ML17059C591

Responds to 990218 Request That NRC Exercise Discretion by Not Enforcing Compliance with Action Required in Nine Mile Point Unit 1 Tsas 3.1.3.e.Concludes NOED Warranted & Discretion Exercised

ML17059C591
Person / Time
Site:	Nine Mile Point
Issue date:	03/09/1999
From:	Blough A NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:	Mueller J NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORP.
References
NOED-99-1-001, NOED-99-1-1, NUDOCS 9903220009
Download: ML17059C591 (30)

Text

~aA REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR:9903220009 DOC.DATE: 99/03/09 NOTARIZED: YES FACIL:50-220 Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit 1, Niagara Powe AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION BLOUGH,A.R.

Region 1 (Post 820201)

RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION MUELLER,J.H.

Niagara Mohawk Power Corp.

E

SUBJECT:

Responds to 990218 request that NRC exercise discretion by not enforcing compliance with action required in Nine Mile Point Unit 1 TSAS 3.'1.3.e.Concludes NOED warranted discretion exercised.

DISTRIBUTION CODE:

IE01D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL SIZE:

TITLE: General (50 Dkt)-Insp Rept/Notice of Violation Response NOTES:

DOCKET 05000220 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD1-1 PD INTERNAL: ACRS AEOD/TTC NRR7"XlRPM7"PEC NUDOCS -ABSTRACT OGC/HDS3 COPIES LTTR ENCL 1

1 2

2 1

1 1-1 1

1 1

1 1

1 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME HOOD,D AEOD/SPD/RAB DEDRO NRR/DRCH/HOHB NRR/DRPM/PERB OE DIR RGN1 FILE 01 COPIES LTTR ENCL 1

1 1

1 1

1 1

1 1

1 1

1 1

1 EXTERNAL: LMITCO MARSHALL NRC PDR 1

1 1

1 NOAC NUDOCS FULLTEXT 1

1 1

1 D

N NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENTS:

PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE.

TO HAVE YOUR NAME OR ORGANIZATION REMOVED FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS OR REDUCE THE NUMBER OF COPIES RECEIVED BY YOU OR YOUR ORGANIZATION, CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK (DCD)

ON EXTENSION 415-2083 TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED:

LTTR 19 ENCL 19

i

March 9, 1999 Mr. John H. Mueller Chief Nuclear Officer Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Operations Building, 2nd Floor P.O. Box 63 Lycoming, NY 13093

SUBJECT:

EXERCISE OF ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION FOR NINE MILEPOINT UNIT 1 (NOED No. 99-1-001)

Dear Mr. Mueller:

By letter dated February 18, 1999, (Enclosure 1), you requested that the NRC exercise discretion by not enforcing compliance with the actions required in Nine Mile Point Unit 1 Technical Specification Action Statement (TSAS) 3.1.3.e.

That letter documented information previously discussed with the NRC in a telephone conversation completed at approximately 8:26 p.m., on February 17, 1999.

During the teleconference, you stated that on the afternoon of February 17, 1999, Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (NMPC) discovered that Technical Specification (TS) 3.2.6.a.1 regarding the structural integrity of ASME Section XI components had not been met. This TS required that all ASME code class components be operable in modes where their respective systems were required to be operable.

Nonetheless, four heat exchanger bundles for the Nine Mile Point Unit 1 Emergency Condensers (ECs) had been installed in 1997 but the 16 associated welds had

~

not been inspected in the manner prescribed by ASME Section XI requirements.

Thus, these ECs were declared inoperable on February 18, 1999.

TS 3.1.3.e requires that a normal orderly shutdown begin within one hour and that the reactor be placed in cold shutdown within 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />.

In order to preclude this TS-required plant shutdown, you requested that a Notice of Enforcement Discretion (NOED) be issued for TS 3.1.3.e to extend the allowed outage time (AOT) by 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> pursuant to the NRC's policy regarding Exercise of Discretion for an operating facility, set out in Section Vll.c, of the "General Statement of Policy and Procedures for NRC Enforcement Actions" (Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600. The NRC reviewed and granted your request for the period beginning at 8:26 p.m., on February 17, 1999, and ending not later than 8:26 p.m.,

February 19, 1999. This approval was based in part on NMPC's determination that the ECs remained capable of performing their intended function and that the enforcement discretion would not be inconsistent with protecting public health and safety.

The NRC's basis for the discretion considered the lack of any visible or otherwise detectable degradation in the EC welds, satisfactory results from previously performed nondestructive evaluations (NDE) which included both surface and volumetric examinations of the affected 9903220009 990309 PDR ADOCK 05000220 P

PDR OFFICIAL RECORD COPY IE: 01

Mr. John H. Mueller and related weld areas, and successful operational pressure testing of the welds at system design pressure.

Additionally, NMPC determined that based on analysis of the plant's probabilistic risk assessment the risk of extending the allowed outage time by 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> was minimal (1.0 E-

06) for the period of discretion.

NMPC considered the possibility of significant hazards associated with this period of noncompliance with TS and determined that there were no significant hazards.

As a compensatory measure, NMPC agreed to maintain both the automatic depressurization system (ADS) and the core spray system in a fullyoperable status during the period of time that discretion was requested, which included performing no maintenance or surveillance activities that would have impacted operability.

On the basis of the staff's evaluation of your request, the staff concluded that a NOED was warranted because we concluded that this action involved minimal or no safety impact and had no adverse radiological impact to the public's health and safety. Therefore, we exercised discretion not to enforce compliance with TSAS 3.1.3.e for the period from 8:26 p.m., on February 17, 1999, and ending not later than 8:26 p.m., February 19, 1999. This letter documents our telephone conversation on February 17, 1999, when we verbally issued this notice of enforcement discretion at 8:26 p.m.

We note that your inspections were completed on February 18, 1999, and found no weld material discrepancies.

This incident will be discussed further in NRC Inspection Report 50-220/99-03.

As stated in the Enforcement Policy, the NRC will normally take action, to the extent that violations were involved, for the root cause that led to the noncompliance for which this NOED was necessary.

Sincerely, Original Signed by:

Glenn M. Meyer for A. Randolph Blough, Director Division of Reactor Projects Docket No. 50-220 NOED No. 99-01-001

Enclosure:

Enclosure 1

Mr. John H. Mueller cc w/encl:

G. Wilson, Senior Attorney, M. Wetterhahn, Winston and Strawn J. Rettberg, New York State Electric and Gas Corporation P. Eddy, Electric Division, Department of Public Service, State of New York C. Donaldson, Esquire, Assistant Attorney General, New York Department of Law J. Vinquist, MATS, Inc.

F. Valentino, President, New York State Energy Research and Development Authority J. Spath, Program Director, New York State Energy Research and Development Authority

Mr. John H. Mueller Distribution w/encl:

Region I Docket Room (with concurrences)

Nuclear Safety Information Center (NSIC)

PUBLIC NRC Resident Inspector H. Miller, RA/J. Wiggins, DRA D. Holody, OE, Rl B. Boger, NRR J. Zwolinski, NRR J. Lieberman, OE M. Boyle, NRR S. Barber, DRP W. Cook, DRP R. Junod, DRP M. Oprendek, DRP Distribution w/encl: (VIAE-MAIL)

M. Tschiltz, Rl EDO Coordinator E. Adensam, NRR D. Hood, NRR G. Hunegs - Nine Mile Point Inspection Program Branch (IPAS)

R. Correia, NRR DOCDESK NOED NRCWEB DOCUMENT NAME: G:FNOEDENOEDNMP.WPD

• See previous concurrences To receive a co of this document, indicate in the box: 'C' Co without attachment/enclosure

'E' Co with attachment/enclosure

'N' No co OFFICE

• RI/DRP NAME GSBarber/SB DATE 03/09/99

• RI/DRP GWMe er/GM 03/9/99 03/

/99 03/

/99 03/ /99 OFFICIALRECORD COPY

Mr. John H. Mueller Distribution w/encl:

Region I Docket Room (with concurrences)

Nuclear Safety Information Center (NSIC)

PUBLIC NRC Resident Inspector H. Miller, RA/J. Wiggins, DRA D. Holody, OE, Rl B. Boger, NRR J. Zwolinski, NRR J. Lieberman, OE M. Boyle, NRR S. Barber, DRP W. Cook, DRP R. Junod, DRP M. Oprendek, DRP Distribution w/encl:

(VIAE-MAIL)

M. Tschiltz, Rl EDO Coordinator A. Adensam, NRR D. Hood, NRR G. Hunegs - Nine Mile Point Inspection Program Branch (IPAS)

R. Correia, NRR DOCDESK NOED NRCWEB DOCUMENT NAME: G:iNOEDiNOEDNMP.WPD To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the box: "C" ~ Copy without attachment/enclosure "E" ~ Copy with attachment/enclosure "N" ~

No co OFFICE RI/DRP 4

RI/DRP NAME DATE GSBarbe 3 03/09/99 GWMeyer 03

/99 03/

/99 FICIAL RECORD COPY 03/

/99 03/

/99

ENCLOSURE 1 Niagara@>

John H. Muollor Senior Vice President ond Chief Nuclear Officer February 18, 1999 NMP1L 1407 Phone: 315.349.7907 Fac 315.349.1321 e mail muellejQnimo corn U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Contxol Desk Washington, DC 20555 RB:

Nine MilePoht Unit l Docket No. $0-220 Subject.

Request forEftfonemeax Dfscreriors xo Technfcal Specgl'calfon 3.1.3.e Gentlemen:

On February 17, 1999, following discussions with the NRC Staff, Nine MilePoint Unit 1 (NMP1) was granted enforcemcnt discretion with respect to Technical Specification g'S) 3.1.3.e.

The enforcement discretion became effective at 2026 hours0.0234 days <br />0.563 hours <br />0.00335 weeks <br />7.70893e-4 months <br /> on February 17, 1999, and expires at 2026 hours0.0234 days <br />0.563 hours <br />0.00335 weeks <br />7.70893e-4 months <br /> on February 19, 1999.

The purpose of this letter is to document the basis of the verbal xequest and to xequest written confirmation of the enforcement discretion that was granted.

NMP1 TS 3.2.6'a.1 requires that to be considered opexable, Quality Gxaup A, 8 and C components shall satisfy the requirements contained in Section XIof the ASMBBoiler and Pxessuxe Vessel Code and applicable Addenda for continued service of ASMB Code Chss 1, 2 and 3 components, respectively.

TS 3.1.3.a requires that during power operating conditions and whenever the reactor coolant temperature is greater than 212'F, except for hydrostatic testing with the reactor not critical, both Bmexgency Cooling Systems (ECSS) shall be operable except as specified in TS 3.1.3.b.

TS 3.1.3.b states that ifone BCS becomes inoperable, TS 3.1.3.a shall bc considered Mfilled, provided that the inoperable system is retu'rned to an opexable condition within 7 days.

TS

. 3.1.3.e states that ifTS 3.1.3.a or 3.1.3.b is not met, a'normal orderly shutdown willbe initiated within one hour and that the reactor will'bein the cold shutdown condition within':ten hours.

On.Febriiaxy 17,."1999, Niagara'Mohawk Power Coxpoxation (NMPC) determined that ASMB Code xeqtsized examinations had not been performed on the ECS Bmergencjj Conden'scr (EC)

'eisel welds.

Accordingly, both BCSs.were dcclaxed'inoperable and TS 3.1.3.e was entered which required a plant shutdown".

To preclude completion of. a plant shutdown, NM'C requested enforeanent discxetion from the xequirements of TS 3.1.3.e for 48 bours to perfoon the xequir'ed exaniinations and evaluation of data asso'ciated with these examinations.

Nine HQo Paint Nuclear Station PO. Box Q. Lmmlng, Haw Yoa 130334063

Page 2 NMPC believes there is less risk in continued operation than in forcing an unnecessary plant chaQenge by taking the plant to the shutdown condition to comply with the requirements of TS 3.1.3.e.

Attachment 1 provides NMPC's response to the 12 criteria identified in NRC Inspection l4mual 9900, which provides the appropriate justification for this enforcement discretion.

This request for enforcement discretion has been reviewed and approved by the NMP1 Station Optmtions Review Committee (SORC).

Very truly yours, Jl John H. Mueller Chief Nuclear Officer JHM/JMT/sc Attachment xc:

Mr. H. J. Miller, Regional Administrator, Region I Mr. S. S. Bajwa, Director, Project Directorate I-l,.NRR Mr. G. K. Hunegs, Senior Resident Inspector Mr. D; S. Hood, Senior Project Manager, NRR Records Management

1)

UNITEDSTATES OF AMERICANUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION Ixi the Matter of

)

)

Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation

)

)

Nine MOe Point Nuclear Station Unit No. I

)

Docket No. $0-220 John H. Muellcr, being duly sworn, states that he is Chief Nuclear Officer of Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation; that he is authorized on the part of said Corporation to sign and file with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission the documents attached hereto; and that all such documents are true and correct to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief.

NIAGARAMOHAWKPOWER CORPORATION By Joh H. Mueller Chief Nuclear Officer Subscribed and sworn to before me this 1Sth day of February 1999.

NOTARYP BLIC SEvtRa W, itlPlta iolaty Public Stataot Naw Toe qual, in Oawaro Co. tlo, a idly.'Oneiaalan aXO o \\i

The Tecbnkal Specification or other license conditions that willbe violated.

Nine MilePoint Unit 1 (NMP1) Technical Specification (TS) 3.2.6 a. 1 xequires that to be considered opmable, Quality Group A, B and C components shall satisfy the requirements contained in Section XIof the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and applicable Addenda for continued service of ASME Code Cjass 1, 2 and 3 components, respectively.

TS 3.1.3.a requires that during power operating conditions and whenever the reactor coolant tempexature is greater than 212'P, except for hydrostatic testing with the reactor not critical, both Emergency Cooling Systems (ECSs) shall be operable except.

as specified in TS 3.1.3.b.

TS 3.1.3.b states that ifone ECS becomes inoprmd)le, TS 3.1.3.a shall bc considered fulfilled,provided that the inoperable system is returned to an operable condition within 7 days.

TS 3.1.3.e states that ifTS 3.1.3.a or 3.1.3.b is not met, a normal orderly shutdown willbe initiated within one hour and that the reactor willbe in the cold shutdown condition within ten hours.

'n Pebruaxy 17, 1999, Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (NMPC) determined that ASMB Code required examinations had not been performed on the ECS Emergency Condenser (EC) vessel welds.

Accordingly, both ECSs were declared inoperable and TS 3.1.3.e was entered which required a plant shutdown.

To preclude completion ofa plant shutdown, NMPC requested enforcement discretion from the xequimnents of TS 3.1.3.e for 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> to perform the required examinations and evaluation of data associated with these examinations.

'Ihe drcuinstances surx otxnding the situation, iadudiag mot causee, the xwed for.

prompt action, and identincatloa of any relevant historical events.

The NMP1 EC tube bundles wexe replaced in the last quarter of 1997. This necessitated the disassembly and reassembly ofpart of the ECS EC vessels.

Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code requires that=prio'r to return of the plant to service, a prescrvice inspection shall be made in accordance with WC-2200 for the component and part replaced.

Contrary to the above, the preservice examinations werc not performed in accordance with Code requirements for the vessel welds.

The manufacturer NDE examinations of the vesse1 welds that could possibly be credited as preservice examinations were performed prior to ASME Section Hi hydrostatic testing.

The Code requires that for vessels, the preservice examinations be performed after

'ASME Section QI hydrostatic testing.

Due to the improper application of the presezvice examination zequizemcnts of ASMB Section M, TS Suzveilhnce Requirement (SR) 4.2.6.a.1 of the Inservice Inspection and Testing Specification was not satisfied for the four BCs (i.e., the ASME Code examinations were not performed).

The failure to perform this SR resulted in the four ECs being inoperable and thereby resulted in both ECSs being declared inoperable.

With both ECSs dech3ued inopezable, TS 3.1.3.e requires thc plant to be shutdown.

A prelimiziazy evaluation of the cause of the failure to perform the pzeservice examinations indicates a misunderstanding of the Code rcquirement3 duang the zeplaceznent of the four ECs'ube bundles during the hst quarter of 1997.

3, The safety basis foz the request; includhag an evaluation of the safety sigd5cazzce and potential coasequences of the proposed course of actloa. This evabzatlon should include at ksst a quaBtatlve risk assesstnent derived from the licensee's PRA.

The NMP1 ECS is a standby system for the zemoval of fission product decay heat without the loss of reactor water after a reactor scram when the main condenst~ is not available as a heat sink, or in the event of loss of reactor feedwater.

In addition, the ECS aids the Core Spray System and the Automatic Depressuzization System (ADS) in pmviding effective coze cooling following a loss of coolant from the reactor.

The ECS consists of two independent loops, each with two ECs. The system operates by natural circulation, without the need for power to keep the system in operation.

initiation of the system is automatic, with the appropriate signals from the Reactor Protection System (RPS).

Due to degradation in the previous BCs'ressure boundary between the shell to tube interface, the four ECs'ube bundles were replaced during a unit shutdown that occurred during the last quarter of 1997.

These BCs were oziginal plant equipment which were installed during the 1960's when NMpl was constructed and placed into operation.

NMPC has determined that the ECSs are capable ofperforming their intended function with the missed examination and that this enforcement discretion is consistent with protecting public health and safety.

The basis for this determination is as follows:

No degradation has been observed since replacement of the tube bundles in any of the four ECs'hell to tube interne that would warrant dcchuing any EC inoperable due to leakage.

This conclusion is based on water chemistry testing offluid (i,e., mlioisotopic composition) on the shell side of the ECs.

No degradation has been observed since replacement of the tube buncDcs in any of the four ECs shell side of the condensers that would warrant declaring any EC inoperable due to leakage.

This conclusion is based on visual inspections of the shell side of the ECs and the lack of pressure boundary ledcage.

The tube side of the ECs is pressurized to reactor operating pressure during plant operation.

Examinations and testing of the subject vessel welds that were succc3sMly performed at the vendor's shop facilities included the following:

Visual Inspection Liquid Penetration Examinations Section IIIUltrasonic Examinations Section IIIRadiographic Examinations Section IH Hydrostatic Testing Testing that was successfully performed at NMP1 on the installed ECs which included the subject welds included ASME Section XIpressure testing.

Consistent with the guidance provided in Generic Letter 87~,

Sections 3.0 and 4.0 of the Standard Technical Specifica6ons on thc ApplicabBIty of Limiting Conditions for Operation and Surveillance Requirements,'he vast majority of surveillances do in fact demonstrate that systems or components are operable.

Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that systems or components arc still operable when a Surveillance Requirement has not been performed and thus that the BCSs willperform their safety function.

Thc baseline core damage frequency (CDF) with all four BCs operable is 2.54 E-05 per year. The CDF associated with all four BCs out of service is 2.0 E-04 per year.

Assuming all four ECs are out'of setvice for a 48 hour5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> period, thc integrated risk (i.c., core damage probability).for the period of enforrAment discretion is 1.0 E-06.

4.

The basis for the licensee's conclusion that the aancompHance willaot be of potential detrhnent to the.public.health and safety and.that neither aa unrevtewed safety question nor a significant baaed consideration Is involved..

NMPC has evaluated this request using the criteria set forth in 10CHt50.92, and determined that it does not involve a significant hizards consideration nor an unxeviewed safety question.

NMPC has evaluated the missed ASME Code examination and has concluded that there is no significant hazards consideration involved with the requested enforcement discretion.

The significance of not performing the examination has been found not to bc of potential detriment to the public health and safety based upon the evaluation provided in Item 3, which concludes that the BCs are capable ofperforming their safety function. Thus, there is no safety consequence associated with the request for enforceinent discretion.

Operation of NMPi ha accordance with the eaforeemeat

@scretioa wQl aot involve a s~eaat increase ia the probability or coasequeaces of an accident parlously evaluated.

Based on the recent replacement of the ECs'ube bundles, the successful completion of the above testing and inspections, the absence of external leaks of the ECs and the acceptable water chemistry results on the shell side of the ECs, NMPC has concluded that the ECs are capable of performing their safety function during accident conditions.

Accordingly, there is not a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

Operation of NMP1 ia accordance with the eaforcemeat cUscret)oa willaot create the possibility ot a aew or diffexeat kind of accident from any accideat previously evaluated.

Based on the recent replacement of the ECs'ube bundles, the successful completion of the above testing and inspections, the absence of external leaks of the ECs and the acceptable water chemistry results on the shell side of the ECs, NMPC has concluded that the ECs are capable ofperforming their safety function during accident conditions.

No system configuration changes result from this request for enforcement discretion.

Accordingly, the enforcement discretion willnot create the possibility of a new or different kind ofaccident from any accident previously evaluated.

Operation of NMPl ha accordance with the pt oposed eaforceaeat discretioa will aot involve a slgaRcaat reductloa Ra a raargla of safety..

The four ECs'ube bundles were. recently replaced (i.e., last quarter of 1997).

Vendor shop and onsite examinations have been successfully completed for each of the ECs.

Based on the recent replacement of the ECs'ube bundles, the'successM completion of.

the above testing and inspections, the absence ofexternal leaks ofthe BCs and the P

'P P

acceptable water chemistry results on the shell side of the BCs, KMPC has concluded that the ECs aze capable ofperforming their safety function doting accident conditions.

Accordingly, the pmposed enforcement discretion willnot involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The bash for the lkensee's conclusion that the noncomplilice w91 not involve adverse consequences to the environment.

The enf~ment disctetion involves the NMP1 ECs.

The requested enforcement discretion does not involve an increase in thc amounts or types of any effluents that may be released offsite nor an increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.

Also, the requested enforcement discretion does not physically modify the plant, increase the plant's licensed power level or involve irreversible environmental consequences.

6.

Atty proposed compensatory measures.

During the 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> for which the enforcement discretion is requested, no activities (e.g., preventive maintenance or surveillance testing) willbc performed in the plant that would render a Core Spray System or the ADS inoperable.

Currently, the NMP1 Core Spray and ADS Systems are operable.

Although the ECSs are inoperable, the ECSs willbe maintained available.

7.

ThegusNicatlon for the duration of the nonc0tnpliance.

NMPC requests enforcement discretion from TS 3.1.3.e for no greater than 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> from February 17, 1999 at 2026 hours0.0234 days <br />0.563 hours <br />0.00335 weeks <br />7.70893e-4 months <br /> until Pebruaxy 19, 1999, at 2026 hours0.0234 days <br />0.563 hours <br />0.00335 weeks <br />7.70893e-4 months <br />.

The requested duration of time is needed to allow performance of the required examinations and evaluation of data associated with these examinations.

8.

A statement that the request has been approved by the faciHty organLtatlon that normally reviews safety bsues.

This request for enforcement.discretion was reviewed and approved by 'the NMP1 Site

.Operations Review Committee (SORC).

Ql

The request must speclGcaBy address how one of the NOED criteria for appropriate plant conditions speclGed ln Section B ls satlsfkd.

NMP1 is currently operating.

Section B of Part 9900, Criteria 1, states that for an operating plant, the enforcement discretion is intended to (a) avoid undesirable transients as a result of forcing compliance with the license condition and, thus, minimixe potential safety consequences and operation risks or (b) eliminate testing, inspection, or system realignment that is inappropriat for the particular plant conditions.

This enforcement discretion meets criterion 1(a) in that entry into TS 3.1.3.e would require a plant shutdown.

NMPC believes there is less risk in continued operation than in forcing an unnecessary plant challenge by tang the plant to a shutdown condition to comply with the requirements ofTS 3.1.3.e.

10.

Ãa follow-up license amendment is required, the NORD request must include marked up Technical Specification pages shawizC the proposed Technkal Speci5cldion changes.

'Ihe actual license azneadment request must foBow within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />.

No follow-up license amendment is required as part of this enforcement discretion.

The required examinations and evaluations willbe performed by 2026 hours0.0234 days <br />0.563 hours <br />0.00335 weeks <br />7.70893e-4 months <br /> on February 19, 1999.

ll.

A statement that prior adoption of approved line item bmproveznents to the

'echnical Speci6cations or the ITS would not have obviated the need for the NOED request.

There are no current plans to convert NMPl to the II'S. IfNMP1 were converted to the lTS, the need for Staff approval of this enforcement discretion would be eliminated-NMPC would alternatively develop an operability assessment of the emergency condensers using similar logic that is contained in this justification.

12.

Any other information the NRC staff deems necessary before ma@lag a decision to exercise enforcement discretion.

h NMPC knows of no additional information that is. necessary for processing this request..

TOTRL P. 18