ML17053C883

Responds to Request for Info Re Physical Fitness Requirements for Members of Fire Brigade at Nuclear Power Plant.Section III Paragraph H App R to 10CFR50 States Min Physical Fitness Requirements. Ref Encl

ML17053C883
Person / Time
Site:	Nine Mile Point
Issue date:	10/05/1981
From:	Dircks W NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO)
To:	Lee G HOUSE OF REP.
Shared Package
ML17053C884	List: ML17053C883
References
NUDOCS 8110190958
Download: ML17053C883 (18)

Text

The Honorable Gary A. Lee United States House of Representatives Washington, D.C. 20515 Dear Congressman Lee:

OCT 5 t98t

'lesITI STR IBUTII; EDO 10857 EDO Reading File EDO SECY 81-2038 CA

~~c et No. 50-220 PDR LPDR ELD HDenton R. Vollmer ECase RMattson TMur1ey BSnyder DEisenhut LUnderwood PPAS WJohnston VBenaroya RFerguson JStang PPolk In response to your request for information concerning our physical fitness requirements for members of a fire br igade at a nuclear power plant licensed by the NRC, I am pleased to provide the following information.

William.J. Dircks Cy Executive Director for Operati 1P/

/P A:M&:DE

Enclosures:

1.

Federal Register gol. 45 BRBygg BR+p5 BQ No. 225 2.

Ltr 9/8/Gl W. F. Crowell to JS an9:mb RFer son VB roya WJohnston

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o USGPO. 1980-329 824 OFF(cjAL RE ORD COPY At present,Section III Paragraph H of Appendix R to 10 Code of Federal Regulations Part 50 states our minimum physical fitness requirements for a member of a fire brigade at a nuclear power plant licensed by the NRC.

Appendix R states, "The qualifications of fire brigade-members shall include an annual physical examination to determine their ability to perform strenu-ou'.s fire fighting activities."

A copy of the Federal Register Vol. 45 No. 225 dated November 19, 1980 which contains Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50 is enclosed.

Each licensee determines the type of physical examination given to members or applicants of a fire brigade to comply with our requirements.

'or your information I am also enclosing a copy of a letter we received from Mr. Crowell concerning the agility test which was required to be taken and passed for.employment in the fire brigade at the Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation, Nine Mile Point, Plant No; 1.

Mr. Crowell indicated that he was informed by Mr. Wheland of the Niagara Mohawk Power Corpor ation that the NRC set the specific requirements for the physical examination given to the appli-cants for the fire, brigade at their Nine llile Point, Plant No. l.

In a sub-sequent.- telecon between Mr. Wheland of the Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation and Mr. Phillip Polk of the NRC, Mr. Wheland indicated that the NRC had not given any specific requirements to the.Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation.op-~~pe of physical examination to be given to applicants for the fire hpi@5e.<.li cy Please contact me if we can be of further assistance.

g pP S.incerely, OgT 8 1983'

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V/ednesday November 19, 1980

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Part ff Nuclear Regulatory Commission Fire Protection Program for Operating Nuclear Povrer Plants

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Federal Register I Voj. 45. No. 225 / Wednesday. November 19. 1980 1 o ies and Regulatiors

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM!SSION

>0 CFR Pait 50 Fire Protection Program for Operating Huclear Power Plants AGEHcY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

AcTtotc Final rule.

suMMARY:The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is amending its regulations to require certain provisions for fire protection in operating nuclear power plants. This action is being taken to upgrade fire protection at nuclear power plants licensed to operate prior to Janua'ry.l. 1979. by requiring resolution of certain contested generic issues in

'ire protection safety evaluation reports.

EFFEcrtvE OATE: February 19. 1981.

Note.The Xuc!ear Regula tory Commission has submitted this rule'to the Comptrofler General for review as may be appropriate under the Federal Reports Act. as amended (44 U.S.C.

3512). The date on which the reporting requirement of this rule becomes

. effective. u'nless advised to the contrary, reflects inclusion of the 45-day period that statute a0ows for such review (44, U.S.C. 3512(c)(2)).

FOR FuRTHER IKFORMATlOH COHTACT'avid P. Notley, Office of Standards Development. U.S. Nuclear Regu!atory, Commission. Washington. D.C. 20555.

phone 301-443-5921 or Robert L Ferguson, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.'.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Washington. D.C 20555, phone 301-492-7098.

SVPPiEMEHTARY IKFoRMATioHiOn May.

29,,1980. the Nuclear Regulatory Commission published Ln the Federal Register (45 FR 36082) a notice of proposed rulemaking inviting written suggestions or comments on the

-proposed'ntie by june 30,1980. The notice concerned proposed amendments to 10 CFR Part 50. "Domestic Licensing

~ of Production and Utilization Facilities,"

which would require certain minimum provisions for fire protection in nuclear

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power plants operating prior to January

1. 1979. F'.fty-one comment letters were received regarding the proposed amendments. A number of comments pertained to specific requirements in the proposed Appendix R, and these willbe dealt with below. However. there were three substaritive contentions which were raised by many of the commenters These three comments are summarized as follows:

1. Most commenters stated that the 30 day comment period was too short to permit adequate detailed response and that toe comme'nt pertoo snould nave

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been extended...

The Commission does not agree.'The.-

NRC has been developing fire protection requirements since19.5. The XRC published comprehensi've fire protection guidelines. Branch Technical Position>>

BTP APCSB 9.5-1. and its Appendix A in 1976. Licensees have compared. their fire.

protection programs against these-guidelines and have discussed their deviations from these guidelines with..

the NRC staff for the past four years during the IvRC's fire protection reviews of operating reactors. A Safety Evaluation Report and. in most cases.

supplements to the Safety Evaluation Report, have be'en issued for each operating reactor. These reports

'escribe fire protection alternatives:hat have been proposed by the licensee and found acceptable by the staff as well as unresolved fire protection issues remaining between the staff and the licensee. Proposed Appendix R provided the Commission's requirements for resolving those issues. Thus. it concerns only a limited numoer of issues derived from the use of 6e earlier guides. The Commission believes that a 30-day comment period was adequate under these circumstances.

2. Many licensees questioned the need for backfitting all the requirements of Appendix R. They commented that they had previously complied with staff fire

. protection recommendations!n "good faith" and have committed to or completed certain moaifications. They contend that the staff has properly aetermined that these modifications provide at least the level of fire protection described by the guidance contained in Appendix A to Branch Tecnnical Position BTP APCSB 9.5-1.

They also contend that these modifications provide a level of protection at least equivalent to that contained in the proposed rule. They express the concern that the proposed nile was written in such specifi'c language that fire protection issues that were thought closed would be reopened and new. but not necessarily better.

mooifications would be required. These modifications could be accomplished only by the expenciture of considerable engineering, design. and construction effort and at great undue expense. The commenters request that the requirements in the proposed rule be rewritten to specify only the general requirements of what needs to be accomplished.

These comments raise three;elated issues. The first relates to the ~eed for specific requirements. The generai requirements relating to flre protec:ion ar'e aireacy set cnorth in General Design Criterion 3 oi Appendix A to 10 CFR Part =0 ar.d in the NRCguidance accuments. These general provisions gave r!se to a number of disputes over,.

':vhe:i.er speciiic methods adequately

~coo.-..pflshed the ii.tended goal. The.

prsposea rule is intended to provide suffc'.ent specific guidance to ensure sa tisfaclon resoiution of these issues.

Thus. reverting to generalized guidance

,;vened not accompiish the intended purpose of:he proposed rule.

The second issue involved some instances in which the specific wording used resulted in unnecessary and unimended restrictions. for example.

he proposec rule called for a "fresh water".supp! v. For firefighting purposes.

'rackish ivater is satisfactory and a

-!resn".vater supply is unnecessary.

Sii.".i!arly. the proposed rule called for an -underground" yard fire main!oop.

Often por:ions of a flre main loop'nm above. ground in and as they enter str c; res. The Commission had riot in:ended;o prohibit running portions of.

a f.ire:"..ain loop above ground. Other

, siri!ar changes are dis'cussed in Section.

ill.-Speciflc Requirements." of this preamble.

The (n!rd issue relates to imposition of reoui:emen'.s on plants with presently

!n iai!ec cr Aith existing commitments

'o ir.stal! fire protection features..-

previously determined by the staff to sadsjr the g idance of Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1. The Commission generally agrees that, except for three sec:ions that willbe back fitted,.

Appendix R should not be retroactively appiied to:eatures that have been previous!y approved 'oy the NRC staff as satisiying the provisions of Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1.

Tne

.".RC staff had intehded. iriits original proposal !or Appendix R. that the requirements be applicable only for the resoluticn of unresolved disputed

. fire protection features. Thus. the staff had not intended the provisions of Append!x R to require modiTication of previousiy approved features..This was not c!ear!y described in the proposed ruie a's puoiished for comment. In fact.

he Supplementary Information pubiislied ivith '.he proposed arule e-pi!ci:iyincicated diat "!ajlllicensees

.villbe expected to ineet Jie requirements oi this rule. in its eifecdve

or;. !nciuding whatever changes result from t.uoiic comments."

!n aete:mii.ing whether the specific rsc 'ire...en:s of A pendix R should be

niposea on licensees with present!y instailed or existin> commitments to ins'.all:ire protection ieatures previousiy determined

'.o satisfy Appendix A to Branch. echnical Position BTP.APCSB

C 0 Fedetal Register I Vo). 45. No. 22S / Wednesday.

November

19. 1980 / Ru es and Regulations 766(]3 9..~-t.:t is impcttan!!o tecogr'ize lhat Appendix R addresses only a portion af

!he spec!:!c

.et..s con:ained in the more ra...orehensive doc4ment. Branch Tcci:!zeal Pcsi!!on BTP APCSB 9.5-l and!ts Appendix A. Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1 has beer.,'he basic fire proiec.':on gu!dance used by the staff ir.

the!r:!re pro!ect:on tev!ews conduc!ed

or all opetatit.g pla.".ts during the past seveta) yeers. For many p)ants.

lice.".sees ptapcscdaystems and features

hat satisiac:ct!)v achieved tLe fire protect!on ct:teria set forth in Apperdix A !'o BTP APCSB 9.5-1 and begar. tc pramp:)y impiement such ieatures and sys! erns, Sans.'actory feat res and systems are

'a!teacy ilplace and in operation in

...any "ian:s. There is a reasonable degree c: uniform!:y amcrg'most of

hese a"'pro:ec.'ca:utes ior a)) facilities s:nce'!net were rcv!cw'ed aga!nst:he sane cti:e.;a ot Append! v A:c BTP APCSB 9.5-1

>" genera!.

he features ptev!a sly approved by!he YRC staii in 3!s.evict's ol fitc p oicc"cn "shlg lle c.:!er!a oi Appencix A!o BTP APCSB 9.5-1 J.cvicc at'eo!valent!evei of fire pta:ec::or. saiety:a!hat provided uncer

'he spec! Ac praxis!ors of Appendix R.

'hus.;hc further "enefit that mignt 'oe prov:ded '"; rec;izing hat previously approved featu. es be moci'.ied;a coniorm 'o '.he spec!Ac iarcuaite set

or'.h!n Append:x R ':s cutv eighed by

.'.he ovetaii bene:it ai the eariy

>mp)c'crta'.ion of such previously approved

.feat res. which in mary cases are c ttently be!lg irsta))ed.

Fever:he)ess.

as a result of its cent!nu!lg.eview cf fire protection tca!:crs. ',he XRC staff has!ndicated to

he Commission that taete are requirements it. three sections!n which the.protec;!on a:fotded by Apper.dix R ove. and above lhat previously accep!ed....ay be desirable. The Cam.-.>ass!on has decided:hat these tecuireme"'.s sHould be retroactive!y app)iec to a))!aci)!ties. This decisicn is nat meant to reflect adverselv on ptev!ous!ii?ensee or slaf! evaluations:

ether i!s purpose is to '.ake fu))y!lto accou.,l 'he:n~cteased icnow)edge and erpe::ence ceve!oped on fire protection ma::ets over he!ast several years.

Thc!i!st oi!hese secdons is related to Ate "ro;ec:!cn;ea!utes

.'or ensuring!hat

'svstens and assoc!a!ed circuits used:a sc'h:eve and ma!ntain safe shutdown are

.'tee.'rom fire danage. Appendix A lo OTP APCSB 9.51 pernits a ccmbination oi f!te.retarcant coatii:gs and fire deiec:ion and suptession systems without spec:f'tmg a physical separa!ian cis;ance tc proteclian redundant sysiens (Appendix A. D.l(2)), and such artangenenls were acce'pled in sone permitted either >tn oil collection system early f!.e protection reviews. As a result

. or a fire suppression system. The staff of some separate effects tests. the staff has also accepted an automatic Are changed its position cn this

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- suppression system as an acceptable coriitturauon. and subsequent p)ans method oi fire protection for this have been required io provide application. The Commission has add! tiora] protecticl in '.he fcrlt of fire, cc~nc]uded:hat fire suppression systems barriers c. s"bstantial phys)ca).

do not give adeouate protection for fiires separatior. fot safe shutdown systems.

ihat nay be induced bv seismic events.

Yo ctecit ior such coatings as fire The Ccmmission lherefore believes:hat barriers!s allowec bv Section t)I.G oi

'reviously approved suppression Appendix R. Appendix A to Branch systeins should be repiaced with cil Technical Position BTP APCSB 9.5.1 and cci]ec:ion systems that can wi!hstand lhe prcposed Apperdix R recognized seismic events.

lhal there were plant.unique,

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The technical basis on which these configurations tnat required fire

'.hree sec'.ions are based are further pr'otectian ieatures that are not identical discussed in Section IIL"Specific to those )is ted in Section )II.G of "

'equirements." of this preamble.

,Appendix R. For!hese cases. fire'. 4(ost commenters stated that the protec!ion ieatures were developed by

'mp)ementation schedule contained in the!icensee and described

<in a fire =

'he proposed tule is impossible lo !neet hazatiis ara)ysis. Some of these

!or any of the operating p)attts. The arrangements were accepted by the staff coii:meniers furrier stated that ifthe as provic "g ea !valent protection lo lhe

!-.olemen:ation schedule in!he effective requirements of Sec!ion III.Gto, "

tule is i..e same as that in the proposed Appelcix R.

ru)e. the Commission must be prepare!(

Requi.enen:s

'.hat account for a)) of

- 'o either shutdown each oPerating the parameters that are itnportanl to ri.e nuclear power p)ant ar process protec:ion anc consistent with safety The commenters ther. conc)uded that equ!rements fcr a)) P)ant-unique 'e ir.:p]enentation scleduie shou)d be confi8utatiors have rot been deva ped.

re~tten to a l w an -.e uate tim 1'n.ight of the exPerience ga)ned in fire 'riod for campiiance. The proposed tu)e Protection eval atiors over the Past four - stated that "all rite protec!ion and tvears,:he Comn.ission believes that the modifiications identified by the staff as I!censees should reexatrine those necessary to sausfy Criterion 3 o Previous]'.

CPPtoved configurations of

~ perdix A to this pert. Whether fire Pra!ec!ion that da not meet ~he contained in Appendh R to this part or requirements as sPecified in Section

!n other staff fire protection guidance III.G to APPendix R. Based on this !excep'or a]ternate or dedicated reexamiraticl lhe ))censee.must e)her snutdown capab)])ty) sha)i be comp)eted meet the req" irements of Section III.G of

.by 4 vember 1, 1980 un]ess, for'oo

<PPcnd'x R ot aPP)y for an excmP!icn cause slown he Commission approves

!ha: iustiiies alternatives by a fire.

an extersion." (proposed paragraph hazard analysis. However. based on MA81.(c)). Ti:e Commission went on to present information, the Comtnission state its intention in the Statement of does nol expect lo be able lo approve Consideration to the ru)e that"'... no exempt!ons for fire.retardant coatirgs p)ant wou]d be afiowed!o continue lo used as fire barriers.

operate after november 1. 1980, or The second relates lo emergency beyond an extended date approved by lighting Sect)on I)i.jof Appendix R ca))s the Comission, un)ess all modificat)ons

.'or 8-hour emer8ency ])8)t))ng whereas (except for alternate ar dedicated in some cases less than 8-hour shutdown capability) have been emergency lighting has been accepted as imp]amen!ed satisfying Appendix A to BTP APCSB The Commission has reconsidered lhe 9.5-1, th))e an adequate level oi saiety implementatian schecule and has may be prcvided by iess than an 8-hour deterndned'&at it should be nodified supply. an 8.hour system wou)d provide lcr the followingreasons:

added protection and would genera!)y

~ Aiie. reviewing tLe comments and involve on)y a small cost. The the infornation deva!oped as a resu)t of Commissior. theteiore believes that conpie'.ion of fire reviews over'the past licersees should upgrace the previously 8 nonths, the staff has informed the.

approved facilities to satisfy the 8-hour Con:nission that the date of november lighting.equirement of Appendix R.

1, 1980, is not possible because the The third relates ta protection against efieclive date of the rale willbe after fires in non!ner:ed'containments that dale.

involving reacior coolant pump

. ~ The staffhas informed the lubrication oil (Sec!ion Il).O of.

Comm!ssion that it would expect Appendix R). The proposed rule 'irtuallya0 licensees to request

I 76604 Federal Register / Vol. 4S. No. 225 / Wednesday.

November 19, 1980 / Rules and Regulations exemptions ifthe new implementation dates do not provide an appropriate

'eriod of time for complying with the requirements of Appendix R. The time and manpower resources needed by the licensees to prepare such requests and

'y the statT to formulate recommendations on these requests is not warranted from the standpoint of timely'fire protection improvement.

~ Tiie revised implementation schedule provides a careful balance of these considerations. calling for the rerrainmg rire protection modifications to be implemented and installed on a phased schedule'that is as prompt as

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can. be reasonably achieved.

The revised schedules distinguish'etween requirements imposed for the

'irst time on the licensee by Appendix R and those requirements already imposed in license conditions or Technical SpecUicarions issued prior to the effective date of the rule. For

'equirements imposed by Appendix R, including the!tems "backfit" to all plants. th schedule provides a reasonable!ime afier publication of the rule for compierion of required modifications. For requirements already imposed by license conditions providing

. for implemention after November 1, 1980. the Commission has reviewed these schedules and has found that in some instances the allotted time for completion of the required modifications may be excessive. Thus, for fire-protection features other than those covered by Appendix R. although the Commission nas extended the compliance dates beyond the November

1. 1980. date in the proposed rule, the Commission has added a requirement that limits the compliance schedule in existing licenses ifsuch schedules extend beyond what we now believe

'hould have been a reasonable schedule initially.Relief 'rom such limitation may

~ be granted by.the Director of Nuclear Reactor'Regulat!on upon a showing that there is good cause for extending such date and that public health and safety is not 'adversely affected by such extension.

It should'also be noted that for licensees whose license conditions imposed a schedule with a compliance date of hiovernber 1, 198L or other date prior to the.Ifective date of ri 50.48. the Conunission has suspended such compliance dates by promulgating on October 29, 19M. a temporary rule f M.48 (45 FR 71589), which willbe superseded by this rule.

To better undei" tand the nature of the public comments received and the staffs resolution of these comments, the following section willconsider each section of Appendix R to this part. In Section III,we provide a summary of the Technical Basis for each requirement.

followed by a summary of the public comments and a statement of the staffs disposition of those comments.

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Section I. Introduction cind Scope This section has been'revised as a result of comments to include a discussion of the importance of safe shutdown capability and the distinction

'etween requirements for "safety-related" equipment and equipment needed for "safe shutdown."

Section II. General Itequirements This section has been substantially rewritten as a result of comments to provide a concise summary of general requirements. The specific requirements were consolidated with the appropriate parts of Section III,"Specific Requirements," except that the credit given for'50-foot separation has been

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dropped.

Section III.Specific Requirements

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The requirements in Axis rule are based upon principles long accepted within that portion of American industry that has been classified by their

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insurance carriers as "Improved Risk" or "HighlyProtected Risk". In qach of these cases. the Commission has decided that the overall interest of public safety is best served by,.

establishing some conservative level of fire protection and ensuring firat level of, compliance exists at all plants. The followingis a list of the specific technical bases and resolution ofpublic-comments for each of the specific requirements in Appendix R.

A. Water Supplies forFire Suppression Systems Technical Basis.

One of the basic fire protection requirements for a modern industrial site in the United States is a separate water distribution system !or fire protection with dual water supplies.

Duplicate water supplies are required to

.ensure uninterrupted fire suppression capability allowing for single failures and periodic maintenance and repair of vital portions of the systems. Duplicate water supplies may consist of separate suctions for fire pumps from a large body of water such as lake..-iver. or pond or from two water storage tanks.

For nucIear power plants, the distribution system is required to consist of a loop around the plant with suitable valves for isolating portions of the system for maintenance or repair without interrupting the water supply to the various fire suppression systems in the plant. Thus. with dual supplies and a loop concept. an adequate water supply can be ensured to each manual or automatic water suppression system throughout the plant.

An ensured minimum volume of water

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is set aside and dedicated for fire protection uses to be available at all times regardless ofother simul:aneousater uses in the plant. This water

'olume is dedicated for fire service by means of separate storage tanks or separate p'ump suctions from a large

'ody of water. When common tankage

.is employed for fire service needs and other water services, the fire pump suctions must be at the bottom of the tank and other water supply suctions must be located at a higher level to ensure that the minimum dedicated water volume is set aside for fire protection needs. Administrative

'ontrols by themselves. such as locked,

'alves to ensure'adequate water supply

. for fire fighting needs, are deemed"

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unacceptable at nuclear power plants.

Comment Resolution Many commenters stated that we were being too restrictive by stipulaing an underground yard fire main loop and freih wz:. <coolies. Our intent was only that a yard fire main loop be furnished. We have deleted the specification for an underg;ound loop

'ince special conditions may dictate that part of:he.loop be above ground or inside safety-related buildings. Such '

arrangements are acceptable.

With regard to the specification for a

, fresh water supply, the staff was attempting to avoid potential plant problems that are not associated with fire protection. From a fire pr'otection standpoint,'salt or brackish water is acceptable for fire suppression provided the fire protection system is designed and maintained for salt or brackish water. The requirement for fresh water supplies is therefore dropped. Other operational problems unrelated to fire protection that may result from the use of:alt or brackish water for fire suppression activities are outside the scope of this regulation.

Several commenters took issue with the reauirement for two separate redundant suet!ons. stating that some plan> use a single large intake structure on a lake or a river!or all water requiren ents. The requirement for separat intake structures was not.

intended ard the rule has beeri clariTied.

Several comments cal!ed for de!et!ng the requirements for dedicated tanks or use of ~'ertical standpipe for other water

.services when storage tanks are used for combLaed service. water/fire. water uses.

on the ba is that this is overly restrictive and other ways are available to ensure a dedicated supply such as weirs, suction location, etc. Two separafe but

Federal Register l Vol. 45. No. 22S / Wednesday.

4ovetnber 19, 1980 / Rules and Regulatiors 76605 rela!ed issues are involved here. The first is the requirement ior dedicated water storage!anks for fire fighting purposes. The suggestion that the

,requirement ior decicated!anks be deleted was relected for the reasons stated!n t!te preceairg Techrical Basis.

The other point deals with ensuring minimum wa!er stcrage capanty for fire suppression activi;ies when storage tanks are used:or "ombined service-water/fire. water uses. The term

-vertical standpipe ior other water service" simply means'that the suction for other wateruses in corunon storage tanks willbe loca!ed sufficiently high to ensure the minimum water volume

. needs for Are suppression activities. If the commerrers were assuming that "vertical stardpipe" referrea only to

" pipes inside the tank:hfs is not the case. In'iact a standpipe exterior to the storage tank is more aesirable since any leakage would be'inmediately eviderti On an internal standpipe a leak in the pipe cculd act a!Iv aliow deple!iar. of the'water c:herwtse to be reserved for Are uses,;he rule has been clarified to al/ow physical al:ernatives ior water supply deaica!!on bu! to preclude exclusive use ci aaministrative controls for this pvrpose.

Some commenters objected to ~J.e

equfrerient Hat other water systems used as a backup wa'.er suppiy for Are prctec:ion should be permaner tly

. connected to t?:e Are main system and suggested that it would be sufficient to prcvide a wa:er svppiy capable ofbeing connected to the fire ~afn systen within len mfnutes of <he loss of rormal water

'upplv or pumps. the rule does not address backup water supplies. The requirement means that. ifanother wa!er system is used as one of the redundant wa!er supplies, it must satisfy all oi the reqvirements of the fire protection water supplies. Additional backup supplies need'not meet:hese requiremer ts..

One ccnmenter as'ked why only a two.hour water supply is required when the Browns Fe~ Fire lasted well over

wo hcurs.,All of:he investigations oi

, the Browns Ferri Fire clearly show that ifwater had been used immediately. the Are wot.id have been exunguisned much earlier. Indeed orce the manual fire Iighting ac:ivities were started with the vse of only one fire hose stieam. the fire was extinguished within one-half hour.

The staff would fird unacceptable any condition in which a postulated fire that could threaten safe shutdown capability could rot be controlled and extinguished within!wo hours with any combination of manual and automatic fire suppression activities. Therefore. a two-hour water s pply is considered adequate. It should also be noted that this mininum aedicated water volume is based on maximun Row rates. Since most fires are con!rolled and extingvishea with much smailer Bow' rates.:his requirement realistically "

represents a aedicated water volume far in excess of two hours.

B. Sec,'ional Isolation Valves..-

C. HI";"at:t 1solation Valves Tech nicai Basis. These two

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requirements are similar and can be

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treated together. Proper valving is '"

required to isolate portions of the water distribution system for maintenance or repair without irteauptfng the water supply to nanual ar automatic fire suppression systems inside the plant.

Valves are similarly.equired to permit isolation of outsicie yard hydrants f-.om the water distribution system far

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maintenance or repair without inte~pting water supply to Are;-

suppression systems inside the plant.

'isvaliy indica Jng valves such as post indicator valves are preferrea so that the position of!he valve can be readily determined. However. key-operated valves {commonly known as curb valves) are acceptable for these purposes where plant-specific conditions war.ant their use.

B. Section Control ValvesCommert Resolation. Many comnenters stated, that Le requfrenent for "approved visually indicating" sectional control

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valves was overly restrictive..'-

unrecessary.

and not specific with respect to who should give t.'ie approval.

The Conmission has accepted this suggestion: the rule now requires that sec:ioral control valves shall be provided to isolate portions of the fire main!or maintenance or repair without shutting off the entire system. Post fndicator or key.operated valves are mentioned as two examples of acceptable valves.-

C. Hydrant Bloch ValvesComment Resolution. A number ofrommenters made suggestions for rewording this'ection.

This section has been clarified to state the requirement for capability'to isolate hydrants!rom the fire tnain without dfsrupting the water supply to auton:atic or manual fire suppression systems in any area containing or presenting a Are hazard to safety-related or safe shutdown equipment.

One commenter suggested that this requirement be dropped in its entirety since it "is a new requirement which has not been subjected!o the peer review process." This svggestion was rejected on the basis tha! Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.3-1 contains the following sentence:

The lateral to each hydrant

'rom the yard inain should be controlled by a visually irdicating;r key.operated

{curb) valve." and there was an opportunity to comnent on this documen!.

D. Manual Fi~ Suppression Tecnhtcal Bcsis. Considerable reliance is placed on automatic fire suppression systems throughout a nuclear power plant.

However, manual Aire fighting ac:ivities often can control and extinguish slowly deveiaping fires beiore an automatic fire suppression system is actuated. In addfQon. fires that are controlled or extinguished by automatic systems require a certain amount of manual response. Also. some areas of &e plant do not warrant the installation of

'utomatic fire suppression systems.

Manual response is ie only fire suppression available.'or these areas:

thus. it is important ~Rat manual fire fighting capability. be present ht all areas of the plant. era that standpipe and hose stations be located throughout the plant. The standpipe and hose

. statfors are to be!ocated so!hat at'least one effective hose s',ream can oe-brought:o bear at any location in the plant containing or presenting a hazard to structures. systems. or coinponents important to safety, They are to be supplied from the fire water supply system except for Lose inside containment. which nay be ccnnected to other reliable water supplies ifa separate penetration into con:airanent cannot be made ior fire water service needs.

Comment Resolution Several commen:ers suggested adding a sentence reading -Stanapipe and hose

'ta'.ions are not requied ifsufficient justification can be provided:hat adequate fire protection feeluas have been provided to account for a given fire area." This suggestion was rejected. The

'taff has taken the position that the

, mirimum requirements are that at least one effective hose stream that will be able to reach any location Jiat contains or could present an exposure fire hazard

, to the safety-related equipment:The Commission concluded that no analyses can ide.".!!fyhazards so ca!eely that this mnimum requirement can be further reduced.'.

Hydrostatic Hose T st Technical Basis. Fire hoses should be hydrostaticaliy tested perioaically to ensure that t.".ey willnot rupture auring use. The requirementfor a minimum test pressure of 3N psi comes from NFPA

~ Ao. 19!f {Natioral Fire Protecion Association Standard Yo. 196 Standard for Fire Hos'e), a nationally recogr 'zed consensus standartL This standard con'.ains other guidance for the

0 76606 Federal Register.'ttl

45. No. ZZS,! KVetlncsday. %men!>er 19.

lqfif> 'uins and Regulations use and cire of fire ho.<< lLui r<<cl Industr.vs find useful Ct>mn>vt>t Resoiut fr >n

~!any cominenters pointed >'.:t'the erroneous usage of the term -servire pressure" rather than -operating pressure-:n this requirement. The.

~

!rtended meaning for this r'equirement is

hat all hoses tvould'be'tested at a pressure greater than the maximum

. pressure fttund in the fire prolection water distribution systems. The correct terminoiogy is "operating pressure.- The rule has been so changed. In addition.

!he staff added a specific minimum test pressure requireinent of 300 psi to meet the NFPA standard.

.One commenter also pointed out that hoses should be inspected for m~ldew.'ot.

cuts. or other damage. Although this is a valid comment. it is not an unresolved issue with.any licensee so il need not be covered by this rule. In addition. such inspections are already being periormed in accordance'with the piant's Technical Specificaitons.

F, Autcmc!ic Fire Detection T<<cnnicol Basis. The reauirement that automalic fire detection systems be installed in all areas that contain safe shutdown or safety..related systems or compcnents foi!osvs generally accepted fire protection praclice. Installation of such fire detection capability is independent

fany requirements for automatic or

". manual fire suppression capability in an'rea.

The purpose oi'hese detection

.'." systems is to give early warning oi fire conditions in an area so that the fire brigade can initiate proinpt actions to minimize fire damage within the plant.

Comment Resolution Many commenters suggested that the

'ords -automatic fire detection capability-be substituted for

-automatic fire detection systems" on the basis tha!. as worded.

the'equirements are too limiting.They staled that an automatic sprinkler system with appropriate alarm check valves and central alarm features provides acceptable detection/alarming capability. Several commenters claimed that a separa;e detection system is not needed in areas covered b>, sprinkler systems equipped with fusibie link sprirkie. heads. A fusible link has a time delay before it actuates. However.

more importantly. a smoldering localized fire that could do damage may not generate enough heat to melt the fusible link.!Vh!lewe do not disagree that:he alarm irom an automatic fire suppression system serves as notification that a fire exists. we concluded that the minimum requirern<<nt for a separate fire detection svsten in ul! such;trtuts should be retained. The fire h<<ziirds analysis nay call for a separate suppression system.

but this wou!d be in ttdd!tion to the fire detection svstem.

G. Prate c!icn i>'.Saic Shutduu'n:.

Capabilit t Tecbn.'cal Basis. The objective for the protection of safe shutdown capabilit>, is!o ensure that at least one means of achieving and maintaining sale shutdotvn conditions willremain available during and after any postulated'lire in the plant. Because it is not possible to predict the specific conditions under which fires may occur and propagate. the design basis

.'rotective features are specified rather

!han the design basis Bire. Three different means for protecting the safe shutdown capability outside of contamnent are acceptaole. The first means is separation'of redurdant safe shul down!rains and us so cia ted circui!s by means of 3-hour fire rated barriers.

The second means is a combination of seoaration oi redundant safe shu'.dotvn

. trains and associated circui!s by'a1-hour fire rated barrier and au>or>attic '"ire suppression and t>etection capability for

, both redundant trains. The:hird means.

which >nay be used onl? when redundant:rains and associated circuits are separated by 30 feet or nore of clear space. requires automatic fire suppression and detection sys:ems'in the area. An alternative or dedicated safe shutdown capability independent oi the fire area is required iffire protection for safe shutdown capability cannot be provided as outlin'ed above. For cables and eouipment needed for safe shutdown located inside of norinerted containments.

a lesser degree of fire protection is permitted because transient exposure fires are!ess likely inside containment during plant operation.Section III.M."Fire Barr!ers."

discusses the technical basis for the 3-,

- hour barrier. and Section II!.L

'Alternative and Qedicated Shutdown Capability." discusses the technical basis ior safe shutdown capability.

Comment Resolution Many commenters suggested that the first paragraph be changed slightly and the rest of this section deleted. The basis ior their c'ontention is that the rule should state siinply lhe reqvirenent to protect cables or equipment of systems necessary for safe shutdown of the plant and leave specific implementation details in some other type of document.

SVe have modified this section by removing the listing of considerations.

deleting Table I. and revising ihe wording to provide clarification.

H. Fire Brigade.

I. F rr B.:t:at."c T. ciri.-st Technical.,

Bcsis. Most.modern irdustriai plants wi!h replacement cost values,

, approaching those of a modern nuclear powered <<iectric generating station haVe a frill-timefullyequipped Bre depart>nent. ircivding motorized fire appara!<<s. Because of the reduced severity ol fire hazards n a nuciear

'enerating station as compared to a "-

manufacturing plant. the Commission believes that it is not recessary to

, mandate a fullystaffed fire department.

However. maruai fire response

, capability is required at a nuclear plant and av properly eouipped and fully trained '."ire brigade willsatisfy this need. The Coinmission has determined

'.hat a brigade of five persons constitutes the mini>num size sufficient!o perform

'he actions:hat may be required by the o."'.jade duririg '.he iire and:o provide.

scne margin for unartici'pated events.'imilarly.

the training reou!rema..ts listed are considered she minimu>h reeded to ensure!ha'l!he fire brigade wi!I be able!o.'urction eifectiyeiy..

during a lire emergency.'

The proposed rvle recuired emergency breathing apparatus tv!haut specifying

- '!he nuirber of such pieces of apparatus.

The rule has been modified lo specify

=

the personnel for whom such apparatus

is to.be provided and to specify.eserve

'i.. equiremen'.s.-

H. Fire BrigadeComment Resolution. Many commenters suggcs',ed cnanging this requirement to a simple

':atement:hat a ',rained and equipped.

rominal size. site fire b".;gade of five pe.sons be provided on each shiit unless a!esser rumber is justified. This recommended change was rejected by ti:e Commission for the reasons stated.

in!he Technical Basis.

Sone corn>re.".ters "'bjected to the exclusion of the shift supervisor from

he fire brigade. The commenters felt

hat lhe shift supervisor should go to!he Sire and provide the benefi! of his expertise and authority. The rule would

'not prevent this. However. the shift supervisor may have to go elsewhere during the course of a:".re!hat adverse!y affects plant operation. The fire brigade

!eader must stay wilh:he Bre brigade and be assigned ro otLer

esponsibilities durirg a f>re emergency

't>erefore. the shif! supervisor nvst be excluced from nemoership on the fire briga de.'.

Fire Brigcde T. ciningComment Resolution. Many coninenters have

~ Th>> is discussec at!en!3ct m the tiRC siail's

'Evaluation of >Minimum Fire anzade Shift Stre".

cited tune e.:9r9: copies are avai!abie from David P Yo.ley. Office of Siindards Deva!opment. t:S.

vuc!vir itettutaiorv Commiss on. Washineton. 0 C.

dsss.

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Federal Register / Vo). 45, No. 225 / Nedstesdtty.

November

19. 1980 / Rules astd Regulations f660y s: i'."c '.:..i: XRC. used unnecessary

deiui,

".. s"eiimg ou'. specific requirements for iassrocm:ns:..uc.ion..":re".ighttrg ommvntrrs fe)t!hat these requirements we.e more detailed than anything the C "".'Ssion 'las published;vith regard

o opera'.or:ra:ning. T..e Cos..mission he.e poets out:hat...osi of:he

nvest gations of the TMIaccident iden'.ified inadequately!rained ooerators as an in:portant factor ard

"..a: ivork is now being done in this area. T'h e fact is not that '!he training reouiresren!s spelled out here for the fire brigade members are excessive when compared to!raining requirements for reac'.o'r operators. but that fire brigade

'!atnlng is further along in development, and!raining parameters that are essen:ial to a comprehensive program have Keen identified.

). '~mope.".c7 Lignting Technical Botuss. Emergency!igh:ing is required in all nuc:ear power pian'.s. Batte~-

powered!!p~hts wi~h capacities of I!!2 lo

~

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emergency egress..-'.cwes'er.

'.he pcstfire emergency lighting requi:ements in a

.". clear power piar t are of a different kind. The need is:or lighting that aids the access

'.o equipment and components that must be manually opera'!ed by plan! persons.el to effect safe giant sL'd own dur:ng olant erne.~ei ches. Because such activities

,. may extend over a consicerable period of time both during and af!er the."ire. it is prudent to crovice 8.hour battery em~ergency lighting capability to a!)ow suf."icient time for norma),)ignting to be restored with a margin for unanticipated events.

Comment Resolution Mary commer ters stated that the

'requirement for emergency!ighting is overly restrictive in three specifics: first.

that emergency. lignting is urnecessary in many of!he"designated areas; second, that the reouire.-..er.t for sealed beam or fluorescent units is over)y restrictive; third.'tLat the requirement for individual 8-hour battery power supp)y is excessive. Tl:ree commenters recom...cooed a 2.hour bat!ery power suoply::ive commenters recommended a

plant-specific power supply; and one commenter recommended:hat:here be

. no permanen! installation.

These surgestions have been accepted in par!. Ligi:ting units with 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> battery suppiies are to be provided in all areas needed for operation of safe

=

shutcown equipmen! and in access and egress routes thereto. The reasoning behind:he requirement for an 8-hour battery power supply is that there can be a great deal of other activity during a fire emerg<<si-i an" operal.iss invoive:

ir. safe pian: shutcown snouic'. not also have to be concerned with lighnng m th>>

'rea.

The sn;all cost differential between 2.hour supply and the substantial additional protection afforded by the 8-hour supply does not"-

warrant reducing this requirement. The Commission has decided to require an 8-

'our battery power supply in all areas needed!or ooeration of sa'e snu'tcown'quipment a.".d in access and egress routes.

K. Administrative Controls Technical Basis. The fire protection program uses administrative conuo)s for fire prevention and prefire planning. The items listed in this section are generally.

accepted witLin!he fire protection community as minimum requirements for an effective administration of the fiie protection program. Controls are placed on the storage are use of combustible materials to reduce the fire loading in safety-related areas and on ignition sources to avoic careless operations...:

Procecures are used to control actions to be taken by incividuals who discover a fire and by the slre brigade for the developmen! of preplanned fire fighting strategies and ac:ual fire fighting techniques, Comment Rescluttbn Many commenters stated that this requirement was much too detailea for a regulation. Some staten Jtat the requirements shou)d apply on)y to those areas having safe shutdown equipment.

Other commenters stated that a simple statement that acministrative procedures should be established to control the venous fire hasards throughout the plant was sufficient. and that the details could be spelled out in a regulatory guide or some other similar document.

Minor changes have been made in the wording of this requirement for c)arificat)on.

L. Alternctive and Dedicated Shutdown Capability.

Technic'al Bosis. In some locations (such as the cable spreading room) within operating nuclear power plants. It is not always possible or practicable to protect red ndant safe shutdown systems against adverse effects of fire or fire suppression activities only Jirough the use of Are protection features because the redundant safe shutdown systems in a given fire area are too close to each other. Alternative shutdown capability has usually been required to be independent of the control room.

cable spreading room. switchgear rooms and cable riser areas because redundant systems in these areas are not adequate)y separated.

Vfhen plant

'odiiicanors io provi 'e aiternat:ve shutdown systems are extensive, a dedicated sys:em that is essentially a minimum caoabihty safe shutdown train and is independen'. of those already.-

existing may be provided. This misiimum capability is requiredi to maintain tn'e.

process sariabies within those vaLues predicted!or a loss ofoffsite power.:he case of loss of offsite power is assumed because fires in certain circumstances (e.g.. electricai dist.."but on system

)

could cause or be related to such a loss.

Fire damage to cold shutdown capability is limi!ed to damage that can be repa'ired within. 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> to provice a margin in achieving cold shutdown conditions. Consideration is given to associated circuits because most p)ants'ere not designed with this concep! in mind. Should either the alternative or dedicated capability be required to functicn beca~use of a fire, it must no: be disabled bv fire damage to associated circuits. A)so.!his capability does not have to mee!

he sirg!e failure criterion because it is onlv ot.e of several!'eve!s of defense. Seismic Category I criteria is not imposed because fires. that uould require the installation of alternative or dedicated shutdown capability are rot seismically induced.

Comment Resolution Many of the commenters stated that t'his require!rent exceeded the scope oi Appendix It by definirg alternative shutdown requires.".ents. T.".ey stated that the time requirements are excessive and should be dropped. They also contend that this reg 'sation does not take into account the.-..any plant reviews being corducted under the Systematic Evaluation Program (SEP).

It is generaily understood that cold

.shutdown is the ultimate safe shutdown condition and that, for each fire area.

different means may be used and may be necessary to achieve cold shutdown.

Because a fire in cer!ain areas at some plants would have the capability of disabling systems required to achieve both hot and cold shutdown, it is necessary to specify the minimum capability and time requirement for each cond)!Ion accessary to achieve safe shutdown. We arree that evaluations being mace under the Systematic Evalua!ion program (SEP) may also call for alternative or dedicated shutdo'wn capability for reasons other than fire protection. For example. seismic.

Pooding. or emergency core cooling requirements resultmg from the SEP may require additional modifications. Each licensee should be aware of the status of the SEP so that!he requirements resulting from SEP can be effectively integrated with those re)at!ng to fire

protection to the extent possible.

However. the Commission has decided that ihe modifications r'equired to complete the fire protection program should not be deferred until the SEP review is completed.

M. Fire Barners.

Technical Basis. The best fire protection for redundant trains of safe shutdown systems is separation by unpierced fire barriers walls and ceiling-floor assambfies.

Because these barriers are passive fire protection features. they are inherently reliable provided they are properly installed and maintained. Fire barriers have been used successfully for many years to subdivide large potential fire losses into smafler. more acceptable risks. Even fire barriers with openings have successfully irterrupted the progress of many fires provided the openings were properly protected by fire doors or other acceptable means.

Fire barriers are "rated" for fire resistance by being exposed to a "standard test fiire-. This standard test fire is defined by the American Society for Testing and Materials inAS'-

119. -Standard for Fire Resistance of Building Materials.- Fite barriers are,

. commonly rated as having a fire resistance of from 1 to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />. Most "Improved Risk-or "HighlyProtected Risk- (as classified by insurance carriers) industrial properties in the United States require fire barriers to have a resistance rating of 2 to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

IVhile a nuc!ear power plant has a low fire load. the potential consequences of,fire are serious.

Therefore. the Commission has selected 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> has been as an acceptable minimuin fire resistance rating foi'ire barriers separating redundant trains for safe shutdown systems. This willgive

'inple time for automatic and manual fire suppression activities to control any potential fire and for safe shutdown

'c'tivities to'prbperly control the reactor.

Many op'crating plants, or plants that are already built but thai are not yet oper'ating: have both trains of safe shutdown equipment located in close proximity and a single lire could damage or destroy the functional" capability of both redundant trains. If specific plant conditions preclude the instaHa tion of a 3-hour fire barrier to separate the redundant trains. a 1-hour fire barrier and automatic fire suppression system for each redundant train wiH be considered the equivalent of 3-hour barrier.

Ifthe 1-hour lire barrier and automatic fire suppression for each redundant train cannot be provided because of plant-specific conditions, alternative or dedicated shutdowrs capability willbe required to ensure safe shutdown capability. The use of u 1-hour barrier in conjunction ivith automatic fire.

suppression and detection capability for each redundant train of safe shutdown

'quipment is based on the foHowing considerations. Automatic svppression is required to ensure prcirpt. effective application of suppressant to a fire that could endanger safe shutdown "

capability. The activation of an automatic fire detection or suppression system does not occur until sufficient smoke or heat has been developed by the fire. Therefore. the Commission is requiring a 1-hour barrier to ensure that fire damage willbe limited to one train until the fire is extinguished.

These requirements have now been incorporated in Section III.G. "Fire Protection ofSafety Functions.-

Comment Resolution Several commenters made a number of suggestions of an editorial nature.

One suggestion was to add "or unless other fire protection features have been provided to ensure equivalent" protection" in the first paragraph. where three-hour rated fire barriers were stipulated unless a lowe". rating was justified by the fire hazards analysis.

The Commission feels that thiszdds nothing in '.he way of clarification and the suagestion was not adopted. The second paragraph'requires that structural steel forming a part of or supporting any fire barrier have a fire, resistance equivalent to that required of the barrier. An example was given of metal lath and plaster covering as being one means of providing equivalent protection. Several commenters stated that they thought this was too narrow and would be interpreted by some people as the only acceptable method permitted. Since the example seemed to be confusing, a decision has been made to eliminate it. Other comments to the effect that the requirement was excessively restrictive ~ith regard to fire barrier penetrations, including fire doors and their as5ociated frames and hardware. and ventilation systems have been acted upon by the staff and the requirement. as it had affected these items. was deleted.

N. Fire Barrier Cable Penetration Seal Qualification.,

Technical Basis. Unpierced fire barriers offer the best protection for separating redundant trains of safety-related or safe shutdown equipment.

However. these barriers must be pierced for both control and power cables.

These penetrations must be sealed to achieve a degree of fire resistance equivalent to that required of the barrier that is pierced. ASTM Standard E-119 is the national consersus stardard vsed for testing and ratirg these cable penetration seals. Since the cables conduct the heat through the barrier.

and since the cable'insulation is " '

combustible. the acceptance criteria ni the ASTM Standard E-119 relating to temperature on the nexposed side must be appropriatelv modified.

Comment Resolution Some commenters suggested that this entire section be deleted and replaced with the following two sentences:

"Penetration seals shall provide the,,

equivalent protection which is required of the fire barrier. Evaluation of the penetration seals based upon a design-review and relevant test data or qualification tests may be made.- The commenters felt that sufficient test data are available to permit evaluation of design requirements without full-scale mockup testing and that many of the items spelled out ir. the regulation. such as the water hose stream test. were too detailed and did not belong in the regulation. The Commission has reconsidered this issue and revised the rule to (a) require tiie use of noncombustible materials only in the construction of fire oarrier penetraticn seals, (b) require fire barrier penetration seals to be. qualified by test: and (c) require such tests to satisfy certain acceptarce criteria.

O. Fire Doors.

Technical Basis. Door openings in fire walls constitute another breach that must be protected. Fire doors that have been tested and rated for ceriam fire exposures are instafled to protect these

'penings.

Fire doors frequently fail to protect the openings in wnich they are installed because they are not hHy closed. Various methods are available to licensees to ensure that fire doors are in proper operating condition and that they willbe closed during a fire. These options are listed in Appendix R.

Comment Resolution Many commenters stated that this requirement is too detailed and should be deleted. Minor editorial changes have been made in order to more clearly state the requirements.

P. Reactor Coolant Pumps ubr ""::an System.

Technical Basis. Each reactor coolaqt pump motor assembly typically contains 140 to ~~"0 gaHons of lube oil. Oil leaking from some portions of'the lube oil system may come in contact with surfaces that are hot enougn to ignite the oil. The resulting fire cauld be large. and access to the fire would be delayed because of the time required to enter the containment. Containent air temperature

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'Federal Register / Vo). 45. No. 225 / wednesday.

Novetnber 19.'1980 / Rules and Regulations

";6609 would increase. severe localized environments would develop in the area of the fire. and a large amount of smoke v ouid be generated. These conditions could affect operability of safety-related equipment inside containment.

Therefore. an oil collection system is necessary to confine any oil discharged due to leadkage or failure of the lubrication. system and to prevent ft from becoming a fire hazard by draining it:o.a safe locattotr. These occur."ences could be random or could be seismically induced'because the existing lube oil system piping and oil collection systems may not be designed to withstand a design basis seimic event.

Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1 states that for operating plants, "postulated fires or fire protection system failures need not be considered concurrent with other plant accidents or the most severe natural phenomena."

The basis for that statement is two fold.

First. nuclear power plants are massive struc'.utes. and essential services are designed!o withstand earth'quakes and other na!ural phenomena.

Second. the history a!many tres associated with

'recent ear!hquakes have been

'valuated.

These evaluations showed that such fires usually are aue to iailure of piping or tanks off)ammab)e gasses or liquids such as municipal natural gas

.distributio systems or gasoline storage and/or dispensing stations. Where such potential fire hazards exi'st in nuc)ear power plants te.g.. hydrogen for generator cooling, or oil fuel for the energency diesel generator or station space heatf~ boilers) they are designed and insta!led to withstand the damaging eifects of various natural phenomena.

and other special fire protection features

're provided as necessary. However.

. General Design Criterion 2 Design'Bases for Protection Against Natural Phenomena requires that structures, systems. and components important to sefetv be'aesigned to withstand the effects of earthquakes without loss of capability to perform their safety function. Regulatory Guide 1.29, "Seismic Design Classification.-

describes'an acceptable method for

~

identifying and classifying those features of light-water-cooled nuclear power plants that should be designed to withstand the ef!ects of the Safe Shutdown Earthquake. In this guide, paragraph C.1 applies to systems that are required to remain functional to ensure heat removal capability; paragraph C.2 applies to systems that do not have to remain frunctional for that purpose. but whose failure could reduce the functioning of those systems covered by paragraph C.1. The reactor coolant pump oil collection system is covered by paragraph C.2 because its function is required to protect safety-reiated

'ystems rather than to perform a safety function. Because the failure of the oil co))ection system for a seisnica)ly induced oil,"ire should not prevent a safety-related system from performirg its safety!unction (Regulatory Guiae 1.29, "Seismic Design Classification."

paragraph C."). the oil collection system should be designed. engineered.

and installed so that its failure willnot lead to a fire affecting safety-related equipment as a result of an earthquake.

The proposed rule permitted two alternatives an oil collection system or an automatic fire suppression system. "

We have deleted the alternative of the suppression system because unacceptable damage may resu! t to the safety-related systems from the bur.".ing of oil before the suppressfon system is ac'.uated and because the fire water supply system is not designed;o withstand seismic events. In addition.

these pumps are located within the biological shield inside containment."

'herefore.

!imely fire brigade ac!ion would be difficultif!he suppression system malfunctions. Further, 'he suppression system becomes inoperable during operation. a fire watch or patrol cannot enter the area d ring operation.

Comment.Resoluti an A number of comnenters suggested that this section is too detailed and should be substantially modiTied. This requirement was changed to delete the option of protecting the'reactor coolant pump lubrication system with an automatic fire suppression system. We have modified the rule to indicate that the requirement that the oil co))ecdon system be designed to provide reasanable assurance that it will withstand the Safe Shutdown Earthquake can be met by sat!sfying paragraph C.2. of Regulatory Guide 1.&.

"Seismic Design Classification." as described above.

Q. Associated Ciraui ts.

Technical Basis. When considerihg the consequences of a fire in a given fire area during the evaluation of safe shutdown capabilities of a plant, the staff must be able to conclude that one train of equipment that can be used immediately to bring the reactor!o a hot shutdown condition remains unaffected by that fire. The staff must also be able to conclude that damage to one train of equipment'used for achieving cold shutdown willbe limited so that the equipment can be returned to an operable condition within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. (See Technical Basis for Sectfon IILG, "Protection of Safe Shutdown Capabi):ty.-) fn ',he:":re hazards analysis

!or a p)ant. the equipment reiiec upon to periorm both func:ions nus! be identified fo. each:"ire area. It!of!aws

!hat any associated non-saiety circuits in the fire area:hat cauld adversely aifect the iden!ified shutdoivn, eauipment by feeding back potentiaiiy disabling conaitions ',e.g.. hot shor:s or

'horts to ground) to the power supplies or con!rol circuits oi that equ:pment must also be eva)ua! ed. Of course such disabling conditions must be prevented to provide assurance that the identified safe shutdown equipment willfunc!ion as designed. These requirements have now been incorporated in Section ll).I "Alternative and Dedicated Shutdown

~

Capability."

Camnient Resolution Many commenters statedi!hat this

'equirement shouid be delete'd because nar.y o!der plant designs cid not consider associated c!!cults and!his is.

therefore. a new design requirement.

The coinmenters ielt!hat the analysis

&at m)) be required to satisiy this requirement willbe both long and compiicated and the requireinent snould thereiore be de)eteL The Commission rejected these suggestiops for the'following reasons.

1. Virtuallya)) of the fire protection modifications made:o date have been required to correct deficiencies!hat resulted from!ack of consideration of certain specific items during initial design and construction.

" Tne Browns Fem fire shpwed the necessi!y of divisional separation of the associated circuit of the control cables to Prevent the disabling o! safety systems by a single fire. This has been discussed with licensees during evaluations of a)ter. a!ive and dedicated shutdown capabi)ity and is necessary to ensure that saic shu:down systems will be able to function properly in he event of fire.

3. The staf.'considers incomplete any fire hazard analysis!hat does not consider the eifec!s of fire damage to circuits that are associated with safe shutdown systems.

As indicated above. as a result of the comments received on this issue. it is unclear that associa:ed circuits have in fact been adequately consiaered by licensees in iieir reviews using the guidance of Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1. To ensure!ha'! the associated circuits are considered. all operating nuclear power plants willbe required to meet the requirenents of Section IILGof Appendix R.

76610 Federal Register /- Vo). 45, No. 225 / Wednesday.."november

19. 1980 / Rules and Regulations Generol Cotnnrenls Resolution:

Several commenters contended that Commission regulations mandate that an adjudicatory hearing be conducted prior to a fina! decision. One commenter labeled the regulation an "order" within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. 551(6)) (APA) and asserted that 10 CFR 2.204 of the Commission's regulations, "Order for Iviodification of-License." applies to this rutemaking proceeding..

The Cominission disagrees with these comments. A "rule" is defined in the APA to mean "the whole or a part of an agency statement of general or particular applicability and future effect designed to implement or prescribe law or policy '

'" (5 U.S.C.

551(4)). The agency action questioned here is clearly one that treats similarly situated licensees equally and that prescribes future conduct or reouireuierts. For those licensees who haie not already provided an equivalent level ".'~rye protection. certain specific fire protection features are required.

~

Various of tLese requirements would

'pply io approxirrately 40 facilities. The commenter's characterization of the rule as an order. along with the assertion that 10 CFR 2.204 mandates a hearing before ihe rule becomes final is

incorrect. On its face. that regulation (which does grant a hearing right) applies only to Commission orders that modify a license.'It does not apply to requirements promulgated through a rulemaking action conducted in accordance with the requirements of applicable la'w.

Several commenters contended that the environmental impact had not been adequately addressed.

One commenter.

citing the requirements in Section III.A

~

of Appendix R'for two water supplies and two separate redundant sections as examples of requirements involving

~ 'nvironmental issues. contended that the Conimission relied upon its staffs "unsupported dete'rmination that.

.Pursuant to 10 CFR t'r 51.5(d). an environmental impact.s ta tement.

appraisal. or negative declaration is not

'required.- The Commission has consjdered Section III.Aand has further corsidered the, remaining requirements of Appendix R and remains convinced that the regulations are not substantive and are insignificant from the standpoint of environmental impact.

One commenter suggested that all plants be required to install dedicated s ii snouid aiso be noted that I -".zos is codified in Subpari B of iOCFR Pari 'he scope of Subpurr B is specifically hmned to-cases ininated by:he staff

'o impose requiremenis by onter on ~

licensee"i,ro CFR MO(~ )). iEinphasi ~ supplied.l shutdown capability. The Commission does not agree. We believe that the Commission's overall fire protection program involving extensive plant-specific fire protection modifications that are based on guidance set forth in'ranch Technical Position BTP APCSB 9.5-land its Appendix A and the specific requirements of Appendix R to resolve disputed issues provide

'dequate fire protection.

~

One commenter stated that the ambiguity of the proposed regulation with regard to critical items requires that it be renoticed. The commenter referenced three portions of the proposed Appendix R as examples oi such ambiguity. They were Section IILG.

Section Ill.iV,and Section III.Q. We have reviewed these examples.

, In reference to the first example. the commenter stated that tne first paragraph of Section III.Gidentifies alternative shutdown capability as an.

optional protective:eature and:hat paragraph III.G.o c '.hen identifies alternative shutdown capability as a minimum fire protection feaiure. We do not agree with!his statement. The first paragraph of Section III.G Identifies alternative shutaown capability as one option in a combination of fire protection features for a speciTic fire area. Paragraph HI.G.3 indicates'when this optior. should be used.

In reference to the second example.

the commenter stated that Section III.N requires a pressure differential across the test specimen during the testing of fire barrier pene-ation seals but fails to define the pressure differential. This comment is incorrect. The pressure differential called for by the proposed provision was the maximum pressure differential that the barrier would experience in the specific plant installation. In any event, the requirement for pressure differential during such testing has been deleted since only noncombustible material is now being used for suoh seals..

In reference to the third example. the commenter stated that Section III.Q is totally lacking in definition. We do not agree. Footnote 6 references Regulatory Guide 1.".5 and KEE Std 384-1924. The latter document is a commonly used industry standard that defines associated circuits and provides guidance for ensuring that such circuits do not compromise the independence of the shutdown circuits they are associate'd with.

Based on the above examples and our review of lhe other provisions of:he proposed rule. we do not believe that the rule as proposed was ambiguous so as to require renoticing. Moreover. it should be noted that. based on other comments received on the proposed-regulations. other commenters 4lemonstrated a thoroUgh understanding of the proposed requirements.

Pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of, 1954. as amended. the Energy Reorganization Act of 19F4. as amended.

and Sections 552 and 553 ofTitle 5 of the United States Code. notice is hereby

'iven that the following amendments to Title 10. Chapter I. Code of Federal Regulations. Part 50. are published as a document subject to codiTication.

1. A new $ 50.48 is added to read as follows:-

g 50.48 Fire protection.

(a) Each operating nuclear power plant shall have a fire protection plan that satisfies Criterion 3 of Appenaix A to this part. This fire protection plan shall describe the overall fire protection program for the facility. Ideritify the various positions within the licensee's organization that are responsibile forthe program. stale:he authorities that are delegated to each of these positions to implement those responsibilities, and outline the plans for fire protection. fire

. detec',ion and suppression capability..

and limitation of fire damage. The plan shall also describe specific features..

necessary to implement the program described above. such as administrative controls and personnel requirements for fire prevention and manual lire suppression activities. automatic and manually operated fire detection and suppression systems. and he means to.

limitfire damage to structures: systems, or components important to safety so.

that the capability to safely shut dowrr the piant is ensured.'b)

Appendix R to this part establishes-fire protection features required to satisfy Criterion 3 of Appendix A to this part with respect to certain generic issues for nuclear power plants licensed to operate prior to January 1. 1929..

Except for the requirements of Sections III.G. III.J. and GI.O. the provisions of Appendix R to this part shall not be appiicable to nuclear power plants licensed to operate prior to January1.

'929.

to the extent:hat lire protection features proposed or implemented by

'asic!ise proiect:on gvidance for nuclear power plams is conia:ned ln rw~o YiRC documentsc Branch. echnical Poniion AuxiliaryPower Conversion System Branch BTP APCSB 9 S-l.

"Cuideiines for Fire Protecnon for Nucleas Power p!anis." for new planis dockered sacs July 1. 19.S.

dared May 1KL

~ Appendix A io BTP APCSB 9.5-1. "Cindeiines for Fhe Proiecnon for Ki.ciear Power Piants Oochered Rior to July 1. 19FS." for plants that were operating or under venous sieges of design or consuucnon before July 1. 1&Ldated August K.

1916.

Also see Yore 4.

~

~

Federal Register / Vol. 45. Ao. 22S / Wednesday..'v'ovember

]9. 1980 / R'es a.".d lioguja;Jons 76611.

lhe '.:cenhee have been accepted by the NRC stai~as satisfvmg the provisions of Appendix A to Branch Technical, Position BTP APCSB 9.5-1 'eflected in s:aif fi.e protection safety evaluation reports issued prior to '.he effective date oi his rule. or to lhe extent that fire ptoiec!los features were accepted by

he staff in comprehensive fire pro!ect

on safery evaluation reports.

issued heforo Appendix A to'Branch Technicdi Position BTP APCSB 9.5-1 was published in August 1976. 'Vith respect to all other fire protection features covered by Appendix R, all nuclear power piants licensed to operate prior to january 1. 1979 shall satisfy the applicable requirements of Appendix R lo this part. including specifically the

~ requirements of Sections I!I.G, lI!,J, and 111.0.

'c) Ailfire prolection modifications require.io satisfy the provisions 'of Appendix R to this part or directly affected by such requirements shall be completed on the following schedule:

{1) Those fire protection features that involve revisions of administra!ive

~.-.on"ols. manpower changes. and training. shail be implemented within 30 days after the effective date of iiiis section and Appendix R to this part.

(2) Those fire protection features that

. !nvolve insta!lation of modifications that

.do noi reqvire prior h RC approval or plant sLv!down shall be implemen',ed within 9 months after &e effective date of this section and Appendix R to this t part.

(3) Those flire protectJon features, except for '.hose requiring prior NRC approval by. paragraph (c)(5) of this seciion..'hat involve instaflation of modifications that do require plant shvtdown, the need for which is. justified in!he plans and schedules required by the provisions of paragraph (c)(5) of this sec'!ion. shall be implemented before

. startup after the earliest of the following events con:mencing 180 days or more

'tetiftctuon cnd guidance whh respect io pctmileibic euctotuves io ctciefy Appendix

• ic KPCSB 9.5-! htt been ptovided in faut other YRC dctumcms.

'Supcicmeiittty Cuidtnte cn lnfctneifcu Heeded.fct Fire proiccuun Kvttueuon." detcu Oc!ouct I. 19.6.

~ "Sum pic Techn<ctl Spctificcucn.- dticd Mey ig, ist..

~ -."uciecr p!cni Fire Pmictdon Fuctuonet Rctpoiitihihuec. Adminltvtuve Cont. cl tnd Qucuiy*csuieote." Ceied June tt. lgi..

~ "hienpowcr Requitemcnit for Opeteiing Reecictt." deicd icy '.I. Istb,

• Fice Rwiccuon Sefeiy Evetutucn Recoti ihci cut beta issutd!ct etta opertung p!cni sitics hcw iheit guidcuncs wtte eppheo:o ecch ftcitiiyend ideniifice open fite ptoiecucn iscuce that willbe tctoivca when ihe feei!ay tcusfics:ce tpptopticie tcqu:tcmenit of Appeiidix R io this peti.

miter:he effective ditle of this sec! ton and Appendix R to this part:

(i) the first refueling outage:

(ii) another planned outage that lasts for at least 60 davs: or...

(iii)an unplanned outage that!asts for at least 120 days.

(4) Those 1'ire pro!ec!ion features that require prior NRC approval by

~

paragraph (c)(5) of this section. shall be implemented w'ithin the following ~

'chedule:

Dedicated shu!down systems 30 montLs after NRC approval: tnodifications requiring plant snutdownbefore star!up after the earliest of!he events given in paragraph (c)(3) commencing 180 days ai er NRC approval: modifications not requiring plant shutdown 6 months after NRC approval.

(5) Lice!:sees sihall make any modifications necessary to cotnply with these requirements in accordance with the above schedule without prior review and approval by YiRC except for modifications required by Section I!I.G.3 of Appendix R to this part. Lice.".sees shalf submit plans and schedvoes for meeting '!he provisions of paragraphs (cj(2), {c)(3), and (c)(4) wilhin 30 days after the effective date of this section and Appendix R to this part. Licensees, sha!I submit design descriptions of modifications needed to saIJsfy Section III.G.3 of Appendix R to ~his part within 30.days after the the effec'.ive date of this section aid Appendix R to tltis part.

(6) In the event that a request for exemption from a requirement to comply with one. or more of the provisions of Appendix R filed within 30 days of!he effective date of:his rule is based on an assertion by the!!censee that such required modiflcations would not enhance fire protection safety in the fac!iityor that such modifications may be detrimental to overall facilitysafety.

the scnedule requirements of paragraph (c) shall be tolled until final Commission action on the exemption request upon a

.determination by the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation-lhat the licensee has provided a sound technical basis.'or such assertion that warrants, further staff review of the request.

(d) Fire protection features accepted by!he NRC staff in'Fire Protec'.ion Safety Evaluation Reports referred to in paragraph (b) of this section and supplements to such reports. other than fealvres covereo by paragraph (c). shall be conipleted as soon as pracdcab!e but no later than the coinpletion date currently specified in!icense conditions or technical specifications for such facility. or the date determit.ed by paragraphs (dj(1) through (d)(4) of this section. whichever is sooner. unless the Direc'!or of Nuclear Reactor Regulation determines. upon,i s.'".:iivina by the licensee. !hat there is good cause:or extending such date and that the public'-

health and safety is iot adversely-affec!edbv such ex'.ensicn. Ex!ensions of such date sLal! Ro! exceed!he dates determined by paragraphs (cj{%)through.

(c){4) of this secnon.

{ljThose Are protecucn features that.

involve revisions of dcmimstrative controls. manpoiver changes. and lraining shall be 'i...plemented within 4 months after '.he date of:he NRC staff

. Fire Protection Evaluation Report accepting or requ!rirg such features.:.

(2) Those fire prolectior.'eatures invoiving instaflation of modiTications not reqviring pr:cr approval or plant shutdown shall be imp!ernented within

'2 months after:he date oi the YRC staff Fire Protec:ion Safety Evaluation.

Report accep'ting or requiring such features.':

(3) Those fire protection features, including alternative shutdown capability. !nvolving installation of mod!fications requiring plant shutdown

'., shall be implemer ted before the startup after the earliest of the fo!!owing events cornme!.cing 9 months or more after the date of the NRC staff Fire Protection Safety Evaluation Report accepting or requiring such features:

(i) The first reiue!!ng outage:

=-

(ii) Another planned outage that lasts

'or, at least 60 days: or (iii)An unplanned outage that lasts for at!east 120 days.

.(4) Tnose fire protection features "involvingdedicated shutcown ca pability requiring new buildings and sys! ems sLall be implemented witLin30 months of XRC approval. Othe: niodificaticns requiring NRC approval prior to in'stallation shall be irrplemented within 6 months after NRC approval.

(e) Nuclear power plants licensed to operate after January 1. 1979. shall complete all fire protection modifications needed to satisfy Criterion 3 of Appendix A to this part in accordance with the provisions of their hcenses.

2. A new Appendix R is adoed to.

10 CFR Part 50 to read as follows:

Appendix RFtte Protection Ptogtttn for Yucttat Powet Ftcititics Operating Prior io

!tnuaty I. 1979 1.!otic'vctfcn cnc'Scope This Appencix appifet to!ictited ".,ucieat powet t!ecitic g nttaucg snuions.thai were operating prior!o January I. l979. except io

ht ex!eni tei:otih in paragraph 50.ts(b) of this patt. With respect:o cttisin."enctic issues for such iaciii'.les ii ters.!ct'.h:ite ptoiec'.ion featutct requited '.o stusfy Critcticn 3 ofApptncfx A io ihit pari. ~

'See fooincte t.

v

~ I 76612 Federal Register'/

Vol. 45. Ao. 225 / Wednesday.

November

19. %980 / Rules and Regulations Sa tery tunclen Sre dsme9e smns Stet Shutdctvh...,.

uavl ol eoucthtnl necessary lo achere 'ot shulcotm

'lhe control toom cr metvency con'ol stalehtst thus'l be'shlared tree ol fve Oema9e lty a en9te tre, Ihcstoh9 ah eelosure tra I Som Carts oi eouemem necessary lo

~chere cold

<<sndotth mey be damsced by a sm9>> tre. rearsn9 an etcesure trebIS oame9e must oe Stnted so mai ai least lee ban

~ be reoeved or thade ooerabte

~ttoel TZ holrs uun9 ohstte cacacA eom bare Ot Ier thtb9aboh ol cohsecsuences tou lchvth9 deu9h base acceetns ney be oatna9eo by a srh9NI exbosufe

Are,

<<rr. <<n erlesure tre e a Are rt a 9heh area oei rtvotves enhet tn snu cr bans>>hi combussbes ate e eriethst lo any Strucares.

sysleths.'cf ccrtlootlenls sscaled n or ad>>cent w'net sane area. yhe enema ol sucn Are is 9.

sthene.

teal.

Cr vSrrtent can 'awny ctrees cese Seucares.

sys>>thL ot comcehetlls rnoonatn lo safety,

. a tre rhonm9 one bart ol sate shulcchvn eouenenl Itley cotettane ah esoosute tre tot oe tedunoatn tress ecsleo rt lne sar>>

area.

and

~ tre rnohm9 comcusabes otter man other reoundam bart msy mnsctute an etboslre tre SO bern redundant sorts coated tn me san>>

area The most stringent tire damage limitsiiall apply for:hose systems that fall into nore than one category. Redundant systems used to miugate the consequences ol other design basis accidents bui not necessary for safe shutdown may be lost to a single exposure fire. However. protection shall be provided so that a lire within only one such system will not damage the redundant system.

II. Ceneral itequiremettis A. Fire Protection Program A tire protection program shell be established at caen nuclear power plant. The Criterion 3 of Appendix A to this part specifies that "Structures. svstems. and components important to safety shall be designed and located to mmimize. c'onsistent with o:her safety requirements. the, probabihiy and effect ot fires ard explosions.-

When considering the effects of fire. those systems associated v ith achieving and maintaining safe shutdown conditions assume major importance to safely because damage to them can lead to core damage resulting from loss of coolant through boiloff.

The phrases "important to safety.- or "safety.ietatetL-willbe used throughout this Appendix R as applying to all safety

. functions. The phrase -safe shutdown" will be used throughout this Appendix R as applying to both hot and cold shutdown functions.

'ecause fire may affect safe shutdown systems and because the loss of function of systems used to mitigate the consequences of design bisis accidents under postfire condittons does rot per se impact public safety. the need to lin:itfire damage to

~'ystems required to achieve and maintain

" safe shuiaown conditions is greater than the need to 1!mit fire damage to those system's required to mitigate the consequences of

.des.'gn basis acc! dents. Three levels of fire damage limits are estabtished according to

'he safety functions of the structure. system.

, or component:

program shall establish the fire protecuon policy for the protection of structures.

systems. and components important to safety at each plant and the procedures:equipment.

and personnel required to implement the program at the plant site.

The fire protection program shall be under the direction of an individual who has been delegated authority commensurate with the responsibilities of the position and who has available staff personnel knowledgeable in both fire protection and nuclear safety.

The fire protection program shall extend the concept of deferse.in.debth to fire protection in fire areas important to safety.

with the followingobjectives:

~ to prevent fires from starting:

~ to detect rapidly. control. and extinguish promptly those fires that do ocau:

~ to provide protection for structures.

systems. and components important to safety so that a fire that is nat promptly extinguished by the fire suppression activities willnot prevent the safe shutdown of the plant.

B. Fire Hazards Analysis A lire hazards analysis shall be performed by qualified fire protection and reactor systems engineers to {1]consider potential in situ and transient fire hazards: {")determine the consequences of fire in any location in the plant on the abihty to safely shut down the reactor or on the ability to minimize and control the release of radioactivity to the environment: and {3) specify ineasures for fire prevention. fire detection. fire suppression.

and fire containm'ent and

'lternative shutdown capability as required for each fire area containing structures..

systeins, and components important to safety

'n accordance with NRC guidelines and.

regulations.

C. Fire Prevention Features Fire protection features shall meet the

, foilowinggeneral requirements for all fire areas that contain or present a fire hazard to structures. systems. or components unportant to safety.

1. In situ tire hazards shall be identified and suitable protection provided.

Transient fire hazards associated with normal operat!on. maintenance. repair. or modification activities shall be identified and eliminated where possible. Those t:ansient fire hazards that can not be efiminated shall be controlled and suitable protection provided.

3. Fire detection systems. portable exiinguishers. and standpipe and hose stations shall be installed.

4. Fire barriers or automatic suppression systems or both shall be installed as necessary to protect redundant systems or conponents necessary for safe shutdown.

s. A site fire brigade shall be established.

trained. and equipped and shall be on site at all times.

6. Fire detection and suppression systems shall be designed. tnstatted. maintained, and tested by personnel properly qualified by experience and training in tre protection systeins.

T. Surveillance procedures shall be established to ensure that fire barriers are in place and that fire suppression systems and cotnponents are operable.

0. A(ternati ve or Dedtcorea Shutda sun Capabtliry In areas where the fire.protection!eatures cannot ensure safe shutdown capability in the event of a fire in that area. alternative or dedicated safe shutdown capability snail be'rovided.,,

ill.Specific Requmntents'-....

A. SVater Supplies forFire Suppression Systems Two separate water suppfies shall be provided to furnish necessary water volume and pressure to the fire main loop.

Each supply shall consist of a storage tank.

puinp. piping. and appropriate isolation and control valves. Two separate redundant

'uctions in one or more intake structures from a large body of water {river. take. etc.)

willsatisfy the requirement lor two separated water storage tanks. These supplies shall be separated so that a failure of one supply wdl not result in a failure of the other supply.

Each supply of the fire water distribution system shall be capable of providing for a period of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> the maximum expected water demands as determined by the fire.

hazards analysis for safety-related areas or.

other areas that present a tire exposure.

'azard to safety. related areas.

When storage tanks are used for combinec service-water/fire. water uses t)te minimum volume lor fire uses shall be ensured by means of dedicated tanks or by some physical means such as a vertical standpipe for other water servic. Adininistrative cantrots. including locks for tank auttetl valves. are unacceptable as the only means to ensure minimum water volume.'ther water systems used as one of the two fire water supplies shall be permanendy connected to the fire main system and snail be capable of automatic alignment to the fire, main system. Pumps. controls, and power supplies in these systems shall satisfy the.'equirements for the main fire puinps. <<? e use of other water systems for fire protection shall not be incompatible with their funcdcns

'equired for safe plant shutdown. Failure of the other system shall not degrade the fire main system.

B. Sectional Isolctian Valves Sectional isolation valves such as post indicator valves or key operated valves shatt be installed in the fire main loop to perinit

!solation of portions of the fire main loop for maintenance or repair without interrupting the entire water supply.

C. Hydrant Isolation valves Valves shall be installed to permit iso!ation of outside hydrarts from the fir'e main for maintenance or repair without tnterrdpttng the water supply to automatic or manual fire suppression systems in any ares coniairtng or presenting a fire hazard to.safety-related or safe shutdown equipment.

D. Manual rire Suppression Standpipe ard hose systems shall be installed so that at least one effective hose stream willbe able to reach any location ".at contains or presents an exposure fire hazard to structures. systems. or components important ta safety.

Access to permit effective functioning of the fire brigade shall be provided to all areas that contain or present an exposure fire

~

~

- Federal Register / Vol. 45. No. 225 / wednesday.

November

19. 1980 / Rules and Regulations 76613

)iazard to stnictures. systems. or components i...portant to safety..

Standpipe and hose stations shall be inside P1VR containa:ents and BWR'contaimnents that are not!nerted. S'.andpipe and hose statiors inside containment may bc

'onnected to a high quaiity water supply of sufficient quantity and pressure other than the Are mam hop!f plant specific features p.event exten"ing:he fire main supply inside containment. ror BIVR drywefis, standpipe and hose stations shafibc placed outside the dry well with adequate lengths of hose to

each any!ocatI&'!aside '.he dry weil with an effective hose st!cern.

K. Hydrostatic Hose. Tests Fire hose shaH be hydrostaticaHy!ested at a pressure of300psi or 50 psi above maximum Are main operating pressure.

'h!chever is g;ee!er. Hose stored in outside hose houses shall be tested annually. Interior standpipe hose shaH be tested every dirac years.

F. Ai.'rome.'ia F:re Derecrion Automatic!ire detection systems shall be installed m aH areas of the plant that contain or present" an exposure iw ha'zard:o sa:e shu!dowr. or safeiy reiated svs!ems or conponerts. These Are detection sys!er.:s shaii be ca pable of ooera:ing w!th >r w hout o.'fsue power.

G.:"i:c.~. cree.'ica o!Safe Shurdcwn

1. Fire prc!ection featur s shall'be provided fcr stree:~ares. sys!ens. and components impar.ant to safe shutaown. These features shai! be ca"'able of limiting Are damage so

a. One "ain of systems necessary to achieve and nainta!n hot shutdown conditicns!ron ei!her!he control room or emergency control station(s) is free of fire damage: and

~ b. Si ate...s necessary to achieve end maintain cold shu!aown:rom either!he cont.ol rooni or emergency control station(s) can be re pa!reB within 22 hours2.546296e-4 days <br />0.00611 hours <br />3.637566e-5 weeks <br />8.371e-6 months <br />.

2. Except as prcvidea for paragraph G.3 of this section. where cables or equipnent.

including associated non-safety circuits that cou)d prevent operation or cause maloperation due to hot shorts, open circuits.

or shor.s!o ground. or redundant trains of systems necessary!o achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditfons are located withi:i

.the same.'ire area outside of prinary containment. one of:he fofiowing neans of ensuring:ha! one of !Le redundant trains is

.free of fire danage shall be provided:

a. Separaiicn of cables.and equipment and associated non.safety circuits of redundant

.trains by'a Are barrier Laving a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> rating.

Stree!ural steel!orning a part of or support!ng such fire barriers shall be protecteci to prov!de!ire resistance equivalen! to that required of the barrier

b. Scparat!on of cables and equipment and associated non.safety circui!s of redundant trains by a horizontal distance of more than 20 feet with no.inte~cning combustible or Arc hazards. In addition. fire detectors and an autcmatic fire suppression system shall be mstailcd in!he!ire area: or

c. Enclosure of cable and equipment and associated non.safety circuits of one redundant train in a fire bamer having a 1.

hour rating. In addition. fire detectors and an automatic fire suppression s >stem shail be.

installed in the Are area:-.

Inside noninerted conte!!.ments one ol tne Aire protection means specified above or one of the following fire protection means shall be provided:

d. Separation of cables hnd equipmcnt and associated non.safety circuits of reduncant trams by a horizontal distance of more than 20 feet with no intervening combustibles or Are hazards:-

~

e. Instafia!ion of fire detectors and an automatic fire suppression system in the i":re a'rea: or

f. Separation of cables and equipment and associated non-safety circuits of redundant trains by a noncombustible radiant energy shield.

3. Alternative or dedicated shutdown capability and its associated circuits."

fnde pendent of cables, systems or compcnents in the area. room or =one under consideration, shall be provided:

a. Where Hie protection of systems whose function is required for hot shutdown does no: satisfy!he requirement of paragraph G2 cf this section: or KVhere redundart -..sins of systems required for bot shutdown located in the same fre area may be subject to damage

!re suppression activities or from toe nipture cr inadve!tent operation of tire suppression systems.

ln addiuon..'ire detection and a fixed Are suppression system shell be Instafied in the area, room, or zone under consideration.

H. Fire Brigade

~

A site Are brigade trained and equipped ior fire Aghting shaH be established to ensure aacquate manual fire fighting capability for'll areas of the plant containing structures.

systems. or components important to safety..

The fire brigade shall be at least five members on each shift. The brigade leader ard at least!wo brigade members shafi have suf Ic ent training in or knowledge of plant safety-related systems to understand the eL!ec:s of Are and fire suppressants on safe shutdown capabifity. The qualH!cation of fire brigade members shaH include an annual physical examination to deterninc their ability to perform stenuous fire Aghting actlidties. The shift supervisor shall not be a member of the fire br!gade. The brigade leader shall be conpctent to assess the potential safety consequences of a fire and advise control room personnel.,Such competence by the brigade leader may be evidenced by possession of an operator's license or equivalent knowledge of plant safety. related systems.

The minimum cquipmen't provided for!he brigade shall consist of personal protective equipment such as turnout coats. boots.

g!aves, hard hats: emergency communications equipment. portable lights. portable ventilation equipment. and portable cxtinguishers. Seif.contained breathing apparatus using full.face positive-pressure masks approved by VIOSH {National AIieruadve shutdown capabday!e provided by.

ieruui!ng. retocaung or modlficaitng of existing syiuiemiu dedicated shuidowii capability ia provided by ut ~ta!lhig new struciuree and syeiema for the fuucuon of post!lre shutdown.

!nsaivte for Occuaa!:onal Safeiv and Health-approve! formerly even by the LLS Bureau of Mines) shaH be proiided for Are brigade. damage comrol. 4nd control toom personnel. At least 10 masks shail be available for fire br'gade personnel. Control room personnel nay be furnished breathintt

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air by a manifold system piped froai a, storage reservoir ifprac:ical. Service or rated operating 1i'fe shall be a minimuin of cne-half hour for the self crntamed nits.

At least two extra air bottles shall be

!ocated on site for each sell contaii.ed breatLing unit. In adc!tion. an onsite s.hour supply of reserve air shaH bc proviaed and arrarged to permit quick and compiete replenishment of exhausted supply air bottles as Hiey are returneiL Ifcompressors are used as a source of br'eathing air. only units approved for breathing air shall be used:

coinpressors shall be operable assuming a

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loss of offsite power. Special cart must be taken to locate the compressor in areas bee

'l dust and contaiainants.

LFire Brigade Trainiag i The fire brigade training pro~an shaH ensure that tiie capability to fight potential fi es is estabfished and main'.ained. The pro!ram shall consist of an initiai c!assniom-

!nstruction pmcram.'ofiowcd by p.nocic classroom instruction. fire fichtine prac!ice.

and fire drifis:

1. Instru crion

a. The inifial classroom inst"~c:loa shaH include:

(1)!ndoctrination ol!he plant Are fightiag plan with specific identification of ecch indlildual's responsibilities.

(2) idea;iTicaricn of thc type and location of Are hazards and associated types of fires!hat cculd cccur La thc plant (3) The tox!c and corrosive characteristics of expected products of combustion.

',4) Identificaaon ol the Iocat!on of fire fighting equipment for each fire area and faauliarization with the layout ol'the plant.

including access and eg!ess routes io each area.

(S) The proper use of available fire fight!ag equipment and the conect method of fighting each type of fire. The njpes ol fires covered should Inc!ude Ares incue~ electrical equipment. fires in cables and cable uaya.

hydrogen fires. fires involving Damnable and combustible liquids or hazardous process chemicals. Pres resultiig from construction or nod!fications (welding), and record file fires.

(8) The proper use of communication.

lighting. ventilation. and emergency breathing equipinent.

{2)The proper method for fighting fires r'nside buildings and confined spaces.

!8) The direction and coordination of the fire Agh!ing activities {Are brigade leaders only).

.9) Detailed review of fire fighting strategies and procedures.

{10) Review of the latest plan't mooifications and canesponding changes in Are fighting plans.

Note.liens (9) and (10) may be deleted from the training of no more than two of the nonwperations personnel who may be assigned to the fire brigaae.

b. Thc instruction si:aH be provided by quafified individuals who are knowledgeable.

0 76614 Federal Register ( Voj. 45. Yu.'>>5 / Wednesday.

Yiovember 19.'980

( Rules and Regulations experience<<). ~n 1 suiiiiblytrained in fighting the types <<i'.,res:hut coiild occur in the plan and in us:ng the iyprs of equipment availabl in the nuclear a<<>>iver pliin:."

c. )nstruction shall be provided to aH fire brigade iacinbers and fire brigade leaders.

d. Reguiar planned ineetings shall be held at least every 3 months for all brigade members to review changes in the lire protection program and other subjects as nece'ssary.

e. Periodic refresher traming sessions shel be held to repe'at the classroom instruction

. program for 81l brigade members over a two-year period. These sessions may be concurrent with the regular planned meetings..

2. Practice Practice sessions shall be held for each shift fire brigade on the proper method of fighting the various types of fires that could occur in a.nuclear power plant. These sessians shall provide brigade meinbers with experience in actual fire extinguishment and the use of emergency breathing apparatus ader strenuous conditions encountered in fire fighang. These practice sessions shall be provided at least once per year for each fire brigade member.,

3. Dril/s

a. Fire brigade drills shall be performed in the plant so that the fire biigade can practice as a team.

b. Drills shall be performed at regular intervals not to exceed 3 months for each shift fire. brigade. Each tire brigade member should participate in each drill.but must participate in at least two drills per year.

A sufficient number of these drills. but nat less than one for each shift lire brigade per

'year. shall be unannounced to determine the fire fighting readiness of the plant fire brigade. brigade leader. and fire protection

'systems aad equipment. Persons planning

'aad authorizing an unannounced driflshall ensure that lhe responding shift fire brigade members are not aware that a drillis being planned until it is begun. Unannounced drills shall not be scheduled closer thea four weeks.

At least one drillper year shall be performed on a "back shift-for each shift fir brigade.

c. The drifls shal) be preplanned to establish the training objectives of the driH and sha))'b4 critiqued to determine how well the'traming objectives have been met.

Unannounced drills shall be planned and

..'criti<<(ued by members of the management staff responsible for plant safety and fire protection. Performance deficiencies of a fire

~ bngade or of individual fire brigade membe shall be remedied by scheduling additioaal

raining for the brigade or members.

Unsatisfactory drill performance shall be followed by a repeat dri)l within 30 days.

a. At 3-year intervals. a randomly selected unannounced drill shall be criiiqued by qualified individuals independent of the licensee's staff. A copy of the written report from such individuals shall be available for YRC review.

e. Drills shall as a mini<<num include the following:

tl) Assessment of fire alarm effectiveness.

'ime required to'notify and assemble fire brigade. and selection.)i)acement and use oi equipment. and flre fighting strategies.

e (2) Assessment of each brigade member's knowledge of his or her role in the fire fighting strategy for the area assumed to contain the fire. Assessment af the brigade

'member's conformance with established.

plant fire fighting procedures and use of fire fighting equipment. Inc)udiag se)f~oatained emergency breathing apparatus.

communication equipment. and ventilation I

equipment. to the extent practicable.

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(3) The simulated use of fire fighting equipment required to cope with the situation and type of fire selected for the dri)). The area and type af fire chosen for the arill should differ from those used in the previous drill so that brigade members are trained in fighting fires in various plant areas. The situation selected should simulate the size and arrangemeat of a fire that could reasonably occur in the area selecte*.

allowing for fire development due to the time required to respon* to obtain equipment. and organize for the fire. assumiag loss of

'utomatic suppress) on capability.

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(4) Assessment of brigade leader' direction of the fire fighting effort as to thoroughness.

accuracy. and effectiveaessi

4. Records Individual records of training provided to'ach fire brigade member. including drill critiques. shaHbe maintained for at least 3 years to ensure that each member receives training in aH parts of the training program.

These records of training shall be zvaflablc for VRC review. Retraining or broadened training for lire lighting within buildings shall

"'e scheduled for aH those brig'ade members whose performance records show deficiencies.

j. Emergency Eighting'mergency lighting units with at least an 8-hour battery power supply shall be provided in aH areas needed for'operation of safe.

shutdown equipment and in access aad egress routes thereto.

K.rt dministraiive Controls Administrative controls shall be established to minimize fire hazards in areas coatainiag structures. systems. and e

components important to safety. These controls shall establish procedures to:

1. Govern the handflng and limitation of the use of ordinary combustible materials.

combustible and flammable gases and liquids. high efficiency particulate'ir and charcoal filters. dry ion exchange resins. or other combustible supplies in safety related areas.

2. Prohibit the storage of combustibles in rs safety. related areas or. establish designated storage areas with appropriate lire protection.

3. Govern the iaad)ing of and limit transient fire loads such as combustible and flammable liquids. wood and plasric products. or other combustible materials in buildings caataining safety. rc)atcd systems or equipaient during all phases of operating.

and especially during maintenance.

moaification. or refueling operations.

4. Designate thc onsite staff member responsible for the inplant fire protection review of proposed work activities to identify potential transient fire hazards and specify required additional lire protection in the" work activity procedure.'.

Govern the use of ignition sources by use nt a flame permit system to control welding.

flame cutang. braziing, or soldering operations. A separate permit shi<<H be issued for each area where wark is to be done. lf" work cominues over more than one shift. the permit shall be valid for not more than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> wi:en the plant is operating or for the duration of a par icular job during plant shutdo>>m.

8. Coatm) the removal from the area of all waste. debris. snap. oil spills. or other combustibles resulting from the work activity immediate)y followingcompletion of the activity. or at the ead of each work shift.

whichever coiaes first.

r. Maintain the periodic housekeeping.

inspections to ensure continued compliance with these administrative controls.

8. Contro) the use of specific combustibles in safety. related areas. Allwood used in safely-related areas during maintenance.

modification. or refueling operations (such as lav-down blocks or scaffolding) shaH be treated with a flame retardant. Equipiaent or sup plies (such as new fuel) shipped in un<<seated combustib)e packing containers may be unpacked in safety-related areas if-re"uired for valid operating reasons.

However. aH combustible materials shall be removed fram the area immediately following the unpackhg. Such transient combustible materiaL unless stored in approved cortainea. shall nat be left unattended

'uring lunch breaks. shift changes. or other similat periods. ~se combustible packing materiai such as wood or paper excelsior. or polyethy)ene shecdag shall be placed in metal containers edth tight-fittingse!fw)osing metal cove>.

9. Control actions to be taken by an iacividual discovering a fire. for example.

notification of conga) room. attempt to extLaguish fire. and actuation'of local fire suppression systems.

10. Control actions to be taken by the'ontrol roon operator to determine the need for brigade assistance upon report of a fire or receipt of 'alarm on control room annunciator pareL for example. announcing location of lire over PA system. sounding fire alarms.

and aotifyir4) the shift supervisor and the fire brigade leader of the type. size. and location af the fire.

11. Control aceous to be taken by &e fire brigade after notification by the, control room operator of a fire. for example. assembling in a designated location. receiving directions front the lire brigade leader. and discharging spcnf<<c fire fighting responsibilities including selenion and transportation of fire fighting equiipment to fire location. sciection of protective equipmeat. operatiag instructions for se of fire suppression sysiems. and use of preplanned strategies for fightingfires in '-

specific areas.

12. Define the strategies for fighting fires'in aH safety-related areas aad areas preseating a hazard to safety. related equipmeni. These strategies shall desi@ate:

a. i ire hazards in each area covered by the spec'Sic prefire plans.

b. rire extiaguishaats best suited for

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caa'wflintt Lhe fires associated with the fire

'0

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- Federal Register f Vol. 43. Yo. 225 / Wednesday.

November 19.'1980 / Rules and Regulations

76615, irrva a-.c hv nearest tocatior.

oi '~ ~ac'h!Inc!'Isaants.

. !ifnst!avorabie airer!ion from which to a".~ i a

.re i.". each area

".. view ci!ne

!ia'..~:.

n ":.ec!ion. access aaBways. stairs.

a!rc "irs li a'i are nos't hke!y to ue !.ree oi

.v arrd!he hest s:ation or elevation for

.'ic1ung '.he fire. All access ana egress routes

!ba::ni "lie locked doors saouic be sp~c:ficaBv identified in ihe procedure with tne ap":opr.'a'.e presauriors and me!beds!or access iaectfied.

'. Plant sys:ens that should be managed to

!educe iae canape pater!ial during a local

!ire and:he iocat:on of local and remote con:rois.!or such management te.g.. any nydrauiic o. eiect.".cai systems m tne zone covered by the spec!fic fire fighting procedure that could inc!ease the hazards in !lie area because of over'pressurizatton or electrical hazardsl.

e. Vital heat-sensitive system romponents'ha'.

neec to be kept cool while fightidg a local:ire. Par:icularly hazardovs ccmaustibles that need cooling should be designatea.

f. Or anization of Are fighting brigades and

be! ssizamen! c! special duties acccrding to

ob

i!le so:bat aB fee fighting Tunct:ons are cave.ed ay ary =o.".!pie!e sh:.'! personnel compiemert..hese duties inciude ccmnand suppress!on aro suppcn equipmeat to the A!e scares. apply!ag:..e extiagu!shart to the fire.

comm mca:ion wnh the control rear.:. and

. coorc:rat:cn with outs!ca '.ire departments.

g. Paten'.iai radiological and toxic hazards ir.:ire zones.

'.".. Vent:lat!cn system operation that ensures des!red pient air cist..'bu!ion when

he ven:ilation Bow is mccified:or fire

, con:ainnent or smoke clearing operations.

i. Operatiors;equiring control room and shift eagireer coordination or au!horization.

j. Instwctions for plart operators and gene.al piant person~nel during fire.

L. Ahe...ct!ve cnd Dediccted Shutdown Ccpcb li(y

.'. Aite..,ativeor dedicated shutdown capability prcviced for a specifiic fire area shaB be ab!e to ac'hieve and maintain svbcritical react!sty conditions in the reactor. maintain reactor coolant irventory aciueve and mairtam hot standby '

condi:iors!or, a PWR (hot shutdown for a

'WRI and achieve cold shutdown

'ci.diuors within.2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> and n:aintain cold shuicown concitiors;hereafter. During the postfire shu!dcwn. he reac'.or coolant system process variabies shail be maintained withm

!bcse precic:ed!or a loss of normal a.c.

pcwer. aad t'h e.!ission product bovadary

ntearuy shail aoi be affected: i.e.. there shail be io!'e! c:ad damage. rupture or any

-unary c"olart bourdary. or rupture of the

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".. he performance goals for the shutdown fane:ions snail be:

a. The reactivuy control function shall be capable of achievmg and maintaining cold shutaowr.

eac:iviiy condiuons.

'".. be reactor coolant makeup function sha!I be capaole of maintaining:he reactor Aa cefired in ibe Standard Tcchnical Speaficationa.

coolan'. Ivy~I aoove '.he:oa of the cor~ I-BRVRs ard be wi'!hin the ievel!ndication in the pressurizer for P1VRs.

c. Tne reactor heat removal function shall be capable o! achieving and maintaining decay heat removal.-"

d. The process monitorir.g function snaB be caaable oi providfrg direct Feedings of!he process iariables necessary to perform and control the above functions.

e. The supporting functions shall be capable of providing the process cooling.

lubrication. etc.. necessary

'.o permit the

'peration of the equipment used!or safe

'hutdown functions.

3. The shutdown capabi!ity for specific fire areas may be unique for each such area. or it may be one unique combination of systems for aB such areas. In either ease. the a!tetnative shutdown capability shell be indepe..dent of the specific Aire area(s) and shaB acco...modate post!ire conditions where of!site power is available and where offsite power 'is aot available for "-" hours.

Procedures shaB be in effect to implement this capaoiiity.

4.!f the capability to achieve and maintain cold shutdown willnot be available because of Aire da...age. the equipment and systetas conor:sing the means to achieve and naia'.ai..:he hot siandby or ho'. shutdown cond!tica shaii be capable of naia'.a!ning such ccrciiions unril cold shutdown can be achieved.!f svch eqvipmert and svstens will not be capable of being powered by both orsite and offsite elecrric power systeins because of Are damape. an independent onsite power system shali be provided. The ru!roer o.'perating shift personnel.

exclusive of fiire brigade members. required to cperate such equipment and systems shail be on site at aB tines.

5. Equipnent and syste!as comprising the means to achieve and maintain cold shu'.do@a conditions shall not be damaged by Are: or the fire damage to such equipment ard sys!ems shall be limited so!hat tne syste.-..s can be !hade operable and cold shvtdown achieved within 22 hours2.546296e-4 days <br />0.00611 hours <br />3.637566e-5 weeks <br />8.371e-6 months <br />.

5 faterials

.'or such repairs shall be readily availabie on site and procedures shaB be in effect to implement such repairs. Ifsuch equ!pment and systems used prior to.2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> afier '.he fire wiB not be capable of being powe:ed by both onsite and offslte elecrric power systems because of fire damage. an inae penanet onsite power system shall be provided. Equipment and systems used after 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> may be powered by offsite power only.

8. Shutdown systems ins!alled to ensure postfiire shutdown cipabfiity need not be designee!o meet seismic Category I criteria.

single failure criteria. orpther design basis acnden! criteria, except where required for other reasons.'e.g because of interface with or impact on existing safety systems. or because of adverse valve actions due to fire damage.

.". The safe shutdown equipment and systems for each,'ire area shaB be known to be isola!en!rom associated ~afety circ its in!he lire area so that hot shorts, open circuits. cr shorts to ground in the associated iarcuits willnot prevent operation of he safe shutdown eqinpmeat. The seaeratior. aad barrens between trays and condui! s contain!at! associated !a!cults of one safe shutdown division and t!ays and corduits contaimng associated circuits or sale sbu.'down cables kom.'he redundant division. cr!he isolauan of these associated circuits from the safe shutdown equipment.

shall be such that a pos!ala!ed fire involving-associa!ed n;uiis vi!Bnot,prevent safe shutdown.

M.:"lre Bcrrier Ccble Penefra(ion Seal,'uali ffcation Peeetration seal oesigns shall uulize only ncrcombvs:ib!e materials and shaB be quah:ied by '.eats that are comparable!o tests used:o rate fire barrie. The acceptance criteria for the '.est s'naB indude:

~a..e cable, fire barrier pena!rat!on seal has withstood the fire endurance test without passage of Fiame or ignition ofcables on the unexposed side for a period of time eqvivalent:o &e tire resistance rating reqvired of the barrie..

-" The:eiaperature ievels recorded for Lhe unexposed side are analyzed and demonstrate that the maximum temperature is sv!Aicient!y below &e cable insulauon iga:ucn temperature: and 3.. he fire barrier pane tratfon seal remains intact ard does not allow projection of water

'"eyord the

".exposed surface during 6e hase st.ea:a tesi N. Pi> Pocrs.

Fiw doors shall be self.c!osing or provided with dosing nechanisns and shall be inspected seniannuaBy to verify that automatic hold open. !elease. and dosing mechanisms and latches are operable.

One of the foBowng measures shaB be prov!cad to ensure &ey wiB p!otect the opening as required in case of fire:

1. Fire doors shaB be kept closed and elecaicaBy supervised at a continuously mar+ed location:

> Fire doors shall be locked closed and inspected weekiy to verify that'the doors are in the cloaca position:

3. Fire doors shall be provided with autor.:atic holdwpen and release iaechanisms and hspected daily to verify that doorways are free of obstructions; or

4. Fire doors shall be kept closed and inspected daily to verify that they are in the dosed position.

The fire b!igade leader shall have ready access to keys for any locked fire doors.

Areas protected by automatic total fiooding

'as suppression systems shall have elecrricaHy supervised selfwfoaing fire doors or shaB satisfy option 1 above, O. Oil Co!leo!ion System. forReac!or Coolant Pump T.'.e reactor coolant pump shaB be equipped with an oil cofiection system ifthe containment is not!rerted during normal operation.

Ta ~h.e oil ccllection system shaB be so designed. engineered. and instaBed ~hat faiiure willaot lead to fire during noimai>r design basis accident conditions and'that An ac"aptaala method of coniplytnit with ibis aiiematwe would be io meai Reitutaiory Guide 1..a poi:non a related to associated circuits and KEE Sid saa-tora iseainn 48! where trays ftuin

'edundant safety divisions are sn protected that pairu!a!ed fires affect trays frnin only one safety diviaion.

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II 76616 Federal Register / Vol. 45. No. ZZS / Wednesdtty.

Novemb'er

19. 1980,r Rules*'and Regtliatton. --

there is reasonable assurance that the system willwithstand the Sir fe Shutdown Earthquakr

'uch collecuon systems shall be capable of collecting lube oil from all potential

'ressurized and unpressurized leakage sites m the reactor coolant pump lube oil systeins.

Leakage shall be collected and drained to a vented closed container that can hold the entire lube oil system inventory. A flame

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arrester is required in the vent ifthe flash'oint characteristics of the oil present the nazard of fire flashbac Leakage points to be protected shall include liftpump and piping.

overflow Hnes. lube oil cooler, oil filland drain lines and plugs. flanged connections on oil lines. and lube oil reservoirs where such features exist on the reactor coolant pumps.

The drain line shall be large enough to accommodate the largest potential oil teak (Sec. 161b. Pub. L 83-703. 68 Stat. 948: sec. 201. Pub. L 93-438. 88 Stat.'1242 (42 O.S.C.

'201(b).

5841))

~ Dated at Washington. D.C this 17th day of November 1980i For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.h

~

Samuel J. Chilk, Secretory ofJre Commission.

ira Doe.4040l,s fired rl l~arsaIrri.

BrtlJHC COOE rs9441M

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"See Regulatory Culde t~-Seismic Design Classification" Paragraph C2.