ML17095A501
| ML17095A501 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 10/15/1985 |
| From: | Schierling H Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Knighton G Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8510240497 | |
| Download: ML17095A501 (52) | |
Text
Docket Nos.:
50-275 and 50-323 4CT 15 Jeep MEMORANDUM FOR:
George W. Knighton, Chief Licensing Branch No.
3 Division of Licensing FROM:
SUBJECT:
Hans Schierling, Project Manager Licensing Branch No.
3 Division of Licensing DIABLO CANYON - CRDR MEETING WITH PGSE DATE 5 TIME:
LOCATION:
'URPOSE:
PARTICIPANTS:
November 6 and 7, 1985 9:00 am - 5:00 pm Room 5033 Air Rights Building 4550 Montgomery Avenue
- Bethesda, Maryland Discuss status of Licensee's Detailed Control Room Design Review.
NRC H. Schierling N. Thompson L. Beltrachi NRC Consultants (SAI)
PG&E B. Lew, et al.
OrilIABlsipped by Harls Schlorling cc:
See~next pa e
DL:L 3
D 5'3 HSchierling/es W
ighton 10/]p'85 10/(i /85 Hans Schierling, Project Manager Licensing Branch No.
3 Division of Licensing 8510240497 85101 5
'PDR ADOCK 05000275:,
';I,
ENCLOSURE 2
DIABLO CANYON DCRDR MEETING November 6, 1985 Attendance List Name'ans Schierling Peter Beckham Joseph,Cucco, Jr.
Bryant Giffin Joe Seminara John J. Vranicar Joseph Lisboa Rob Fisher W. Neil Thompson Dom Tondi Dick Eckenrode Saba N. Saba John Stokley Joel Kramer Carol Kain Sig Auer Tom Libs Affiliation NRC Diablo Canyon Project Manager PG&E CRDR Phase II Project Manager PG&E CRDR Phase II Review Team Leader PG&E PG&E - Consultant PG&E Bechtel PG&E NRC-DHFS-HFEB Team Leader NRC-DHFS-HFEB NRC-DHFS-HFEB NRC-DHFS-HFEB SAIC - Consultant to NRC NRC-DHFS-HFEB SAIC - Consultant to NRC PG&E PG&E'
1 I
P II
ENCLOSURE 3
MINUTES OF MEETING BETWEEN NRC AND PG&E ON THE DCRDR FOR THE DIABLO CANYON GENERATING STATION, UNITS 1
AND 2 The following are minutes of a meeting held on November 6,
- 1985, between the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E).
Also in attendance were a
PG&E human factors consultant and NRC consultants from Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC).
Specific attendees and the organizations they represent are shown in Attachment 1.
The purpose of the meeting was to address concerns that resulted from an in-progress audit conducted on February 11-15,
- 1985, at the plant site.
Results of that audit were documented in a report and forwarded to PG&E on September 16, 1985 (Reference 1).
In response to the in-progress audit report PG&E requested a
meeting with NRC staff to address the in-progress audit findings and to attempt to overcome any problems found with the DCRDR being conducted.
The following are highlights of the meeting.
Attachment 2
provides the NRC meeting agenda that had been suggested in the audit report.
Attachment 3 consists of handouts provided by PG&E during the meeting.
Establishment of a uglified Multidisci linar Review Team During PG&E's in-progress audit, several concerns surfaced regarding the core review team composition and the management review team's'participa-tion in the DCRDR.
PG&E addressed concerns in the audit report in'escribing the team composition by discipline and the types of disciplines that are assigned to each DCRDR task.
A handout to illustrate DCRDR task assignments was also provided.
At the time of the audit, the human factors specialist was not engaged with some important par ts of the DCRDR; however, PG&E indicates that this expertise is now available and will take a stronger role in DCRDR tasks.
PG&E also discussed the management team participation in review of Human Engineering Discrepancies (HEDs) and approval of proposed design changes.
A DCRDR procedure has been established for management sign-off in the assessment and resolution process to increase their involvement.
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Also mentioned during the meeting was the assignment of a new manager to Phase 2 of the DCRDR; this individual is also charged with managing the implementation of the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS).
PG&E recognizes that an overlap of personnel between the different control room improvement programs will help to coordinate efforts.
Complete documenta-
'ion of personnel by name, DCRDR tasks
- assigned, level of involvement, and participation in other improvement programs should be included in PG&E's documentation of this requirement.
Function and Task Anal sis Com arison of Dis la and Control Re uirements With a Control Room Inventor The methodology and the composition of the DCRDR Team which were employed in the effort to meet this requirement were judged by NRC to be inadequate.
This message was conveyed to PG&E at the time of the in-progress audit and again in the NRC in-progress audit report (Reference I).
Since the time of the audit, Diablo Canyon has completed writing all the EOPs associated with Revision I of the Westinghouse Owners Group Emergency
Response
Guidelines.
As of the date of the current meeting, PG&E had not yet turned its attention to satisfying the task analysis concerns resulting from the NRC in-progress audit.
However, at the meeting, PG&E agreed to comply with this requirement of NUREG-0737, Supplement l.
Specifically, PG&E agreed to:
I.
Include a
human factors specialist to assist it in the completion of both the analysis itself and the comparison of the display and control needs (product of the task analysis) with the control room inventory.
Confirm methodology to be used for completing the task analysis.
2.
Identify, independent of the control
- room, the needed human factors characteristics of the information and control require-ments needed to perform the task.
3.
Create documentation of these required characteristics for use in comparison against the control room inventory.
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~
4.
Complete the comparison and identify HEDs.
5.
Document process for audit purposes.
As an integral part of completing the above
- steps, PG&E should respond to elements 2 and 3 of the in-progress audit report (Reference
- 1) in its letter to the NRC Diablo Canyon Project
- Manager, as well as in its Supplement to the Summary Report.
Additional guidance to PG&E may be found in an NRC memorandum from H.B. Clayton to D.C. Ziemann, dated April 5, 1985 (Reference 2).
Items 2 and 4 of this memo are still open items.
PG&E should note that completion of the task analysis was intended to be done to assist in developing effective EOPs.
Consequently, the results of the new task analysis effort may result in modifications to those EOPs already written by PG&E (e.g., instances may be found where the control room does not adequately support the EOPs).
NRC concluded this item by requesting that PG&E describe their methodology to the NRC before beginning the task analysis.
That description should be documented in their response to the NRC Project Manager.
They should feel free to phone NRC for any guidance to develop their methodology.
Control Room Surve During the in-progress
- audit, PG&E had not completed some of the studies that are part of the survey; namely lighting survey, control environment for heating, ventilation and air, the auditory environment, emergency equipment, annunciator system and communications.
Review of the remote shutdown panels was also in progress.
Display formats and features on the plant computer and the SPDS are also to be part of the control room survey effort.
The audit team had also found the survey identified several generic or control room-wide HEDs for which the survey team were to resurvey on a panel-by-panel basis.
PG&E addressed this concern by indicating that plans for survey completion were under way and were expected to be finished by February 1986.
Assessment of HEDs In response to the in-progress
- audit, PG&E developed a methodology to reassess HEDs in order to identify the safety significant HEDs.
That
methodology was discussed during the meeting, and PG&E provided handouts to illustrate the assessment process and the manner by which it will maintain records.
The major item left unresolved during the audit was the specific process to screen safety-significant HEDs.
The assessment of HEDs has been revised and improved from that originally performed; HEDs that impact plant safety will be identified and placed in Priority Groups 1 or 2.
The major delineation between Group 1 and 2
HEDs is defined as the potential for error.
NRC staff are concerned that the potential for error be assessed by the human factors specialist and that HEDs be grouped by either high, medium or low categories.
HEDs with no high error potential and no significant safety consequences may be placed in lower priority categories.
Group 1
HEDs will be scheduled for the first refueling outage which is planned for July 15, 1986; and Group 2
HEDs will be corrected during either, the first or the second refueling outage.
PG&E was reminded to assess HEDs that have neither high safety consequences nor high potential error for their cumula-tive effects which could raise their significance and priority.
Because the Supplement to the Summary Report describing corrections is tentatively scheduled for July 1987 - after the correction phase begins -
a conflict exists between implementation of corrections (July 1986) prior to NRC review of those correc tions.
In conclusion, the meeting resulted in clarification of PG&E's methodology to satisfy this requirement.
With exception of a scheduling
- conflict, NRC found PG&E has adequately improved its process to identify and schedule corrections for safety-related HEDs.
The conflict in scheduling may be resolved by an NRC staff visit prior to the Supplement to the Summary Report to review proposed corrections for safety-significant HEDs.
HEDs and other findings documented during the in-progress audit mini-survey should be addressed in the assessment process and documented in the Supplement to the Summary Report.
Results of the HED assessment process should also be reported to the NRC in their Supplement to the Summary Report.
Selection of Desi n
Im rovements This item, which was addressed during the meeting involved the specific procedure PG&E would institute to guide HED correction from design improve-ments through to implementation, including the participation of a human factors special ist.
During the
- meeting, PGSE discussed its correction
- process, provided a
flow chart to illustrate the process, and described the role the human factors specialist would provide.
Preliminary HED corrections are formed during core team assessment of HEDs and more formal selection of design changes are to be determined by using a half-scale mock-up.
The process will be done by the core review team with the full participation of a human factors specialist.
Documentation of HEDs and proposed corrections are submitted for management team review who then either concur or ask for other alternatives.
Interim compensatory action may also be proposed to reduce the safety significance of potential for error of the HED until a time when full or optimal correction can be made.
Justification for no correction may also result during the correction phase.
PGKE also discussed the approach that is taken for modifying procedures when correcting those types of HEDs.
The process is largely identical to the one for design corrections;
- however, the PGSE operations group plays a
stronger role in the process to verify that the HED is corrected.
All design changes or procedure changes are fully documented and reviewed by management in a formal plant design change procedure.
The procedure also calls for human factors involvement throughout the process.
It was concluded that this item from the audit has been addressed with a process that should guide HEDs through design correction proposal to implementation.
Verification That Selected Im rovements Will Provide the Necessar Correc-
- tion, and Verification That Im rovements Will Not Create New HEDs During the in-progress
- audit, PGSE had not formalized a procedure for this stage of the
- DCRDR, and had not identified the role the human factors specialist would take.
As described
- above, a
more formalized procedure to document HED corrections and to include human factors was established.
That process includes review of the corrections on a mock-up and/or in the simu-lator.
Procedural changes are also to be verified by an operations review group who have the following checklists at their disposal to help in verify-ing the correction:
al ql
1.
Westinghouse Owners Group Writer's Guide 2.
2005-EOP Checklist 3.
Human factors review of format consistency with other procedures Coordination of the DCRDR With Other Control Room Im rovement Pro rams The process to accomplish this requirement was briefly described by PG&E. Specifically it indicated that overlap of team members on the dif-ferent programs would afford a mechanism to meet this requirement;
- however, it did not provide documentation or examples of how this mechanism would function, i.e., sign-off sheets, procedures, etc.
PG&E also stated that the EOPs are complete as of March 1985, Regulatory Guide 1.97 instrumentation is largely installed, and the SPDS has been declared operational.
Training of operators to all changes is not complete, at least for the DCRDR; however, a
mechanism exists for the training department to sign-off on all design changes.
PG&E should fully respond to this item during future submittals.
One way to illustrate this item may be to expand the HED Correction Flow Chart to indicate the relatiohship and integration of DCRDR corrections with other control room improvement programs.
Conclusions The meeting resulted in clarification of most items found during the NRC in-progress audit at Diablo Canyon, Units 1 and 2.
PG&E concurrence with this meeting summary should be provided along with a specific response to all nine items that were found during the audit, with specific detail describing the process to conduct the function and task analysis.
The NRC staff believe that PG&E has performed a great deal of work to accomplish the DCRDR, but has yet to document the specific procedures (particularly for items 2 and 3) and communicate them via submittals to the NRC.
Only through such submittals can the licensee be assured of receiving credit for its efforts.
At a
minimum, information to address all audit
- items, including the SPDS audit findings, should be submitted in PG&E's Supplement to the Summary Report.
An organization chart identifying personnel, task assign-
- ments, and levels of effort for each of the nine items should be developed and provided, in addition to any quality control aspects for completion of
items.
PG&E should also inform the NRC of intentions to implement safety-related corrections during the first refueling outage.
A response to all nine items from PGLE should be received by NRC in early January.
REFERENCES l.
"In-Progress Audit of the Detailed Control Room Design Review Evalua-tions for Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Units 1 and 2."
Division of Human Factors
- Safety, NRR, NRC, September 1985.
2.
NRC Memorandum from H.B. Clayton to D.L. Ziemann, "Meeting Summary-Task Analysis Requirements of Supplemenet 1 to NUREG-0737," April 5, 1985.
v
ATTACHMENT 1 DIABLO-CANYON DCRDR MEETING November 6, 1985 Attendance List Name Affiliation Hans Schierling Peter Beckham F. Joseph Cucco, Jr.
Bryant Giffin Joe Seminara John J. Vranicar Joseph Lisboa Rob Fisher W. Neil Thompson Dom Tondi Dick Eckenrode Saba N. Saba John Stokley Joel Kramer Carol Kain Sig Auer Tom Libs NRC/DL/LB-3 PG&E CRDR Phase II Project Manager PG&E CRDR Phase II Review Team Leader PG&E PG&E - NF consultant PG&E Bechtel I&C PG&E - Ops Sr. Engr.
NRC DHFS HFEB Team Leader NRC DHFS HFEB NRC DHFS HFEB NRC DHFS HFEB SAIC/consultant to NRC NRC DHFS HFEB SAIC/NRC PG&E Co. Eng.
'4
ATTACHMENT 2 SUGGESTED AGENDA FOR DIABLO CANYON DCRDR MEETING 1.
Structure and Participation of the DCRDR team A.
B.
C.
Increased participation of human factors consultants Provision for documenting levels of effort or task assignments Increased involvement of PGEE management in HED review and approval process.
2.
Function and Task Analysis A.
B.
C.
Changes to methodology in order to provide a listing of needed instrument and control characteristics associated with operator tasks.
Change in process to include human factors specialists in task optimization of EOPs.
Completion of all tasks associated with Revision 1 or the EPGs.
3.
Comparison of Display and Control Requirements with a Control Room Inventory A.
Change in methodology to use identified inventory and product from SFTA B.
Method for documentation.
4.
Control Room Survey A.
Discuss current status and plans for completion of studies/surveys B.
Discuss methods for documenting specific HEDs which are part of a
larger generic group.
10
5.
Assessment of HEDs Change of process to screen safety significant HEDs 6.
Selection of Design Improvements Development of a procedure to guide HED correction from design improvement through to implementation, including the participation of the human factors specialists in all phases.
- 7. and 8.
Verification Discuss a formalized procedure for this activity, and include the participation of the human factors specialists.
9.
Coordination of DCRDR with other programs A.
Discuss a formalized process B.
Provide a procedure with a milestone chart to illustrate product completion, integrator, and iteration with other programs.
11
ATTACHMENT 3 DCRDR TASK ASSIGNMENTS REASSESSMENT OF HED'S Develop Methodology:
Review Team Leader Human Factors Specialist Core Review Team members Plant Operations Personnel Reassess HED's:
Human Factors Specialist Review Team Leader Core Review Team members Operators Additional technical support as required Perform Invest/Surveys:
Core Review Team members Human Factors Specialist Additional technical support as required Results reviewed by other review team members including Human Factors Specialist HED Assessment Concurrence:
Management Team Plant Representative for Priority I HED's Any MT member for non-priority I HED's FORMALIZE ENHANCEMENT METHODOLOGIES Draft Guidelines:
Human Factors Specialist Core Review Team members Plant personnel Convert to Technical Format:
Core Review Team members Review Guidelines:
Human Factors Specialist Review Team Leader Formalize Guidelines:
Core Review Team members Design Drafting personnel Management Team HED RESOLUTIONS Develop Resolution Options:
Human Factors Specialist Core Review Team Review Team Leader Plant Operations Personnel
Implement Changes to Mock-up: Core Review Team members Design Drafting personnel Review Team Leader Verify HED's Corrected:
Core Review Team members Human Factors Specialist Plant Operations personnel Review Team Leader Validate Corrections:
Human Factors Specialist Plant Operations personnel Core Review Team members Review Team Leader General Review of Changes:
Review Operator Comments:
Plant Operations personnel Human Factors Specialist Review Team Leader Core Review Team members Others (DCPP,
- NOS, DCP) as required SUBMIT MODIFICATION RECOMMENDATIONS Design Change Requests:
Core Review Team members Design Drafting Review Team Leader Project Manager Other Requests/Recommend:
Core Review Team members Review Team Leader Project Manager DEVELOP RESOLUTION IMPLEMENTATION PLAN Establish Milestones:
Review Team Leader Core Review Team members Management Team members (via HED assessment concurrence)
Implementation Schedule:
Project Management Group persomnel Diablo Canyon Project scheduling personnel Review Team Leader PROVIDE MECHANISM FOR HUMAN FACTORS REVIEW OF FUTURE CHANGES Provide HF Training:
(to Eng'g, Operations, etc.)
Human Factors Specialist Review Team Leader Core Review Team members
Perform HF review of DCN's:
(duration of DCRDR)
Review Team Leader Core Review Team members Human Factors Specialist Perform HF review of DCN's:
(post-DCRDR)
Human Factors Group (to be established)
INTEGRATE WITH OTHER NUREG-0737 ACTIVITIES Reg.
Guide 1.97 Review:
Core Review Team members I6C Engineering Human Factors Specialist Review Team Leader SPDS Review:
CRDR Project Manager Human Factors Specialist Core Review Team members Review Team Leader EOP's Review:
Plant procedures group Operating Procedures Review Group Human Factors Specialist Core Review Team members Review Team Leader ISSUE FINAL REPORT Draft Report:
Review Team Leader Human Factors Specialist Core Review Team members Review report:
Project Manager Management Team members DCPP.
NOS.
and DCP Managers licensing DCRDR contributers Note 1:
The order of listing reflects the relative level of involvement.
Note 2:
The core Review Team consists of personnel from ISC Engineering, Electrical Engineering, and Operations Engineering..
GENERIC TO PLANT SPECIFIC (DCPP 1 6 2) TASK ANALYSIS CONVERS10H PROCESS GENERIC AND DCPP I 6 2 DOCVHENTATION (FSARk STS ~ ~ ~
HUREC-0899 DCPP I 6 2 TASK ANALYSIS DCPP I 6 2 TASK AHAI.YSIS - EOPs/INSTKUHKNTATION & CONTROL RK UIREHEHTS TASK AHA(YSIS ACCOHPl ISHHKNTS DCPP I & 2 FSAR DCPP 16 2 SPECIFIC DESIGN DAThe DCPP 16 2 STANDARD TECHNICAL SPECS (S.T.S.)
Ada ted/Au mented generic documontatlon to reflect plant specific configuration and oporatlonal philosophy for EOPs and the required Instrumentation and Controls.
By a direct correlation between generic ERC-SRTA documentation and plant specific sequential task analysis an Lntegrated CRDR-KOP developmont was attained.
4.
Develo cd Back round Informatio (BI) for plant specific EOPc by augmenting generic documentation to plant speclELc requirement.s on the following:
S stematlc Evaluation of generic Optimal Recovery Cuidelines (ORCs), Critical Safety Function Statue Trees (CSFSTs), Critical Safety Function Restoration Cuidelines (CSFRCs),
System Review Task Analysis (SRTA) documentation with the plant specific documentation (ex:
STS, etc.),
identiEied operator's specific tasks and task/element requLrements.
Evaluation of the Lndivldual and integrated (sequential) task requirements identified Inctrumentatlon 6 Control characteristics, and the Instrumentatlon and Controls necescary for proper operator response to emergency transients.
2.
S stematlc Evaluatio of Ldentified KOPs Instrumentatlon and Controls (Step I) for a given task(s) for a set of event sequencos validated all associated task requirements.
For example, dLscrete event soquences generate task requirements.
These in turn establish specific I&C
<<haracterlstics.
Evaluation of the Instrumentation and Controls for the full spectrum oE event sequences for a glvon cystem (Ex:
Containment Instrumentatlon)
Validate all the associated task requirements of that system.
5.
Established Specific Step Deviation Documents for each task analysis requirement and justified differences and/or basis from the generLc documents.
6.
Performed BI calculations (values, cetpoints, accuracy, etc.) of instrumentation requLred for emergency transients identi.fied ln task analysis.
0~k* d i kk kk i i i ikon ko kkokk the systematic identl,fication and assessment of Control Room/Hot Shutdown Panel Human Engineering Discrepancies (HEDs).
B.
Established KOP Verification and Validation Record (Operators'nteraction record).
9.
Contre Room Walk-Throu h:
Operability Analysis Task Analysis Walk-Through Worksheet Walk-Through Instrument Suitabl.llty Review Walk-Through Operator Task Review 10.
The above sequential analysis developed Plant SpeciElc KOPs and identified Instrumentatlon and Control Characteristics associated wLth KOPc'asks for all affected systems.
SRTA WOC Operator specific actions Instrumentation and Controls availability and sultablllty to allow operators'esponse to emergency trancients.
Plant Specific Information (Ex:
Variable values for ~
given emergency transient)
0230T/0003T-I
GENERIC DOCUMENTS (ORCs ~ CSFSTs p etc ) ~
FSAR ~
S T S
~ PL6S ~ etc ENKRCEMCY PROCEDURE REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION EP E-0 STE IN E-O PROCEDURE BRANCHES TO YP E-O SEQUENTIAL STEPS MUHBKR TITLE BACK GROUND IMFORHAT10N (BI)
FOR ENER.
PROC+
REACTOR TR1P OR SAFETY IMJ. EP-E-O STEP ACIIIEVKNEMTS CRDR ACIIIEVENRMTS ACHIEVEMENTS o
Task Requirements
(*)
o Operator Actions (e)
Instr 6, Controls (s)
HEDs (*)
Operator's CosuLents As an example see Step I
3 3
4 11 13 16 18 11 20 21 222i 26-27 28 32 33 FR-S.1 ECA-0.3 ECA-O.O E-0.1 K-10 C-1 FR-H. 1 J-68 E-1 8-2 8-3 E-l E-l.l 8-3 ECA-1. 2 AP-9 E-l
Response
to N.P. Cen/ASS Restoro Vital Bus Loss of All AC Pwr.
Reactor Trip Response Sealed Vlv Chkilst KCCSS Resp to Loss Sec.
Ht Sink Diesel Generators Loss of Rx or Sec Cool.
Faulted S.C. Isol S.C.
Tube Rupture Loss of Rx or Sec Cool SI Termination S.G.
Tube Rupture LOCA Outs Containment Loss of Instrument Alt Loss of Rx or Sec Cool I
3 3
4 11 13 16 18 20 21 22 24
.6-21 28 32 o
Purpose (*)
o Basis (a) o Actions (*)
o Instrument (*)
o Control/Equip (*)
o Knowledge (*)
o Specific Info (<)
o Operator's Comments s As an example see Step 11 Control Room Malk-ThrouEh o
Operability Analysis o
Task Analysis Haik-ThrouEh llorksheet o
Malk-thru 16C Suitabi,llty Review o
IIEDs o
Operator's Comments ACHIEVEMENTS o
Task Requirements o
Operator Actions o
Instrument 6 Controls o
Operator's Cocmw.nts INTEGRATED RESULTS o
Specific SlnEle/Sequential Task Requirements o
Instrumentatlon 6 Controls Characteristics o
BI Calculations (81-1. -2, -3. -9, -10, -13) o EOPs Dovlatlon Document (KP-E-O) o EOP Verification 6 Validation Record (K-O)
EOP Verification I6C Requirements For All Affected S stems SAHPLE OF DCPP 1 6 2 TASK ANALYSIS REACTOR TRIP SAFETY INJECTION 0230T/0003T-2
REASSESSMENT OF HUMAN ENGINEERING DISCREPANCIES (HED'S)
SCOPE This procedure provides guidance for assessing the safety significance and operability concerns of Human Engineering Discrepancies (HED's).
PROCEDURE Each HED will be assessed in accordance with the flow chart shown on Attachment 1.
This assessment will place each HED in one of five categories which relate to the priority of the HED.
The categories are:
I High priority; HED shall be corrected or mitigated by the 1st refueling, or justification must be made-for continuina operation.
II Medium prioritv; the HED should be corrected within a reasonable time period (1st or 2nd refueling).
III -
Operability concern; HED will be corrected as the schedule permits.
IV Low priority; cost/benefit analysis will be performed to determine fix (if any).
No established schedule.
N/A HED need not be considered for correction.
The assessment process will consider the safety significance of the equipment associated with the HED, the potential for error of the HED, and the consequences should an error occur.
PLANT FUNCTION The first step in assessing the HED's as shown on Attachment 1 is determining the function of the equipment involved.
HED's affecting equipment which is safety-related, or equipment which is not safety-related but is used in an emergency operating procedure, will be assessed for safety significance.
HED's affecting the balance of plant equipment or which do not directly affect plant equipment will be assessed for plant operability.
POTENTIAL FOR ERROR The HED is next reviewed for potential for error.
Attachment 2
includes a series of questions (derived from NUREG-0800, Exhibit 2-2) which will be used as guidance during this part of the assessment.
The human factors specialist will be relied on heavily to determine the actual potential for error occurrence.
Ol
Qi CONSE UENCE OF ERROR The HED's following the safety significance path will next be reviewed for safety consequences of an error resulting from not correcting the HED.
The following are examples of errors with significant safety consequences:
An error that would likely result in unsafe operation or the violation of a technical specification, safety limit, or a limiting condition for operation.
An error that would likely result in the unavailability of a safety-related system needed to mitigate transients or systems needed to safely shut down the plant.
An error that would likely result in a challenge to the safetv-related systems in shutting down the plant (e.g.,
a Reactor Trip or a Safety Injection).
HED's judged to not lead to errors of significant safety consequences will also be reviewed for operability concerns.
Operability concerns include factors affecting plant availability, plant efficiency, plant reliability, etc.
. The HED's following the plant operability path will be reviewed for plant operability concerns only.
PRIORITIZATION AND RATIONALE By following the flow chart, each HED will fall into one of the five priorities previously mentioned.
If the priority is not apparent or if there is no clear cut "yes" or "no" answers to some of the assessment factors, the HED will be further analyzed with a view toward improving operator performance and plant safety, and a priority will be selected by the Review Team.
The rationale used will be documented on the assessment form.
Any significant dissent from the final priority selected will also be documented, CORRECTION
'After the HED has been assessed and prioritized, proposed resolutions can be discussed and documented.
This step is included here because the subject is clear and it allows input from both Operations and the Human Factors Specialist in determining design requirements.
The manner in which HED's are assessed (by function, error potential, and consequence) prevents discussion of resolutions at this time to affect the prioritization of an HED.
For Priority I HED's, an Interim Compensatory Action or summary Justification for Continued Operation (JCO) is included on the Assessment form.
The Interim Compensatory Action serves to reduce the safety significance or potential for error of the HED until time permits implementation of a final or optimal correction.
A JCO is documented when it is impractical to implement an interim physical modification or when no correction is planned.
The Backfit Feasability is added for information only. It will not be a factor in whether or not a Priority I or II HED will be corrected or mitigated. It may be a factor in the extent of the correction and/or the schedule for implementing the final (optimal) resolution.
The Schedule for Implementation is a goal for resolving an HED.
Milestone dates such as "first refueling," "second refueling,"
"completed," will be used here.
Specific dates will be generated later as the extent of the number of changes and Engineering and Construction involvement become known.
CONCURRENCE During the assessment, the Review Team members performing the assessment will initial the form in the available space.
Any dissents shall also be'initialed.
After the assessment form is completely filled out, it shall be sent to a Management Team member for concurrence.
Priority I HED's should be signed by the DCPP Management Team member.
The non-Priority I HED's may be reviewed by any Management Team member.
HKU P,ss EssNEQl-OPERAS>Li~
APED
~MYEL dR PS~IRTE5 ggv>biOP'es ML6H ERR.o R PormuAlt.
Y&s
g)
POTENTIAL FOR ERROR DISCREPANCY HAS CAUSED AN ERROR IN THE PAST (If this can be answered
- yes, no further review is required).
OPERATORS HAVE ATTEMPTED TO CORRECT THE DISCREPANCY THEMSELVES FACTORS. AFFECTING OPERATOR ATTENTIVENESS Discrepancy will cause undue operator fatigue.
Discrepancy will cause operator confusion.
Discrepancy will cause operator discomfort.
Discrepancy presents a risk to control room personnel.
Discrepancy will distract control room personnel from their duties.
FACTORS AFFECTING OPERATOR PHYSICAL ABILITIES Discrepancy will affect the operator's ability to see and read accurately.
Discrepancy will affect the operator's ability hear correctly.
Discrepancy will affect the operator's ability to communicate with others.
FACTORS AFFECTING OPERATOR ACTIONS Discrepancy will cause a delay of necessary feedback to the operator.
Because of the discrepancy, operator will not be provided with positive feedback about control tasks.
Discrepancy will lead to inadvertent activation or deactivation of controls.
Discrepancy will otherwise degrade the operator's ability to manipulate controls correctly.
FACTORS AFFECTING OPERATOR MENTAL OR PHYSICAL WORKLOAD Tasks in which the discrepancy is involved may be highly stressful.
Discrepancy is involved in a task which is usually performed concurrently with another task.
Discrepancy requires operator to calculate or interpolate data.
Discrepancy violates normal control room or nuclear industry conventions or population stereotypes.
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CHRON ll CATEGORY HK'KN ENGZNEERXNG DISCREPANCY ASSESSMENT TITLE/SUBJECT (Complete description is on attached HED)
ASSESSMENT:
Reviewers SAFETY RELATED:
HIGH ERROR POTENTIAL:
YES NO YES NO SIGNIFICANT SAFETY CONSEQUENCE:
YES NO N/A OPERABILITY CONCERN:
YES NO N/A Date PRIORITY:
RATIONALE:
DISSENT:
CORRECTION PLAN:
A.
Immediate Compensatory. Actions/Justification for Continued Operation:
B.
Optimal Correction:
SCHEDULE FOR IMPLEMENTATION CONCURRENCE:
Management Team Representative Date
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SUMMARY
DISTRIBUTION Docket or entral file Local PDR PAD83 RDG J. Partlow (Emergency Preparedness only)
Steve Varga Hans Schierling OELD E. Jordan B. Grimes ACRS (10)
Plant Service List C. Parrish NRC Partici ants
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