ML17079A526
| ML17079A526 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | South Texas  |
| Issue date: | 03/20/2017 |
| From: | Greg Werner NRC/RGN-IV/DRS/EB-2 |
| To: | Gerry Powell South Texas |
| Werner G | |
| References | |
| IR 2017007 | |
| Download: ML17079A526 (28) | |
See also: IR 05000498/2017007
Text
March 20, 2017
Mr. G. T. Powell
Executive Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer
STP Nuclear Operating Company
South Texas Project Electric Generating Station
P.O. Box 289
Wadsworth, TX 77483
SUBJECT: SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT ELECTRIC GENERATING STATION,
UNITS 1 AND 2 - NRC TRIENNIAL FIRE PROTECTION INSPECTION
REPORT 05000498/2017007 AND 05000499/2017007
Dear Mr. Powell:
On February 9, 2017, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection
at the South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2, and discussed the results
of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are
documented in the enclosed report.
The NRC team documented one finding of very low safety significance (Green) in this report.
The NRC is treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2.a
of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violation or significance of the violation in this report, you should provide a
written response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your
denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk,
Washington, DC 20555-0001, with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; the Director,
Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001;
and the NRC resident inspector at the South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Units 1
and 2.
G. Powell
2
This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection
and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document
Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for
Withholding.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Gregory E. Werner, Chief
Engineering Branch 2
Division of Reactor Safety
Docket Nos. 50-498 and 50-499
License Nos. NPF-76 and NPF-80
Enclosure:
Inspection Report No. 05000498/2017007
and 050000499/2017007
w/ Attachment: Supplemental Information
cc w/ encl: Electronic Distribution
Enclosure
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
Docket:
05000498 and 05000499
License:
Report:
05000498/2017007 and 05000499/2017007
Licensee:
STP Nuclear Operating Company
Facility:
South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2
Location:
FM 521 - 8 miles west of Wadsworth
Wadsworth, Texas 77483
Dates:
January 23 through February 9, 2017
Team Leader:
S. Makor, Acting Senior Reactor Inspector
Inspectors:
S. Alferink, Reactor Inspector
J. Drake, Senior Reactor Inspector
C. Stott, Reactor Inspector
J. Watkins, Reactor Inspector
Approved By:
Gregory E. Werner, Chief
Engineering Branch 2
Division of Reactor Safety
2
SUMMARY
IR 05000498/2017007; 05000499/2017007; 01/23/2017- 02/09/2017; South Texas Project
Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2; Fire Protection (Triennial)
The report covers a two-week triennial fire protection team inspection by specialist inspectors
from Region IV. One finding, which was a non-cited violation, was documented. The
significance of inspection findings is indicated by their color (i.e., Green, White, Yellow, or Red)
and determined using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process,
dated April 29, 2015. Cross-cutting aspects are determined using Inspection Manual
Chapter 0310, Aspects within the Cross-Cutting Areas, dated December 4, 2014. All
violations of NRC requirements are dispositioned in accordance with the NRCs Enforcement
Policy, dated November 1, 2016. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of
commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process,
Revision 6.
A.
NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings
Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems
Green. The team identified a non-cited violation of License Condition 2.E for the failure
to provide 8-hour emergency lighting in all areas where operators perform manual
actions required during an alternative shutdown. As a compensatory measure, the
licensee added flashlights to the procedure box in the essential cooling water intake
structure. The team noted that operators were also required to carry a flashlight while
on shift. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as
Condition Report 17-1741.
The failure to provide 8-hour emergency lighting in all areas where operators perform
manual actions required during an alternative shutdown was a performance deficiency.
The performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the
protection against external events (fire) attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone
and it adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability,
and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable
consequences. Specifically, the failure to provide 8-hour emergency lighting could
adversely affect the ability of operators to perform the manual actions required for an
alternative shutdown.
The team determined this finding affected the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone. The
team evaluated this finding using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, Fire
Protection Significance Determination Process, dated September 20, 2013, because it
affected the ability to reach and maintain safe shutdown conditions in case of a fire. The
team determined this finding was of very low safety significance (Green) in Task 1.3.1
because it had a low degradation rating.
The finding did not have a cross-cutting aspect since it was not indicative of present
performance in that the performance deficiency occurred more than three years ago.
Specifically, the team determined that the performance deficiency existed since original
construction. (Section 1R05.08)
3
B.
Licensee-Identified Violations
None
REPORT DETAILS
1.
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity
1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05T)
This report presents the results of a triennial fire protection inspection conducted at
South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 in accordance with NRC
Inspection Procedure 71111.05T, Fire Protection (Triennial), dated January 31, 2013.
The inspection team evaluated the implementation of the approved fire protection
program in selected risk-significant areas with an emphasis on the procedures,
equipment, fire barriers, and systems that ensure the post-fire capability to safely
shutdown the plant.
Inspection Procedure 71111.05T requires the selection of three to five fire areas and one
or more mitigating strategies for review. The inspection team used the fire hazards
analysis section of the South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2
Individual Plant Examination of External Events to select the following five risk-significant
fire areas (inspection samples) for review:
Fire Area 20
Non-Radiological Pipe Chase
Fire Area 32
Component Cooling Water Pipe Chase
Fire Area 51
Train D Auxiliary Pump Room
Fire Area 1
Control Room
Fire Area 7
Alternate Shutdown Room
The inspection team evaluated the licensees fire protection program using the
applicable requirements, which included the plant Technical Specifications, Operating
License Condition 2.E, NRC safety evaluations, 10 CFR 50.48, and Branch Technical
Position 9.5-1. The team also reviewed related documents that included the Updated
Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), Section 9.5; the fire hazards analysis; and the
post-fire safe shutdown analysis. Specific documents reviewed by the team are listed in
the attachment.
Five fire area inspection samples and one mitigating strategy sample were completed.
.01
Protection of Safe Shutdown Capabilities
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed the piping and instrumentation diagrams, safe shutdown equipment
list, safe shutdown design basis documents, and the post-fire safe shutdown analysis to
verify that the licensee properly identified the components and systems necessary to
achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions for fires in the selected fire areas. The
4
team observed walkdowns of the procedures used for achieving and maintaining safe
shutdown in the event of a fire to verify that the procedures properly implemented the
safe shutdown analysis provisions.
For each of the selected fire areas, the team reviewed the separation of redundant safe
shutdown cables, equipment, and components located within the same fire area. The
team also reviewed the licensees method for meeting the requirements of
10 CFR 50.48; Branch Technical Position 9.5-1, Appendix A; and 10 CFR Part 50,
Appendix R,Section III.G. Specifically, the team evaluated whether at least one
post-fire safe shutdown success path remained free of fire damage in the event of a fire.
In addition, the team verified that the licensee met applicable license commitments.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.02
Passive Fire Protection
a. Inspection Scope
The team walked down accessible portions of the selected fire areas to observe the
material condition and configuration of the installed fire area boundaries (including walls,
fire doors, and fire dampers) and verify that the electrical raceway fire barriers were
appropriate for the fire hazards in the area. The team compared the installed
configurations to the approved construction details, supporting fire tests, and applicable
license commitments.
The team reviewed installation, repair, and qualification records for a sample of
penetration seals to ensure the fill material possessed an appropriate fire rating and that
the installation met the engineering design. The team also reviewed similar records for
the rated fire wraps to ensure the material possessed an appropriate fire rating and that
the installation met the engineering design.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.03
Active Fire Protection
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed the design, maintenance, testing, and operation of the fire detection
and suppression systems in the selected fire areas. The team verified the automatic
detection systems and the manual and automatic suppression systems were installed,
tested, and maintained in accordance with the National Fire Protection Association code
of record or approved deviations, and that each suppression system was appropriate for
the hazards in the selected fire areas.
The team performed a walkdown of accessible portions of the detection and suppression
systems in the selected fire areas. The team also performed a walkdown of major
5
system support equipment in other areas (e.g., fire pumps and Halon supply systems) to
assess the material condition of these systems and components.
The team reviewed the electric and diesel fire pumps flow and pressure tests to verify
that the pumps met their design requirements. The team also reviewed the halon
suppression functional tests to verify that the system capability met the design
requirements.
The team assessed the fire brigade capabilities by reviewing training, qualification, and
drill critique records. The team also reviewed pre-fire plans and smoke removal plans
for the selected fire areas to determine if appropriate information was provided to fire
brigade members and plant operators to identify safe shutdown equipment and
instrumentation, and to facilitate suppression of a fire that could impact post-fire safe
shutdown capability. In addition, the team inspected fire brigade equipment to determine
operational readiness for firefighting.
The team observed an unannounced fire drill and subsequent drill critique on
February 8, 2017, using the guidance contained in Inspection Procedure 71111.05AQ,
Fire Protection Annual/Quarterly, dated September 30, 2010. The team observed fire
brigade members fight a simulated fire in the isolation valve cubicle, located outside the
radiological controlled area. The team verified that the licensee identified problems,
openly discussed them in a self-critical manner at the drill debrief, and identified
appropriate corrective actions. Specific attributes evaluated were: (1) proper wearing of
turnout gear and self-contained breathing apparatus; (2) proper use and layout of fire
hoses; (3) employment of appropriate firefighting techniques; (4) sufficient firefighting
equipment was brought to the scene; (5) effectiveness of fire brigade leader
communications, command, and control; (6) search for victims and propagation of the
fire into other areas; (7) smoke removal operations; (8) utilization of pre-planned
strategies; (9) adherence to the pre-planned drill scenario; and (10) drill objectives.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.04
Protection from Damage from Fire Suppression Activities
a. Inspection Scope
The team performed plant walkdowns and document reviews to verify that redundant
trains of systems required for hot shutdown, which are located in the same fire area,
would not be subject to damage from fire suppression activities or from the rupture or
inadvertent operation of fire suppression systems. Specifically, the team verified:
A fire in one of the selected fire areas would not directly through production of
smoke, heat, or hot gases cause activation of suppression systems that could
potentially damage all redundant safe shutdown trains.
A fire in one of the selected fire areas or the inadvertent actuation or rupture of a
fire suppression system would not directly cause damage to all redundant trains
(e.g., sprinkler-caused flooding of other than the locally affected train).
6
Adequate drainage was provided in areas protected by water suppression
systems.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.05
Alternative Shutdown Capability
a. Inspection Scope
Review of Methodology
The team reviewed the safe shutdown analysis, operating procedures, piping and
instrumentation drawings, electrical drawings, the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report,
and other supporting documents to verify that hot and cold shutdown could be achieved
and maintained from outside the control room for fires that require evacuation of the
control room, with or without offsite power available.
The team conducted plant walkdowns to verify that the plant configuration was
consistent with the description contained in the safe shutdown and fire hazards
analyses. The team focused on ensuring the adequacy of systems selected for
reactivity control, reactor coolant makeup, reactor decay heat removal, process
monitoring instrumentation, and support systems functions.
The team also verified that the systems and components credited for shutdown would
remain free from fire damage. Finally, the team verified that the transfer of control from
the control room to the alternative shutdown location would not be affected by
fire-induced circuit faults (e.g., by the provision of separate fuses and power supplies for
alternative shutdown control circuits).
Review of Operational Implementation
The team verified that licensed and non-licensed operators received training on
alternative shutdown procedures. The team also verified that sufficient personnel to
perform an alternative shutdown were trained and available onsite at all times, exclusive
of those assigned as fire brigade members.
The team performed a timed walkdown of the alternative shutdown procedure for Unit 2
with licensed and non-licensed operators to determine the adequacy of the procedure.
The team verified that the operators could reasonably be expected to perform specific
actions within the time required to maintain plant parameters within specified limits.
Time critical actions that were verified included restoring electrical power, establishing
control at the remote shutdown and local shutdown panels, establishing reactor coolant
makeup, and establishing decay heat removal.
The team also reviewed the periodic testing of the alternative shutdown transfer
capability and instrumentation and control functions to verify that the tests were
adequate to demonstrate the functionality of the alternative shutdown capability.
7
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.06
Circuit Analysis
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed the post-fire safe shutdown analysis to verify that the licensee
identified the circuits that may impact the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown.
The team verified, on a sample basis, that the licensee properly identified the cables for
equipment required to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions in the event of a
fire in the selected fire areas. The team verified that these cables were either
adequately protected from the potentially adverse effects of fire damage or were
analyzed to show that fire induced circuit faults (e.g., hot shorts, open circuits, and
shorts to ground) would not prevent safe shutdown.
The teams evaluation focused on the cables of selected components from the
emergency diesel generator, component cooling water, auxiliary feedwater, high head
safety injection, low head safety injection, pressurizer power operated relief valves
(PORVs), PORV block valves, alternative shutdown control room isolation and transfer
switches, and chemical volume and control system. For the sample of components
selected, the team reviewed electrical elementary and block diagrams, and identified
power, control, and instrument cables necessary to support their operation. In addition,
the team reviewed cable routing information to verify that fire protection features were in
place as needed to satisfy the separation requirements specified in the fire protection
license basis. Specific components reviewed by the team are listed in the attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.07
Communications
a. Inspection Scope
The team inspected the contents of designated emergency storage lockers and
reviewed the alternative shutdown procedure to verify that portable radio
communications and fixed emergency communications systems were available,
operable, and adequate for the performance of designated activities. The team verified
the capability of the communication systems to support the operators in the conduct and
coordination of their required actions. The team also verified that the design and
location of communications equipment such as repeaters and transmitters would not
cause a loss of communications during a fire. The team discussed system design,
testing, and maintenance with the system engineer.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
8
.08
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed the portion of the emergency lighting system required for alternative
shutdown to verify that it was adequate to support the performance of manual actions
required to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions, and to illuminate access and
egress routes to the areas where manual actions would be required. The team
evaluated the locations and positioning of the emergency lights during a walkdown of the
alternative shutdown procedure.
The team verified that the licensee installed emergency lights with an 8-hour capacity,
maintained the emergency light batteries in accordance with manufacturer
recommendations, and tested and performed maintenance in accordance with plant
procedures and industry practices.
b. Findings
Introduction. The team identified a Green non-cited violation of License Condition 2.E
for the failure to provide 8-hour emergency lighting in all areas where operators perform
manual actions required during an alternative shutdown.
Description. During a walkdown of the alternative shutdown procedure, the team
identified four areas where the 8-hour emergency lighting was not sufficient for operators
to perform manual actions required during an alternative shutdown. The four areas,
manual actions, and associated procedure sections are provided in the table below.
Area
Manual Action (Procedure Step)
Electrical Auxiliary Building Penetration
Space (train A)
De-energize valve 2-CC-MOV-0339
(Addendum 20)
Electrical Auxiliary Building Penetration
Space (train B)
De-energize valve 2-CC-MOV-0356
(Addendum 21)
Essential Cooling Water Intake Structure
(train B)
De-energize dampers HZ-FV-9895/9895A
(Addendum 5, Step 2.0)
Essential Cooling Water Intake Structure
(train C)
De-energize dampers HZ-FV-9896/9896A
(Addendum 5, Step 2.0)
In response to the teams request, the licensee conducted a blackout test to evaluate the
adequacy of the 8-hour emergency lighting in the essential cooling water intake structure
(train B). This blackout test confirmed the teams determination that the 8-hour
emergency lighting in the room was not sufficient for operators to de-energize dampers
HZ-FV-9895/9895A.
9
As a compensatory measure, the licensee added flashlights to the procedure box in the
Essential Cooling Water Intake Structure. The team noted that operators were also
required to carry a flashlight while on shift.
Analysis. The failure to provide 8-hour emergency lighting in all areas where operators
perform manual actions required during an alternative shutdown was a performance
deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated
with the protection against external events (fire) attribute of the Mitigating Systems
Cornerstone and it adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the
availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to
prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the failure to provide 8-hour
emergency lighting could adversely affect the ability of operators to perform the manual
actions required for an alternative shutdown.
The team determined this finding affected the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone. The
team evaluated this finding using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, Fire
Protection Significance Determination Process, dated September 20, 2013, because it
affected the ability to reach and maintain safe shutdown conditions in case of a fire. The
team assigned the finding to the post-fire safe shutdown category since it impacted the
remote shutdown and control room abandonment element. Using Inspection Manual
Chapter 0609, Appendix F, Attachment 2, Degradation Rating Guidance Specific to
Various Fire Protection Program Elements, dated February 28, 2005, the team
assigned the finding a low degradation rating since the ability to reach and maintain safe
shutdown conditions in the event of a control room fire would be minimally impacted by
the failure to provide 8-hour emergency lighting in the four areas. Specifically, the team
determined that operators were required to carry flashlights while on shift and these
flashlights would be sufficient for operators to perform the required manual actions.
Because this finding had a low degradation rating, it screened as having very low safety
significance (Green) in Task 1.3.1.
The finding did not have a cross-cutting aspect since it was not indicative of present
performance in that the performance deficiency occurred more than three years ago.
Specifically, the team determined that the performance deficiency existed since original
construction.
Enforcement. License Condition 2.E states, in part, that the licensee shall implement
and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program as described
in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report through Amendment Number 55 for Unit 1,
the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report through Amendment Number 62 for Unit 2,
and the Fire Hazards Analysis Report through Amendment Number 23. Section 4.1 of
the Fire Hazards Analysis Report contains a comparison of the licensees fire protection
program to the requirements in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R. The Fire Hazards Analysis
Report states that fixed self-contained emergency lighting, consisting of sealed-beam
units with individual 8-hour minimum battery supply, will be provided in areas needed for
operation of hot standby/hot shutdown equipment, and in access and egress routes
thereto.
Contrary to the above, prior to February 9, 2017, the licensee failed to implement and
maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program. Specifically, the
licensee failed to provide 8-hour emergency lighting in all areas needed for operation of
hot standby/hot shutdown equipment.
10
The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as Condition
Report CR 17-1741. In addition to ensuring operators carried flashlights while on
shift, the licensee also implemented a compensatory measure of adding flashlights to
the procedure box in the essential cooling water intake Structure. Because this violation
was of very low safety significance and has been entered into the corrective action
program, this violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with
Section 2.3.2.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy: NCV 05000498/2017007-01; 05000499/2017007-01, Failure to Provide 8-hour Emergency Lighting for All Alternative
Shutdown Manual Actions.
.09
Cold Shutdown Repairs
a. Inspection Scope
South Texas Project Electric Generating Station has three trains of redundant
equipment in each unit and, therefore, does not credit any cold shutdown repairs.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.10
Compensatory Measures
a. Inspection Scope
The team verified that compensatory measures were implemented for out-of-service,
degraded, or inoperable fire protection and post-fire safe shutdown equipment, systems,
or features (e.g., detection and suppression systems and equipment; passive fire
barriers; or pumps, valves, or electrical devices providing safe shutdown functions). The
team also verified that the short-term compensatory measures compensated for the
degraded function or feature until appropriate corrective action could be taken, and that
the licensee was effective in returning the equipment to service in a reasonable period of
time.
The team reviewed operator manual actions credited for achieving hot shutdown for fires
that do not require an alternative shutdown. The team verified that operators could
reasonably be expected to perform the actions within the applicable shutdown time
requirements. The team reviewed these operator manual actions using the guidance
contained in NUREG-1852, Demonstrating the Feasibility and Reliability of Operator
Manual Actions in Response to Fire, dated October 2007.
For the train of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions, the
team verified that the licensee treated these manual actions as compensatory measures
while appropriate corrective actions are implemented or while preparations are made by
the licensee to submit exemptions or deviations. For components important to safe
shutdown that could adversely affect the safe shutdown capability, the team verified that
operators could reasonably be expected to perform the actions within the applicable
shutdown time requirements.
11
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.11
Review and Documentation of Fire Protection Program Changes
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed changes made to the approved fire protection program since
September 25, 2014. The team verified that the changes did not constitute an adverse
effect on the ability to safely shutdown.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.12
Control of Transient Combustibles and Ignition Sources
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed the licensees approved fire protection program, implementing
procedures, and programs for the control of ignition sources and transient combustibles.
The team assessed the licensees effectiveness in preventing fires and in controlling
combustible loading within limits established in the fire hazards analysis. The team
performed plant walkdowns to independently verify that transient combustibles and
ignition sources were being properly controlled in accordance with the administrative
controls.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.13
Alternative Mitigation Strategy Inspection Activities
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed the licensees implementation of guidance and strategies intended to
maintain or restore core, containment, and spent fuel pool cooling capabilities under the
circumstances associated with the potential loss of large areas of the plant due to
explosions or fire as required by 10 CFR 50.54(hh)(2).
The team verified that the licensee implemented and maintained adequate procedures,
maintained and tested equipment necessary to properly implement the strategies, and
ensured station personnel were knowledgeable and capable of implementing the
procedures. The team performed a visual inspection of portable equipment used to
implement the strategy to ensure the availability and material readiness of the
equipment, including the adequacy of portable pump trailer hitch attachments, and verify
the availability of on-site vehicles capable of towing the portable pump. The team
assessed the off-site ability to obtain fuel for the portable pump and foam used for
firefighting efforts. The strategy and procedure selected for this inspection sample
included:
12
Procedure 0POP10-FP-0001, Alternate Fire Protection System Operation,
Revision 4
One mitigating strategy sample was completed.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4.
OTHER ACTIVITIES [OA]
4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution (71152)
Corrective Actions for Fire Protection Deficiencies
a. Inspection Scope
The team selected a sample of condition reports associated with the licensee's fire
protection program to verify that the licensee had an appropriate threshold for identifying
deficiencies. The team reviewed the corrective actions proposed and implemented to
verify that they were effective in correcting identified deficiencies. The team evaluated
the quality of recent engineering evaluations through a review of condition reports,
calculations, and other documents during the inspection.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit
Exit Meeting Summary
On February 9, 2017, the team presented the inspection results to Mr. G. Powell, Executive
Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer, and other members of the licensee staff. The
licensee acknowledged the findings presented.
The team verified that no proprietary information was retained by the team members or
documented in this report.
Attachment
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee Personnel
J. Alston, Systems Engineering Department Supervisor
M. Berg, Manager, Design Engineering
J. Berrio, Manager, Operations-Production Support and Programs
A. Capristo, Chief Administrative Officer
F. Cox, Design Engineering Department Safe Shutdown
G. Ferrigno, Radiation Protection GS
K. Frazier, Systems Engineering Department, Elect/IMS Section Supervisor
C. Gann, Manager, Employee Concerns Program
C. Georgeson, Supervisor, Design Engineering
D. Gore, Supervisor, Reactor Analysis
D. Hubenak, Radiation Protection GS
D. Janak, Performance Improvement Coordinator
D. Jenkins, Operations Support-Procedures
W. Jordan, Plant Operator
R. Kersey, Supervisor, Design
D. Koehl, President and Chief Executive Officer
R. Krupa, Senior Staff Specialist, Quality
R. Lacey, Design Engineering Department Electrical
B. Lane, Manager, Operations Division - Integrated Work Mgmt. & Outage
G. Lamberth, Operations Support-Procedures
H. Leon, Design Engineering Department, Electrical Engineer
J. Lovejoy, Manager Assistant, Maintenance
N. Mayer, Manager, Major Projects
M. Murray, Manager, Regulatory Affairs/Licensing
C. Pence, Manager, Chemistry
B. Powell, Staff Operations Specialist
G. Powell, Executive Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer
D. Rohan, Operations Support-Procedures
R. Scarborough, Manager NOS
M. Schaefer, Plant General Manager
G. Schinzel, Supervising Engineer
C. Stinson, Manager, Maintenance & Technology Training
R. Stastny, Manager, Maintenance
D. Wiegand, Fire Protection Engineering
D. Whiddon, Supervisor, Quality
R. Gonzales, Engineer Staff
NRC Personnel
F. Sanchez, Senior Resident Inspector
N. Hernandez, Resident Inspector
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
None
2
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Cable Routing Data Components
A2AF01C1WB
A2RC13C1LAA
B2CV31C2WA
B2SP17CDSA
A2AF01C1WC
A2RC13C1LB
B2CV31C2WC
B2SP17CHSB
A2AF01C1WD
A2RC13C1LC
B2CVAEC1LA
B2SP17CHSE
A2AF01C1WE
A2RC13C1WA
B2MB04C1SK
B2SP17CHSF
A2AF01C1WF
A2RC13C1WB
B2MB04C1SU
C2CV26C1WA
A2AF01C1WG
A2RC13C1WC
B2MB04C1SV
C2CV26C1WB
A2AM14C1SA
A2RC13C1WD
B2MB04C1SW
C2CV26C1WC
A2CV26C1WA
A2RC13C1WE
B2RC05C2WA
C2CV26C1WD
A2CV26C1WB
A2RC13C1WF
B2RC05C2WB
C2CV26C1WE
A2CV26C1WC
A2RCAAC1WA
B2RC05C2WC
C2CV31C1SB
A2CV26C1WD
A2RCABC1LA
B2RC05C2WD
C2CV31C1WA
A2CV26C1WE
A2RCABC1LB
B2RC05C2WE
C2CV31C1WC
A2CVAAC1GA
A2RCABC1LC
B2RC13C2LB
C2CVACC1GA
A2MB01C1SB
A2SI05C1SA
B2RC13C2LC
C2CVAHC1LA
A2MB01C1SJ
A2SI05CSSB
B2RC13C2LD
C2MB04C1SB
A2MB01C2SN
A2SI06C1SA
B2RC13C2LE
C2MB04C1SL
A2MB04C1SB
A2SI06C1SB
B2RC13C2WA
C2SP17CFSA
A2MB04C1SS
A2SIAAC1EA
B2RC13C2WB
N2AM11C3SA
A2MB04C1ST
A2SIAAC1EB
B2RC13C2WC
N2IC14C1XD
A2MB04C1SU
A2SP17CHSB
B2RC13C2WD
N2IC14C1XD1
A2RC05C1WA
A2SP17CHSE
B2RC13C2WE
N2IC14C3XD
A2RC05C1WB
A2SP17CHSF
B2RC13C2WF
N2IC14C3XD1
A2RC05C1WC
A2SP22CASG
B2RCACC1WA
A2RC05C1WD
A2SP22CMSD
B2RCADC1LA
A2RC05C1WE
A2SP27CASE
B2RCADC1LB
A2RC13C1LA
B2CV31C2SB
B2RCADC1LC
Calculations
Number
Title
Revision/Date
EC6053 Sheet 187
4.16 kV Switchgear Transfer Switch Schemes
Figure 8.5 Fuse Curves for 15 Amp Type A4J15 fuse,
KWN15A fuse, and ITE Class J 30 Amp A4J30 fuse
December 24,
1987
3
Calculations
Number
Title
Revision/Date
MC06023
Appendix R Evaluation
13
MC-5557
IVC Flooding Analysis
9
NC-0709
Fire Hazards Analysis
6
NC-9703
Flooding Analysis: MAB
2
Condition Reports
11-10905 15-864
17-1020*
13-11633
16-1036-1
17-1022*
14-10845
16-12666
17-1026
14-16243
16-13030
17-1029*
14-17206
16-13587
17-1042*
14-17681
16-13588
17-1102*
14-17098
16-13821
17-1110*
14-4215-4
16-13941
17-1113*
15-10544
16-13993
17-1141*
15-10698
16-14060
17-1473*
15-16087
16-14207
17-1661*
15-17634
16-14210
17-1677*
15-18016
16-14274
17-1741*
15-20739
16-1488
17-1776*
15-22156
16-15937
17-1777*
15-22736-2
16-15951
17-1790*
15-23704
16-16045
15-23705
16-1832
15-23793
16-3841
15-23796
16-4633
15-23859
16-4905
15-24143
16-6501
15-24188
16-8427
15-24734 16-903
15-25399
17-1016*
15-26129
17-1019
- Issued as a result of inspection activities.
4
Design Change Notices
0601177
0601176
0701838
Drawings
Number
Title
Revision/Date
5S139F00063#2
Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Feedwater
36
5S109F00016#2
Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Main Steam
34
5S142F00024
Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Auxiliary
12
5R209F05017#2
Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Component
Cooling Water System
20
E0AAAA Sht. 1
Single line Diagram Main one Line Diagram Unit
Number 1 and 2
28
9E0AAAB#1 Sht. 1
Single Line Diagram Class 1E 125V DC and 120V
Vital AC Non-Class 1E 48V, 125V, 250V, DC and
120V Vital AC Non-Class 1E Inverter power for
Computer 208V/120V AC Regulated Power
27
C012-000937F
Detail M-1A Silicone Elastomer Typical Mechanical
Penetration Seals (walls and Floors)
November 9,
1999
9E0DG04#2 Sht. 1
Elementary diagram Standby Diesel Generator
Number 21 Emergency Control and Instrumentation
20
9E0DG04#2 Sht. 2
Elementary diagram Standby Diesel Generator
Number 21, 22, and 23 Emergency Control and
Instrumentation
16
5Z109Z42117#2
Instrumentation ESF Load Sequencer Actuation
Train A Logic Diagram System SP
12
804101197CE
STP Log Number Cooper Bessemer G5-553-137
Control Schematic (Starting Sequence Control)
0
9-E-MB03-01#2
Elementary Diagram Master Block Diagram ESF
Main Control Board ZCP003
6
9E0PK03#2
Elementary Diagram ESF Transformer and 4.16kV
Bus E1A, E1B, and E1C Protection and Metering
Circuit
9
9E0PK04#2 Sht. 1
Elementary Diagram ESF Transformer and 4.16kV
Bus E2A, E2B, and E2C Protection and Metering
Circuit
14
5
Drawings
Number
Title
Revision/Date
9E0DG01#2 Sht.1
Elementary Diagram Standby Diesel Generator
DG21 4.16kV Feeder Breaker
16
9E0PK01#2 Sht. 1
Elementary Diagram 4.16kV ESF Bus E1A, E1B,
and E1C Supply Breaker Control
10
9E0PK01#2
Elementary Diagram 4.16kV ESF Bus E1A, E1B,
and E1C Supply Breaker Control
7
9-E-RC1 3-01
Elementary Diagram Reactor Coolant Pressurizer
Power Relief Valves PCV-655A and PCV-656A
9
9E0SI05#2 Sht. 1
Elementary Diagram High Head Safety Injection
Pumps PA201A, PA201B, and PA201C
8
9E0SI06#2 Sht. 1
Elementary Diagram Low Head Safety Injection
Pumps PA202A, PA202B, and PA202C
9
9E0CH11#2 Sht. 1
Elementary Diagram E.A.B. HVAC Essential Chilled
Water Chiller Units CH004, CH005, and CH006
10
9-E-CH11-03#2
Elementary Diagram E.A.B. HVAC Essential Chilled
Water Chiller Units CH004, CH005, and CH006
5
9-E-PKAA-01 #2
Single Line Diagram 4.16kV Class 1E
Switchgear E2A
10
9E0PKAB#2 Sht. 1
Single Line Diagram 4.16kV Class 1E
Switchgear E2B
10
9E0PKAC-01#2
Single Line Diagram 4.16kV Class 1E
Switchgear E2C
9
9E0EW01#2 Sht. 1
Elementary Diagram Essential Cooling Water
Pumps Number 2A, 2B, and 2C
20
9E0AF01#2 Sht. 1
Elementary Diagram Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps
Number 21, 21, and 23
10
9E-AF01-02 #2
Elementary Diagram Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps
Number 11, 12, and 13
3
9E0CV26#2 Sht. 1
Elementary Diagram Centrifugal Charging Pumps
Number 2A and 2B (PA201A and PA201B)
12
9E0CV26#2 Sht. 2
Elementary Diagram Centrifugal Charging Pumps
Number 2A and 2B (PA201A and PA201B)
12
6
Drawings
Number
Title
Revision/Date
9E0CC01#2 Sht. 1
Elementary Diagram Component Cooling Water
PA201A, PA201B, and PA201C
16
9E0CC01#2 Sht. 2
Elementary Diagram Component Cooling Water
PA201A, PA201B and PA201C
20
9-E-CC10-01 #2
Elementary Diagram Master Cable Block Diagram
Component Cooling Water System
13
9E0CV05#2 Sht. 1
Elementary Diagram CVCS VCT Outlet Isolation
MOV-0112B and MOV-0113A
12
9E0CV31#1 Sht. 1
Elementary Diagram CVCS RWST to Charging
Pump MOV-0112C AND MOV-0113B
14
9E0SI12#2 Sht. 1
Elementary Diagram SI RWST Outlet MPVs 0001A,
0001B, and 0001C
11
9E0RC05#1 Sht. 1
Elementary Diagram Reactor Coolant Pressurizer
Relief Block Valve MOV0001A and MOV0001B
17
9E0RC05#2 Sht. 1
Elementary Diagram Reactor Coolant Pressurizer
Relief Block Valve MOV0001A and MOV0001B
15
5-R-14-9-Z-42155#1
Reactor Coolant Pressurizer Relief Block Valves
logic Diagram System
11
9E0AF13#2 Sht. 1
Elementary Diagram AFW to Steam Generator 2D
Regulating Valve FV-7526
16
9E0CV09#2 Sht. 1
Elementary Diagram CVCS Excess Letdown Line
Isolation MOV-0083 and MOV-0082
11
9E0RH05#2 Sht. 1
Elementary Diagram Residual Heat Removal
Pumps 2A, 2B, and 2C (PA201A, PA201B, and
PA201C)
12
9E0RH05#2 Sht. 2
Elementary Diagram Residual Heat Removal
Pumps 2A, 2B, and 2C
1
9E0PLAA#2 Sht. 1
Single Line Diagram 480V Class-1E Center E2A
19
9E0PLAB#2 Sht. 1
Single Line Diagram 480V Class-1E Center E2B
16
9E0PLAC#2 Sht. 1
Single Line Diagram 480V Class-1E Center E2C
17
9E0PMAA#2 Sht. 1
Single Line Diagram 480V Class-1E Motor Control
Center E2A1
26
7
Drawings
Number
Title
Revision/Date
9E0PMAA#2 Sht. 2
Single Line Diagram 480V Class-1E Motor Control
Center E2A1
21
9E0PMAB#2 Sht. 1
Single Line Diagram 480V Class-1E Motor Control
Center E2A2
27
9E0PMAC#2 Sht. 1
Single Line Diagram 480V Class-1E Motor Control
Center E2A3 ECW Building
14
9E0PMAD#2 Sht. 1
Single Line Diagram 480V Class-1E Motor Control
Center E2B1
25
9E0PMAD#2 Sht. 2
Single Line Diagram 480V Class-1E Motor Control
Center E2B1
22
9E0PMAE#2 Sht. 1
Single Line Diagram 480V Class-1E Motor Control
Center E2B2
17
9E0PMAF#2 Sht. 1
Single Line Diagram 480V Class-1E Motor Control
Center E2B3 ECW Building
15
9E0PMAG#2 Sht. 1
Single Line Diagram 480V Class-1E Motor Control
Center E2C1
21
9E0PMAG#2 Sht. 2
Single Line Diagram 480V Class-1E Motor Control
Center E2C1
17
9E0PMAH#2 Sht. 1
Single Line Diagram 480V Class-1E Motor Control
Center E2C2
21
9E0PMAJ#2 Sht. 1
Single Line Diagram 480V Class-1E Motor Control
Center E2C3 ECW Building
14
9E0PMAK#2 Sht. 1
Single Line Diagram 480V Class-1E Motor Control
Center E2A4
22
9E0PMAL#2 Sht. 1
Single Line Diagram 480V Class-1E Motor Control
Center E2B4
22
9E0PMAM#2 Sht. 1
Single Line Diagram 480V Class-1E Motor Control
Center E2C4 Center
20
9E0PCAA#2 Sht. 1
Single Line Diagram 13.8 kV Switchgear 2F
17
9E0PCAB#2 Sht. 1
Single Line Diagram 13.8 kV Switchgear 2G
17
9E0PCAC#2 Sht. 1
Single line Diagram 13.8 kV Switchgear 2H
16
8
Drawings
Number
Title
Revision/Date
9E0VAAA#2 Sht. 1
Single Line Diagram Vital 120V AC Distribution
Panels DP001, DP1201 Channel I
27
5R209F05017
Piping and Instrumentation Component Cooling
Water System
20
86-534801 Sht. 1
Liquid Level Controller FR72LL - Remote
Electronics
A
86-534801 Sht. 2
Liquid Level Controller FR72LL - Remote
Electronics
A
9-W-01-9-E-50102
Electrical-Communications Maintenance Jack
Station One Line Diagram
5
9E569E03765
Electrical - Electrical Auxiliary Bldg. Lighting &
Communications Plan Elevation 35-0
11
9E569E03751
Electrical - Electrical Auxiliary Bldg. Lighting &
Communications Plan Elevation 10-0
15
9E569E03753
Electrical - Electrical Auxiliary Bldg. Lighting &
Communications Plan Elevation 10-0
20
9E569E03767#2
Electrical - Electrical Auxiliary Bldg. Lighting Plan
Elevation 35-0
21
9E560E03001
Electrical Elementary Diagram - Lighting Fixture
Schedule Units 1 & 2
30
0-E-0102 SH. 5
Electrical Lighting Notes & Details Lighting Symbols
9
7E569E03046
Appendix R Light Locations
3
9E560E0102 SH. 23
Electrical Lighting Notes And Details Wall Mount
Emergency LTGS.
9
9W019E00466 #2
Mech. And Elect. Aux. Bldg. Fire Detection
Plan El. 21-0 & 29-0
7
9W019E00467 #2
Mech. And Elect. Aux. Bldg. Fire Detection
Plan El. 35-0 & 41-0
9
9W019E00468 #2
Mechanical and Electrical Aux. Bldg. Fire Detection
Plan El. 60-0
7
9-W-01-9-E-50471 #2 Mechanical & Electrical Auxiliary Building Fire
Detection Partial Plans for Miscellaneous Areas
4
9
Drawings
Number
Title
Revision/Date
9-W-01-9-E-50474 #2 Isolation Valves Cubicle Fire Detection
Plan El. 10-0 & 21-2
4
9-W-01-9-E-50475 #2 Isolation Valves Cubicle Fire Detection
Plan El. 58-6
3
7M149M24514 #2
Fire Areas Mechanical & Electrical Building Plan at
El. 21-0, 23-0, 29-0, & 32-0
10
7M149M24515 #2
Fire Areas Mechanical & Electrical Auxiliary Building
Plan at El. 35-0, 41-0 & 51-0
14
7M149M24516 #2
Fire Areas Mechanical & Electrical Auxiliary Building
Plan at El. 60-0
11
Fire Areas Isolation Valves Cubicle Plan at El. 10-0
& 21-2
4
Fire Areas Isolation Valves Cubicle Plan at El. 34-0
& 44-0
4
Fire Areas Isolation Valves Cubicle Plan El. 51-6
4
Fire Areas Isolation Valves Cubicle Plan at El. 59-6
4
Fire Areas Isolation Valves Cubicle Sections A-A &
B-B
4
7M149M24513 #1
Fire Areas Mechanical & Electrical Auxiliary Building
Plan at El, 10-0
10
7M149M24515 #1
Fire Areas Mechanical & Electrical Auxiliary Building
Plan at EL. 35-0, 41-0 &51-6
19
7M149M24514 #1
Fire Areas Mechanical & Electrical Building Plan at
EL. 21-0, 23-0 & 330-0
10
7M149M24516 #1
Fire Areas Mechanical & Electrical Building Plan at
EL. 60-0
11
Fire Areas Mechanical & Electrical Building Plan at
EL. 10-0 & 21-2
4
00000E0AAAA
Single Line Diagram Main One Line Diagram Unit
No. 1 & 2
28
00009E0AAAB #1
Single Line Diagram Class 1E 125V DC & 120V Vital
AC Non-Class 1E 48V, 125V, 250, DC, & 120V Vital
AC Non-Class 1E Inverter Power for Computer
27
10
Drawings
Number
Title
Revision/Date
208V/120V AC Regulated Power
AC Non-Class 1E Inverter Power for Computer
208V/120V AC Regulated Power
7M149M24513,
Sheet 1
Mechanical & Electrical Auxiliary Building, Plan at
El. 10-0
10
7M149M24514,
Sheet 1
Mechanical & Electrical Auxiliary Building, Plan at
El. 21-0, 23-0, 29-0, and 30-0
10
7M149M24515,
Sheet 1
Mechanical & Electrical Auxiliary Building, Plan at
El. 35-0, 41-0, and 51-6
19
7M149M24516,
Sheet 1
Mechanical & Electrical Auxiliary Building, Plan at
El. 60-0
11
7M149M24534,
Sheet 1
Isolation Valves Cubicle, Plan at El. 10-0 and 21-2
4
9-E-56-9-E-3608,
Sheet 2
Electrical - Mechanical Auxiliary Building, Lighting
and Communications Plan, Elevation 29-0
13
9-E-NI02-091,
Sheet 2
Elementary Diagram, Master Block Diagram,
Neutron Flux Monitoring System, QDPS Interface
4
Miscellaneous Documents
Number
Title
Revision/Date
Westinghouse Type EB, EHB, MARK 75 Type
HFBFuse Curves for 15 Amp circuit breaker
December 11,
1985
Littelfuse Incorporated Time-Current Characteristics
334 and 336 Series Indicating Fuses Fuse Curves
September 25,
1986
STP Users Guide for Maintenance Jack and
Fueling/Refueling Jack Systems
September
1987
07-457-70
Evaluation for Adding 500 GPM of Demineralized
Water to the Spent Fuel Pool Using the Temporary
Fire Water Pump Through the Fire Water Header
December 9,
2008
1200006
Design Change Notice
March 7, 2012
1200360
Design Change Notice
March 13,
2012
9703446
Document Change Notice
October 8,
1997
11
Miscellaneous Documents
Number
Title
Revision/Date
ED-1020
Document Change Notice
January 2,
1991
204608A
PCF Amendment Form
February 14,
1994
204641A
PCF Amendment Form
January 31,
1994
CR 08-14399
STP Multiple Spurious Operation Report
1
1
15-06 (FP)
STP Nuclear Operating Company Fire Protection
Quality Audit Report
August 31,
2015
16-07 (FP)
STP Nuclear Operating Company Fire Protection
Quality Audit Report
August 17,
2016
Active Fire Protection Impairment Permits
January 26,
2017
U2 Open Fire Watches
January 26,
2017
17-01-03
Unannounced Fire Drill (0PGP03-ZF-0011, STEGS
Fire Brigade, Rev. 16)
February 8,
2017
NCR 89-2-025
Appendix R Emergency DC Lighting, ECWIS
Rooms 101, 102, 103
January 26,
1989
5A019MFP001
Post-Fire Operator Actions and Equipment
Protection Requirements
16
Fire Hazards Analysis Report
23
Modifications
Number
Title
Date
1401401
13-11489-1, Revise Drawing as Shown on Page 3
June 16, 2014
1400495
13-11489-1, Change Page 2 of
Calculation 0238-0201005SQ
May 19, 2014
12
Procedures
Number
Title
Revision
Chemical and Volume Control System Valve
Operability Test (Cold Shutdown)
28
Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valve Operability
Test
13
Remote Shutdown System Operability Test (Cold
Shutdown)
16
Train A Remote Shutdown System Operability Test
9
Train B Remote Shutdown System Operability Test
9
Train C Remote Shutdown System Operability Test
9
Train A Remote Shutdown System Operability Test
4
Train A Remote Shutdown System Operability Test
5
Train A Remote Shutdown System Operability Test
5
Train C Remote Shutdown System Operability Test
9
Train C Remote Shutdown System Operability Test
5
STPEGS Fire Brigade
16
Alternate Fire Protection System Operation
4
Respirator Fit Testing
8
Plant Operations Department Administrative Guidelines 49
Fire Protection Water System Functional Test
15
Alternate Fire Protection System Operation
4
Extensive Damage Mitigation Guideline
5
Fire Protection System Functionality Requirements
19
Safe Shutdown Fire Response
15
13
Procedures
Number
Title
Revision
Emergency Response Activities
15
PMI-EM-EL-0001
Emergency Light Testing
0
Hot Work Program
3
Control of Transient Fire Loads and Use of
Combustible and Flammable Liquids and Gases
15
Fire Protection System Functionality Requirements
19
Fire Protection Training and Qualification Program
11
Safe Shutdown Fire Response
14
Fire/Explosion
25
Condition Report Engineering Evaluation
24
Control Room Evacuation
42
Unit 2 ECWIS Emergency DC Lighting Test
0
Vendor Document
Number
Title
Revision
VTD-M568-0004
Holophane M-19 12 volt DC power pack for automatic
emergency lighting - Installation and maintenance
instructions
3
Work Orders
553365
476850
509206
469672
498017
476853
509205
439418
516337
525424
503414
455441
482275
525364
497337
489640
499679
486919
479338
525362
507880
470941
476848
484809
502929
96006291
SUNSI Review: ADAMS:
Non-Publicly Available Non-Sensitive Keyword: NRC-002
By: STM Yes No Publicly Available
Sensitive
OFFICE
ASRI:EB2
RI:EB2
SRI:EB2
RI:EB1
RI:EB2
C:EB2
C:PBB
C:EB2
NAME
SMakor
SAlferink
JDrake
CStott
JWatkins
GWerner
NTaylor
GWerner
SIGNATURE
/RA/
/RA/
/RA/
/RA/
/RA/
/RA/
/RA/DLP
for
/RA/
DATE
03/08/17
03/03/17
03/06/17
03/06/17
03/16/17
03/10/2017
03/20/17
03/20/17