ML17138B444

Forwards 800819 Fr Notice Amending Regulations on Emergency Planning,Effective 801103

ML17138B444
Person / Time
Site:	Susquehanna
Issue date:	08/22/1980
From:	Cutchin J NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE LEGAL DIRECTOR (OELD)
To:	Bechhoefer C, Bright G, Paris O Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
References
NUDOCS 8008280201
Download: ML17138B444 (28)

Text

August 22, 1980 Charles,Bechhoefer, Esq.,

Chairman Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

. hlashington, D. C.

20555 Dr'. Oscar H. Paris Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission l(ashington, D. C.

20555 Mr. Glenn 0. Bright Atomic Safety -and Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission tlashington, D. C.

20555 Gentlemen:

In the Matter of Pennsylvania Power and Light Co.

Allegheny Electric Cooperative, Inc.

(Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2)

Docket Nos. 50-987, 50-388 On Tuesday, August 19, 1980, the Commission amended its regulations on emergency

-planning.

NeFed.

Reg.

55402-55418.

These rule changes became effective on November 3, 1980.

A copy of the pertinent pages of the Federal Register is enclosed for the information of the Board and the parties.

Enclo Sincerely, James M. Cutchin, IV Counsel for NRC Staff

Enclosure:

As stated cc (w/ encl.):

Jay Silberg, Esq.

Dr.'Judith H. Johnsrud Mr. Thomas M. Gerusky Ms. Colleen Marsh Mrs. Irene Lemanowicz

\\

Susquehanna Environmental Advocates Bryan A. Snapp.

Esq.

Atomic Safety 5 Licensing Appeal Board Atomic Safety 8 Licensing Board Panel Secretary

. OFFICE)..

SURNAME DATE$.

NRC FORM 318 {9.76) NRCM 0240 4U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1979 289 369

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Tuesday August

$9, 1980 Part Vill.

1 Nuclear Regulatory Commission Emergency Planning; Rnal Regulations

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'5402 Federal Register / Vol. 45, No. 162 / Tuesday, August 19, 1980 / Rules and Regulations NUCLEAR REGULATORY

. COMMISSION 10 CFR Parts 50 and 70 Emergency PIannlng AoENcY: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION:Final rule.

sUMMARY;The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is upgrading its emergency planning regulations in order to assure that adequate protective measures can and willbe taken in the event of a radiological emergency. Nuclear power plants and certain other ))censed facilities are required to submit their emergency plans, together with the emergency response plans of State and local governments, to the Commission.

The Commission and the Federal Energy Management Agency willreview the plans for adequacy. The amendment.

also extends emergency planning considerations to "Emergency Planning Zones", and makes additional clarifications.

'FFEGTIYE DATE: November 3, 1980.

Note~The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has submitted this rule to the

'omptroller General for review of the reporting requirements in the rule, pursuant Io the Federal Reports Aci, as amended (44 U.S.C. 3512). The date on which the reporting requirements of the rule become effective includes a 4Way period, which the statute allows for Comptroller General review (44 US.C. 3512(c) (2)).

FOR FURTHER INFORMATIONCONTACl.

Mr. Michael T. Jamgochian, Office of

~Standards Development, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555 (telephone: 301-443-5966).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:Oii September 19. 1979 and on December 19, 1979, the Commission published for public comment (44 FR 54308 and 44 FR 7516/) proposed amendments to its emergency planning regulations for production and utilization facilities.

Extensive comments were received, all of which were evaluated and considered in developing the final rule. The comments received and the staff's evaluation is contained in NUREG-0684.

In addition, the NRC conducted four Regional Workshops to solicit comments; these comments are available in NUREG/CP-0011 (April 1980).'Copies of NUREG documents are avallablc al the Commission's Public Document Room. trVH Street. NW Washington. D.C. 2O555. Copies may be purchased fsum the Govammcut Printing Office.

information on current prices may be obtained by wsfting the U.S. Nuclear Regulatosy Commission.

The final regulation contains the, followingelements:

1. In order to continue operations or to receive an operating license an applicant/licensee willbe required to submit its emergent plans, as well as State and local governmental emergency response plans, to NRC. The NRC will then make a finding as to whether the state of onsite and offsite emergency preparedness provides reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and willbe taken in the event of a radiological emergency. The

'RC willbase Its finding on a review of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) findings and determinations as to whether State and local emergency plans are adequate'and capable of being implemented and on the NRC assessment as to whether the licensee's/applicant's emergency plans are adequate and capable of being implemented. These issues may be raised in NRC operating license hearings, but a FEMA finding will constitute a rebuttable presumption on the question of adequacy,

2. Emergency planning considerations'ill be extended to "Emergency Planning Zones,"

3. Detailed emergency plan implementing proceudres oflicensees/

applicants willbe required to be submitted to NRC for review, and

4. Requirements in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E are c)sr(fied and upgradeIL

Background

In June 1979, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission began a formal reconsideration of the role of emergency planning in ensuring the continued protection of the public health and safety in areas around nuc)ear power facilities. The Commission began this reconsideration in recognition ofthe-need for more effective emergency

'lanning and in response to the TMI accident and to reports issued by responsible offices of government and the NRC's Congressional oversight committees.

On December 19, 1979, the Nuc)ear Regulatory Commission published in the Federal Register (44 FR 75167) proposed amendments to 10 CFR Part 50 and Appendix E to Part 50 of its regulations.

Publication of these final rule changes in the Federal Register is not only related to the December 19, 1979 proposed rule changes but also incorporates the proposed changes to 10 CFR Parts 50 and 70 (44 FR 54308) published on September 19. 1979. Interested persons were invited to submit written Washlugtou.D.C. 20555. hueuuun: Publications Sales htanager.

comments/suggestions in connection with the proposed amendments within

. 60 days after publication in the Federal Register, During this comment period (in January 1980) the Commission conducted four regional workshops with State and local offtcia)s, utility

-representatives, and the public to discuss the feasibility of the various portions of the proposed amendments.

their impact, and the procedures proposed for complying with their provisions. The NRC used the information from these workshops along with the public comment letters to develop the final rule (more than 200 comment letters and the points made in two petitions for rulemaking were also considered).

In addition to the above, on June 25, 1980, the Commission was briefed by three panels of public commenters on the rule, one each comprised of representatives from the industry. State

. and local governments, and public interest groups. Each panel raised important concerns regarding the final rule. On July 3, 1980, the Commission

~

mas briefed by its staff in response to

'these panels, including several modifications to the proposed final rules. Finally, on July 23. 1980, at the final Commission consideration of these rules, the Commission was briefed by the General Counsel on the substance of conversations with Congressional staff members who were involved with passage of the NRC Authorization Act for fiscal year 1980, Pub. L No.96-295.

The General Counsel advised the Commission that the NRC final rules were consistent with that Act. The Commission has relied on all of the above information in its consideration of these final rules. In addition. the Commission directs that the transcripts of these meetings shell be part of the administrative record In this rulemaking.

However, the transcripts have not been reviewed for accuracy and, therefore, are only an informal record of the matters discuss'ed.

After evaluating all public comment

.letters received and all the information obtained during the workshops as well as additional reports such as the Presidential Commission and the NRC Special Inquiry Group Reports, the Commission has decided to publish the final rule changes described below.

Descr)ption of Final Rule Changes

• The Commission has decided to adopt a version of the proposed rules similar to alter'native A described in Sections M.47 and S0.54 in the Federal Register Notice dated December 19, 1979 (44 FR 7S167), as modified in )Ight of comments.

These rules are consistent with the

~

FederaE Register / Vol., No. 182 / Tuesday, August 19, 1980 /

ules and Regulations S5403 approach outfined by FEMA and NRC in Memorandum ofUnderstanding (45 FR 5847, January 24. 1980). No aew operating license willbe granted unless the NRC can make a favorable finding that the integration ofonsite and offsite emergency planning provides reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and willbe taken in the event ofa radiological emergency. In the case ofan operating reactor. ifit is determined that there are such deficiencies that a favorable NRC

'finding is not warranted and ifthe deficiencies are not corrected within 4 months of that determinatioa, the Commission willdetermine expeditiously whether the reactor should be'shut down or whether some other enforcement action is appropriate.

pursuant to procedures provided for in 10 CFR 2200-2206. In any case where the Commission beHeves that the public health. safety. or Interest so requires, the plant willbe required to shut down immediately (10 CFR 2202(I), see 5 U.S.C. 558(c)).

The standards that the NRC willuse in making its determinations under these rules are set forth in the final regulation.

Wherever possible, these standards may blend with other emergency planning procedures for nonnudear emergencies presently in existence. The standards are a restatement of basic NRC and now joint NRC-FEMA guidance to licensees and to State and local governments. See NUREG-0654; FEMA-REP-1, "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants for Interim Use and Comment," (January 1980). In dedding whether to permit reactor operation in the face of some deficiendes. the Commission willexamine among other factors whether the defidendes, are significant for the reactor fn question, whether adequate interim compensatory actions have been or willbe taken promptly. or whether other compelling reasons exist for reactor operation. In determining the sufficiency of "adequate interim compensatory actions" under this rule. t)ie Commission willexamine State plans, local plans, and licensee plans to determine whether features of one plan can compensate for deficiencies in another plan so that the level ofprotection for the pubfic health and safety is adequate. This interpretation is consistent w'ith the provisions of the NRC Authorization Act for fiscal year 1980, Pub. L 96-295.

The regulation contains the following three major changes from past practices:

'1. In order to continue operations or to redeve an operating license, aa applicant/Hcensee willbe requfred to submit its emergency plans, as well as State and local governmental emergency response plans, to NRC. The NRC wiH then make a finding as to whether the state of onsite and offsite emergency preparedness provides reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and willbe takea in the event of a radiological emergency.

The NRC willbase its finding on a review of the FEMAfindings and determinations as to whether State and local emergency plans are adequate and capable of being implemented and on the NRC assessment as to whether the applicant's/licensee's emergency plans are adequate and,capable of being Implemented. In any NRC Hcensing proceeding, a FEMAfinding will consitute a rebuttable presumption on the question of adequacy. SpecificaHy:

a. An operating license wiH not be issued unless a favorable NRC overall finding can be made.

b. AfterApril1, 1981, an operating plant may be required to shut down ifit is determined that there are deficiencies such that a favorable NRC finding cannot be made or is no longer warranted and the defidencies are not corrected within 4 months of that

.determination.

2. Emergency planning considerations must be extended to "Emergency Planning Zones," and

3. Detailed emergency planning implementing procedures of both Hcensees and applicants for operating Hcenses must be submitted to NRC for review.

In addition, the Commission is revising 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, "Emergency Plans for Production and UtilizationFacilities," in order to darify, expand, and'upgrade the Commission's emergency planning regulations.

Sections ofAppendix E that are expanded include:

1. Specification of Emergency Action Levels" (Sections IV.Band C)

2. Dissemination to the public ofbasic emergency planning information (Section IV.D)

3. Provisions for the State and local governmental authorities to have a capability for rapid notification of the public during a serious reactor emergency, with a design objective of completing the initialnotification within 15 minutes after notiifiication by the licensee (Section IV3))

4, A licensee onsite technical support center and a Hcensee near site emergency operations fadlity (Section IVX)

5. Provisions for redundant communications systems (S'ection IV.E)

8. Requirement for specialized training (Section IVX)

7. Provisions for up-to-date plan maintenance (Section IV.G)

Applicants for a construction permit would be required to submit more information as required in the new Section IIofAppendix E Rationale for the Final Rules The Commissioa's final rules are based on the significance of adequate emergency planning and preparedness to ensure adequate protection of the public health and safety. It is dear, based on the various officialreports described in the proposed rules (44 FR

'5169) and the public record compiled in thjs rulemaking. that onsite and offsite emergency preparedness as well as proper siting and engineered desiga features are needed to protect the health and safety of the pubHc. As the Commission reacted to the accident at Three Mile Island, it became dear that the protection provided by siting and engineered design features must be bolstered by the ability to take protective measures during the course of an accident. The accident also showed clearly that onsite conditions and actions, even ifthey do not cause significant offsite radiological consequences, willaffect the way the various State and local entities react to protect the public from any dangers associated with the accident. In order to discharge effectively its statutory responsibiHties, the Commission must know that proper means and procedures willbe in place to assess the course of an accident and its potential severity, that NRC and other appropriate authorities and the public willbe notified promptly, and that adequate protective actions ia response to actual or antidpated conditiotts can and will be takea.

The Commission's organic statutes

'-provide it with a unique degree of discretion in the execution ofagency functions. Siegel v. AEC, 400 F.2d 778, 783 (D.C Cir. 1968), see Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. NBC, 598 F.2d 759. 771

& n.47 (3d Cir. 1979). "Both the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 confer broad regulatory functions on the Commission and specifically authorize it to promulgate rules and regulations it deems necessary to fuUillits responsibilities under the Acts, 42 U.S.C 5 2201(p)." Public Service Co. ofNear Hampshire v. NBC, 582 F.2d 77, 82 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 439 US. 1046 (1978).

See 42 U.S.C. 2133(a). As the Supreme Court stated almost 20 years ago, the

. Atomic Energy Act "dearly contemplates that the Commission shall

55404 Federal Register / Uol. 4

o. 162 / Tuesday.

August 19. 1980 /

and Regulations by regulation set forth what the public safety requirements are as a prerequisite to the issuance of any license or permit under the Act,"Power Reactor Development Co. v. International Union ofElectrical Radio Machine 8'orkers, 367 U.S. 396, 404 (1961). Finally, it is also clear that "Congress, when it enacted (42 U.S.C. 2236].. must have envisioned that licensing standards, especially in the areas of health and safety regulation, would vary over time as more was learned about the hazards ofgenerating nuclear energy. Insofar as those standards became more demanding, Congress surely would have

'wanted the new standards, ifthe Commission deemed it appropriate, to apply to those nuclear facilities already licensed," F4 Pierce UtilitiesAuthority

v. United States, 606 F2d 986, 996 (D.C.

Cir, 1979).

In response to and guided by the various reports and public comments. as well as its own determination on the significance of emergency preparedness, the Commission has therefore concluded that adequate emergency preparedness is an essential aspect in the protection of the public health and safety. The Commission recognizes there is a possibility that the operation of some

'eactors may be affected by this rule through inaction ofState and local governments or an inability to comply with these rules. The Commission believes that the potential restriction of plant operation by State and local officials is not significantly different in kind or effect from the means already available under existing law to prohibit reactor operation. such as zoning and land-use laws, certification of public convenience and necessity, State financial and rate considerations (10 CFR 50.33(f)), and Federal environmental laws. The Commission notes, however, that such considerations generally relate to a one. time decision on siting, whereas this rule requires a

'eriodic renewal of State and local commitments to emergency preparedness.

Relative to applying this rule in actual practice, however, the

. Commission need not shut down a facilityuntil all factors have been thoroughly examined. The Commission believes, based on the record created by the public workshops, that State and local officials as partners in this undertaking willendeavor to provide fullyfor public protection.

Summary of Comments on Major Issues The Commission appreciates the extensive public comments on this important rule. In addition to the record of the workshops, the NRC has received over 200 comment letters on the proposed rule changes. The following major issues have been raised in the comments received.

Issue A:NRC Review and Cancurrence in State and LocalRadiological Plans

1. FEMAis best suited to a'ssess the adequacy ofState and local radiological emergency planning and preparedness and report any adverse findings to NRC for assessment of the licensing consequences of those findings.

2. The proposed rule fails to provide objective standards for NRC concurrence. reconcurrence, and withdrawal of concurrence.

3. In the absence of additional statutory authority, the proposed rule

~ frustrates Congressional intent to preempt State and local government veto power over nuclear power plant operation.

4. Procedures and standards for adjudication of emergency planning disputes are not adequately specified in the proposed rule.

Issue B: Emetgency Planning Zones (EPZs)

1. Regulatory basis for Imposition of the Emergency Planning Zone concept should be expressly stated in the regulation.

2. Provisions regarding the plume

~exposure pathway EPZ should provide a maximum planning distance of 10 miles.

3. References to NUREG-0396 should be deleted to avoid disputes over its meaning in licensing proceedings.

Issue C: Alternative A and B(in 50.47 and 50.54)

1. Neither alternative is necessary because the Commission has sufficient authority to order a plant shut down for safety reasons and should be prepared to exercise that au'thority only on a case-by-case basis and when a particular situation warrants such action.

2. No case has been made by the Commission for the need for automatic shutdown, as would be required in alternative B, and certainly no other NRC regulations exist that would require such action based on a concept as amorphous as "concurrence in State and local emergency plans."

3. The idea that the Commission might grant an exemption to the rules that would permit continued operation (under alternative B) has little wignificance, primarily because 10 CFR Part 50.12(a) already permits the granting of exemptions.

4:The process and procedures for obtaining such exemptions are not defined. nor is there any policy indication that would indicate the Commission's disposition to grant such

-exemptions.

5. The Commission, in developing this aspect of the proposed rule, must consider its own history. There was time when regulation was characterized by the leaders of the agency by simple and very appropriate expressions. The process was to'be "effective and efficient." The application ofregulatory authority was to be "firm,but fair."

Regardless of the outcome of the "concurrence" Issue, the Commission must appreciate that alternative B is not fair. It is not effective regulation.

Issue D: Public Education Only information required to inform the public about what to do In the event of a radiological emergency need be disseminated. There should be flexibility,in any particular case, as to who willbe ultimately responsible for disseminating such information.

Issue E: Legal Authority

1. A few commenters felt that NRC had'no authority to promulgate a rule as the one proposed.

2. Other comments were the nature that NRC has statutory authority only inside the limits of the plant site.

3. Some commenters suggested that NRC and FEMA should seek additional legislation to compel State and local governments to have emergency plans. if that is what is necessary, Issue F: Schedule forImplementation The schedule for implementing the proposed rule was considered to be unrealistic and in some cases in conflict with various State schedules already in existence. A sampling of the comments on the implementation schedule follows:

1. The 180 days in the schedule is an insufficient amount of time to accomplish tasks of this magnitude; the Federal government does not work with such speed. States are bureaucracies

'lso; there is no reason to assume they can work faster. It took years of working w'ith States to get the plans that are presently concurred in. It is just insufficient time for new concurrences and review. Also, to get a job done within that time frame means a hurried job, rather than an acceptable and meaningful plan.

2. The time provided is inadequate for States to acquire the hardware needed.

States must go out for competitive bids just as the Federal government does.

Between processing and accepting a bid and actual delivery of equipment, it may take a year to get the hardware. The State budgets years ahead; therefore, if a State or local government needs more

'oney, it may have to go to the

Federal Register / Vol. 45&o. 162 / Tuesday, August 19, 1980 / R&es and Regulations 55405 legislature. This is a time-consuming public process that may not fit the.

Federal schedu! e.

3. NRC and FEMAcould not review 70 or more plans and provide concurrence by January 1, 1981. The Federal government moves slowly. Commenters did not think that NRC and FEMA can review all the plans within the time frame scheduled. Ifthe Federal government cannot meet its schedule, why or how should the States'.

Funding could not be appropriated by State and local governments before the deadline. It was suggested that the Commission use H. Rept. 496-413, "Emergency Planning U.S. Nuclear Power Plants: Nuclear Regulatory Commission Oversight," for the time frame rather than that in the proposed rule or use a sliding-scale time frame since States are at various stages of completing their emergency plans.

Issue G: Impact ofProposed Rule

1. The proposed regulations were considered by some commenters as unfair to utilities because it was felt they place the utilities In the political and financial role that FEMA should be assuming. NRC is seen as in effect giving State and local governments veto over the operation ofnuclear plants. It was questioned whether this was an intent of the rule. In addition, it was felt that utilities, their customers, and their shareholders should not be penalized by a shutdown (with a resulting financial burden) because of alleged deficiencies or lack of cooperation by State and local officials.

2. Itwas suggested that NRC's Office of Inspection and Enforcement conduct the reviews of the State and local governmental emergency response plans in order to ensure prompt. effective, and consistent implementation of the proposed regulations.

3. One commenter noted that the public should be made aware of the issue of intermediate and long-term impacts ofplant shutdowns.

Specifically, people should be informed of the possibility of "brownouts," cost increases to the consumer due to securing alternative energy sources, and the health and safety factors associated'ith those alternative sources.

Issue H: Public Notification

1. Ultimate responsibility for public notification of a radiological emergency must be placed on State and local government.

2. The fifteen minute" public notification rule is without scientific justification, fails to differentiate between areas close in and further away from the site, and ignores the technical difficultIes associated with such a requirement.

Issue I: Emergency Action Levels Applicants. in cooperation with State and local governmental authorities, should be permitted the necessary flexibilityto develop emergency action level criteria appropriate for the facility in question, subject to NRC approval, Infiexible NRC emergency action level standards are not necessary.

Issue frTraining

1. Mandatory provision for training local service personnel and local news media persons is outside of NRC's jurisdiction and is not necessary to protect the public health and safety.

2, Public participation in drills or critiques thereof should not be required.

3. The provision regarding formal critiques should be clarified to mean the licensee fs responsible for developing and conducting such critiques.

4. Definitive performance criteria for evaluation of drills should be developed by the Bcensee, subject to NRC approvaL Issue K Implementing Procedures NRC review of implementing procedures is,only necessary to apprise the NRC staff of the details of the plans for use by the NRC during the course of an actual emergency.

Issue L"Fiinding

1. Nuclear facilities, although located in one governmental tax jurisdiction and taxed by that jurisdiction. affect other jurisdictions that must bear immediate and long-term planning costs without having access to taxes from the facility.

2. As the radius ofplanning requirements becomes greater, few facilities are the concern of a single county. The planning radius often encompasses county lines, State lines, and in some instances, international boundaries.

3. As new regulations are generated to oversee the nuclear industry and old ones expanded. there is an immediate need to address fixed nuclear facility planning at all levels ofgovernment, beginning at the lowest and going to the highest. Alllevels ofgovernment need access to immediate additional funds to upgrade their response capability.

4, It is well understood that the consumer ultimately must pay the price for planning, regardless of the level in government at which costs are incurred.

It becomes a matter ofhow the consumer willbe taxed, who will administer the tax receipts, and what is the most effective manner in which to address the problem.

5. The basis for effective offsite response capabilities is a sound emergency preparedness program.

Federal support (funding and technical assistance) for the development ofState and local offsfte capabilities should be incorporated into FEMA's preparedness program for all emergencies.

Issue M: General The States support Federal oversight and guidance in the development of offsite response capabilities. However, many States feel the confusion and uncertainty in planning requirements followingThree Mile Island is not a proper environment in which to develop effective capabilities nor does it serve

'he best interests of their citizens. The development of effective nuclear facility Incident response capabilities will require close coordination and cooperation among responsible Federal agencies. State government, and the nuclear industry. An orderly and comprehensive approach to this effort makes it necessary that onsite responsibilities be clearly associated with NRC and the nuclear industry while deferring offsite responsibilities to State government with appropriate FEMA oversight and assistance.

In addition to these comments, two petitions for rulemaking were filed in reference to the proposed rule. These were treated as public comments rather than petitions and were considered in developing the final rule.

The Commission has placed the planning objectives from NUREG-0654; FEMA-REP-1; "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation ofRadiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants for Interim Use and Comment," January 1980, into the final regulations. Comments received concerning NUREG-0654 were available in developing the final regulation. The Commission notes that the planning objectives in NUREG-0654 were largely drawn from NUREG-75/111, "Guide and Checklist for Development and Evaluation of State and Local Government Radiological Emergency Response Plans in Support ofFixed Nuclear Facilities," (December 1, 1974) and Supplement 1 thereto dated March 15, 1977, which have been in use for some time.

The approximately 60 public comment letters received on NUREG-0664 were not critical of the proposed planning objectives. The Commission also notes that at the May 1, 1980 ACRS meeting, the Atomic Industrial Forum representative encouraged the use of the planning objectives from NUREG-0654 in the final regulations in order to

58406 Federal Register / V

. 45, No. 182 / Tuesday, August 19, 1980 Rules and Regulations redifce ambiguity and provide specificity to the final regulation.

Based on the above, the Commission has decided to modify the proposed rule changes in t)ie areas discussed in paragraphs I through X below.

L FEMA/NRC Relationship In issuing this rule. NRC recognizes the significant responsibilities assigned to FEMA. by Executive Order 12148 on July 15, 1979, to coordinate the emergency planning functions of executive agencies. In view ofFEMA's new role, NRC agreed on September 11, 1979, that FEMA should henceforth chair the Federal Interagency Central Coordinating Committee for Radiological Emergency Response Planning and Preparedness (FICCC). On December 7, 1979, the President issued a directive assigning FEMA lead responsibility for offsite emergency preparedness around nuclear facilities.

The NRC and FEMA immediately initiated negotiations for a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that lays out the agencies'oles and provides for a smooth transfer of responsibilities. It is recognized that the MOU, which became effective January

14. 1980, supersedes some aspects of previous agreements. Specifically, the MOU identifies FEMAresponsibilities with respect to emergency preparedness as they relate to NRC as the following:

1. To make findings and determinations as to whether State and local emergency plans are adequate.

2. To verify that State and local emergency plans are capable ofbeing implemented (e.g., adequacy and maintenance of procedures, training.

resources, staffing levels and qualification, and equipment).

3. To assume responsibility for emergency preparedness training of State and local officials.

4. To develop and issue an updated series ofinteragency assignments that delineate respective agency capabilities and responsibilities and define procedures for coordination and direction for emergency planning and response.

Specifically, the NRC responsibilities for emergency preparedness identified in the MOU are:

1. To assess licensee emergency plans for adequacy.

2. To verify that licensee emergency plans are adequately implemented (e.g.,

adequacy and maintenance of procedures, training, resources, staffing levels and qualiTications, and equipment).

3. To review the FEMA findings and determinations on the adequacy and capability ofimplementation ofState and local plans.

4. To make decisions with regard to the overall state ofemergency preparedness (i.e., integration of the licensee's emergency preparedness as determined by the NRC and of the State/local governments as determined by FEMA and reviewed by NRC) and issuance of operating licenses or shutdown of operating reactors.

In addition, FEMA has prepared a proposed rule regarding "Review and Approval of State Radiological Emergency Plans and Preparedness" (44 FR 42342, dated June 24, 1980).

According to the proposed FEMArule, FEMAwillapprove State and local emergency plaris and preparedness, where appropriate, based upon its findings and determinations with respect to the adequacy of State and local plans and the capabilities ofState and local governments to effectively implement these plans and preparedness measures. These findings and determinatione willbe provided to the NRC for use in its licensing process.

H. Emergency Planning Zone Concept The Commission notes that the regulatory basis for adoption of the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) concept is the Commission's decision to have a conservative emergency planning policy in addition to the conservatism inherent in the defense-in-depth philosophy. This policy was endorsed by the Commission in a policy statement published on October 23, 1979 (44 FR 61123), At that time the Commission stated that two Emergency Planning Zones (EPZs) should be established around each light-water nuclear power plant. The EPZ for airborne exposure has a radius of about 10 miles; the EPZ for contaminated food and water has a radius ofabout 50 miles. Predetermined protective action plans are needed for the EPZs. The exact size and shape of each EPZ willbe decided by emergency planning officials after they consider the specific conditions at each site, These distances are considered large enough to provide a response base that would support activity outside the planning xone should this ever be needed, III.Position on Planning Basis for Small Light-Water Reactors and Ft. St. Vrain The Commission has concluded that the operators of small light-waterwooled power reactors (less than 250 MWt) and the Ft. St. Vrain gas-cooled reactor may establish smaller planning zones which willbe evaluated on a case-bywase basis. This conclusion fs based on the lower potential hazard from these facilities (lower radionuclide inventory and longer times to release significant amounts ofactivity in many scenarios).

Guidance regarding the radionucildes to be considered in planning is set forth in NUREG-0396; EPA 520/1-78-016, "Planning Basis for the Development of State and Local Government Radiological Emergency Response Plans fn Support of Light-Water Nuclear

'ower Plants," December 1978.

IV.Rationale for Alternatives Chosen In a few areas of the proposed rule, the Commission identified two alternatives that it was considering.

Many public comments were received on these alternatives; based on due consideration of all comments received as well as the discuseione presented'uring the workshops, the Commission has determined which of each pair of alternatives to retain in the final rule.

In Sections 50.4'7 and 50.54 (s) and (t),

the alternatives dealth with conditioning the issuance of an operating license or continued operation of a nuclear power plant on the existence of State and local government emergency response plans concurred in by NRC.'he basic difference between alternatives A and B in these sections was that, under alternative A, the proposed rule would require a determination by NRC on issuing a license or permitting continued operation of plants in those cases where relevant State and local emergency response plans had not received NRC concurrence. Denial of a license or shutdown of a reactor would not follow automatically in every case. Under alternative B, shutdown of the reactor would be required automatically ifthe appropriate State and local emergency response plans had not received NRC concurrence within the prescribed time periods unless an exemption is granted.

Afterconsideration of the public record and on the recommendation of its staff. the Commission has chosen a text for Sections 50.47 and 50.54 (s) and (t) that is similar to. but less restrictive than, alternative A in the proposed rule.

Rather than providing for the shutdown of the reactor as the only enforcement action and prescribing specific preconditions for the shutdown remedy, the final rule makes clear that for emergency planning rules, like all other rules, reactor shutdown as outlined in the rule is but one of a number of possible enforcement actions and many factors should be considered in determining whether it is an appropriate action in a given case. This Commission choice is consistent with most of the comments received from St'ate and local

'ee Secuon Y for s discuss! on concernlne concotrence.

Federal Register / VoO,'o. t62 / Tuesday, August 19,'980 gules and Regulations 5540y goverinnents and is consistent with the

~ provisions of Section 109 of the NRC fiscal year 1980 Authorization Act.

Alternative B was seen by some of the, commenters as potentially causing unnecessarily harsh economic and social consequences to State and local governments. utilities, and the public.

State and local governments that are directly involved in implementing planning objectives of the rule strongly favor alternative A since it provides for a cooperative effort with State and local governments to reflect their concerns and desires in these rules. This c?iofce is responsive to that effort. In addition, the industry strongly supported alternative A as being the more workable of the two alternatives.

In Appendix E, Sections II.C and III, alternaUve A would require an applicant/licensee to outline "...

corrective measures to prevent damage to onsite and offsite property," as well as protective measures for the public.

Alternative B addresses only protective measures for the public health and safety. The Commission has chosen alternative B because public health and safety should take clear precedence over actions to protect property.

.Measures to protect property can be taken on an ad hoc basis as resources become available after an accident.

In Appendix E, under Training, alternative A would provide for a joint licensee. Federal. State, and local government exercise every 3 years, whereas alternative B would provide for these exercises to be performed every 5 years at each site. The Commission has chosen alternative B because the Commission is satisfied that the provision that these exercises be performed every 5 years for each site willallow for an adequate level of preparedness among Federal emergency response agencies. In addiUon, under these reguiaUons, each licensee is required to exercise annually with local governmental authorities. Furthermore, Federal emergency response agencies may have difficultysupporting exercises every 3 years for all of the nuclear facilities that would be required to comply with these rule changes.

V. Defin?Uon of Plan Approval Process The term "concurrence" has been deleted from the proposed regulations and replaced with reference to the actual procedure and standardti that NRC and FEMA have agreed upon and

're implementing. According to the agreed upon procedure, FEMAwill

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make a finding and determination as to the adequacy ofState and local government emergency response planL The NRC willdetermine the adequacy of the licensee emergency response plans.

After these two determinaUons have been made, NRC willmake a finding in the licensing process as to the overall and integrated state ofpreparedness.

It was pointed out to the Commission at the workshops and in public comment letters that the term "concurrence" was confusing and ambiguous. Also, there was a great deal of misunderstanding with the use of the term because, in the past, the obtaining ofNRC "concurrence" in State emergency response plans was voluntary on behalf of the States and not a regulatory requirement in the licensing process.

Previously too, "concurrence" was statewide rather than site-specific.

Vl.Fifteen-Minute Notification The requirement for.the capability for notification of the public within 15 minutes after the State/local authorities have been notified by the licensee has been expanded and ciarifled. It also has been removed as a footnote and placed in the body ofAppendix F The Implementation schedule for this requirement has been extended to July 1, 1981. This extension of time has been adopted because most State and local governments identified to the Commission the difficultyin procuring hardware. contracting for insta?laUon, and developing procedures for operating the systems used to implement this requirement.

The Commission is aware that various commenters, largely from the industry, have objected to the nature of the 15-minute notificatio re'quirement, indicating that it may be both arbitrary and unworkable.

Among the possibfe alternatives to this requirement are a longer notification time, a notification time that varies with distance from the facility, or no specified time. In determining what that criterion should be, a line must be" drawn somewhere, and the Commission believes that providing as much Ume as practicable for the taking ofprotective acUon is in the interest ofpublic health and safety. The Commission recognizes that this requirement may present a signiflicant financial impact and that the technical basis for this requirement is not without dispute. Moreover, there may never be an accident requiring using the 15-minute notification capability. However, the essential rationale behind emergency planning is to provide additional assurance for the public protection even during such an unexpected event. The 15-minute notification capability requirement is whollyconsistent with that rationale.

The Commission recognizes that no single accident scenario should form the basis for choice ofnotification capability requirements for offsite authorities and for the public.

Emergency plans must be developed that willhave the flexibilityto ensure response to a wide spectrum of accidents. This wide spectrum of potential accidents also reflects on the appropriate use of the offsite notificaUon capability. The use of this notification capability willrange from immediate notification of the public (within 15 minutes) to listen to predesignated radio and television stations, to the more likelyevents where there is substantial time available for the State and local governmental officials to make a judgment whether or not to activate the public notfflication system.

Any accident involving severe fuel degradation or core melt that results in significant inventories of fission products in the containment would warrant immediate public notification and consideration, based on the particular circumstances, ofappropriate protective action because of the potential for leakage of the containment building'. In addition. the warning time available for the public to take action may be substantially less than the total time between the original initiating event and the time at which significant radioactive releases take place.

Specification ofparticular times as design objectives for notification of offsite authorities and the public are a means of ensuring that a system willbe in place with the capability to notify the public to seek further information by listening to predesignated radio or television stations. The Commission recognizes that not every individual.

would necessarily be reached by the actual operation of such a system under all conditions of system use. However, the Commission believes that provision of a general alerting system will significantl improve the capability for taking protective actions in the event of an emergency. The reduction of notification Umes from the several hours required for street-by-street notification to minutes willsignificantly increase the opUons available as protective actions under severe accident conditions. These actions could include staying indoors in the case of a release that has already occurred or a precautionary evacuation in the case of a potential release thought to be a few hours away. Accidents that do not result in core melt may also cause relatively quick releases for which protective actions, at least for the public in the immediate plant vicinity,are desirable.

I SS40S Federal Register oL 45. No. 162 / Tuesday, August 19, 1

/ Rules and Regulations

'Some comments received on the proposed rule advocated the use of a staged notification system with qufck notification required only near the plant.

The Commission believes that the capability for quick notiTicatfon within the entire plume exposure emergency planning zone should be provided,but recognizes that some planners may wish to have the option of selectively actuating part of the system during an actual response. Planners should carefully consider the impact of the added decisions that offsite authorities would need to make and the desirability of establishing an 'official communication link to all residents in the plume exposure emergency planning zone when determining whether to plan for a staged notiTication capability.

VII.Effective Date of Rules and Other Guidance Prior to the publication of these amendments.

two guidance documents

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were published for public comment and fnterim use. These are NUREG-0610, "Draft Emergency Action Level Guidelines for Nuclear Power Plants,"

(September 1979) and NUREG-0654/

FEMA-REP-1. "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants for Interim Use and Comment." oanuary 1980). It is expected that versions of these documents, revised on the basis ofpublic comments received, willbe issued to assist in defining acceptable levels of preparedness to meet this final regulation. In the interim, these documents should continue to be used as guidance.

VIII.Hearing Procedures Used in Implementation of These Regulations Should the NRC believe that the overall state of emergency preparedness at and around a licensed facilityis such that there is some question whether a facilityshould be permitted to continue to operate, the Commission may issue an order to the licensee to show cause, pursuant to 10 CFR 2.202. why the plant should not be shut down. This issue may arise. for example. ifNRC finds a significant deficiency in a licensee plan or in the overall state of emergency preparedness.

Ifthe NRC decides to issue an order to show cause, itwillprovide the licensee the opportunity to demonstrate to the Commission's satisfaction. for example.

that the alleged deficiencies are not significant for the reactor in question, whether adequate interim compensating actions have been or willbe taken promptly, or whether other compelling reasons exist for reactor operation.

Finally. pursuant to 10 CFR 5202(f), the Commission may. in appropriate circumstances.

make the order immediately effective, which could result in immediate plant shutdown subject to a later hearing.

IX.Funding In view of the requirements in these rule changes regarding the actions to be taken in the event State find local government planning and preparedness are or become inadequate, a utilitymay have an incentive, based on its own self interest as well as its responsibility to provide power, to assist in providing manpower, items ofequipment, or other resources that the State and local governments may need but are themselves unable to provide. The Commission believes that In view of the President's Statement ofDecember 7, 1979, giving FEMA the lead role in offsfte planning and preparedness, the

'uestion of whether the NRC should or could require a utilityto contribute to the expenses incurred by State and local governments in upgrading and maintaining their emergency planning and preparedness (and ifit is to be required, the mechanics for doing so) is beyond the scope of the present rule change. It should be noted, however, that any direct funding of State or local governments solely for emergency preparedness purposes by the Federal government would come through FEMA.

X. Exercises On an annual basis, all commercial nuclear power facilities willbe required by NRC to exercise their plane; these exercises should involve exercising the

'ppropriate local government plans in support of these facilities. The State may choose to limitits participation in exercises at facilities other than the facility(site) chosen for the annual exercise(s) of the State plan.

Each State and appropriate local government shall annually conduct an exercise jointlywith a commercial nuclear power facility.However, States with more than one facility(site) shall schedule exercises such that each fndividual facility(site) is exercised in conjunction with the State and appropriate local government plans not less than once every 3 years for sites with the plume exposure pathway EPZ partially or wholly within the State, and not less than once every 5 years for sites with the ingestion exposure pathway EPZ partially or wholly within the State.

The State shall choose, on a rotational basis, the site(s) at which the required annual exercise(s) is to be conducted:

priority shall be given to new facilities seeking an operating license from NRC that have not had an exercise involving the State plan at that facilitysite.

The Commission has determined under the criteria in 10 CFR Part S1 that an environmental impact statement for the amendments to 10 CFR Part 50 and Appendix E thereof fs not required. This determination is based on "Environmental Assessment forFinal Changes to 10 CFR Part SO and Appendix E of 10 CFR Part SO, Emergency Planning Requirements for Nuclear Power Plants" (NUREG-0685, June 1980). Comments on the "Draft Negative Declaration; Finding of No Significant Impact" (45 FR 3913, January 21, 1980) were considered in the preparation of NUREG-OMS.

Pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended.

and Sections 552 and 553 ofTitle 5 of the United States Code, notice is hereby given that the followingamendments to Title 10, Chapter L Code ofFederal Regulations, Parts 50 and 70, are published as a document subject to codiTication.

Part 50Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities

1. Paragraph (g) ofSection 50.33 is revised to read as follows:

$ 50.33 Contents of applications; general information.

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(g) Ifthe application is for an operating license for a nuclear power reactor. the applicant shall submit radiological emetgency response plans of State and local governmental entities in the United States that are wholly or partially within the plume exposure pathway Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) ', as well as the plans of State governments wholly or partially within the ingestion pathway EPZ.'Generally, the plume exposure pathway EPZ for nuclear power reactors shall consist of an area about 10 miles (16 km) in radius and the ingestion pathway EPZ shall consist of an area about 50 miles (80 km) in radius. The exact size and configuration of the EPZs surrounding a particular nuclear power reactor shall be determined in relation to the local emergency response needs and r Emergency Planning Zones fEPZsl cre discussed in NUREC-0395. EPA Sge/1-ylHHS. "Planning Basis for the Development of State and Local Government Radiological Emergency Response Plans In Support of Light Water Nuclear Power Plants," December 1978.

elf thc State and local emergency response plans have been previously provided to the NRC for fnctuston in the facilitydockcL thc applicant need only provide the appropriate reference to meet thi~

tequiremcni.

rederal Register / Vol @No. 161 / Tuesday. August ttt 1950 / %es and Regulations 55409 capabilities as they are affected by such conditions as demography, topography, land characteristics, access routes, and jurisdictional boundaries. The size of the EPZs also may be determined on a case-by-case basis for gas-cooled reactors and for reactors with an authorized power level less than 250 MW thermal.

The plans for the ingestion pathway shall focus on such acUons as are appropriate to protect the food ingestion pathway.

2. Anew ti 50.47is added.

tl 50.47 Emergency plans.

(a)(1) No operating license for a nuclear power reactor willbe issued unless a finding I@made by NRC that the state ofonsite and offsite emergency preparedness provides reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and wiH be taken in the event of a radiological emergency.

(2) The NRC willbase its finding on a review of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) findings and determinations as to whether State and local emergency plans are adequate and capable of being implemented. and on the NRC assessment as to whether the applicant's onsite emergency plans are adequate and capable ofbeing implemented. In any NRC licensing proceeding. a FEMAfinding will constitute a rebuttable presumpUon on a question of adequacy.

(b) The onsite and offsite emergency response plans for nuclear power reactors must meet the foHowiag

standards:

'1)

Primary responsibiHties for emergency response by the nuclear faclHty licensee and by State and locaI organizations witldn the Emergency Planning Zones have been assigned, the emergency responsibilities of the various supporting organizaUons have been speclftcaHy established, and each principal response organization has staff to respond and to augment its initial response on a continuous basis.

(2) On-shift facilitylicensee responsibilities for emergency response are unambiguously defined. adequate staffing to provide initialfacility accident response in key functional areas is maintained at aH times, timely augmentation ofresponse capabilities is available and the interfaces among various onsite response activities and offsite support and response activities are specified.

'These standards are addressed by spect8c criteria in NURE~: FEMA-REP-1 entitled

-Criteria for Preparation and Et/elus tion of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness ln Support of Nuclear Power Planta-For interun Use and Conunent" ianuary 1SSk (3) Arrangements for requesting and effectively using assistance resources have been made, arrangements to accommodate State and local staff at the licensee's near-site Emergency Operations Facility have been made, and other organizations capable of augmenUng the planned response have been identified.

(4) A standard emergency classification and action level scheme, the bases of which Include facility system and effluent parameters.

is in use by the nuclear faciHty Hcensee. and State and local response plans caH for reliance oa InformaUon provided by facilitylicensees for determinations of minimum initialoffsite response measures.

(5) Procedures have been established for notification, by the licensee. of State and local response organizations and for notification of emergency personnel by aH organizaUons: the content ofinitial aad foHowup messages to response organizations and the public has been established; and means to provide early notiflcatioa and clear ins trucUon to the populace within the plume exposure pathway Emergency Banning Zone have been establishetL (8) Provisions exist forprompt communications among principal response organizations to emergency personnel and to the pubHc.

(7) Information is made available to the public oa a periodic basis on how they willbe notified and what their initialactions should be in an emergency (e.g., listening to a local broadcast station and remaining indoors), the principal points of contract with the news media for dissemination ofinformation during an emergency (including the physical location or locations) are established in advance, and procedures for coordinated dissemination of information to the public ere established.

(8) Adequate emergency facilities and equipment to support the emergency response are provided and maintained.

(9) Adequate methods, systems. and equipment for assessing and moidtorin8 actual or potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency condition are in use.

(10) A range of protective actions have been developed for the plume exposure pathway EPZ for emergency workers and the public. Guidelines for the choice ofprotective actions during an emergency, consistent with Federal guidance. are developed and in place.

and protective actions for the ingestion exposure pathway EPZ appropriate to the locale have been developed.

(11) Means for controlling radiological exposures, in an emergency, are established for emergency workers. The means for controlling radiological exposures shell include exposure guidelines consistent with EPA Emergency Worker and Lifesaving ActivityProtective Action Guides.

(12) Arrangments are made for medical services for contaminated injured individuals.

(13) General plans for recovery and reentry are developed.

(14) Periodic exercises are (wiH be) conducted to evaluate major portions of energency response capabilities.

periodic drills are (wiH be) conducted to develop and maintain key skiHs, and deficiencies identified as a result of exercises or drills are (wiH be) corrected.

(15) Radiological emergency response training is provided to those who may be caHed on to assist in an emergency.

(18) Responsibilities for plan development and review and for distribution ofemergency plans are estabfishetL and planners are properly trained.

(c)(1) Failure to meet the standards set forth in paragraph (b) of this subsecUon may result in the Commission declining to issue an Operating License: however, the applicant willhave an opportunity to demonstrate to the satisfaction of the Comndssion that deflciencfes in the plans are not significant for the plant in question, that adequate interim compensating actions have been or will be taken promptly, or that there are other compeHing reasons to permit plant opera Uoa (2) Generally. the plume exposure pathway EPZ for nuclear power plants shell consist of an area about 10 miles (18 km) in radius and the ingestion pathway EPZ shall consist of an area about 50 mfles (80 km) in radius. The exact size and configuraUon of the EPZs surrounding a particular nuclear power reactor shell be determined in relation to local emergency response needs and capabilities as they are affected by such conditions as demography, topography, land characterisUcs, access routes, and jurisdictional boundaries. The size of the EPZs also may be determined on a case-by-case basis for gaswooled nuclear reactors and for reactors with an authorized power level less than 250 MWthermal. The plans for the ingestion pathway shall focus on such actions as are appropriate to protect the food ingestion pathway.

3. Section 50.54 is amended by adding five new paragraphs (q), (r), (s). (t), and (u).

g 5044 CondfUons of licenses.

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gg4'JQ Federal Register /0 44, No. Mg / Tuesday, August tg, 49 Rules and Regulations (q) A licensee authorized to possess and/or operate a nuclear power reactor shall followand maintain in effect emergency plans which meet the standards in g 50.47(b) and the requirements in Appendix E of this Part.

A licensee authorized to possess and/or operate a research reactor or a fuel facilityshall followand maintain in effect emergency plans which meet the requirements in Appendix E of this Part.

The nuclear power reactor licensee may make changes to these plans without Commission approval only ifsuch changes do not decrease the effectiveness of the plans and the plans, as changed, continue to meet the standards of $ 50.47(b) and the requirements of Appendix E of this Part.

The research reactor licensee and/or the fuel facilitylicensee may make changes to these plans without Commission approval only ifsuch changes do not decrease the effectiveness of the plans and the plans, as changed, continue to meet the requirements ofAppendix E of this Part. Proposed changes that decrease the effectiveness of the approved emergency plans shall not be implemented without application to and approval by the Commission. The licensee shall furnish 3 copies of each proposed change for approval: and/or if a change is made without prior approval. 3 copies shall be submitted within 30 days after the change is made or proposed to the Director of the appropriate NRC regional office specified in Appendix D, 10 CFR Part 20, with 10 copies to the Director ofNuclear Reactor Regulation, or, ifappropriate, the Director ofNuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington. D.C. 20555.

(r) Each licensee who is authorized to possess and/or operate a research or test reactor facilitywith an authorized power level greater than or equal to 500 kW thermal, under a license of the type specified in 5 S0.21(c), shall submit emergency plans complying with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, to the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation for approval within one year from the effective date of this rule. Each licensee who is authorized to possess and/or operate a research reactor facilitywith an authorized power level less than 500 kW thermal, under a license of the type specified in 5 50.21(c), shall submit emergency plans complying with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, to the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation for approval within two years from the effective date of this amendment.

(s)(1) Each licensee who is authorized to possess ttnd/or operate a nuclear power reactor shall summit to NRC within 60 days of the effective date of this amendment the radiological emergency response plans of State and local governmental entities in the United States that are wholly or partially within a plume exposure pathway EPZ, as well as the plans of State governments wholly or partially within an ingestion pathway EPZ."'Ten (10) copies of the above plans shall be forwarded to the Director ofNuclear Reactor Regulation with 3 copies to the Director of the appropriate NRC regional ofhce.

Generally. the plume exposure pathway EPZ for nuclear power reactors shall consist of an area about 10 miles (16 km) in radius and the ingestion pathway EPZ shall consist ofan area about 50 miles (80 km) in radius. The exact size and configuration of the EPZs for a particular nuclear power reactor shall be determined in relation to local emergency response needs and capabilities as they are affected by such conditions as demography, topography, land characteristics, access routes, and jurisdictional boundaries. The size of the EPZs also may be determined on a case-bywase basis for gas-cooled nuclear reactors and for reactors with an authorized power level less than 250 MW thermal. The plans for the ingestion

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pathway EPZ shall focus on such actions as are appropriate to protect the food ingestion pathway.

(2) For operating power reactors, the licensee, State, and local emergency response plans shall be implemented by April1, 1981, except as provided in Section IV,D.3 ofAppendix E of this Part. Ifafter April1, 1981, the NRC finds that the state of emergency preparedness does not provide reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can and willbe taken in the event of a radiological emergency and ifthe deficiencies are not corrected within four months of that finding, the Commission willdetermine whether the reactor shell be shut down until such deficiencies are remedied or whether other enforcement action is appropriate. In determining whether a shutdown or other enforcement action is appropriate, the Commission shall take into account. among other factors, whether the licensee ca'n demonstrate to the Commission's satisfaction that the deficiencies in the plan are not

'Emergency Platutfng Zones fEPZg) are dfgcugged tu NUREG-OSSS: EPA SZO/1-7~5. "Planning Bagia for tha Development of State aud Ldycal Government Radiological Emergency Response Plang in Suppo'rt of Ught Water Nuct ear Power Plants." December ltr/s.

4ifthe State and local emergency response plans have been previously providad tu the NRC for Inclusion tn tbe facilitydocket. the applicant need only pyuvtde the appropriate reference to meet this requirement.

significant for the plant in question, or that adequate interim compensating actions have been or willbe taken promptly, or that there are other compelling reasons for continued operation.

(3) The NRC willbase its fmdlng on a review of the FEMAfindings and determinations as to whether State and local emergency plans are adequate and capable of being implemented, and on the NRC assessment as to whether the licensee's emergency plans are adequate and capable of being implemented.

Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed as limitingthe authority of the Commission to take action under any other regulation or authority of the Commission orat any time other than that specified in this paragraph.

(t) A nuclear power reactor licensee shall provide for the development, revision, implementation, and maintenance ofits emergency preparedness program. To this end, the licensee shall provide for a review of its emergency preparedness program at least every 12 months by persons who have no direct responsibility for Implementation of the emergency preparedness program. The review shall include an evaluation for adequacy of interfaces with State and local governments and of licensee drills.

exercises, capabilities. and procedures.

The results of the review. along with recommendations for improvements.

shall be documented. reported to the licensee's corporate and plant management. and retained for a period of five years. The part of the review involving the evaluation for adequacy of interface with State and local governments shall be available to the appropriate State and local governments.

(u) Within 60 days after the effective date of this amendment, each nuclear power reactor licensee shall submit to the NRC plans for coping with emergencies that meet standards in 4 50.47(b) and the requirements of Appendix E of this Part.

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4.10 CFR Part 50, Appendix F is amended as follows:

Appendix EEmergency Planntug and Preparedness for Production and Utilization Facilities 4 Table ofCanfenfs L Introduction

'RC staff bag developed iwo regulatory guides:

Z.S. "Emergency Planning for Research Reactors,"

and 3AZ. "Emeygency Platutittg in Fuel Cycic Facilities aitd Plants tlcengad Under 10 CFR Parts SO aud 70;" aud a jchi NRC/FEMArcport NUREG-OSS4: FEMA-REP-1. "Cyfieria for Pre parauun and Footnotes continued on next page

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Federal Register f Vol. 4S, No. 1B2 / Tuesday, August 1$, 1980 / Rules and Regulations

'5411 H. 'Ihe Preliminary Safety Analysis Report HLThe Final Safety Analysis Report IV. Content of Emergency Plans V. Imp!ementing Procedures I. Introduction Each applicant for s construcUon permit Is required by 5 50.34(s) to indude in the preliininsry safety analysts report a discussion of prefiminaiy plans for coping-with emergencies.

Each applicant for an operating license is required by 5 50.34(b) to hclude In the final safety analysis report plans for coping with emergencies.

This appendix establishes minimum requirements for emergency plans for use ln attaining an acceptable state of emergency

, preparedness.

These plans shall be described generally h the preliminary safety analysis report and submitted as a part of the finsl safety analysis report.

The potential radiological hazards to the public associated with the operation of research and test res'ctors and fuel facilitiet licensed under 10 CFR Parts 50 and 70 involve considerations different than those assodsted with nuclear power reactors.

Consequently, the size of Emergency Planning Zones 'EPZs) for facilities other than power reactors and the degree to which compliance with the requirements of this Section and Sections ILHLIV.and V as necessary willbe determined on a case-(iy-case basis.c IL'Ihe Pieflmhsry Salety AnalysIs Report The Preliminary Safety Analysis Report shsfl contain suffident informauon to ensure the compatibility of proposed eniergency plans for both onsite areas and the EPZs, with fadlity design features, site layout, and site location with respect to such Footnotes continued from last page Evslucuoa of Rcdlolostocl Emergency Rttpollla Plans aad Prcpcitdaccc ia Support ofNudttr

'ower Heats for Iattrim Ucc cad Comment."

Jtaucry 1980. to provide guidance fa dcvtloptag plans for coping with tmcrgtndcs. Copltc of these doeumcatc are available at the Comm!teton'c Public Doeumcat Room. trit11 Street. NW Wachiagtoa, D.C. 20555. Copies of these documents msy be purchased tram the Government Priattag OIItcc.

laiormaiioa oa cuncat prices mty be obtamcd by wiitiugthe Ua. Nudttr Regulatory Commlction.

Washington, D.C. 20555, Aticaiioa: Puhlicatioas Scltc Manager.

~EPZc Ior power reactors are discus std ia NUREO-039@ EPA 520/1-7fHM "Hcaaiag Bette I'or the Development of State cad Local Covtmmtat Rtdtolostccl Emergency Rcspoact Plans la Support of Light Wcicr Nudtcr Power Heats." Dcocmhtr 1978. The cist of the EPZc for c audctr power pleat shall be dtttrmtatd ia rciailoa to local tmcrgtacy response needs cad ctpcbllititc as they are affected by such conditions ac demography. topography, land chtrtcttrisiioc. access routes. cad iuricdictloatl hoimdtritc. Tht cite of the EPZc alto mcy be dcttnatacd oa c ctst.hyatt basis Ior ttts-cooled audttr rtcclorc cnd for rccctorc with an authorize power level less ihaa 250 MW ihcnacL Ccacrdiy, the ptumt exposure pathway EPZ far audccr power plants with an cuihoriztd power level greater than 250 MWihtimcishall coaclct ot an area shout 10 mlles (16 hm) ia radius cad Ihe Iascsttoa ptihwcy EPZ shall coaclst ofan area about 50 mitts Ieo kml ia radius.

%tgulctory Guide zest wiIIbe used as guidance for the ccctptahihty ofrttcinch cad test reactor cmcrgcacy rtcpoact ptsau, consideraUons as access roates, surrounding population distributions, land use, snd local jurisdictional boundaries for the EPZs in the case ofnudear power reactors as weH as the means by which tbe standards ofI 50.4/(b) willbe met.

As a minimum, the followingitems shall be described:

Onsite and offsite organizations for coping with emergendes and the means lor notification. in the event of an emergency, of persons assigned to the emergency organizations.

B. Contacts and arrangements made and documented with local. State, and Federal governmental agencies with responsibility lor coping with emergendes, inchding identification of the principal agencies.

G Protective measures to be taken withh the site boundary and within each EPZ to protect health and safety in the event of an accident; procedures by which these measures are to be carried out (e.g., in the case ofan evacuation, who authorizes the evacusUon, how the public is to be notified and hstructed. how the evacuation is to be cerned out); and the expected response of offsite agencies In the event ofan emergency.

(D) Features ol the facilityto be provided for onsite emergency first aid and decontamination and for emergency trans portation ofonsite individuals to offsits treatment I'sciliUes.

E Provisions to be made for emergency treatment at offsite fsdlities of individuals hjured as a result of licensed activities.

F. Provisions for s training program for employees of the Bcensee, indudlng those who are assigned spedfic authority and responsibility In the event ofan emergency, and for other persons who are not employees of the Bcensee but whose assistance may be needed In the event ofa radiological emergency.

G. A preliminary analysis that projects the time and mesne to be employed in the notification of State and local governments and the public In the event of an emergency.

Anudear power plant applicant shall perform s preliminary analysis of the thne required to evacuate various sectors and distances withh the plume exposure pathway EPZ for transient and permanent populations, noting major impediments to the evacuation or taking of protective actions.

H. A preliminary analysis reflecting the need to include facilities, systems, and methods for identifying the degree of seriousness and potential scope ol radiological consequences of cmeigency situations withh and outside the site boundary, induding capabilities for dose projection using reel-time meteorological information and for dispatch of radiological monitoring teams within the EPZs: and a preflminary analysis reflecting the role of the onsite ttchnka) support center and of the near site emergency operations facilityin assesshg hfonnation, recommending protective acUon. and dissemhating information to the pubBc.

HLThe Final Safety Analysis Report The Final Safety Analysis Report shaH contah the plans for coping with emeigendes.'Ihe plans shall be aa expresdon of the overaH concept of operation; they shall describe the essenUal elements of advance planning that have been considered and the provisions that have been made to cope with emergency sltuaUons. The plans shaH incorporate information about the emergency response roles of supporting organizations and offsite sgendes. That information shall be suffident to provide assurance of coordinaUon among the supporting groups and with the licensee.

The plans submitted must indude a descriptioa of the elements set out in Sectian IVfor the Emergency Planning Zones (EPZs)

'o an extent sufficient to demonstrate that the plans provide reasonable assurance that appropriate measures csa aad willbe taken ln the event of an emergency.

IV.Content of Emergency Phns

'The applicant's emergency plans shall contain. but not necessarily be limited to, information needed to demonstrate compliance with the elements set forth below, l.e. ~ organization for cophg with radiation emergencies, assessment

action, activaUon ofemergency orgardzation, notification procedures, emergency ladlities and equipment, training. maintaining emergency preparedness, and recovery. In addition. the emergency response plans submitted by an applicant for a nuclear power reactor operating Bcense shafl contain information needed to demonstrate compliance with the standards described in Section 50.47(b).'nd they willbe evaluated against those standards. The nuclear power reactor opersUng license applicant shall also provide an analysis ofthe time required to evacuate and for taking other protective

'actions for various sectors and distances within the plume exposure pathway EPZ for transient and permanent populations.

A. Organizariori

'Ihe organization for coping with radiological emergendes shall be described, hduding definition of authorities, responsibilities, and duties of individuals assigned to the licensee's emergency organization and the means fornotification of such individuals in the event of an emergency. SpeciTicafly. the following ahaH ba induded:

1. Adtscri ption of the normal plant operating organization.

Z. Adescription of the onsite emergency response organization with a detailed discussion of:

a. Authoritiee. responsibilities, snd duties of the individual(s) who wiQ take charge during an emergency;

b. Plant staff emergency assignments;

c. Authorities, responsibilities. and duties on an onsite emergency coordinator who shall be in charge of the exchange of information with offsite authorities responsible for coordiriatlng and imp!ementing olfslte emergency measures.

3. A description, by position and function to be performed. of the Bcensee's.

~These ohicctlvtc are cddrccccd by cpcdfio critcria ia NURE~ FEMA-REP-1 entitled "Crltcria for Preparation tad Evcluciioa of Radiological Emergency Response Plans tad Preparedness ia Support ofNucittr Power Phmts for Iatcrha Uce sad Comment Jcautiy 19'

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55412 Federal Register /

45, No. 182 / Tuesday, August 18, 18 Rules and Regulations headquarters personnel who willbe sent to the plant site to augment the onsite emergency organization.

4. Identification. by position and function to be performed, of persons within the licensee organization who willbe r'esponslble for making offsite dose projections, and a description of how these projections willbe made and the results transmitted to State and local authorities, NRC, and other appropriate govenuaental entities.

5. Identification, by position and function to be performed. of other employees of the licensee with special qualifications for coping with emergency condiUons that may arise.

Olher persons with special qualifications, such as consultants, who are not employees of the Hcensee and who may be called upon for assistance for emergencies shall also be identilied. The special qualiTications of these persons shall be described.

B. A description of the local offsite services to be provided in support of the Bcensee's emergency organization.

t. Identification of, and assistance expected from, appropriate State, local, and Federal agencies with responsibilities for coping with emergencies.

L Identification of the State and/or local officials responsible for plaiudng for,'

ordering. and controlling appropriate protective actions, hciudhg evacuaUons when necessary.

B. Assessmenl Aclions

'IIie means to be used for determining the magnitude of and for continually assessing the impact of the release oi'radioactive materials shall be described, including emergency action levels that are to be used as criteria for determining the need for notification and parUcipation of local and State agencies. the Commission, and other Federal agencies, and the emergency action levels that are to be used for determining when and what type of protective measures should be considered within and outside the site boundary to protect health and safety.

The emergency action levels shall be based on in.plant conditions and instrumentation in addition to onsite and affsite mordtoring.

These emergency acUon levels shall be discussed and agreed on by the applicant and Slate and local govenunental authoriUes and approved by NRC. They shaB also be reviewed with the State and local governmental authorities on an annual basis, C. Aclivalion ofEmergency Organizalion The entire spectrum of emergency conditions that involve the alerting or activating ofprogressively larger segments of the total emergency organizaUon shall be described. The communication steps to be taken to alert or activate emergency personnel under each class of emergency shall be described. Emergency action levels (based not only on onsite and offsite radiation monitoring information but also on readhgs from a number ofsensors that indicate a potential emergency. such as the pressure in containment and the response of the Emergency Core Cooling System] for notification of offsite agencies shall be described. The existence, but not the details, of a message authentication scheme shall be noted for such agencies. The emergency c)asses defined shell inc)ude: (1) notification ofunusual events, (2) alert. (3) site area emergency, and (4) general emergency. These classes are further discussed in NUREG-0554; FEMA-REP-1.

D. Notification Procedures

1. AdmhistraUve and physical means for notifying locaL State. and Federal officials and agencies and agreements reached with these officials and agencies for the prompt notification of the public and for public evacuation or other protective measures, should they become necessary, shall be described, This descripUon shall include identification of the appropriate officials, by title and agency, of the State and local government agencies within the EPZs.'.

Provisions shall be described for yearly dissemination to the public within the plume exposure pathway EPZ of basic emergency planning information, such as the methods and Umes required for pubBc notification and the protective actions planned ifan accident occurs, general information as to the nature and effects ofradiation, and a listing oflocal broadcast stations that wHI be used for dissemination of information during an emergency. Signs or other measures shall also be used to disseminate to any transient population within the plume exposure pathway EPZ appropriate information that would be heiphl ifan accident occurs.

s. A Bcensee shall have the capabiBty to noUfy responsible State and local govenunental agencies within 15 adnutes after declaring an emergency.'Ice licensee shaH demonstrate that the State(local officials have the capability to make a public notificaUon decision promptly on being informed by the licensee of an emergency condition. By July 1, 1951. the nuclear power reactor licensee shall demonstrate that administrative and physical means have been established for alerting and providing prompt instructions to the public wi0dn the plume exposure pathway EPZ. The design objecUve shall be to have the capability to essentlaHy complete the initialnotification of the pubBc within the plume exposure pathway EPZ within about 15 minutes. The use of this notification capabiBty willrange from Immediate notification of the public (within 15 minutes of the time that State and local officials are notified that a situation exists requiring urgent action) to the more likely events where there is substantial time available for the State and local governmental officials to make a.judgment whether or not to activate the pubBc noUfication system. Where there is a decision to activate lhe notiDcation system, the State and local officials wiH determine whether to activate the entire notification system simultaneously or in a graduated or staged manner. The responsibility for activating such a public notification system shall remain with the appropriate government authorities.

E. Emergency Facffilies and Eqvipmenl Adequate provisions shaB be made and described for emergency facIBties and equipment, hcluding:

1. Equipment at the site forpersonnel mordtorhg;

2. Equipment for determining the magnitude ofand for continuously assessing the impact of the release ofradioacUve materials to the environment;

s. FacHities and supplies at the site for decontamination ofonsite Individuals;

4. Facilities and medical suppBes at the site for appropriate emergency first aid treatment; S. Arrangements for the services of physicians and other medical personnel qualified to handle radiation emergencies on-site; B. Arrangements for transportation of contaminated injured individuals from the site to specifically identified treatment facilities outside the site boundary:

7. Arrangements for treatment of individuals injured in support of Bceased acUvities on the site at treatment facIBUes outside the site boundary;

s. A licensee onsite technical support center and a licensee near-site emergency operations facilityfrom which effective direcUon can be given and effective control can be exercised during an emergency;

. 9. Atleast one onsite and one offsite communications system; each system shaH have a backup power source.

AH communication plans shaH have arrangements for emergencies, including titles and alternates for those in charge at both ends of the communication links and the primary and backup means of communication. Where consistent with the function of the governmental agency, these arrangements willinclude:

a. Provision for communicaUons with contiguous State/local governments within the plume exposure pathway EPZ. Such communicaUons shall be tested monthly.

b. Provision lor communications with Federal emergency response organizations.

Such communications systems shaB be tested annuaHy.

c. Provision for commurdcations among the nuc]ear power reactor control room, the onsite technical support center. and the near-site emergency operaUons fecHity; and among the nuclear facility. the principal State and local emergency operations centers, and the field assessment teams. Such communications systems shaH be tested annually.

d. Provisions for communications by the Bcensee with NRC Headquarters and the appropriate NRC Regional Office Operations Center from the nuclear power reactar control room. the onsite technical support center, and the near-site emergency operations factBty. Such communications shaH be tested monthly.

F. 17uining The program to provide for [1) the tralniag of employees and exercising, by periodic drills, of radiation emergency plans to ensure that employees of the Hcensee are familiar with their specific emergency response duties and (2) the participation in the training and drills by other persons whose assistance may

'be needed in the event of a radiation emergency shall be described. This shall hclude a description of speciaHzed hitial training and periodic retraining programs to be provided to each of the foHowhg categories of emergency personnel:

Federal Register / Vol. 4

o. 162 / Tuesday, August 19, 1980 /

s and Regulations 55413

a. Directors and/or coordinators of the plant emergency organization:

b. Personnel responsible for accident assessment, Including control room shift personnel:

c. Radiological monitoring teams:

d. Fire control teams (fire brigades):

e. Repair and damage control teams:

f. First aid and rescue teams:

g. Medical support personnel:

h. Licensee'I headquarters support personnel:

i. Security personnel.

In addition. a radiological orientation training program shall be made available to local services personnel. e.g. ~ local Civil Defense. local law enforcement personnel.

local news media persons.

The plan shall describe provisions for the-conduct of emergency preparedness exercises. Exercises shall test the adequacy of timing and content of implementing procedures and methods. test emergency equipment and communication networks, test the public notilication system, and ensure that emergency organization personnel are familiar with their duties. Each licensee shall exercise at least annually the emergency plan for each site at which it has one or more power reactors licensed for operation. Both full scale and small scale exercises shall be conducted and shall include participation by appropriate State and local government agencies as follows:

1. A full.scale exercise which tests as much of the licensee, State, and local emergency plans as Is reasonably achievable without mandatory public participation shall be conducted;

a. For each site at which one or more power reactors are located and licensed for operation, at least once every five years and at a frequency which willenable each State and local government within the plume exposure pathway EPZ to participate in at least one full.scale exercise per year and which willenable each State within the ingestion pathway to participate in at least one full.scale exercise every three years.

b. For each site at which a power reactor Is located for which the first operating license for that site is issued after the effective date of this amendment. within one year before the issuance of the operating license for full power. which willenable each State and local government within the plume exposure EPZ and each State within the ingestion pathway EPZ to participate.

2. The plan shall also describe provisions for involving Federal emergency response agencies In a ful! scale emergency preparedness exercise for each site at which one or more power reactors are located and licensed for operation at least once every 5 years:

3. A small. scale exercise which tests the adequacy of communication links.

establishes that response agencies understand the emergency action levels. and tests at least one other component (e.g..

medical or offsite monitoring) of the offsite emergency response plan for licensee, State.

and local emergency plans for iurisdications within the plume exposure pathway EPZ shall be'conducted at each site at which one or more power reactors are located and licensed for operation eacir year a full.scale exercise is not conducted which Involves the State(s) within the plume exposure pathway EPZ.

Alltraining. including exercises, shall provide for formal critiques In order to identify weak areas that aced corrections.'ny weaknesses that are identified shall be corrected.

G. Maintaining Emergency Preparedness Proilstons to be employed to ensure that the emergency plan. its Implementing procedures. and emergency equipment and supplies are maintained up to date shall be described.

H. Recovery Criteria to be used to determine when.

followingan accident, reentry of the facility would be appropriate or when operation could be resumed shall be described.

I'.

Impiementing Procedures No less than 180 days prior to scheduled issuance of an operating license for a nuclear power reactor or a license to possess nuclear niaterial, 3 copies of each of the applicant's detailed implementing procedures for its emergency plan shall be submitted to the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office with 10 copies to the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation or, ifappropriate.

the Director of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards. In cases where a decision on an operating license is scheduled less than one year after the effective date of this ru)e, such implementing procedures shall be submitted as soon as practicable but before fullpower operation is authorized. Prior to March 1, 1981, licensees who are authorized to operate a nuclear power facility shall submit 3 copies each of the licensee's emergency plan Implementing procedures to the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office with 10 copies to the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. Three copies each of any changes to maintain these implementing procedures up to date shall be submitted to the same NRC Regional Office with $0 copies to the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation or. if appropriate. the Director of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards within 30 days of such changes.

PART 70DOMESTIC LICENSING OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL

2. Section 70.32 is amended by adding paragraph (i) to read as follows:

t)70.32 ConditIons of licenses.

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(i) Licensees required to submit emergency plans in accordance with 5 70.22(i) shall followand maintain in effect emergency plans approved by the Commission; The licensee may make changes to the approved plans without Commission approval only ifsuch changes do not decrease the effectiveness of the plans and the plans, as changed, continue to meet the requirements ofAppendix E,Section IV, 10 CFR Part 50. The licensee shall furnish the Director ofNuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555, with a copy to the appropriate NRC Regional Office specified in Appendix D, Part 20 of this Chapter, each change within six months after the change is made. Proposed changes that decrease the effectiveness of the approved emergency plan shall not be implemented without prior application to and prior approval by the Commission.

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e (Sec. 161b.. I.~ and o.. Pub. L 83-703. 68 Stat.

948 (42 U.S.C. 2201): Sec. 201. as amended.

Pub. L 93-438. 88 Stat. 1242 Pub. L 94-79. 89

~

Stat. 413 (42 US.C. $341))

Dated at Washington. D.G this 11th day of August 1980.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Samuel J. Chilk, Secretary ofthe Commission.

IFR Doc. 804$ ZIrFiled I-1M'.ISarel artzrrio coos 75%&)MI 10 CFR Part 50 Emergency Planning: Negative Declaration; Finding of no Significant Impact for Effective Rule Changes AGENGY: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

AGTloN: Final negative declaration; finding of no significant impact.

SUMMARY

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission's regulations require that the environmental impact of certain regulatory actions, including substantive amendments to 10 CFR Part 50, be evaluated to determine ifan environmental impact statement should be prepared. Ifit is determined an environmental impact statement need not be prepared. a negative declaration willbe issued. The NRC has evaluated the environmental impact of the proposed changes to Part 50 dealing with emergency planning requirements for nuclear power plants (published elsewhere in this issue), and has determined that the rule changes will not have a significant impact on the human environment. Therefore, an environmental impact statement willnot be prepared. and a negative declaration is being issued.

DATEs: The rule changes for emergency planning willbecome effective November 3. 1980.

ADDREssEs: Copies of the Final Environmental Assessment, NUREG-0885, and the comments received by the Commission may be examined in the

'ommission's Public Document Room at 1717 H Street NW., Washington, D.C.

55414 Federal Register / 445. No. 151 / Tuesday, August 1g, 1+Rules and Regutagons and'at local Public Document Rooms.

Single copies of the final Environmental Assessment (NUREG-0685) are available for purchase through the NRC GPO sales program for $4.25 (USNRC, Attention Sales Manager. Washington.

D.C. 20555).

FOR FURTHER INFORMATIONCONTACT; Michael T. Jamgochian. Offiice of Standards Development, U.S. Nuclear

. Regulatory Commission. Washington.

D.C. 20555, Telephone: (301) 443-5966.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:On January 21, 1980 the Nuclear Regulatory Commission published a "Draft Negative Declaration; Finding of No SigniTicant Impact" (45 FR 3913, January 21, 1980)'for proposed changes to 10 CFR Part 50, 5g 50.33, 50.47, 50.54 and Appendix E that deal with emeigency planning requirements for nuclear power plants (44 FR 75167, December 19, 1979).

A draft Environmental Assessment accompanied the draft Negative Declaration. The comment period ended on February 18, 1980.

Sixteen sets of comments were submitted and have been analyzed.

Although all 16 commenters felt that the draft Environmental Assessment was inadequate to support the Finding of No Significant Impact. the staff analysis does not support this view. The commenters suggested that some points in the draft Environmental Assessment were in error, some required much more detailed discussion, and some points had been ignored. The errors have been corrected and do not significantly affect the earlier conclusion. The levels of detail and the omissions are generally related to the penalties associated with noncompliance with the rule. The staff originally judged that invocations of the noncompliance penalties (i.e., nuclear power plant shutdown) would be infrequent and of short duration and the associated impacts would thus be insignificant. Commenters asserted that there willbe frequent and long-tenn shutdowns which willhave severe

~ impacts which woidd require detailed consideration in an Environmental Impact StatemenL The staff analysis has supported the judgment of infrequent, short-term shutdowns and thus concludes that no additional detailed studies are necessary.

Minor revisions have been made in the environmental assessment reflecting comments received, but its conclusions have not been altered. Based on this assessment.

a final determination has been made by the Director, Office of Standards Development, that the proposed nde changes willnot have a sfgnficant impact on the human environment and, therefore, that an environmental impact statement willnot be Prepared for these rule changes.

Analysis of Comments The groups that submit ted comments are fdentiTied on, the Table together with their principal comments. No comments were received from State or local governments, other Federal agencies, or public interest groups.

The main point of.each set of comments was that an EnvironmentaI Impact Statement should be prepared for the rule changes and that the Environmental Assessment "...

inadequately addresses the environmental impact of the Emergency Planning Proposed Rule and the economic and social impacts an U.S.

fndustry of long-term or permanent premature shutdowns ofnuclear plants" (AEP). The comments have been reconstructed into 14 general criticisms, which have been analyzed'for their relevance to the validityofthe conclusions in the "DraftNegative Declaration: Finding ofNo SigniTicant Impact."

One matter warrants additional mention here. An assumption was made in preparation of the DEA that shutdowns ofnuclear power plants as a result ofactions taken under these rule changes would be infrequent and of short duration. This assumption fs critical to the decision that an Environmental Impact Statement should not,be prepared. The basis for this assumption was that, since State and local authorities have the responsibility.

in common with the NRC, to protect public health and safety and are concerned with meeting the energy needs of their citizens, it is likely that they willcooperate to ensure the

'ontinued safe operation or timely co'mmencement ofsafe operation of nuclear generation capability within their jurisdiction. The only significant adverse reaction by the State and local governments that must bear this burden has been that complications in funding ofState programs and Ibad time for equipment acquisition might make IX difficultto completely satisfy all of the planning and preparedness requirements by the date set forth in the proposed rule changes. As a direct result of this. the deadline for plans and implementation has been extended to AprilL 1981. and the deadline for having warning systems in place has been extended to July 1, 1981. These extensions shoidd be sufficierit in most cases.

It should also be noted that the Commission has chosen the alternative that requires Commission action to initiate a shutdown. Conditions are specified in the regulation that the Commissfon willuse In each case to detertnine whether a shut tfown is warranted. When considered together, the lack of any significant adverse comment from State and local governments, the necessity for Commission action before a plant will be shut down, and the conditions for'hether a shutdown fs warranted, all argue convincingly that the assumption that shutdowns willbe infrequent and of short duration is sound. Thus, the assumption fa retained in the final

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~

Environmental Assessment (NUREG-0685) and the impacts of extendbd shutdowns are not considered valid impacts ofthese nde changes.

The 14 reconstructed general comments and a discussion ofeach follow:

1. Three commenters (see TableJ contend that alternatives ta the proposed rule changes aiz t'nadequataly

. addressed.

They specifical/y mention aiternati va ways ofachieving the same end such as proposing legislation.

In view of the existing safety record of the nuclear industry and the lack of effective preparation for the TM accident. the Commission had the following three alternatives I'rom which to choose:

A. The Commission could take no fmmediate action itself while encouraging other parties,!.e., the Congress, other Federal Agencies, the States, and the utilities themselves to take effective action. This "no action" alternative would be counter to the Commission's legislative mandate to protect public health and safety. In fact,

-the TMIaccident was a clear indication that this "urging without requiring" emergency preparedness had proved to be ineffective. This alternative dearly could not stand fn the face ofthe, Commission's responsibility in this area.

B. The commission is a regidatory agency and has as one of its chief tpols the authority to issue regulations that bind those parties that it regulates. Ifan effective method for achieving protection ofpublic health and safety is available through promulgation of regulations with speciTic requirements and penalties and conditions governing those requirements and penalties, this should be the proper way for the Commission to proceed.

C. Ifthe Commission judged that danger to public health and safety was significant and imminent because of continued operation of existing plants while effective regulations are developed, it had the authority to

, impose immediate shutdowns until a sohtion could be found. The safety record ofnuclear power, including the

I'

Federal Register / Vol., No. 162 / Tuesday,'August 19, 1980 /

ules and Regulations 55415 TMIaccident. does not support an

'industry-wide judgment of imminent.

'ignificant danger. However, potential does exist for significant harm to the public in the event of a severe accident and the events at TMIsuggest that plans must be made to account for this potential problem. Notwithstanding this potential. given the likelihood of an accident requiring off-site emergency protective measures, immediate.

industry-wide shutdown and the attendant severe long-term impacts are not warranted.

Alternatives A and C are clearly-unacceptable. The discussion of alternatives in the Final Environmental Assessment has not been changed from Mat in the Draft Environmental Assessment.

2. Seven commenters (see Toble) assert that theimpacts ofshutdowns are underestimated and that shutdowns of multiple unitplants or severolin the

'ame State were not considered.

BILUNQ CODE 7~1M

0 III I

I i

55416 Federal Register / V 5, No. 262 / Tuesday, Afrgast19, %960 les and Regulatifms

[7590-01J Hatrfx Ofsplay of Cortrxenters and Ha)or Crxreents Crxrrnentersl Ha or Conaaents I. 'Alternatives inadequately addressed 2.

impacts of shutdowns underestimated (costs)

3. 'Health effects of fossil subst1tutfon underestimated 4.

Challenae assumotfon nf fnfreouent, short-duration shutdowns 5.

Judgement on State" cooperation unsubstantiated 6.

Lonq-term impacts not addressed 7.

Psycholoofcal and physfcal risks of false alarms not evaluated 8.

Use of fuel~fx improper, varfatfon fn cost of replacement power 9.

Significant fmpacts due to linkage between approval and continued operation 10.

Proposed rule prior to FEHA ll.

Costs too low (15 minute

>>arn1ng system not 1ncluded) 12.

Deci sfons grant1ng exemptf ons or resumption of operat1on should be classified as categorical exclusions under Coanxfssfon's NEPA regulations 13.

No consideration of costs to utfl1tfes 14.

Ko consideratfon of plants under construction X

X X

X X

X X

X X

X X

VI aO L7C

~aa X

X X

X

~a

~e Ci

~o aa an X

X X'

Key to Coruaenters a

AlF - Atcm1c industrial Form Yank. At. - Yankee Atomic Elecdrfc Co.

Com.

Ed.

Corrrronwealth Edison<

Con. Ed. - Consolidated Edison Company of New York. Tnc.

AEP - Amerfcan Electric Power Serv1ce Corporation EEI - Edison Electric Institute LLLH - LeBoeu(,

Lamb, Leiby d faacRae (for five ut111tfes)

NU - ttortheast Utilities PASNY - Power Authority of the State of New York BAdE - Baltimore Gas and Electr1c 0 d L - Oegevofs d Lfberman (for three ut111 ties)

Duke - Duke Power Company SPPdT - Shaw, Pfttman, Potts A

Trowbridge (for eight utilities)

DOE - U. S. Department of Energy LNRAdT - Lowenstefn.

Keamaan, Reis, Axelrod d Toll (for two utilities)

Federal Register / Vol. 4~o.'1B2 / Tuesday, August 19, 1980 / R s and Regulations 55417 The DEA was prepared with the understanding that ever increasing fuel prices make it difficultto make stable predictions of the costs ofreplacement power. While individual values of replacement costs may be in error, the upper end of the range of costs of replacement power, which is compared in the Environmental Assessment to the costs of compliance, is only changed by about 38% when the heat rate is changed as suggested. The response to comment eleven indicates that the costs of compliance were also underestimated, the relative comparison of these two costs was used to demonstrate the strong economic incentive that exists for all parties to strive for effective emergency planning and preparedness.

The staff agrees that the net plant heat rate assumed in the DEA is low and therefore changed the assumed heat rate from 9,400 Btu/kWh to.11,000 Btu/kWh.

Accordingly. the cost figures have been modified in the Final Environmental Assessment; but these modifications do not alter the conclusions of the Environmental Assessment.

The question ofmultiple-plant shutdowns because of a common reason, i.ean unacceptable State plan or multiple units on a site where the local plan is unacceptable, is a more difficultproblem, The State plans are only a part of the overall Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)program to enhance the ability of State governments to handle emergencies. The economic incentive for the utilities to help the States in every way possible should result in the preparation ofplans and equipment for a nuclear plant emergency that willbe a sound. significant contribution to the overall capability of a State to handle many different kinds of emergencies.

The provision ofconditions that permit issuance of an operating license or continuation of operation, the extension of the compliance date and deadline for warning systems to be in place, and the record of cooperation from the States up to the present time make it unlikely that any State's program willbe so deficient that shutdown of all plants in the State willbe required.

The potential that an unsatisfactory local plan might result in the shutdown of all units on a specific site appears to be significantly greater. Depending on the size and number of the units involved, the incentive of the utilityfor aiding the local governments is also greater. The potential magnitude of the impact of shutdown in these cases is two to three times 'greater than for the single unit case. and this determination has been added to the Environmental Assessment. In any case, it would appear that whether these impacts, if severe enough, constitute "other compelling reasons" to permit continued operation willbe determined in the individual reviews.

3. Four groups comment that health effects offossil substitution are underestimaledin the draft Environmental Assessment and that other effects areignared.

The critical assumption in the draft and final Environmental Assessment is that shutdowns willbe infrequent and of short duration. In such a case, the fossil generating capacity is simply that which

~

is available for normal replacement power during refueling and maintenance outages and would probably be used in periods ofpeak demand until the utifity phases it out of the generating system completely. (The impacts are thus ones that occur anyway, but at a different time. Short, infrequent shutdowns will only change the time period for suffering an impact that willmost likelybe felt eventually anyway.) For such short-tenn replacement, no new plants willbe built.

The draft and final Environmental Assessment accepts these impacts as a consequence ofinfrequent and brief shutdowns. (A more accurate analysis might conclude that there is zero cumulative impact because the useful life of the replacement capability is unaltered.) The discussions in the Final Environmental Assessment are unaltered on this subject.

4. Nine commenters challenged the assumption that shutdowns would be infrequent and ofshort duration and questioned the lack oftreatment ofthe availabilityofreplacement capacity.

The assumption that shutdowns will be infrequent and of short duration is critical to the validity of the Environmental Assessment. At the time when the Draft Environmental Assessment was prepared. this assumption was based on the assertion that State and local governments (having in common with NRC the responsibility to protect public health and safety) willcooperate to provide fullyfor protection of the public. Since that time, the Commission. in cooperation with FEMA, has been working diligently to help State and local governments develop satisfactory emergency plans and programs. The response of the State and local governments has confirmed the validity of the earlier assumption. In addition. no State or local government provided any comment on the Draft Environmental Assessment, thus indicating at least tacit agreement with the basis for the assumption.

Since the basis for the assumption of infrequent shutdowns has not received substantive challenge from the parties directly involved. but there has instead

. been activity that tends to confirm the assumption, it willremain as a fundamental assumption of the final Environmental Assessment.

. The availability of replacement capacity also hinges on this assumption.

Part of the purpose of reserve capacity is replacement during plant outages. As

'long as shutdowns are infrequent and of short duration. they should fit into this normal pattern ofutilization of replacement capacity. No additional discussions of this topic have been prepared for the final Envuonmental Assessment.

5. Seven commenters contend the judgment that "...itis likelythat the States willcooperate to assuis the continued safe operation or timely commencement ofsafe operation of nuclear generation capabi%'ty within theirjurisdiction"is unsubstontiated.

While this assumption was made in the absence of first-hand information, the experience of the Commission since December 1979, in attempting to work with state and local government officials, has confirmed the accuracy of this assumption.

6. Five commenters assert that impacts oflong-term shutdowns are not addressed.

The assumption that shutdowns will be infrequent and of short duration defines the scope of this Environmental Assessment.

As described above. long-term shutdowns are not the expected result of these rule changes. The goal of these rule changes is timely implementation of adequate emergency plans and programs. The draA aod finsl Environmental Assessment address the impacts of this action based on the expected consequences and practical considerations of implementation of the provisions of the rule changes. No analysis of the eHects of long. tenn shutdowns has been added to the final Environmental Assessment

7. Six commenters contend that psychological and physical risks to the public offalse alarms are not evaluoted.

The Emergency Action Level Guidelines (NUREG-0810) recommend notification of the public when a "Site Emergency" has been declared. The expected frequency of an event of this type is predicted to be 1 in 100 to 1 in 5,000 per reactor per year. The high end of this range indicates that two such warnings might occur over the effective life (40 years) for every five units. The low end indicates one event over the life of125 units. Far from causing excessive psychological and physical risks, this

55418 Federal Register / Vo. 45, No. 162 / Tuesday, August 19, 1980 /

ules and Regulations kind of behavior should lead to a more

'ccurate public perception of the true incidence of risk from nuclear power facilities and a more practical and considered response to an emergency when one occurs. No change has been made in the final Environmental Assessment.

8. Five commenters ossert that the use ofthe mix offuels already in usein the State is a poor predicter ofwhat would be the fuel replacement capacity fora specific plant shutdown.

A generic assessment must make some averaging assumptions or become hopelessly lost in detail. In this case. the commenters are correct that this is a "gross assumption." It is, however.

sufficient to establish the range of costs for replacement power, which is the way the detailed information was used. No change has been made in the mix of fuels used to generically assess the range of costs ofreplacement power.

9. Five commenters observe that allof the significant impacts are due to.'inkage between odequacy ofemergency plans ond continued plont operation.

These commenters agree that the impacts of compliance are insignificant and that ifthere were no penalty associated with inadequate emergency preparedness then an Environmental Assessment or no Environmental Assessment would be appropriate. The thrust of the rule is to protect the public

.through adequate emergency planning.

The thrust of the shutdown provision!s to protect the public in the event that adequate provision has not been and is not being made to provide adequate emergency planning and preparedness.

The decision of how the public should be protected has been made, i.e., either emergency planning and preparedness is adequate or a plant may be placed in a condition of safe shutdown. The State and local authorities have the responsibility to determine which option is in the best interest of their citizens.

The linkage remains in the effective rule changes. No additional discussion has been provided in the'final Environmental Assessment.

10. Mo commenters observed thot the proposed rule wasissued priorto the exponded role ofFEMAin emergency planning fornuclear power plants.

The NRC and FEMA are working closely to establish and carry out their respective roles in emergency planning for nuclear power plants. The effective rule has been changed io reflect this change in relationship between the two agencies. However, the substantive provisions of the rule have not changed, only the parties responsible for specific actions.

11. Seven commenters assert that the costs ofimplementotion are too lowand that there may not be enough time allowed to achieve adequacyin all areas ofemergency plannmg and preparedness.

The draft Environmental Assessment based its estimates of cost of implementation on information contained in "Beyond Defense in Depth:

Cost and Funding of State and Local Government Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Commercial Nuclear Power Stations," NUREG-0553, October 1979.

This report did not consider the costs of a warning system that would effectively warn everyone within 10 miles within 15 minutes of the tim'e when the decision to warn the public is made. The cost estimates in the draft Environmental Assessment thus do not include the costs of 15-minute notification. The estimates provided by the commenters have been used to revise the cost estimate in the final Environmental Assessment. It should be noted that all cost figures are approximate and are only intended to give an estimate of the normal magnitude of costs and fees associated with building and operating a nuclear power plant. Significant variations from these costs for individual cases should be expected.'hese changes do not affect the earlier conclusions of the draft Environmental Assessment.

In response to comments that more time might be needed, the deadline for plans and implementation to be completed has been extended to April1, 1981, and the deadline for installation of warning systems has been extended to july 1, 1981 to allow for procurement problems. Appropriate changes have been made in the Environmental Assessment but the earlier conclusions remain unaffected,

12. One commenter suggested that decisions on shutdowns, allowing continued operation despiteinadequate plans, or the resumption ofoperation after a shutdown should be listedin 10 CFR Part 51 as o categorical exclusion.

The categorical exclusions in Part 51 are those Commission actions that have been fudged as a class not to have any significant environmental impact and thus have been excluded from further consideration under those portions of the Commission's regulations that

'ortheast ViiiitiesIndicated costs es much as ZS ihues those quoted tn the En>Mumentet Assessment but e!so cited unusual compllceuous such as targe numbers of local govenuuents that escalated their costs. Since ibis single estimate was not courumed by other State or utilitycommenters, the values were considered beyond the usual range of costs.

implement the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969. The Commission will consider this as a comment on the ongoing rulemaking on 10 CFR Part 51 (45 FR 13739).

13. Two commenters noted that no consideration was given to the costs to the utilitiesofthose portions ofthe rule changes that upgrade previous onsite requirements.

This oversight has been corrected.

While these costs added a significant increment to the total cost of implementation. this total cost is still low compared to the reference costs of.

(1) replacement power. (2) tax and fee burden, and (3) capital investment.

While several of the cost figures in the final Environmental Assessment have been revised upward, the comparison of these costs has remained unchanged and the conclusions of the Environmental Assessment are unchanged.

14. One commenter observed that there is no consideration given to plants under construction.

The cost estimates were forecast for all plants scheduled to be operating by the time the rule was to become

,effective. To go beyond this period would only complicate the estimates with future costs ofgreater uncertainty.

The purpose here was to present an approximation of the relative significance of the cost impacts to determine whether.a more detailed analysis is necessary. The relative magnitude of these costs is well established by the information at hand and these are clearly sufficient to support a decision without the preparation on environmental impact statement.

Dated at Bethesda, Maryland, this 6th day ofAugust 1980.

For the Nucie'er Regulatory Commission.

Robert B. Minogue, Director, OfficeofStandonfs Development.

VS. ¹clear Regulatory Commission.

pR Dec. eo-SSSee Bled e-ieaa ace am)

WlllNO CODE 75~1M

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