
Surveillance Observations
The inspector
observed
and/or reviewed the following surveillance tests to
determine that the following criteria, if applicable to the specific test,
were met:
the test
conformed to Technical Specification requirements;
administrative
approvals
and tagouts
were obtained before initiating the
surveillance;
testing
was accomplished
by qualified personnel
in accordance
with an approved
procedure;
test instrumentation
was calibrated; 'Limiting
Conditions for Operations
were met; test data
was accurate
and complete;
removal
and restoration of the affected
components
was properly accomplished;
test results
met Technical Specification
and procedural
requirements;
deficiencies
noted were reviewed
and appropriately resolved;
and the
surveillance
was completed at the required frequency.
Surveillance observations
and/or reviews included:
S0-249-002,
quarterly
RHR System
Flow Verification, dated August 18,
1994.
S0-256-001,
Meekly Control
Rod Exercising,
dated August 19.
SI-013-248,
Semi-Annual
Functional Test of Fire Protection Ionization
Detectors
in Fire Zone 026-H Control
Room, dated August 27.
3.2.1
HPCI Isolation Caused
by Human Error
On August 25,
1994, while 15C Technicians
were performing residual
heat
removal
(RHR) system
equipment
area differential temperature
high channel
calibrations,
a multimeter was connected
to the wrong terminals.
This
resulted in the
HPCI system
steam supply outboard isolation valve stroking
closed.
Operators
verified no valid leak or high temperature
condition
existed
and reopened
the valve to restore
the system to an operable status
in
accordance
with the system operating
procedure.
At the conclusion of the inspection period, station personnel
had not
completed their investigation of this event.
This item will remain unresolved
pending
NRC review of PP8L's corrective actions
(URI 50-387/94-16-02).
4.
ENGINEERING (71707,
37551,
92903,
40500)
4. 1
Nuclear System Engineering
System
Review Meeting
The inspector attended
the Nuclear System Engineering
(NSE) System
Review
meeting for the standby
gas treatment
system
(SGTS).
The system engineer
discussed
system, availability, performance,
areas of concern,
material
condition, deficiencies,
modifications
and enhancements.
The system engineer
appeared
very knowledgeable of system performance
and design.
The
presentation
was clear,
concise
and comprehensive.
Engineering
and operations
management
attended
the meeting.
Although usually present,
Maintenance
was
not represented
at this meeting.
The Vice-President - Nuclear Engineering
maintained
a healthy questioning attitude throughout the meeting.
Several
followup actions
were required
as
a result of these questions.
The inspector
concluded that the weekly System
Review meeting concept
was
an
engineering
strength.
System performance is reviewed with management
and long
term corrective actions
and performance
improvements
are planned for
implementation.
The meeting facilitates direct management
involvement with
system performance
issues.
However, the inspector
observed
action items are
not formally documented.
The licensee is considering the need to document
follow up actions.
The inspector
had
no further questions.
5.
PLANT SUPPORT
(71750,
71707,
92904,
40500)
5.1
Radiological
and Chemistry Controls
During routine tours of both units, the inspectors
observed
the implementation
of selected
portions of PP&L's radiological controls program to ensure:
the
utilization and compliance with radiological work permits
(RWPs); detailed
descriptions of radiological conditions;
and personnel
adherence
to
requirements.
The inspectors
observed
adequate
access
controls to various
radiologically controlled areas
and
use of personnel
contamination monitors
and frisking methods
upon exit from these
areas.
Posting
and control of
radiation
and high radiation areas,
contaminated
areas
and hot spots,
and
labelling and control of containers
holding radioactive materials
were
verified to be in accordance
with PP&L procedures.
Workers complied with
radiation work permits
and appropriately
used required personnel
monitoring
devices.
Health Physics technician control
and monitoring of these activities
was satisfactory.
Overall, the inspector
observed
an acceptable
level of
performance
and implementation of the radiological controls program.
5.2
Security
Implementation of the physical security plan was routinely observed
in various
plant areas with regard to the following:
protected
area
and vital area
barriers
were well maintained
and not compromised;
isolation zones
were clear;
personnel
and vehicles entering
and packages
being delivered to the protected
area
were properly searched
and access
control
was in accordance
with approved
licensee
procedures;
security access
controls to vital areas
were maintained
and persons
in vital areas
were authorized for entry; security posts
were
adequately
staffed
and equipped,
security personnel
were alert
and
knowledgeable
regarding position requirements,
and written procedures
were
available;
and adequate
illumination was maintained.
Licensee
personnel
were
observed to be properly implementing
and following the physical security plan.
5.3
Fire Door Blocked Open
On July 20 at 2:40 p.m., while conducting
a routine tour, the inspector
discovered fire door 44,
Common Equipment
Room to
Pump Area, in the
656'levation
of the turbine building, blocked open.
A warning was painted
on the
floor that read
"Do Not Block Fire Door Zone."
The inspector notified the
control
room.
Shift supervision
promptly dispatched
an assistant
unit
supervisor
(AUS) to unblock the door.
A compensatory
hourly firewatch was in
place for
an existing door deficiency.
However, Nuclear Department
Administrative Procedure,
NDAP-(A-0441, Fire Protection
System Status Control,
requires that if a fire protection
system or equipment is removed
from service
or impaired,
a Fire Protection
Systems
Status
Change
(FPSSC)
form, NDAP-gA-
0441-1,
and separate
Equipment
Release
Form (ERF)
be issued.
This is to
ensure
the impairment is controlled
and required compensatory
measures
are
implemented.
This activity was not performed to support blocking open Fire
Door (FD) 44.
The inspector
noted that since January
1,
1994 there were four documented
licensee identified examples of blocked
open fire doors without following
procedural
requirements.
The affected plant locations included Standby Liquid
Control
(SBLC) Penetration
Room
(SOORs94-037
and 94-246),
and Main Steam
Pipe
Tunnel
(SOOR 227).
SOOR 94-154 documented
the
same fire door
44 was blocked
open twice without the required administrative approvals
on March 4 and March
7,
1994.
The inspector also noted there were other examples of fire doors
being blocked
open without necessary
compensatory
measures
or administrative
approvals prior to 1994.
Again on August 23, the inspector identified that
fire door 44 was blocked
open without the necess'ary
administrative
authorization.
Shift supervision
issued
SOOR 94-475 documenting the inspector
identified unauthorized fire door blockage.
Previously,
inspector considered
the licensee identification and documentation
of the previous fire door blockage
problems
a strength.
The licensee,
in
response
to earlier events,
had concluded previous corrective actions
were
ineffective.
The licensee
formed
a team to resolve the blocked open fire door
issue.
However, the performance
indicates continuing ineffective corrective
actions for previous events
and lack of sensitivity to the safety function of
fire doors
on the part of station personnel.
The actual safety significance
of the events
was low since roving fire watches
also patrolled the affected
areas
as part of their rounds.
However, fire doors,
which are fire rated
barriers,
function to prevent the spread of fire.
The
NRC and licensee
identified examples of the failure to properly implement fire protection
system status control
as required
by NDAP-gA-0441 is
a significant condition
adverse to quality.
The ineffective corrective act'ions to preclude repetition
of improperly blocked
open fire doors is
a violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix
B
Criterion XVI.
(VIO 50-387/94-16-03).
6.
SAFETY ASSESSMENT/EQUALITY VERIFICATION (40500,
90700,
90712,
92700)
6.1
Licensee
Event Reports
The inspector
reviewed
LERs submitted to the
NRC office to verify that details
of the event, were clearly reported,
including the accuracy of the description
of the cause
and the adequacy of corrective action.
The inspector determined
whether further information was required
from the licensee,
whether generic
implications were involved,
and whether the event warranted onsite follow up.
The following LERs were reviewed:
Unit
1
94-005-00
Unit
1 Turbine Building Sampler for Particulate,
and
Mobile Gas
(SPING) Alternate Sampling,
Disconnected
On March 8,
1994, it was determined that the alternate
continuous
sampling
required
by Technical Specification 3.3.7. 11 Action 112 for an out-of-service
turbine building SPING was not completed
as required.
Chemistry personnel
discovered
the sample tubing from the
SPING vent to the alternate
pump suction
became disconnected.
TS Action 3.3.7. 11 Action 112, which required continuous
sampling of iodines
and particulates,
was not met from 10:15 a.m. - 1:35 p.m.
on March 8.
Sample results before
and after the event indicated that releases
were less than the lower limit of detection.
The licensee
concluded there
was
no unmonitored release
during the time of suspect
sampling.
Corrective
actions
included clamping the sample tubing.
The inspector
agreed with the licensee's
reportability analysis
and considered
corrective actions
adequate.
This violation will not be subject to
enforcement
action
because
the licensee's effort in identifying and correcting
the violation met the criteria specified in Section VII.B(2) of 10 CFR Part 2,
Appendix C.
94-011-00
Reactor
Water Cleanup
(RWCU) System Isolation on High Differential
Flow
On July 7,
1994, the Unit
1
RWCU system isolated
on high differential flow.
The high differential flow was caused
by leakage
past
a maintenance
boundary
valve.
NRC Inspection
Report 50-387/94-11
documented
the event.
7.
MANAGEMENT AND EXIT MEETINGS (30702)
7.1
Resident Exit and Periodic Meetings
The inspector discussed
the findings of this inspection with PP8L station
" management
throughout the inspection period to discuss
licensee activities
and
areas of concern to the inspectors.
At the conclusion of the reporting
period, the resident
inspector staff conducted
an exit meeting
summarizing the
preliminary findings of this inspection.
Based
on
NRC Region I review of this
report
and discussions
held with licensee representatives, it was determined
that this report does not contain information subject to 10 CFR 2.790
restrictions.
7.2
Other
NRC Activities
On August 8-10,
and 15-16,
1994,
an
NRC Region I Reactor
Engineer
conducted
an
engineering
inspection.
Inspection results will be documented
in NRC
Inspection
Report 50-387/94-17,
50-388/94-18.
On August 8-10,
NRC Region I conducted
an initial license examination.
Examination results
are documented
in NRC Inspection
Report 50-387/94-15,
50-388/94-16.
On August 29-31
and Sept 1-2,
an
NRC Region I Security Inspector performed
a
Safeguards
Inspection.
Results will be documented
in NRC Inspection
Report
50-387/94-18;
50-388/94-19.