ML17083B670
| ML17083B670 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 11/26/1985 |
| From: | Kirsch D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | Shiffer J PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC CO. |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17083B671 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8512130482 | |
| Download: ML17083B670 (10) | |
See also: IR 05000275/1985035
Text
NoV 86 ~986
Docket No. 50-275,
50-323
Pacific Gas
and Electric Company
77 Beale Street,
Room 1451
San Francisco,
Attention:
Mr. J.
D. Shiffer, Vice President
Nuclear Power Generation,
Licensing
Gentlemen:
Subject:
NRC Inspection of Diablo Canyon Units
1 and
2
This refers to the inspections
conducted by Mr. J. F. Burdoin of this office
during October 7-November 1, 1985, of activities authorized
by NRC License
Nos.
and to the discussion of our findings with Mr. R.
Thornberry,
and other members of your staff on November
1,
1985.
Areas examined during this inspection are described in the enclosed
inspection
report.
Within these
areas,
the inspection consisted of selective
examinations
of procedures
and representative
records,
interviews with
personnel,
and observations
by the inspector.
No violations of NRC requirements
were identified within the scope of this
inspection.
In accordance
with 10 CFR 2.790(a),
a copy of this letter and the enclosure
will be placed in the
NRC Public Document
Room.
Should you have
any questions
concerning this inspection,
we will be glad to
discuss
them with you.
Sincerely,
D. F. Kirsch, Deputy D'irector
Division of Reactor Safety and Projects
8512130482
851126
ADOCK 05000275
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Diablo Canyon
SSER-33
Appendix 5
B.7-1
Enclosure:
Inspection Report Nos. 50-275/85-35,
50-323/85-33
cc w/enclosure:
S. D. Skidmore,
PGStE
R.C. Thornberry,
PGGE (Diablo Canyon)
P.A. Crane, Jr.,
D. Taggart,
PGSE (Diablo Canyon)
R. Weinberg,
PG&E (Diablo Canyon)
State of Ca Sandra Silver
bcc:RSB/Document
Control Desk
(RIDS)
Mr. Martin, Mr. Faulkenberry
Resident Inspector
Green, Pink, File, Document File
U. S.
NUCLEAR REGlKATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
Report Nos. 50-275/85-35,
50-323/85-33
Docket Nos. 50-275,
50-323
License Nos.
I.icensee:
Pacific
Gas
and Electric Company
77 Beale Street,
Room
1451
San Francisco,,California
94106
Facility Name:
Diablo Canyon Units
1 and
2
Inspection at:
Inspection
co
Diablo Canyon Site,
San tuis Obispo County, California
uc
ctob
7-Nov
er 1,
1985
Inspector:
J
Burd in, Reactor Inspector
Da
e
S gned
Approved by:
s
R. T. Dodds, Chief, Reactor Project Section
1
Da
e Signed
S~umma r
Ins ection durin
eriod of October
7-November
1
1985
(Re ort Nos. 50-275/
85-35
and 50-323/85-33.
Areas Ins ected:
Unannounced
inspection by one regional inspector of open
items consisting of followup inspection items, Part
21 Reports,
Generic
I,etters
and IE Notices
and followup of allegations
by NRC contractors.
Inspection procedures
numbers
92700,
92701,
92704,
and 92705 were used
as
guidance for the inspection.
The inspection involved 78 inspection hours by
one inspector
and approximately
120 hours0.00139 days <br />0.0333 hours <br />1.984127e-4 weeks <br />4.566e-5 months <br /> by contract personnel.
Results:
No items of noncompliance
or deviations
were identified.
Diablo Canyon
SSER-33
B.7-2
Appendix
B
a
~
Task:
Alle ation or Concern
No. 572
(ATS No: RV-84-A-052)
1)
Characterization
PG&Z has stifled Pullman Power Power Products
(PPP) inspectors
reports of faulty Bosten-Bergen
and American Bridge Welds, by
directing them not to issue discrepancy
reports.
2)
Im lied Si nificance to Desi
n
Construction
or 0 eration
Faulty welds in components
received
from vendors, if
uncorrected,
could possibly result in failure of safety-related
systems.
3)
Assessment
of Safet
Si nificance:
Staff review of 'source
document,
GAP 2/2/84 letter,
8102-104
indicates that
PPP inspectors
were issued
memoranda
to stop
issuing Discrepancy Reports
(DRs) on "shop" welds.
The
terminology "shop" is used to describe
purchased
components
that were welded by outside vendors.
The allegation cites
a
PG&E memo dated April 3,
1980, authorized
by Marvin (SIC)
Leppke
as
a basis for the conclusion that
PG&E stifled PPP
inspectors,
The allegation further states that, in 1982,
instructed
Pullman to delete
those welds from the formal
walkdown program.
The
NRC staff reviewed the April 3,
1980
memo issued
by
Mr. M. R. Leppke.
The staff was unable to find any direction
that
PPP should stop issuing discrepancy
reports
on shop welds.
The context of this letter indicates that an extensive
program
had been
underway to investigate,
evaluate
and repair rupture
restraint welds.
The letter states
that sufficient shop weld
data
had been obtained to allow the engineering
department
to
review the data
and include its conclusions in the final
rupture restraint report.
4)
Conclusions
and Staff Positon
The allegation that.
PG&E stifled attempts
by PPP inspectors
to
report and correct faulty vendor welds cannot be substantiated
Action Re uired:
None.
b.
Task: Alle ation or Condern No.
993
(ATS No: RV-84-A-076)
Characterization
(Similar to allegations
353 through
359 for field welds
197-212,
concerning welding
QC at Diablo Canyon.)
It was
alleged that'several
college students
working as
QC Inspectors
Diablo Canyon
SSER-33
B.7-3
Appendix
B
were unqualified.
It was further alleged that weld procedure
code
200 was "grossly inadequate".
2)
Im lied Si nifiance to Desi
n
Safet
or Construction
Unqualified inspectors
or inadequate
weld procedures
could
possibly result in unsatisfactory
construction of
safety-related
systems
or components.
3)
Assessment
of Safet
Si nificance
The source
documents
were reviewed.
The allegers
testimoney
only provided generalities
such
as "the quality controls at
Diablo Canyon leave
a lot to be desired" and"it is
a real
horrendous
mess".
This document lacks the substance
or details
necessary
to conduct
a viable investigation.
Subsequent
testimony identifies three individuals who were
allegedly not qualified to be inspectors.
The staff researched
Pullman Power Products
Company training and certification
records for these
three inspectors.
Their records indicate
that these inspectors
held certificates of qualification that
were issued
upon completion of training and successfully
passed
written examinations for nuclear pipe welding and visual
inspection.
The testimoney further alleges that another indivdual wrote
welding procedures
for Pullman Power Products
Company
and that
"in no way was
he qualified for this task".
A search of
Pullman Power Products
Company records failed to identify this
person
as ever having been
employed at Diablo Canyon.
The only
person with the
same
name
employed at Diablo Canyon that was
even remotely connected with welding was qualified as
a visual
welding inspector.
It was also alleged that the quality of work performed by the
production workers at Diablo Canyon
was "really poor".
This
allegation
was
made by another alleger,
whose allegation
was
resolved
on allegation no.
1543,
ATS No.
RV 84A114.
A May 7,
1984 letter from another alleger to the
NRC expresses
opinions that weld procedure
code 200, Specification
P12B-Pl-K1-4F-SMAW-6G was "grossly inadequate',
that failure
analysis
conclusions
were incomplete, that "significant
factors" were not addressed,
that weld procedure
code
200
"indicated
a basic misunderstanding
of Preheat
theory" and that
radiographic examination
used by itself was not adequate
to
verify weld integrity.
This allegation appears
to be very
similar to earlier, allegations
353-359 concerning weld
procedure
code
200 for field welds 197-212. It was concluded
previously that weld procedure
code
200 and specification
P12B-Pl-Kl-4F-SMAW-6G were written, qualified and approved in
accordance
with the
ASME Code,Section IX, Paragraph
QW 200.2,
Diablo Canyon
SSER-33
B.7-4
Appendix
B
1983 edition,
and Q-10 in the
1971 edition, which is the
accepted
standard for use in the nuclear industry.
4)
Conclusion
and Staff Position:
Review of Pullman Power Products
Company records indicate that
inspectors
were indeed trained,
tested
and certified before
they were permitted to perform weld inspection.
This
conclusion is further supported
by the results of allegations
995 and 378, which are also concerned with inspector training
and qualification.
The allegations
can not be substantiated.
5)
Action Re uired:
None.
c
Task: Alle ation or Concern
No.
1009
(ATS No: RV-84-A-064)
Characterization
I
2)
eration
An individual believes that engineers
who questioned
suspect
assumptions
were transferred
to Unit 2.
Cooperative
engineers
plug new recruits
wer'e assigned
to Unit l.
Im lied Si nificance to Desi
n
Construction
and
Assignment of engineers
based
upon attitudes
could result in a
insufficient level of experience in the groups
assigned
to one
of the units.
An inadequate
experience
level could result in
failure to detect safety significant design or installation
errors.
3)
Assessment
of Safet
Si nificance
Review of previous, similar allegations
by the
same individual
led to the conclusion that the allegation pertains to the split
up of the Onsite Project Engineering
Group
(OPEG) small bore
pipe support group that occurred in January
1983.
This
reorganization
created Unit
1 and Unit 2 areas within the small
bore pipe support
group and divided each area in to three
squads.
Previously there
had been
no subdivisions within the
group.
The reasons
for this reorganization
and the basis for the
individual assignments
to the two groups
were discussed
with
the individuals who were, at the time, the assistant
onsite
project engineer
and the small bore pipe support group
supervisor.
They both indicated that, at the time of the
reorganization,
a consistent
increase in work load was being
experienced
due to the fact that both units were entering
a
construction
phase that entailed
a large amount of small bore
pipe support work.
The group was reorganized
to provide for
better
management
of the increased staffing levels necessary
to
support the required level of effort.
The assignments
to
the'iablo
Canyon
SSER-33
B.7-5
Appendix B
two groups
were made by the group supervisor in conjunction
with the Unit
1 and Unit 2 area
leaders
plus the squad
leaders
who were onsite at the time.
Discussions
with the individual who was the group supervisor
indicated that roughly the
same
experience
level was required
of all group members,
however, there were
some individuals in
the group who had been
employed at the Diablo Canyon Project
for longer than others,
thus these individuals were more
familiar with project procedures
and personnel.
It was his
intention that the reorganization result in each
squad having
a
few individuals with Diablo Canyon Project experience.
To determine if the ultimate squad composition reflected this
intent, the composition of each
squad
was reviewed to identify
those individuals who had been with the small bore pipe support
group since its inception.
Ea'ch of the squads, both'n the
Unit
1 and Unit 2 areas,
had between
two and three engineers
who met this criterion.
4)
Conclusions
and Staff
Position'll
of the engineers
in both the Unit 1 and Unit 2 small bore
pipe support areas
were required to have basically the
same
level of industry experi'ence.
Review of the individuals
assigned in each of the area indicated that the engineers
with
the most Diablo Canyon experience
were divided roughly equally
between the Unit
1 and Unit 2 areas.
Therefore,
no safety
significance
can be attributed to this allegation.
5)
Action Re uired
None.
d.
Task:
Alle ation or Concern
No.
1399
(ATS No. RV-84-A-073)
Characterization
Base plates of support
members
on Unit 2 RHR containment
recirculating lines to RHR Pump have partial penetration
2)
Im lied Si nificance to Desi
n
Construction or 0 eration
The implied safety significance is that base plates
improperly
welded
may not support the designed
loading.
3)
Assessment
of Safet
Si nificance
The staff, after investigation, identified two pipe supports
which have base plates with sections
added
and welded
as
described
by the allegation.
These
were Hangers 22-llR and
413-76R.
Diablo Canyon
SSER-33
B.7-6
Appendix
B
Hanger 22-llR
S 413-76R are similar in which a 3/8" plate
was
located
between
two other base plates
and welded with a square
groove weld joint, requiring full penetration.
The
PPP
as-built
was generated
to modify support per Stress
Analysis
No. G-003-04,
Rev.
1 by Gathersburg
Power Division (GPD).
This
new work consisted of gusset plates
and other nonmelevent
modifications.
A field inspection" substantiated
the allegation.
One hanger
had the weld wrapping around the plate making it difficult to
determine
weld type but the other
showed
a partial penetration
PG&E engineering staff reanalyzed
the hangers
leaving out the welds
and found them to meet the safety factor
requirements.
Therefore, in these
two isolated
cases
no
structural safety significance exists.
The inspector in preparing
a FIR (Field Information Request)
for- GPD mistakenly called out the wrong weld type.
To verify
that was an isolated
case, all the inspectors 'records
were
reexamined.
The records indicated this individual was
a
cognizant inspector
and aware of details.
The individual was
at Diablo Canyon for approximately
one year.
In that time,
he
performed approximately
450 inspections of which only 22 were
of a similar type penetration
weld and only 7 of the 22 were
structural in nature.
These
were reinspected
and the welds
were correctly called out.
4)
Staff Position
The situation in which a wrong weld was called appears
to be
an
isolated
case of no structural safety significance.
5)
Action Re uired
None.
e.
Task:
Alle ation or Concern
No.
1485
(ATS No: RV-84-A-113)
Characterization
Unistrut and Thunderbird
clamps
used to support hydrogen
gas
tubing do not provide adequate
support.
2)
Im lied Si nificance to Desi
n
Construction
and
0 eration
Inadequately
supported
hydrogen lines would present
fire hazard if the lack of support resulted in line
under conditions that imposed
abnormal loads
on the
(e.g. turbine trip).
a potential
rupture
tubing
Assessment
of Safet
Si nificance
Appendix
B
The hydrogen lines for Unit 2 were inspected
and it
confirmed that Unistrut P2026
clamps
have
been
used
Diab1o Canyon
SSER-33
8.7-7
was
in some
12
places to support 1/2 inch pipe and Thunderbird saddle
clamps
have been
used in some places
to support instrument tubing.
Discussions with PG&E engineering indicated that they have
determined that accelerations
on the order of 14g would be
required to load the Unistrut clamps
beyond their design load.
This far exceeds
the maximum loading that could be-imposed
by
an credible source of dynamic loading.
PG&E indicated that
similar results
would be expected for the Thunderbird
clamp
applications.
Independent
assessment
of the loads required to
exceed
design strength of the clamps
concluded that PG&E's
value of 14 g was conservative.
4)
Conclusions
and Staff Position
The Thunderbird
and Unistrut clamps being used to support main
generator
hydrogen lines will withstand significantly greater
loads than they will ever be expected
to experience.
Therefore, this allegation
has
no safety significance.
Action Re uired
None.
f.
Task:
Alle ation or Concern
No.
1493
(ATS No: RV-84-A-114)
Characterization
Pullman used pipe welding procedures
on structural steel
and
when the problem was identified Pullman wrote
a
memo which
revised the
ESD which legalized the existing practice.
2)
Im lied Si nificance to Desi n
Construction or 0 eration
made utilizing the wrong weld procedure
may not meet the
designed
load.
3)
Assessment
of Safet
Si nificance:
The alleger stated that full penetration single bevel welds
performed
on structural steel utilized a 37-1/2
bevel which
was feasible for pipe.
When this was brought to the attention
of Pullman Q.A.
a
memo was written to revise the weld
procedure.
ASME Section IX, Welding and Brazing Qualifications,
does not
consider
a change
on weld joint angle for SMAW or
GTAW as
an
essential variable, therefore, requalification of the weld
procedure if an angle
change is made is not required.
4)
Staff Position:
Diablo Canyon
The staff concludes that the weld joint-angle
change. made by
Pullman Q.A. was performed correctly as per the governing
Code.
SSER-33
B.7-8
Appendix
B
13
5)
Action Re uired:
None.
9.
EXIT MEETINGS
The inspector
conducted exit meetings
on October ll (an interim
meeting)
and November
1 with the Plant Manager,
Plant
Superintendent,
and other members of the plant staff.
During these
meetings,
the inspector
summarized
the scope of the inspection
activities
and reviewed the inspection findings as described
in the
report.
The licensee
acknowledged
the concerns identified in the
report.
Diablo Canyon
SSER-33
B.7-9
Appendix
B
I'