ML17054B536
| ML17054B536 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Nine Mile Point  |
| Issue date: | 03/04/1985 |
| From: | Anderson C, Krasopoulos A, Pullani S NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17054B534 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-220-85-01, 50-220-85-1, NUDOCS 8504080500 | |
| Download: ML17054B536 (36) | |
See also: IR 05000220/1985001
Text
U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report
No.
50-220/85-01
Docket No.
50-220
License
No.
Priority
Category
C
Licensee:
Nia ara
Mohawk Power
Cor oration
300 Erie Boulevard West
S racuse,
13202
Facility Name:
Nine Mile Point
1
Inspection At:
Scriba
Inspection
Conducted:
Januar
21-25
1985
Inspectors:
MA.alai
S.
ulla i, Fi"
rotection Engineer
A. Krasopoulos,
eactor
Engineer
date
9-
4-85'ate
Also participating
and contributing to the report were:
A. Coppola,
Mechanical
Systems Specialist,
A. Singh, Auxiliary System Branch,
H. Thomas, Electrical
Systems Specialist,
J.
Stang,
Chemical
Engineering
Branch,
Approved by: C..
nderson,
Chief, Plant Systems
Section,
date /r-
Ins ection
Summar
Ins ection
on Januar
21-25
1985
Re ort No. 50-220/85-01
Areas Ins ected:
Special,
announced
team inspection of the licensee's
efforts
to comply with the requirements
of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Sections III.G, J,
and 0, concerning fire protection features to ensure
the ability to achieve
and maintain safe
shutdown in the event of a fire.
The inspection
involved
166 inspector
hours onsite
and
53 inspector
hours in-office by the team
consisting of 6 inspectors.
(
85040805
pg000220
850402
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pDR
8
I
t
0
i
Results:
No violation was identified.
One deviation
was identified for
failure to comply with an
FSAR commitment to design
and install all fire
protection
components
in accordance
with NFPA standards.
This deviation is
discussed
in Section 7.4.a.
In addition, three
items remain unresolved at the
end of inspection.
(See Section
11.0 for paragraph
numbers).
l
0
DETAILS
Persons
Contacted
Nia ara
Mohawk Cor oration
J.
AJ
- T
4'p
- G
AD
- M.
AT
- R.
"R.
AJ
- T
K.
- C
- G
"K.
Aldrich, Operations
Supervisor
Barrett, Assistant Supervisor - Technical
Support
Boyle, Nuclear
Compliance
and Verification
Corcoran,
Supervisor
Fire Protection
Chwalek,
Emergency Coordinator
Cifonelli, Licensing Engineer
Christiansen,
Junior Electrical
Engineer
Goodney, Electrical Engineer (Inspection Coordinator)
Gresok,
Manager
Nuclear Design
Jakubowski, Assistant Electrical Engineer
Kehoe,
Fire Training Specialist
Kamer, Fire Protection
Engineer
Lempges,
Vice President
Nuclear Generation
Mangan,
Vice President
Nuclear Engineering
8 Licensing
Main, Training Specialist
Pasternak,
Senior Nuclear Engineer
Pavel, Assistant Superintendent
Training
Perkins,
General
Superintendent
- Nuclear
Raymond,
Supervisor
Fire Protection
Roman, Station Superintendent
Sweet, Electrical Maintenance
Superintendent
Terry, Manager
Nuclear Engineering
Wilson, Systems
Engineer
Zollitsch, Training Superintendent
Nuclear
NMPC Contractors
- J
- E
Densford, Staff Engineer,
Gasser
Associates
Gasser,
Staff Specialist,
Gasser Associates
York, Engineer,
Compis
Nuclear
Re ulator
Commi ssion
NRC
- R.
A.
- J
Herman,
Senior Project Manager,
Hudson,
Senior Resident
Inspector
Luptak, Reactor
Engineer - Region I
Wechselberger,
Resident
Inspector
Oyster Creek
"Denotes
those present at the exit interview.
2.0
~Pun
oae
This inspection
was to ascertain
that the licensee
is in conformance with
10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Sections III.G, J,
and 0, including exemptions
approved
by the Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation
(NRR).
3.0
~Back round
and
10 CFR 50 Appendix
R became effective
on February
17,
1981.
Section III.G of Appendix
R requires that fire protection
be
provided to ensure that
one train of equipment
necessary
to achieve
and
maintain safe
shutdown
remains available in the event of a fire at any
location within a licensed operating facility.
For hot shutdown condi-
tions,
one train of the systems
necessary
must be free of fire damage
(III.G.l.a).
For cold shutdown conditions, repair is allowed using in
place procedures
and materials available onsite with the provision that
cold shutdown
be achievable within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> of the initiating event
(III.G.l.b).
Section III.G.2 lists specific options
as follows to provide
adequate
protection for redundant trains of equipment
located outside of
the primary containment:
~
Separation
by a fire barrier having
a three
hour rating
(III'.2.a).
~
Separation
by a horizontal distance of at least
20 feet with no
intervening combustibles
and with fire detection
and automatic fire
suppression
installed in the fire area (III.G.2.b).
~
Enclosure of one train in a fire barrier having
a one hour rating in
addition to having fire detection
and automatic
suppression
installed
in the fire area (III.G.2.c).
If the protection required
by Section III.G.2 is not provided or the
systems of concern
are subject to damage
from fire suppression
activities,Section III.G.3 of the rule requires that
an alternate
or
dedicated
shutdown capability
be provided which is independent
of the
area of concern.
Any alternate
or dedicated
system requires
NRC review
and approval prior to implementation.
For situations
in which fire protection
does
not meet the requirements
of
Section III.G, however,
such protection is deemed to be adequate
by the
licensee for the specific situation,
the rule allows the licensee
to
request
an exemption
on
a case-by-case
basis.
Such exemption requests
are submitted to the
NRC for review and approval
and must be justified by
the licensee
on
a technical
basis.
4.0
Corres
ondence
All correspondence
between the'licensee
and the
NRC concerning
compliance
with Sections III.G, J and 0 was reviewed
by the inspection
team in
preparation for the site visit.
Attachment
1 to this report is
a listing
of the correspondence
reviewed.
5.0
Post-Fire
Safe
Shutdown
Ca abilit
5.1
S stems
Re uired for Safe
Shutdown
Shutdown of the reactor
and reactivity control is provided by the control
rods.
Primary coolant inventory makeup is not required
immediately after
scram but is subsequently
provided by the diesel driven fire pump and
control rod drive pump.
Reactor coolant pressure
control is maintained
by the primary relief valves.
Decay heat
removal is provided by the
emergency
condensers
in the hot shutdown
phase
and the
system,
reactor building closed
loop cooling water system,
and emergency
system in cold shutdown
phase.
The diesel
generators
are
cooled
by the diesel
generator
cooling water system.
5.2
Areas
Where Alternate Safe
Shutdown is Provided
0
5.3
The licensee
has provided
an alternate
safe
shutdown capability in the
event of a fire within the control
complex (main control
room, auxiliary
control (relay)
room and cable
spreading
room) as redundant
safe
shutdown
equipment
and cabling cannot meet the requirements
of Appendix
R Section
III.G.2.
Remainin
Plant Areas
All other areas
of the plant not provided with an alternate
safe
shutdown
system
are required to be in compliance with Section III.G.2 of Appendix
R, unless
an exemption
request
has
been
approved
by the Commission.
The
licensee
requested
five exemptions
to certain provisions of Appendix
R
which were evaluated
and granted
by the Commission
by letter dated
March
21,
1983.
The exemptions
were for lack of 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> rated fire area
boundaries
and/or automatic
suppression
in the following five areas:
the
Battery Board Rooms, Battery
Rooms,
Reactor Building (upper level),
Turbine Building (upper level),
and the Control
Room.
Alternate
Safe
Shutdown
S stem
The alternate
safe
shutdown
system required for the control
complex
utilizes existing plant systems
and equipment
as identified in Section
5. 1 and two existing electrically independent
and isolated
remote
shutdown panels.
The panels
are located in separate
areas
of the plant.
The alternate
shutdown
system's
design objective is to enable
the
achievement
of the performance
goals outlined in Section III.Lof
Appendix
R as follows:
Reactivit
Control
Safe
shutdown of the reactor is performed
by manual scram of the
control rods from the control
room.
The control rods also provide
subsequent
reactivity control during cooldown.
Reactor Coolant Inventor
The licensee
has performed
an analysis to confirm that reactor
coolant
makeup is not immediately required
upon initiation of the
alternate
shutdown
system.
The analysis
shows that the core remains
covered for at least
8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />
assuming
maximum allowable technical
specification
leakage
(25 gpm)
and automatic initiation of the
emergency
condensers
with corresponding
reactor
vessel
isolation
(main
steam isolation valve closure)
when
Low-Low water level is
reached, in the reactor vessel.
In order to assure
the validity of
the latter assumption,
the control
room evacuation
procedures
require
both
and manual
reactor vessel
isolation
be performed
prior to leaving the control
room.
The main steam isolation valves
can also
be closed
by deenergizing
power at the breakers
outside the
control complex.
makeup to the reactor vessel
is available after
approximately
one hour of emergency
condenser
operation
by utilizing
the direct diesel driven fire pumps
and the existing interconnection
to the feedwater
system.
No credit is taken for the
use of diesel
generator for the reactor level makeup.
However,
once the diesel
generator
is repaired,
the makeup
can also
be provided by a control
rod drive pump.
Reactor Coolant Pressure
Control
Reactor coolant pressure
control is provided by the relief valves
and emergency
condenser
operation, with backup pressure
control
and
overpressure
protection provided by the safety/relief valves.
Reactor
Deca
Heat
Removal
Decay heat
removal in the hot shutdown
phase is accomplished
through
the
use of the emergency
condensers.
Nakeup to the secondary
side of
the emergency
condenser
s is supplied automatically
by gravity flow
from the makeup water storage
tanks.
The licensee
stated that sufficient water is available in the makeup
tanks for eight hours of emergency
condenser
operation.
Backup
makeup for long term operation of the emergency
condensers
is
provided by the condensate
surge
and storage
tanks via the condensate
transfer
pumps.
Nakeup is also available to the makeup tanks from
the direct diesel driven fire pump.
The emergency
condenser
operation is controlled from the remote
shutdown
panels
where valve
control switches
are located.
0
Decay heat
removal
in the cold shutdown
phase is provided by the
shutdown cooling system,
reactor building closed
loop cooling water
system,
and emergency
service water system.
Utilization of shutdown
cooling requires certain repairs,
manual
valve operation,
and
remote/local
pump control.
The repairs
are required to provide local
manual control of a diesel
generator,
control rod drive pump,
shut-
down cooling system pump/reactor building closed
loop cooling system
pump,
and emergency
system
pump for achieving cold
shutdown.
Process
Monitorin
Direct indications of process
variables
including reactor vessel
level, reactor pressure,
reactor"temperature,
drywell temperature
and pressure,
torus temperature,
and
one train of emergency
condenser
level are provided at each
remote
shutdown panel.
Makeup
tank level indication is available at
a local indicator.
Diagnostic
monitoring ( local indication) available
includes
emergency
service
water system pressure,
reactor
building closed
loop cooling water
system temperature
and flow and
shutdown cooling system pressure.
Su
ort Functions
Other than the station batteries,
no other support functions are
immediately necessary
for achieving hot shutdown.
The diesel
generators,
diesel
generator cooling water system,
reactor building
closed
loop cooling water system,
shutdown cooling system,
and
emergency
service water system will be available to provide
necessary
support functions for the alternate
shutdown
system
following repair.
6.0
Ins ection Methodolo
The inspection
team examined
the licensee's
capabilities for separating
and protecting equipment,
cabling
and associated
circuits necessary
to
achieve
and maintain hot and cold shutdown conditions.
This inspection
sampled
selected fire areas
which the licensee
had identified as being in
compliance with Section III.G.
The following functional requirements
were reviewed for achieving
and
maintaining hot and cold shutdown:
Reactivity control
Pressure
control
makeup
Decay heat
removal
I
1
!
pl
~
Support
systems
~
Process
monitoring
The inspection
team examined
the licensee's
capability to achieve
and
maintain hot shutdown
and the capability to bring the plant to cold
shutdown conditions in the event of a fire in various areas
of the plant.
The examination
included
a review of several
drawings,
safe
shutdown
procedures
and other documents.
Drawings were reviewed to verify elec-
.
trical independence
from the fire areas
of concern.
Procedures.
were
reviewed for general
content
and feasibility.
Also inspected
were fire detection
and suppression
systems
and the degree
of physical
separation
between
redundant trains of Safe
Shutdown
Systems
(SSSs).
The team review included
an evaluation of the susceptibility of
the
SSSs to damage
from fire suppression
activities or from the rupture
or inadvertent operation of fire suppression
systems.
The inspection
team examined the licensee's fire protection features
provided to maintain
one train of equipment
needed for safe
shutdown free
of fire damage.
Included in the scope of this effort were fire area
boundaries,
including walls, floors and ceilings,
and fire protection of
openings such
as fire door s, fire dampers,
and penetration
seals.
The inspection
team also
examined the licensee's
compliance with Section
III.J, Emergency Lighting, and Section III.O, Oil Collection System for
Pump.
7.
Ins ection of Protection
Provided to Safe
Shutdown
S stems
7. 1
Protection
in Various Fire Areas
The team reviewed the protection provided to SSSs
in selected fire areas
for compliance with Appendix
R, Sections III.G.1, 2,
and 3.
The following fire areas
were inspected:
~
Diesel Generator
Room
102
~
Diesel Generator
Room '103
~
Power Board
Room
102
~
Power Board
Room 103
~
Screen
House
The team did not identify any unacceptable
conditions.
7.2
Safe
Shutdown
Procedures
7.2. 1
Procedure
Review
The team reviewed the following safe
shutdown procedures:
~
Special
Operating
Procedure
Nl-SOP-ll, Control
Room Evacuation
(Fire), Revision
8
~
Selected
portions of Damage
Repair Procedures
N1-DRP-1 through 8,
All Revision 0.
The scope of this review was to ascertain
that the
shutdown could be
attained in a safe
and orderly manner,
to determine
the level of
difficulty involved in operating
equipment,
and to verify that there
was
no dependence
on repairs for achieving hot shutdown.
For purpose of the
review,
a repair would include installing electrical or pneumatic
jumpers, wires or fuses to perform an action required for hot shutdown.
For cold shutdown, repair is allowed using in place procedures
and
materials available onsite with the provision that cold shutdown
be
achievable within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
The team did not identify any unacceptable
conditions.
t
7.2.2
Procedure
Walk-Throu
h
The team walked through selected
portions of the procedures
to determine
that shutdown could be attained
in an orderly and timely fashion.
The team did not identify any unacceptable
conditions.
7.3
Protection for Associated Circuits
Appendix R,Section III.G, requires that protection
be provided for
associated
circuits that could prevent operation or cause
maloperation of
redundant trains of systems
necessary
for safe
shutdown.
The circuits of
concern
are generally associated
with safe
shutdown circuits in one of
three ways:
~
Common
bus concern
~
Spurious signals
concern
~
Common enclosure
concern
The associated
circuits 'were evaluated
by the team for common bus,
spurious signal,
and
common enclosure
concerns.
Power, control,
and
instrumentation circuits were examined
on
a sampling basis for potential
problems.
7.3.1
Common
Bus Concern
The
common
bus concern
may be found in circuits, either safety related or
non-safety related,
where there is a
common
power source with shutdown
equipment
and the power source is not electrically protected
from the
circuit of concern.
The team examined,
on
a sampling basis,
4160V,
480V and
125V
DC bus
protective relay coordination.
The team also examined,
on
a sampling
basis,
the protection for specific instrumentation,
controls,
and power
circuits, including the coordination of fuses
and circuit breakers.
The
licensee
plans to perform relay setting at approximately
24-month
intervals.
No unacceptable
conditions were identified.
However,
an item related to
lack of breaker
coordination identified by the licensee
was discussed
and
found acceptable
as described
below.
Breaker Coordination
The licensee
has identified two cases
where
a lack of circuit breaker
coordination exists.
By letter to NRR, dated
February
1,
1983, the
licensee
had indicated that
a possible
loss of coordination could exist
between
125
UDC feeder breakers
and the supply breakers
associated
with
Battery Boards ll and
12.
This could result in the loss of the battery
boards.
The licensee
also indicated that
no additional modifications were
required
and only certain administrative
procedures
were necessary
to lock
out certain alternate
feeder breakers
to prevent loss of the battery
boards.
The licensee
stated
and the team verified that the hot shutdown
capability is not affected
and the cold shutdown capability can
be
achieved
by using repairs which is permissible
under Appendix
R.
During the inspection,
the licensee
indicated that
a lack of coordination
had
been recently identified between
the diesel
generator
breaker
R1032
trip setting
and the
600V bus breaker
R1031.
The lack of coordination
could result in shutdown of diesel
generator
103.
However,
redundant
emergency
condenser
s are available for hot shutdown
and diesel
generator
103 which is needed
only for cold shutdown
can
be made available after
repairs permitted under the rule.
A-damage repair procedure
Nl-DRP-5
presently exists for this purpose.
Based
on the above,
the team did not identify any unacceptable
conditions.
However, the licensee
plans to review the coordination
schemes
further for
possible
improvements.
7.3.2
S urious Si nals
Concern
The spurious
signal
concern is made
up of 2 items:
False motor, control,
and instrument indications
can occur
such
as
those
encountered
during
1975 Browns Ferry fire.
These
could be
caused
by fire initiated grounds,
short or open circuits.
0
10
~
Spurious operation of safety related or non-safety related
components
can occur that would adversely affect shutdown capability (e.g.,
RHR/RCS isolation valves).
The team examined,
on
a sampling basis,
the following areas
to ascertain
that
no spurious
signal
concern exists:
~
Current transformer
secondaries
~
High/low pressure
interface
~
General fire instigated
spurious
signals
No unacceptable
conditions were identified.
7.3.3
Common Enclosure
Concern
The
common enclosure
concern
may be found when redundant circuits are
routed together
in a raceway
or enclosure
and they are not electrically
protected
or when fire can destroy both circuits due to inadequate fire
barrier penetrations.
A number of circuits, selected
on
a sampling basis,
were examined for
this concern.
No unacceptable
conditions were identified.
7.4
General
Fire Protection
Features
The team examined the general fire protection features
in the plant
provided to maintain
one train of safe
shutdown
equipment free of fire
damage.
Included in the
scope of this effort were fire area boundaries,
including walls, floors and ceilings,
and fire protection of openings
such as'ire
doors, fire dampers,
seals, fire protection
systems,
and other fire protection features.
No unacceptable
conditions were identified except
as follows:
a
~
Lack of Se aration
between
Diesel
Fire
Pum
and Electric
Fire
Pum
Control Cables
The Final Safety Analysis Report
(FSAR), Section
X.K, Paragraph
4.0,
states
that all fire protection
components
are designed
and
installed in accordance
with the applicable
standards
of the
National Fire Protection Association
(NFPA).
NFPA standards
20 and
803 require that the diesel fire pump be separated
from the electric
fire pump by a
3 Pour fire barrier.
Contrary to the above,
the diesel fire pump is not separated
from
the electric fire pump in that their control cables
are installed in
a
common tray located at elevation
261 feet of the Screen
and
Pump
House without any fire barrier separation
in between.
A single fire
>Ij I
1
I
11
event could therefore result in loss of both
pumps simultaneously.
The lack of separation
between
the control cables is
a deviation of
the
FSAR commitment (50-220/85-01-01).
Ade uac
of Fire Protection for Redundant
Safe
Shutdown Trains
in Reactor
Bui ldin
The licensee
established
several fire break zones
(FBZs) in the
Reactor Building to provide
20 feet of separation
between
the redun-
dant trains of safe
shutdown
systems
in accordance
with Appendix
R,
Section III.G.2.b.
The
FBZs are provided with automatic
suppression
and detection.
The
FBZs are generally but not completely free of
intervening combustible
in that they contained
some limited amount of
combustibles
such
as flamastic coated cables.
Smoke detection is provided throughout the Reactor Building.
However,
automatic
suppression
has not been provided through the Reactor
Build-
ing,
as clarified by Generic Letter 83-33.
By letter dated
December
22,
1983, the licensee
requested
an exemption for the lack of area
wide automatic
suppression.
Subsequently,
in an Appendix
R Lessons
Learned
Regional
Workshop held
on April 18,
1984,
NRC provided addi-
tional clarification that less
than full area wide suppression
and
detection
may also
be acceptable
provided that the licensee
performs
an evaluation to justify its adequacy
and retains
the evaluation for
subsequent
NRC audits.
Accordingly, the licensee
made the required
evaluation
and by letter dated
May ll, 1984, withdrew the above
exemp-
tions request.
The licensee's
evaluation
included technical justification for not
providing area
wide automatic
suppression
throughout the Reactor
Building and for the presence
of intervening combustibles
in the
FBZs.
The team reviewed the evaluation
and found additional
information would be required to resolve this item.
The licensee
verbally committed to provide the additional
information to
NRR.
This item remains
unresolved
pending receipt
and review of the
information and resolution of the issue
by
NRR (50-220/85-01-02).
Securit
Modifications to Fire Doors
The licensee
has provided
3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire rated barriers to separate
redundant
safe
shutdown trains in accordance
with Appendix
R,
Section III.G.2.a.
However, certain
3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire rated doors
(23
doors with Serial
Numbers:
D18,
150,
227,
116,
165, 9, 24, 52-2, 86,
105,
106,
109,
110-1,
110,
111-4,
117,
74,
112,
113,
114,
115,
52,
and 56) installed in the barriers
have
been modified by the
installation of security hardware.
These modifications
may have
degraded
the fire rating of the doors.
The licensee
could not
provide the
team with an evaluation of their fire rating.
However,
the licensee
committed to have Underwriters Laboratories
(UL)
5
12
inspect the doors
and
make
an evaluation
and to upgrade
the ratings
if and where necessary.
This is an unresolved
item pending
comple-
tion of the above licensee
action
and its review by
NRC
(50-220/85"01-03).
d.
Use of Diesel Fire
Pum
as
a Redundant
Safe
Shutdown
E ui ment
The diesel fire pump is used in many fire scenarios
as redundant
safe
shutdown
equipment
and provides
several
safe
shutdown functions.
The functions are backup
source of water for:
emergency
condenser
makeup,
reactor level
makeup,
diesel
generator cooling,
and for
emergency
service water system.
In addition, it also provides its
normal function as
a backup
source of fire protection water from the
electric fire pump.
Because
these
important functions could be lost
if the diesel fire pump is not available,
the team determined
and the
licensee
agreed that
an alternative
source of water should
be
made
available within an acceptable
time limit.
The licensee
committed to make
such
an alternative
source available
from the city water main within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.
Because
redundant
means of
achieving
and maintaining the plant safe
shutdown exist using
emergency
condensers
without the diesel fire pump for at least
8
hours,
the team found this acceptable.
The licensee
accordingly
revised the procedure for a control
room evacuation fire (N1-SOP-ll)
and the operating
procedure for fire protection
system
(OP-21) to
reflect the above
commitment.
The team reviewed the revised
procedures
and found them acceptable.
This item is resolved
and
closed.
8.0
Emer enc
Li htin
10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.J, requires that emergency lighting
units with at least
an 8-hour battery
power supply shall
be provided in
all areas
needed for operation of safe
shutdown
equipment
and in access
and egress
routes thereto.
The team examined the plant emergency lighting system to ascertain
the
licensee's
compliance with the above requirement.
The team did not identify any unacceptable
conditions except
as follows:
Enhancement
of Illumination Level Provided
b
Emer enc
Li htin
The licensee
has provided the required
emergency lighting in all areas
inspected
by the team
among those
areas
needed for operation of the safe
shutdown
equipment
and in access
and egress
routes thereto.
However, the
team felt that the illumination level provided by the installed
emergency
lighting may be marginal
in
some of these
areas
and additional
emergency
lighting may be desirable for safe
shutdown of the plant in the event of a
fire.
The licensee
agreed
to study the
need for additional lighting by
III
13
using operators
to walk down the safe
shutdown
procedures
and committed
to provide additional lighting wherever necessary.
This is an unr'esolved
item pending'ompletion
of the above licensee
action
and its review by
NRC (50-220/85-01-04).
9.0
Oil Collection
S stem for Reactor Coolant
Pum
s
10 CFR 50, Appendix
R,Section III.O, requires that the reactor coolant
pumps shall
be equipped with an oil collection
system if the containment
is not inerted during normal operation.
As the containment in this plant
is inerted during normal operation,
the above requirement
does not apply
to this plant.
Therefore,
no inspection
was performed in this area.
I
. ~iA
During the course of the inspection,
the team reviewed several
drawings,
fire hazard analysis, fire protection modification packages,
procedures,
and other fire protection
documents.
The scope of this review included
verification of their technical
adequacy,
appropriate
reviews,
design
and
procurement controls,
and other guality Assurance
requirements for the
licensee's fire protection
program.
Except
as noted in the previous
sections of this report,
the team did not identify any other unacceptable
conditions.
11.0 Unresolved
Items
Unresolved
items are matters for which more information is required in
order to ascertain
whether they are acceptable,
violations, or
deviations.
Unresolved
items are discussed
in Sections
7.4 and 8.0.
12.0 Conclusions
The significant findings of this inspection
are
summarized
as follows:
~
One deviation
from an
FSAR commitment to design
and install all fire
protection
components
in accordance
with NFPA Standards.
~
Three items remained
unresolved at the
end of the inspection
as
mentioned in Section
11.0 above.
Except
as above,
no other unacceptable
conditions
were identified.
13.0 Exit Interview
The inspection
team met with the licensee
representatives,
denoted in
Section 1.0, at the conclusion of the inspection
on January
25,
1985.
the team leader
summarized
the
scope
and findings of the inspection at
that time.
e
The team leader also confirmed with the licensee that the documents
reviewed
by the team did not contain
any proprietary information.
The
licensee
agreed that the inspection report
may be placed in the Public
Document
Room without prior licensee
review for proprietary information
At no time during this inspection
was written material
provided to the
licensee
by the team.
15
ATTACHMENT 1
LIST OF CORRESPONDENCE
Date
1.
08/07/80
Corres
ondents
Di se
Ippolito
NRC
~Sub 'ect
Letter:
Fire Protection
Modification Schedule
2.
12/31/80
3.
02/13/81
4.
03/19/81
5.
05/19/81
Di se
Ippolito
NRC Staff
Di se
Di se
Ippolito
Disc
Ippolito
NRC
NMPC
NRC
NRC
Letter:
Letter:
Letter:
Letter:
Fire Protection
Modification Schedule
Fire Protection
Schedular Relief
Fire Protection/
Appendix
R
Delays in Design
Information
6.
06/02/81
7.
06/09/81
8.
07/09/81
. 9.
09/30/81
Disc
Ippolito
Disc
Ippolito
Di se
Ippolito
Di se
Ippolito
NRC
NRC
NRC
NMPC,
NRC
Letter
Letter:
Appendix
R
Submittal
Delay
Appendix
R III.G.3
Modifications
Letter:
Fire Brigade Training
Letter:
Remote
Shutdown
Panels
10.
09/30/81
11.
10/15/81
Denton
Disc
Eisenhut
Rhode
NRC
NRC
Letter:
Letter:
Fire Protection
Schedular Relief
Request for Comparison
of Current Fire
Protection
Program to
Appendix
R
12.
04/26/82
13.
06/30/82
14.
07/22/82
Vassallo
Di se
Lempges
Vassallo
Lempges
Vassallo
NRC
NMPC
NRC
NRC
Letter:
Fire Protection
Rule
Letter:
Informati on on III ~ G. 3
Letter:
Appendix
R III.G.3
Submittal
16
Date
15.
09/02/82
16.
09/30/82
17.
10/01/82
18.
11/03/82
19.
11/16/82
Corres
ondents
Mangan
Vassallo
Mangan
Vassallo
Mangan
Vassallo
Vassallo
Disc
Blasiak
Jirousek
Pasternak
Barrett
Randall
Wermiel
Fioravante
Polk
Eberly
Gasser
NRC
NRC
NRC
NRC
NMPC
NMPC
NMPC
NMPC
NMPC
Gasser
Subject
Letter:
Interim Response
to
Appendix
R III.G.3
Letter:
Transmittal of Alternate
Safe
Shutdown
Systems
Letter:
Transmittal
of
Appendix
R Review Safe
Shutdown Analysis
Letter:
Applicability of
Appendix
R III.G.3 and
III.Lto Nine Mile
Point Unit 1
NRC Meeting: Discussion of
Appendix
R Submittal
of October
1,
1982
York
Gasser
Casey
CYGNA
Bonner
CYGNA
20.
12/03/82
21.
12/03/82
22.
03/03/83
23.
03/21/83
24.
05/26/83
Mangan
Eisenhut
Mangan
Vassallo
Vassallo
Rhode
Vassallo
Rhode
Mangan
Vassallo
NRC
NRC
NRC
NRC
NMPC
NRC
Letter:
Letter:
Letter:
Letter:
Letter:
Automatic Depressuri-
zation
System Appendix
R
Modifications
Additional Information
on Appendix
R III.G.3
and III.L
Modification and
Alternate Safe
Shutdown
Capability to Comply
with Appendix
R
Appendix
R Exemption
Requests
Resolution to Three
Spurious
Valves
17
Date
25.
05/27/83
26.
12/22/83
Corres
ondents
Lempges
Vassallo
Mangan
Vassallo
NRC
NRC
Letter:
Appendix
R Exemption
Requests
Subject
Letter:
Remote
Shutdown
Panels
27.
12/22/83
28.
03/13/84
29.
05/01/84
30.
05/11/84
Mangan
Vassallo
Murley
Rhode
Mangan
Vassallo
Mangan
Vassallo
NRC
NRC
NMPC
NRC
NRC
Letter:
Letter:
Letter:
Letter:
Reactor Building Fire
Break Zones
Appendix
R Lessons
Learned
Workshop
Tech Spec
Change for
Remote
Shutdown
Panels
Withdrawal of Fire Break
Zones
0
31.
06/05/84
Mangan
Vassallo
NRC
Letter:
Remote
Shutdown
Panels
Ig
E
E
sVpe.
, Q
li