ML17058A828
| ML17058A828 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Nine Mile Point  |
| Issue date: | 06/26/1991 |
| From: | Brinkman D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9107020447 | |
| Download: ML17058A828 (42) | |
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Docket No. 50-220 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON. D.C. 20555 June 26, 1991 LICENSEE:
FACILITY:
SUBJECT:
Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Unit No.
1 MEETING MINUTES REGARDING THE JUNE 13, 1991, MEETING TO DISCUSS APPENDIX J LEAK RATE TESTING METHODS AT NINE MILE POINT 1
A meeting was held in the NRC One Nhite Flint North Office in Rockville, Maryland, with Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (NMPC) and NRC staff representatives to discuss Appendix J leak rate testing methods at Nine Mile Point 1.
The licensee had requested this meeting.
Enclosure 1 is a list of the meeting attendees.
The handout material used by the licensee during the meeting is attached as Enclosure 2.
During the meeting, the licensee described variations in the procedure it is now using to implement a water seal in the containment spray system versus the procedure reviewed by the I'IRC staff and evaluated in the NRC staff's safety evaluation dated March 20, 1990.
The licensee had implemented the changes in accordance with its 10 CFR 50.59 review process.
The NRC staff decided that it will review the licensee's 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation and the revised procedure (Revision 34 to OP-14).
The results of the NRC staff's review will be included in a resident inspector inspection report.
The licensee informed the NRC staff that the licensee plans to modify the containment spray system to permit system valves to be Type C tested in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J.
However, these modifications will not be implemented before the 1994 refueling outage.
The NRC staff recommended that if the licensee elects to again modify the subject procedure, the licensee should reevaluate the radiological consequences of fai lure of the conta",'nment spray system isolation valves.
Enclosures:
- 1. List of Attendees
- 2. Licensee Handout Material cc w/enclosures:
See next page At.i/iA..
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Donald S. Brinkman, Senior Project Manager Project Directorate I-1 Division of Reactor Projects - I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Sgg
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Mr. B. Ralph Sylvia Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Unit No.
1 CC:
Mr. Mark J. Wetterhahn, Esquire Winston 5 Strawn 1400 L Street, NW.
Washington, D.C.
20005-3502 Supervisor Town of Scriba R. D. P4
- Oswego, New York 13126 Mr. Joseph F. Firlit Vice President
- Nuclear Generation Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Post Office Box 32
- Lycoming, New York 13093 Resident Inspector U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Post Office Box 126
- Lycoming, New York 13093 Mr. Gary D. Wilson, Esquire Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation 300 Erie Boulevard West
- Syracuse, New York 13202 Regional Administrator, Region I U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406 Ms. Donna Ross New York State Energy Office 2 Empire State Plaza 16th Floor
- Albany, New York 12223 Mr. Kim Dahlberg Unit 1 Station Superintendent Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Post Office Box 32
- Lycoming, New York 13093 Mr. David K. Greene Manager Licensing Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation 301 Plainfield Road
- Syracuse, New York 13212 Charlie Donaldson, Esquire As s i s tant Attorney General New York Department of Law 120 Broadway New York, New York 10271 Mr. Paul D. Eddy State of New York Department of Public Service Power Division, System Operations 3 Empire State Plaza
- Albany, New York 12223
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ENCLOSURE 1
ATTENDANCE LIST June 13, 1991 Meeting with Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation to Discuss Appendix 3 Leak Rate Testing Methods at Nine Nile Point Nuclear Station Unit No.
1 Name Donald S. Brinkman Rob Temps Jim Pulsipher Nick Spagnoletti Harold Barrett Timothy Lee Michael G. Annett Dave Greene Lee Ylosowski Daniele Oudinot Susan Perry Mike Hilien Jeff Erickson Hark Wetterhann Gary Wilson Joe Heter Hike Crist Norman Moreau Harrison Lloyd, Jr.
~Donald Haverkamp Position Senior Project Hanager Resident Inspector, NHP-1 Reactor Eng, Plant Sys, NRR Lic. Project Hgr U1 Gen.
Supv.
Ops Ul Supv. Mechanical Design Ul Mechanical Engineer Mgr Licensing Gen.
Supv.
Design Eng (U1)
Project Engineer Asst. Lic. Coord.
Nuclear Engineer Senior Engineer Attorney Managing Attorney Compliance Eng Compliance Eng Principal Engineer Power Prod.
Engr.
Section Chief Or anization NRC/PD I-1 NRC/Region I NRC/SPLB NHPC NMPC NMPC UE&C FOR NMPC NHPC NMPC NCR/NRR/PD I-1 G.P./Duke Power Wise.-Electric Consumers Power Winston
& Strawn NMPC PP&L Bechtel/PP&L General Physics Pa.
Power
& Light Co.
NRC/Region I (by phnone)
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ENCLOSURE 2
NIVIPCINRC MEETING ON CONTAINMENTSPRAY SYSTEM WATER SEAL JUNE 13, 1991
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AGENDA OPENING REMARKS L. KLOSOWSKI CONTAINMENTSPRAY SYSTEM WATER SEAL BACKGROUND N. SPAGNOLETTI CONTAINMENTSPRAY SYSTEM WATER SEAL IMPLEMENTATION T. LEE CONCLUSION L. KLOSOWSKI
NMP-I CONTAINMENTSPRAY SYSTEM WATER SEAL OPERATION BACKGROUND NlVIP-1 HAS IIVIPLEMENTEDWATER SEAL TO MEET APP. J. REQUIREMENTS FOR CONTAINMENTSPRAY SYSTEM.
NRC REVIEWED WATER SEAL OPERATION PRIOR TO IMPLEMENTATION.
PURP E
PROVIDE BRIEF HISTORICAL REVIEW OF BACKGROUND LEADING UP TO WATER SEAL IMPLEIVIENTATION PREVIOUS AND CURRENT SYSTEM CONFIGURATON AND WATER SEAL OPERATION NIVIPC'S LONG TERIVI PLANS TO ELIMINATETHE NEED FOR WATER SEAL
MAY6, 't988 NRC SAFETY EVALUATIONON PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS:
DISAGREED THAT THE CONTAINMENTSPRAY SYSTEM WAS DESIGNED AS EXTENSION OF CONTAINMENT BOUNDARY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS NOT ISSUED BECAUSE OF NEED FOR UPDATE AND REVISION DISCUSSED USING CONTAINMENTSPRAY INTERTIE VALVES TO MAINTAINA WATER SEAL ON ALL DISCHARGE ISOLATION VALVES IN LIEU OF REQUIRED TYPE C LEAK TESTING REQUESTED NMPC TO SUBMIT FOR STAFF REVIEW A PROCEDURE TO MAINTAINWATER SEAL ON CONTAINMENTISOLATION VALVES
NOVEMBER 30, 1989 NIAGARAMOHAWKSUBMITTED COPY OF DRAFT OPERATING PROCEDURE N1-OP-14:
PROVIDED WATER SEAL IN THE EVENT OF A DESIGN BASIS LOSS-OF-COOLANT ACCIDENT PROVIDED WATER SEAL BY UTILIZINGTHE CONTAINMENTSPRAY SYSTEM INTERTIE PROVIDED WATER SEAL WITH AT LEAST ONE CONTAINMENTSPRAY PUMP RUNNING WATER SEAL INOPERABILITYFOR SHORT PERIODS, RESTRICTED BY LIMITINGCONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO)
NMPC PERFORMED SAFETY EVALUATIONON OPERATING PROCEDURE CHANGES
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MARCH 20, 1990 NRC ISSUED SAFETY EVALUATIONON DRAFT PROCEDURE FOR ESTABLISHING WATER SEAL:
CONCLUDED THAT THE PROPOSED PROCEDURE (N1-OP-t4) FOR ESTABLISHING A WATER SEAL FOR THE CONTAINMENTSPRAY DISCHARGE LINE ISOLATION VALVES WAS ACCEPTABLE FOUND THAT THE PROPOSED SEALING WILL SATISFY APPENDIX J SECTION III.C.3(b) AND WILL BE CAPABLE OF MAINTAININGWATER SEAL FOR A MINIMUMOF 30 DAYS CONCLUDED THAT CONDITIONS OF LCO FOR CONTAINMENTSPRAY WATER SEAL WERE ACCEPTABLE
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DECEMBER 4, 1990 NRC ISSUED INSPECTION.REPORT NO. 50-220/90-09:
INSPECTION REPORT IDENTIFIED CHANGES TO NMPC PROCEDURE FOR MAINTAININGWATER SEAL WHICH WERE NOT APPROVED IN NRC MARCH 20, 1990 SAFETY EVALUATION MARCH 7, 1991
'NRC ISSUED NOTICE OF VIOLATIONCONTAINED IN INSPECTION REPORT NO. 60-220/91-02:
OPERATING PROCEDURE N1-OP-14 CONFLICTED WITH EOP-4 REGARDING CRITERIA FOR TERMINATION OF CONTAINMENTSPRAY FAILED TO IDENTIFY THAT PORTIONS OF N1-OP-14 COULD NOT BE PERFORMED, IN THAT POST-LOCA RADIATION FIELDS WOULD LIKELYPROHIBIT LOCAL OPERATION OF TWO CONTAINMENTSPRAY SYSTEM'S CROSS-TIE VALVES PER EOP-10
APRIL 12, 1991 NMPC RESPONSE TO NOTICE OF VIOLATION:
N1-OP-14 REVISED TO REMOVE CONFLICT WITH EOP-4 N1-OP-14 REVISED TO ADDRESS INACCESSIBLE VALVES DUE TO RADIOLOGICALCONDITIONS NMPC SAFETY EVALUATIONNO: 89-13, "CONTAINMENTSPRAY POST DBA LOCA APPENDIX J WATER SEAL" REVISED TO; ADDRESSED METHOD TO BE IMPLEMENTED IN N1-OP-14 WHICH WILL FACILITATEALTERNATE MODES OF OPERATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH EOPs CLARIFIED THE IMPLEMENTATIONOF A WATER SEAL WHEN CONTAINMENTSPRAY IS IN THE SPRAY MODE DURING CONTAINMENTDESIGN BASIS LOCA
NINE MILE POINT UNIT 1 CONTAINMENTSPRAY SYSTEM WATER SEAL
TOPICS
~
BACKGROUND ON THE CONTAINMENTSPRAY SYSTEM
~
PRESENT CONFIGURATION TO EMPLOY WATER SEAL
~
POST LOCA WATER SEAL IMPLEMENTATION
~
BASIS FOR ADOPTION OF CURRENT CONFIGURATION
~
WHY PRESENT MODE OF OPERATION IS PREFERABLE
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BACKGROUND ON THE CONTAINMENTSPRAY SYSTEM ORIGINALDESIGN BASIS (prior to water seal implementation)
ENTIRE SYSTEM DESIGNED TO BE EXTENSION OF PRIMARY CONTAINMENT (INCLUDED IN ALL CONTAINMENT LEAKRATE TESTING)
SUBJECT INJECTION VALVES AND CHECK VALVES WERE NOT DESIGNED TO BE ISOLATION VALVES SYSTEM CONFIGURATION:
TWO SEPARATE AND INDEPENDENT LOOPS PRIMARY AND SECONDARY FOUR 1000i6 CAPACITY CONTAINMENTSPRAY PUMPS PUMP FROM THE TORUS TO THE DRYWELL AND WETWELL SPRAY HEADERS TWO REDUNDANTPRIIVIARYLOOP PUMPS 8c TWO REDUNDANT SECONDARY LOOP PUIVIPS EACH LOOP HAS A
SEPARATE EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR FOUR 100o/o CAPACITY CONTAINMENTSPRAY RAW WATER PUMPS PUMP WATER FROM THE INTAKE STRUCTURE TO THE CONTAINMENT SPRAY HEAT EXCHANGERS AND TO THE DISCHARGE TUNNEL (ONCE THROUGH COOLING SYSTEM)
TWO SEPARATE AND INDEPENDENT PRIMARY LOOP PUIVIPS AND TWO SEPARATE AND INDEPENDENT SECONDARY LOOP PUIVIPS EACH LOOP HAS A
SEPARATE EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR FOUR 100% CAPACITY CONTAINMENTSPRAY HEAT EXCHANGERS FOUR NORIVIALLYCLOSED BYPASS (INTERTIE)VALVESPROVIDED TO SINGLE CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP TEST LINE TO THE TORUS SHARED BY ALLFOUR PUMPS
I
PRESENT CONFIGURATION TO EMPLOY WATER SEAL HOW THE WATER SEAL IS EMPLOYED
't VALVES/VALVELINE UP MODIFIED PNEUMATIC OPERATORS REMOVED FROM INTERTIE VALVES 80-45 8c 80-40 AND REPLACED WITH MANUALHANDWHEELOPERATORS VALVES 80-45 8c 80-40 MAINTAINEDNORMALLY OPEN TO INTERTIE THE PRIMARY AND SECONDARY LOOPS TO ASSURE ENTIRE SYSTEM IS SEALED IN THE EVENT OF A
DIESEL GENERATOR FAILURE CONCURRENT WITHA LOSS OF OFF-SITE POWER THIS CONFIGURATION REQUIRES TWO CONTAINMENT SPRAY.
PUMPS TO ASSURE ADEQUATE SPRAY DISTRIBUTIONANDTO PRESSURIZE BOTH SPRAY LOOP HEADERS TO R 1 1 0% CONTAINMENT PRESSURE TORUS PROVIDES ADEQUATEWATER INVENTORYFOR z 30 DAY AVAILABILITY OF WATER SEAL IN ACCORDANCE WITH APPENDIX J WATER SEAL IS EMPLOYED WHILE SPRAYING CONTAINMENTIN ACCORDANCE WITH EOPs
1
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0 POST LOCA WATER SEAL IMPLEIVIENTATIQN IN ACCORDANCE WITH EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES FOR A
DESIGN BASIS
- LOCA, SPRAYS ARE AUTOMATICALLYINITIATED CONTAINMENTSPRAYS ARE TERMINATEDWHEN CONTAINMENT PRESSURE DROPS TO x3.5 PSIG (APPROXIMATELY15 MINUTES INTO DBA LOCA)
CONTAINMENT SPRAYS ARE NOT REINITIATED UNLESS CONTAINMENTPRESSURE INCREASES TO THE SPRAY INITIATIONLIIVIIT.
FOR OTHER ACCIDENTS, SPRAYS ARE INITIALLY LOCKED OUT BEFORE AUTOIVIATIC INITIATION.
THEY ARE NOT INITIATEDUNLESS CONTAINMENT PRESSURE INCREASES TO THE SPRAY INITIATION LIMIT.
LONG TERM SUPPRESSION POOL COOLING IS IMPLEMENTED WHEN NOT SPRAYING CONTAINMENT BY OPERATING CONTAINIVIENT SPRAY IN THE POOL COOLING MODE UTILIZING THE SINGLE TEST LINE TO THE TORUS AND ONE TRAIN OF CONTAINMENTSPRAY (1 CS PUMP AND ITS ASSOCIATED CSRW PUMP AND CS HEAT EXCHANGER)
DURING LONG TERM SUPPRESSION POOL COOLING THE WATER SEAL IS NOT EMPLOYED.
'E
OSIS FOR ADOPTION%
CURRENT CONFIGURATION THE TORUS WATER MAY POTENTIALLY BE HIGHLY CONTAMINATED CHARGING ~THE CONTAINMENT SPRAY PIPING WITH HIGH PRESSURE CONTAMINATEDWATER TO PRECLUDE LEAKAGE OF LOW PRESSURE FISSION GASES IS NOT RECOMIVIENDED AT LEAST THREE CONTAINMENT SPRAY HEAT EXCHAN GERS WILL BE PRESSURIZED WITH CONTAMINATEDWATER WITHOUT RAW WATER ON TUBE SIDE.
IN THE EVENT OF TUBE LEAK THERE IS A DIRECT PATH TO LAKE.
OPERATOR POST-LOCA EMERGENCY ACTION WOULD BE IVIADE MORE COMPLICATED BY ATTEMPTING TO EMPLOY THE ALTERNATE WATER SEAL DUE TO ADDITIONAL REQUIRED VALVE MANIPULATION TO FACILITATE SUPPRESSION POOL
- COOLING, CONTAINIVIENTFLOODUP, AND OTHER EOP REQUIRED ACTIONS IIVIPLEMENTINGTHE WATER SEAL FOR THESE MODES OF OPERATION WOULD NOT BE AUTOMATIC AND WOULD REQUIRE OPERATORS TO OPEN TWO ADDITIONALBYPASS VALVES AND CLOSE ~L SPRAY INJECTION VALVES
POSITIVE ATTRIBUTES OF NMP1 ADOPTED WATER SEAL THE WATER SEAL MEETS THE CRITERIA OF 10 CFR PART 50 APPENDIX J THE WATER SEAL IS EMPLOYED AS CONTAINMENT SPRAY IS INITIATED UPON HIGH CONTAINMENT PRESSURE CONTAINMENTSPRAY PIPING HAS BEEN INCLUDED IN ALL CONTAINMENTLEAK RATE TESTING EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM DESIGNED TO PRECLUDE UNFILTERED RELEASE OF FISSION GASES
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NEGATIVEATTRIBUTESOF THE CONTINUOUS WATER SEAL WHICH WAS CONSIDERED HIGH
- PRESSURE, HIGHLY CONTAMINATED FLUID CHARGING CONTAINMENTSPRAY PIPING (AND HXs)
COMPLICATES EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES REQUIRED TO MITIGATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT INCREASED POTENTIAL FOR INADVERTENT CONTAINMENT SPRAY RESULTING IN POSSIBLE CONTAINMENT DE'-INERTING OR EVEN DRYWELL IMPLOSION THE DRYWELL AND SUPPRESSION POOL CHECK VALVES WOULD NOT BE SEALED
C0NCLUSION WATER SEAL OPERATION COMPLIES WITH REQUIREMENTS OF APPENDIX J.
EOP'S LIMITTHE TIME WATER SEAL WOULD BE IN OPERATION.
WATER SEAL REQUIRES SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONAL ACTION.
NMPC PLAN TO PERFORM MODIFICATIONTO ELIMINATENEED FOR WATER SEAL (ALLOW TYPE C TESTING OF VALVES).
DEVELOP CONCEPTUAL DESIGN PRIORITIZE IN ACCORDANCE WITH PLANT SAFETY 8c RELIABILITY BUDGET AND SCHEDULE IN AN APPROPRIATE OUTAGE WINDOW IMPLEMENT
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Docket No. 50-220 June 26, 1991 LICENSEE:
FACILITY:
SUBJECT:
Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Unit No.
1 MEETING MINUTES REGARDING THE JUNE 13, 1991, MEETING TO DISCUSS APPENDIX J LEAK RATE TESTING METHODS AT NINE MILE POINT 1
A meeting was held in the NRC One Llhite Flint North Office in Rockville, Maryland, with Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (NMPC) and NRC staff representatives to discuss Appendix J leak rate testing methods at Nine Mile Point 1.
The licensee had requested this meeting.
Enclosure 1 is a list of the meeting attendees.
The handout material used by the licensee during the meeting is attached as Enclosure 2.
During the meeting, the licensee described variations in the procedure it is now using to implement a water seal in the containment spray system versus the procedure reviewed by the NRC staff and evaluated in the NRC staff's safety evaluation dated March 20, 1990.
The licensee had implemented the changes in accordance with its 10 CFR 50.59 review process.
The NRC staff decided that it will review the licensee's 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation and the revised procedure (Revision 34 to OP-14).
The results of the NRC staff's review will be included in a resident inspector inspection report.
The licensee informed the NRC staff that the licensee plans to modify the containment spray system to permit system valves to be Type C tested in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J.
However, these modifications will not be implemented before the 1994 refueling outage.
The NRC staff recommended that if the licensee elects to again modify the subject procedure, the licensee should reevaluate the radiological consequences of failure of the containment spray system isolation valves.
ORIGINAL SIGNED BYs Donald S. Brinkman, Senior Project Manager Project Directorate I-1 Division of Reactor Projects - I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Enclosures:
- 1. List of Attendees
- 2. Licensee Handout Material cc w/enclosures:
See next page Distribution:
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