ML17083B676
| ML17083B676 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 12/27/1985 |
| From: | Schierling H Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Varga S Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| TAC-64501, TAC-64502, NUDOCS 8601060557 | |
| Download: ML17083B676 (70) | |
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UNITEDSTATES NUCLEAR REGULATORYCOMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 December 27, 1985 Docket Nos.:
50-275 and 50-323
MEMORANDUM FOR:
S. A. Varqa, Director PWR Project Directorate No.
3 Division of PWR Licensinq-A FROM:
SUBJECT:
H. Schierling, Project Manaqer PWR Pro,iect Directorate Nn.
3 Division of PWR Licensing-A DIABLO CANYON - MEETING WITH PG&E ON DCRDR DATE & TIME:
LOCATION:
PURPOSE:
January 9, 1986 9:00 am Room AR-5033 Air Rights Buildinq
'ethesda, Maryland To discuss status of Detailed Control Room Design Review.
PART ICIPANTS:
NRC H. Schierling, N. Thompson, SAIC Consultants PG&E B. Lew, etal.'k H. Schierlinq, Pr ect Manaqer PWR Pro,iect Directorate Nn.
3 Division of PWR Licensing-A cc:
See next paqe
TABLE I DCRDR MEETING ATTENDEES Richard Eckenrode Carol Kain.
Hans Schierling John Stokley Neil Thompson Sy Weiss Peter Beckham Charles Coffer Bryant Giffin Lothar Schroeder NRC/PWR-A/EICSB SAIC/NRC Consultant NRC/PWR-A/Project Manager SAIC/NRC Consultant NRC/DHF NRC/PWR-A/EICSB PGSE PGSE PG&E General Physics/PG8E Consultant
TABLE 2 SNUBBER MEETING ATTENDANCE Goutam Bagchi Hans Schierling Richard Anderson Charles Coffer Paul Hirschberg Henry Thailer Hike Tressler NRC/NRR/PWR-A EB/Section Leader NRC/NRR/PWR-A/Project Manager PG&E/Bechtel PG&E/Licensing PG&E/Senior Mechanical Engineer PG&E/Piping Group Supervisor PG8E/Project Engineering
~ )
TABLE 3 RERACK MEETING ATTENDEES Robert Fell Ted Quay Hans Schierling Richard Serbu James Shapaker Amarjit Singh Charles Coffer Scott Johnson Mike Tressler NRC/NRR/PWR-A/PSB NRC/NRR/PWR-A/PSB NRC/NRR/PWR-A/Project Manager NRC/NRR/PWR-A/PSB NRC/NRR/PWR-A/PSB NRC/NRR/PWR-A/PSB PG&E/Licensing PG8E PG8E
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TABLE 4 REACTOR TRIP EXPERIENCE MEETING ATTENDEES V. Benaroya A. Gill S. Israel J. Knight H. Schierling W. Swenson C. Coffer NRC NRC NRC NRC NRC NRC PGSE
Enclosure 2
DETAILS OF DCRDR MEETING ON JANUARY 8, 1986 (SAIC SUYiMARY)
INCLUDING PG&E DRAFT REPORT
MINUTES OF MEETING BETMEEN NRC AND PGLE ON THE DCRDR FOR THE DIABLO CANYON GENERATING STATION, UNITS I AND 2 the u
The following are minutes of a meeting held on January 9
1986 b t e ween e Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and.Pacific Gas and Electric (PGLE).
Also in attendance were a
PGLE human factors consultant from General Physics and NRC consultants from Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC).
Specific attendees and the organizations they represent are shown in Attachment l.
The purpose of the meeting was to address the DCRDR requirement to conduct a systems function and task analysis.
In a prior meeting with NRC PGLE had committed to present the methodology for this analysis and identify the personnel in order to assure NRC that it would satisfy the requirement The methodology for the function and task analysis was presented by their human factors consultant from General Physics Corporation.
Attachment 2 includes a handout 'of the draft methodology.
Discussion of the procedure for data collection and the analysis indicated that a comprehensive approach is being taken and should satisfy the requirement.
The SFTA will be completed primarily by General Physics who will perform the bulk of the analysis in their offices separate from the control room.
This should provide a degree of independence and objectivity in the the ve
'valuation.
The procedure for data collection and methodology to d t g
o con uc e verification and validation were described.
NRC concluded that PGLE has the necessary program plan to conduct the task analysis.
PGLE were also asked if there was a reason the summary report submittal could not be provided sooner than July 1987, which had been indicated in a
prior meeting.
They believe they could provide it earlier than July 1987 and will notify NRC when they determine the date.
'I
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ATTACHMENT 1 DCRDR Meeting Attendees January 9,
1986 Hans Schierling Carol Kain John Stokley Richard J.
Eckenrode W. Neil Thompson Bryant Giffin Lothar Schroeder Pete E. Beckham Charles 0.. Coffer Sey Weiss NRC, Project Manager SAIC/NRC SAIC/NRC NRC/PWR-A/EICSB NRC/HFEB/DHF PGEE General Physics PGKE PGKE NRC
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ATTACHHENT' METHODOLOGY FOR THE DIABLO CANYON NVCl?AR ONER FIANT OYSTER tUNCTXQN REVIEW AND TASI. ANAIYSZS 1.1 Nyet Function Series and Task %+lysis l.1 Furpose The purpose of the Systaa Function Review and Task Analysis
{SYRIA) is to provide a ceeplote set of plant opecifio inforaation and control ebcacteris-tios which are required to support operator tasks during OOQFs 1 a 2 eiergency operations and to ensure that re~ired systeas oan be efficiently and reliability operatod under oonditions of eaergenoy operation ter arailable per sonnet
~
The IFIRh vill also generate information and controls characteristics
?eQQired to conduct the DCCPP 1 0 1 Dhub5ael Frccl Oltsi&e the Control Inca procedure e
le2 Methodology She actirities which oceeprise the SPRTA for the CaN are Shen in tiyare 1oX-1.
A etbodoloyy for each actiritg depicted in Figure X.2-1 is described helcetc S,i2i1 kctirkt Xc Zdentif Plant cific stans and I stee Functions
%lant systeas and subsysteas in the DCÃPZ central roaa and remote Nhuh5cen area that tbe operator aust access during emergency operations vill be identified.
This set villbe ccoperable to the safety and safety-related
'yeteae called Out in the SOPS and the Operatiny InStruoticnS<
eShutdCm Fry Outside the Control Ran
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Oescriptions of the functions tor each of the aysteas identified above eil1 he prepared.
These systea descriptions (see Titure 1.2-2) ei11 includes
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the function(s) of the system
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under vhat conditions the system is uaed The description of systems functions, in thie manner~
serves as a
referenoe base for aubeequant task analysis.
Zn addition< the systems functions listing vill be used to assist in the Selection of operating scenarios.
The DCNPP FBAR vill serve aa the primary source of information to identify a set of DCHPP systems caaparable to'those found in the pOps.
The TSAR vill be supplemented, as necessary vith other existing plant information and documentation.
hctivit Su rtin Documentation Identify Plant Specific Systems
and System Punctions ttc.
Analyze System Functions To Identify Scenarios and Residual Tasks Develop Task hnalysis Worksheets and Identify Plant-Specific Information and Controls Requirements ROPQ t BOP Step Deviations, STB> etc.
Data Entry/Modify Data QP IM PC DBMS IXI Program Perform Control Room Inventory Cc Panel pltgsg BcMr g PcOcsg C.R. Pnls Photos, C R Layout 9wgs~ etc.
Verification of Task Per formance CapabU ities Validation of Control Roee Functions Figure 1.2-1 Pion Diagram of Na)or hctivities Involved in Oeneration of Plant Specific SFRrA'ItC Reqpirements
1 1
l PIANT SYSTEM FUNCTION bESCRI OR DCRPP 1
Plant System Hamei System Abbreviationi System Number>
System Procedure References!
System S'tatus t System Function(s) c Conditiono for System Used Reviewer g Date c Figure X.Q-2 Plant System Function DescriPtion
1
1.2.2 Active 2s Anal xe B stem Functions dentif Scenarios III KH'he list of DCNPP safety-related systems are used to define a set event of sequences or scenarios vhich adequately samples various emergency conditions and the plant systems and system functions exercised in those conditions.
The related DcHpp Bop (and Remote shutdcwn Procedure) steps are also identified in this process.
A check vill be performed to ensure that the desired system and system functions a'e exercised in the scenarios chosen.
The scenarios selected ensure the establishment of those tasks applicable to the DCHPP systems.
A brief narrative description of each scenario vU,1 be prepared that establishes the limits and oonditions of the events to be analyzed.
The descriptions vill includes
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Prccedures Used o
Initial Conditions
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Scenar io Sequence
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Expected
Response
e Termination Criteria Residual operator tasks (unique tasks) from the plant-specifio EoPss and remote shutdown procedure not covered in the scenarios vill be analyzed independently for information and control requirements.
The analysis of residual tasks vill bo done to enssure that all operator interfaces have been examined even if those interfaces are not exercised in the sample of emergency scenarios selected for validation.
Note that verification of equipment availability and suitability vill be performed for these residual tasks as veil, aa for tasks embedded in the emergency scenarios.
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1.2.3.
Activit 3i'~ Devel Task Anal sis Norkshe and I
Identif rmaticn and Control ireme A Task Analysis lforksheet vill be developed and used to collect task performanoe data and other information needed for the CRDR.
The worksheet (see tigurea 1.2-3, 1.2-4 and 1.2-5) vill indicate the operational steps required in each scenario, along vith the appropriate information and control requirements, means of operation, and ZaC present on the oontro1 boards.
The operator tasks Sill be analyzed using the selected plant-specific EOPs as a
~atat tin haeie and doeenented in the dnllneind nannet t
1.
The discrete steps in the plant-specific BOPs in order of performance vill be rtoorded in the 'Procedure Number and Step Number" oolumn of the Task Analysis Norksheet and branching points noted> depending on the plant transitnt being analyrtdg in the 'Scenario Response" oolumn.
2.
h brief description of the operato<<'s tasks (in order of procedural steps) villbe recorded in the "Tasks/Subtasks" column of the Task Analysis Farm, 7LLl tasks, both explicit and implicit~ vill be documented using operations<
engineering, and human factors personnel.
3.
The operator decisions and actions that art linked to task performance are then recorded in the 'Task Decision Requirements'nd Task Action Requirements'olumn, respectively.
System functional response is described vhen appropriate in these columns.'his set of data also includes branching points in the 1@res that determine the ciutcane of the ope<<ating Sequence.
Xnput and Output requirements for successful task performance are recorded in the Znformation and Control Requirements'olumns, These vould typically be system component and parameter, relevant characteristics, and procedural information that is necessary for
~
)
operators
.to adeguate3.y assess plant oond3~ions or system status (e.g.<
h eg temperature>
reactor ooola system flov, pressurizer pressure>
eto.
Specific values for parameter readings or control oharacteristfos (i.e, oloses-open, off>>auto-on) vill be recorded based on EOPs, EOP Bases documents, and Technical Specifications.
Zt is important to note that Stepi 1 through 4 above are completed on the k ~
th h
actual XtC present in the control room.
A I
TASKANALY5ISWtNRSMEKt tnt fe4 Orc~
ll~eoeg Pigare 1.2-3 Task hoalysis %ocksheet
Pigare l.2-l Task Analysis Qorkaheet (coatinued)
1.
SC85hRIO -
ating aoenario name and iden er (ID) ~
PRX3t!ORE N)~ A%) STEP N). - Procedure step number for DCHPP 1 S
2 ROPs or Bhutdown From Outside the Control Room" 3.
%Lsx/RRKILBE - a description of the task/subtaek in the operating" segOenoo 4.
SCABS BRsp ~ - a notation designating decision points or branching information needed for correot tack execution for the operating scenario (as defined in the operating Scenario description).
5.
CAN N5talat - the cree member who performs the task.
6.
MC - the location adhere the task ie performed.
task per formance.
- operator decisions that are linked to 8.
ewe acrxai perforsaance.
- operator action requirements for task 9.
ZRKSNhTXC4 hMD CXt2'R)L QBQ. - the information and contro1 requirements y
t kH~
Ih in the oontrol roam).
(1) System Component/Parameter (2) Relevant Characteristics (type of component, range> unite, positions).
Figure 1.2-5 Task Analysis Norkeheet Forms (Columns) Definitions 10
10.
NEIS8 - the al means (e.g. s~itch, meter<
.) used by operators to perform the task in the control room, HAMI'It 11.
XaC N). >> the actual Instrumentation and Controls (IfC) number identified from the control room inventory.
12.
MRSL N). - the panel on vhich the control or instrument ie located 13.
VCRXFICKTIM (AVAIL/SUIT.)- columns that indicate the availability and suitability of the Instrumentation and Controls (XtC) needed for task performanoe.
These columns mould contain a "yes" or "no" answer.
14.
SF08 - the presence or absence of the TaC and associated characteristics on the SPDS Canputer is noted in the 'Y" and "H" columns.
15.
PMP>> the presence or absence of the ItC and associated characteristics on the post acoident monitoring panels li 2i 3 and i ia noted in the Y"
and I" columns 16+
MUP - the presence or absence of the TaC and associated characteristics on the hot shutdcwn panel is noted in the 'Y" and 'N'olumns.
17.
CCÃKEIFZS - any oamnents related to scenario execution< task performancet or'he aooompanying task retirement columns (the balance of the task analysis mrksheet).
Figure 1.2-5.
Task hnalyaia Norksheet Fields (Columns) Definitions (con't)
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The remaini lumns of the Task Analysis I
vill be utilized during the Verification and Validation (VIV) phases which <<xe described heine!
i 5.
Once the Tasks, Decision Requirements, and Information and Control requirements have been specified, the existing Znstrumentation and Controls (Z4C) that the operator usos or can use for oach procedural step vi11 be documentod based on the control room inventory.
All Z4C needed or avai1able to either (1) initiate, maintain or remove a
system from service, (2) confirm that an appropriate system response has or has not occurredi i.e., feedback, or (3) make a decision regarding plant ox system statusi rill be listed in the "Means" I Zc(C No.<<and "Panel" oolumns.
The <<Beans<<oolumn refers to how the information and contxol requirements are presented on the existing control boards (o.g., smitch< aeter, etc.).
The <<ZrC No.'olumn provides the specific identification number of the control or instrument.
The 'Panel'olumn provides the specific panel number the control or instrument is located on'.
6.
Verification oolumn (used during VtV phase)
'Availability"of the necessary ZCC required for successful operator task performance is noted by a <<Yes<<or
<<No<< in this column o Buitability<< of the existing ZSC to meet the postulated information and control requirements for operator tasks is noted by a 'Yes" or "No" in this column.
7.
SPDS>
PAMP< and HSDP (used during WV phase)
During VSVi presence or absence of information and control requirementS On the BPDSi PAMPi Or HBDP Will be ncted by X-ing'ither the <<Yes<<or
<<No" 12
8.
Comment d Candidate BEDs
'omments or candidate HEos can be noted in this column during any step of the Task Analysis or V@V phases.
Data for BEDs will be entered on a BED form and into the computerized database 9.
During the validation phase the identification of which member of the operating orew io performing each task wi11 be recorded in the
<<Crew Nember column.
l0. During the validation phase, the Location of the crew member when performing the task vill be recorded in the Location" column.
The Task Analysis Wrksheet thus serves as the complete record of operator tasks~ decisions, information and control remi,rements, and IaC availability and suitability during the selected emergency operating sequences.
This record is developed through the series of steps described above.
All task data will be entered into a CRDR ocmputerised database (see Activity i) ~
1 2.4 Activit ig Data Bntr if Data in QP IBM PC DBASE III Pr ram This is a oontinuous task performed throughout the pro)ect, The task statements>
and information on the task analysis vorksheets including information and oontrola characteristics will be oontinually evaluated to reflect changes, addition, and delections.
Any data base changes initiated are reviewed by the team members before changes are made.. All changes are verified after entry into the data base.
Data entry and changes are executed with a General Physics IBM PC MASS IIIProgram.
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1.2.5 Acti Lt 5
f r Control Roan Inventor IMPS The purpose of a Control Room Inventory Ls to provide a current listing of all instruments> controls, and equipment Ln the oontrol roan and hot shutdown panel that the operators interface with durLng the course of their assigned activities.
The Inventory will also include the Post Accident Nwitoring Panels 1, 2, 3, and 4.
The information and control requirements developed from the task analysis Le compared with the control room inventory to determine whether the ZaC needed to support DCNPP emergency operations are available, Documents used to perform this activity ares Control panel photos<
purchase orders, control panel layout drawLngsp Panels Sill of Materialsg etc.
The inventory will oonsist of data, in the form of equipment characteristics, that wL11 be entered on an Equipment Characteristics form (see tigure 1.2%)
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This form will comprise the inventory control documentation.
This documentation will also be entered into a computerized database
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The follcering types of inventory data will be transferad onto the equipment characteristics forms~ the numbers in the. 1Lst correspond to the numbers of the data input areas on the formt l.
Panel Z.D. - the specific panel identification code.
Zt can be a letter oode or a number code.
2.
Reviewer and Date - the name of the person fillingout the equipment characteristics form and the date it was performed.
3.
ZaC Description - this is the noun name description of the instrument or control as it appears on the panel.
The parameter measured should be included as the last part of the ZSC Description where applicable.
4.
ZaC Tag Number - this is the alphanumeric identification code given to an instrument or oontrol.
O(OFF
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Zsstrs
'Ypo - this is otthor s ssit+)rstor,
- rosorsor, RP.
control, potentiometer, puihbutton, indicator light, etc.
6.
Range - thea is the taeter range from minimum to maximum on the scale.
7.
Units - the standard of measurement such aa CE'MP AMPSP ZÃCKES, RPMP etco 8.
Divisions and Scale - the divisions are listed as sa)or and iinor graduations.
The scale is either log or linear.
9.
Control and Lights - for a control, list all of the switch positions (i.e., open-normal~lose}.
Por lights> list the oolor and its leaning rhen illuminated.
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h
We:
taCO s W~
end PmaIneser taco~a EQUIPINEIITCHARACTERISTICS tnst. Type: SN/Meter/
Recorder!Controller Divisions: Mefor/%nor Scale: LociLinear Re<<leeTer Control: SW toslllons lights: ColorlMeaniRI PigTsxe 1..2-6 SEtotipaent Charecterkstics Poxe
l
li2 5 Acti it V ifi ti f T k P f Ca biliti The purpose of the Verification of Task Performance Capabilities fs to systematically verify that the Instrumentation and Controls that were identified in the Task Analysis as being regufred by the operator are~
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Present in the Control Room or Hot Shutdown Area
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Effectively designed to support correct task performance.
The Verification of Task Performance Capabilities will utilize a two-phase approach to achieve the purpose stated above.
Zn the first phase, the presence or absence of the Instrumentation and Controls that were noted in the Task Analysis Wcckoheeta will be confirmed.
This'will be done by oomparing the postulated requirements in the Information and Control Requirements" column of the Taak Analysis torm to the actual control room IaC listed in the ZaC Mentffication" oolumns and referenced in the Control Room Inventory.
a.
Zt C Availability The presence or absence of the required Instrumentation and Controls will be noted by a "Yes" or "No" in the 'Availability" column of the Task Analysis form. If it is discovered that raguired Instrumentation and Controls are not available to the operator, any such occurrence vill be identified ao an RED and documented accordingly on an BED form.
A result of the verification of IaC availability villbe a oontrol room inventory listed in the task analysis worksheet columns< labeled DC Identification".
The parameter>
range, scaling units, and related information fs compiled on a separate inventory listing (see Activity 5).
A separate review of the ItC identiffed above will be done to verify that direct (rather than indirect) indications of parameters are
- provided, b.
IaC Suitability
r
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The secon ase vill determine the human ineering suitability of the required Instrumentation and Controls by comparing them against the criteria shown on Figure 1.2-7.
Por example> if a Net r~+14zed in a lt partlcclar procedcre etep exlete in the control rona, g
tlflcnler meter will be examined to determine vhether or not it has the appropriate range and scaling to support the operator in the corresponding procedural step. If the range and scaling vere appropriate< it vill be noted by placing "Yes<<, in the "Suitability" column of the Task Analysis Form, Conversely, if the meter range or scaling is not appropriate for the parameter of interest to the operator, "No" vill be written in the
<<Suitability" column of the Task Analysis Form.
This type of occurrence vill be defined as an BED and documented accordingly on an HED form.
The suitability review of IF C viH. be performed by an operations expert, an e
IaC engineer, and a human factors engineer as specified in Figure 1.2-7.
.SPIFF 18
Flow Chert of Daeblerl Frpoecs lac VerifyiniRqufplnertt Suitability fer erery tssk In Os tssa analysis, s<<
lfy Ost Os~t tpscIIIsd
~dtWs te rnwt as strrnsnds el orner
~ selrdnpsnehe.
OtITIRIAfOR DlCNIDl4$
fffIJDf%
~ Infonnstion IIO4ysd er eppreeutsts Snpdeilty Irttual ts. eudherr I
~ Appreipriete pet<<net<<'hcdeyed
~
gHspisy ef ~antlsnlre snd/sr eueilts.
the Irllemstlen eppreertetc ter %t
~ Osaee/sonenucna eontrtd funopens
~w
~ !Nscrsy ef cond nfertnstlsn ersoshis
~men <<Keeprtsts Oess ths erevids aeereprlsts Inlennstisn/Issewcir for as Oekf is
~eulprnsnt
~tallstds <<rlilrl
~lets tnfennstien/
pseshsek)
NC
~ Aotldl ernsm/sttuipnrrnt stela infer.
e<<tton Is preyidsd rstr<<r thsn Indirect information Ie4., dsrnsnd w. etsys
, pestturn ser eontreil<<t. <<rect eL In.
<<rect pressure el ke<< ln syseen leep)
Oess as oculernsrn preridr sotusi'O
~yttsnl ctsna informstI ls Wry
~Osr ~lprnsnt ereiisMs ast preytdss ~lets lnienrmien and refissts ero4t jsO
~wsust N'V&0/IAC 0 Ieulprnsnt prortdst sppteprlste ple
<<don old relps ef eentrel
~ ScA unla ers eonsinsnt ala Oe A.
Fes ef position needed
~ leds renpr aors Os sxpestssI songs
~t apeetlensl psrsrnsters 0 Values ~Isei sysd srs ln e tenn leensdh
~Sely VSSSIdS <</e eel<<ertion a
~teltsrnsnt eessais) kIO elslTlfllD ECLIltQKNTIdl~
It/ITAIII.ITYRlQUIRIilINTS fOR TASK PCRPORMANCE Figure 1.2-7.
Flotfchart of Decision process for Verifying Squi~ent Suitability
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i%3;-7 Utilising the Task Analysis Norksheets (Operator Tasks, Xnformation and Validation of Control Rcem ctione 1.2.7 Activit Control Characteristics Requirements, etc.) valkthroughs vill be performed in the simulator (if available) for each scenario developed (e.g., Spurious Safety Infection, LOCh, Loss of Secondary
- Coolant, ATW8) vith DCNPP control room operators.
The valkthroughs vill he directed by QP Human Pactors specialists, operatians specialists and PG and E ICC Engineers.
The valkthroughs villfirst be performed in real-time.
The purpose of the real-time valkthrough is to evaluate the aperational aspects of the control room design in terms af oantrol/display relationships< display grouping, control feedback, visual and communication links, manning levels and traffic patterns.
During the valkthraughs, observers vill note any dynamic performance problems on the comments field of the Task Analysis Vorksheet, Figure l.2-& vill serve Rs 4 guMo during these abservations.
tollaving each real-time valkthrough of a scenario>
the operators vill perfarm the valkthrough at a slaver place.
During these slav valkthroughs, operators vill be instructed to speak one at a time and describe their actions.
Since this vill foroe aer ial action, the operations villnot be performed simultaneously.,
Specificallyy the operators villverbaliseg
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The oamponent or parameter being controlled or monitored o
The purpooe ef the action
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The expected result of the action in terms af system response.
As the operators valk through the event> they villpoint to each control or display that they utiliso, and indicate vhich annunciators are involved.
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The operato ho performed the event vill r ev the Task Analysis Norksheets along vith human factors specialists.
The operators vill be asked to note any errors or problems that vere encountered in the valkthroughs and to expound upon the source of the errors or problems.
These errors or problems vill be documented for investigation as possible HEDs.
Pox each task< the folloving types of information vill be racordedc
'i) g' An indication that the scenario response vas accomplished vill be noted in the <<Scen.
Reap." column.
~
The identification of vhich member of the operating crev is performing the task.
This vas noted in the <<Crev Ramber" column on the Task Analysis Norkeheet.
tProm real-time valkthrough).
e The location of the crev member vhen performing the task in the
<<Loc. <<oolumn.
(Prom zeal-time valkthrough}.
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DCRDR ISSUZS TO M ADDRESSED DURING VhLIDATZOH AND SUPPORTED BY KQS TSROUGBS Are all required displays and controls reachable and readable?
2.
Does placement of the controls and related displays require one person to read and display while another ILanipulates the contro12 3.
Does the arrangement of the control room tend to cause Icm2ers of the ares to get in each other'a vay2 4.
Can the tasks listed in the scenario be accomplished by the number of people on shift?
5.
Is there confusion as to Ao is in charge during eaergency operations2 6.
Zs any one operator overburdened?
V.
Zs there sufficient coordination between control room and support per sonne12 S.
Are the spatial relationships of vark stations/panels appropriate for the demands of the tasks?
9.
Are any controls susceptible to accidental activation?
Figure 1..2-8.
DCRDR Issues To Be AMressed During Validation and Supported by Walkthroughs 22
)
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h verification of the specific decisions and contingent actions that are associated vith each operator task.
This vill include ocnaaunicatians botveen and among crew members.
(Pram real-time valkthrough s) 0 h verification of the Instrumentation and Controls required in the associated procedural step, for example, an indicating light on a contro11er energizing to red, or a pointer on a aeter deflecting upvard.
This vill be added to the ZCC Ident." column an the Task Analysis Workohoot.
(Pram slov valkthroughs)
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Camnents related to verification or validation and potential HEDs, (Pram fast and slav valkthraughs).
Nalkthroughs vill bo videotaped to fully document the tasks involved for aU. arev members and the candidate human engineering discrepancies vhich may arise.
Once the events have been analyzed to extract the information noted above, bink Analyses< vhich trace the movement patterns of the operating crev
& tho control roau< vill be prepared to assess vhether the control roam layout binders operator aovoment vhile performing the events.
Any dynamic performance problems that vere uncovered during this phase of the CRDR process vill be documented for reviev in the HED assessment phase of the CRDR.
1.3 Ie suits All findings fram the 8yatems Function Reviev and Task Analysis Phase vill be documented on HED forms.
The forms villcontain a description of the findings as ve11 as tho source, panel<
snd instruments found discrepant fram Human Pactors Criteria.
The HED forms villbo maintained in the aamputerised DBMS far retrieval and update during the Assessment and Implementation Phase.
8gyy 23
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Enc'tosure 3
UNIT 2 LOAD REJECTION/REDUCTION TESTING
I I
UNIT2 LOADREJECTION/REDUCTION TESTING Test/Date Test Results Cause Corrective Action I.
S. U. Test 43.7, Net Load Rejection From 50% Power, November 6, 1985 Unacceptable.
Reactor trip due to low-low steam generator level.
LER 2-85-013 issued on December 6, 1985.
The turbine intercept valves electro-hydraulic control (EHC) size of the orifice was too small causing the intercept valves to open too slowly following their closure.
The interaction between the valves and the steam dump system resulted in an increase in steam generator pressure and consequent reduction in level.
The size of the orifices supplying hydraulic fluid to the turbine intercept valves hydraulic system was increased to improve the valves'esponse time per'estinghouse recommendation.
2.
S. U. Test 43.7, Net Load Rejection From 50% Power, November 14, 1985 Successfully completed without trip.
NA NA 3.
S. U. Test 43.3, 50%
Load Reduction From 75%
Power, November 26, 1985 4.
S. U. Test 43.3, 50%
Load Reduction From 75% Power, December 7, 1985.
Unacceptable.
Reactor trip and safety injec-tion due to high steam flow with steam line low pressure.
LER 2-85-016 issued on December 24, 1985.
Unacceptable.
Reactor trip and turbine trip due to high-high level in steam generator 2-2.
LER 2-85-016 issued on December 24, 1985.
Adjustment of steam dump valves did not compensate for transient.
All dump valves opened, increasing steam flow to the trip setpoint.
Feedwater control system setting did not properly compensate for transient.
Heating of cool feedwater intro-duced into steam generators caused water level to swell to trip setpoint.
Steam dump valves response was analyzed and readjusted.
Feedwater control system settings were analyzed and readjusted.
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UNIT2 LOADREJECTION/REDUCTION TESTING (Continuec9 Test/Date Test Results Cause Corrective Action 5.
S. U. Test 43.3, 50%
Load Reduction From 75% Power, December 7, l985 6.
50% Load Reduction From l 00% Power Successfully completed without trip.
Successfully completed without trip.
NA 7.
S. U. Test 43.2, Full Load Rejection Test, December 25, l 985 8.
S. U. Test 43.2, Full Load Rejection Test, January 2, l986 Unacceptable.
Auto-matic reactor and turbine trips due to low-tow steam generator water level. LER 2-85-024 to be issued.
Unacceptable.
Reactor trip from low-low steam generator water level, LER 2-86-00X tentative.
Slow response of steam dump control system caused steam generator pressure increase re-sulting in steam generator level shrink.
Technical Review Group to determine exact cause.
Modified steam dump control system by installing volume boosters on all 40 and 35 percent steam dump valves to improve their response time.
Technical Review Group to deter mine exact corrective action.
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MEETING
SUMMARY
DISTRIBUTION cket Central file NRC Local PDR PADF3 RDG Steve Varga H. Schierling OELD E. Jordan B. Grimes ACRS (10)
Plant Service List C.
Vogan NRC Partici ants V. Benaroya A. Gill S. Israel J.
Knight ll. Swenson Robert Fell
'Ted quay Richard Serbu James Shapaker Amarjit Singh Goutam Bagchi Richard Eckenrode Carol Kain John Stokley Neil Thompson Sy Weiss
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