ML17053C495

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IE Insp Rept 50-220/80-19 on 801102-1215.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Action on Previous Insp Findings,Operational Safety Verification & Physical Security & Response to IE Bulletins
ML17053C495
Person / Time
Site: Nine Mile Point Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 02/07/1981
From: Sharon Hudson, Kister H
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML17053C494 List:
References
50-220-80-19, IEB-80-14, IEB-80-17, NUDOCS 8104060173
Download: ML17053C495 (26)


See also: IR 05000220/1980019

Text

U.S.

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE

OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

Region I

2

0

5

. ~50-220 50-19

Docket No.

50-220

9

II

~

License

No.

DPR-63

Priority

Category

C,

Licensee:

" Nia ara

Mohawk Power Cor oration

300 Erie Boulevard West

Syracuse,

New York

13202

Facility Name:

Niiie Mile Point Nuclear Power Station, Unit

1

Inspection at:

Scriba,

New York

Inspection conducted:

November 2-December

15,

1980

ii

Inspectors.

S.

D. Hudson,

Resident

Inspector

z/v W

d te signed

date signed

date

signed

.

Approved by:

H.

B. Kister, Chief, Reactor Projects

Section

No".4,

R08NS Branch

da

e signed

Ins ection

Summar

Ins ection

On November 2-December

15

1980

Ins ection

Re ort No. 50-220 80-.19

A~:.,Nl Nbl>>f.0

byb

resident inspector

(84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br />).

Areas inspected

included:

action taken

on

previous inspection findings, operational

safety verification, physical security,

plant tours, maintenance

observations,

emergency

preparedness drill, verification

of licensee

action in response

to

NRC Confirmatory Order, action taken

by the

licensee

on the interim position for containment

purge

and vent valve operation,

and the status of licensee

action

on

I&E Bulletins 80-14 and 80-17.

Results:

No items of noncompliance

were identified.

Region I Form 12

(Rev. April 77)

816406 6105

DETAILS

1.

Persons

Contacted

R. Abbott, Supervisor,

Operations

J. Duell, Supervisor,

Chemistry 5 Radiation Protection

W. Drews, Superintendent

of Technical

Services

E.

Leach,

Superintendent

of Chemistry

and Radiation

Management

RE

Raymond,

Fire Protection

Coordinator

T.

Roman, Station Superintendent

B. Taylor, Supervisor,

Instrument

and Control

The inspector also interviewed

and talked with other licensee

personnel

during the course

of the inspection including shift supervisors,

adminis-

trative, operations,

health physics,

security,

instrument

and control,

and

contractor personnel.

2.

Licensee Action on Previous

Ins ection Findin

s

(Closed) Inspector

Followup Item (80-14-03):

Background count rate for

personnel

frisking meter in excess

of 300-400

cpm:

The inspector verified

that the personnel

frisking meter in the turbine building at elevation

277'ad

been

moved to

a low background

area (less

than

200 cpm).

(Closed) Deficiency (80-04-01):

Failure to document Site Operations

Review

Committee

(SORC) responsibilities.

The inspector verified that the licensee

issued

a

new Office Instruction

No, OI-18, "Instruction for SORC Records",

Revision

0 dated 5/22/80.

This instruction

was issued to specify

a uniform

format of the

SORC meeting minutes to ensure all actions

are properly

documented.

A review of several

recent

SORC meeting minutes indicates that

the instruction is being

used

and is apparently effective.

3.

0 erational

Safet

Verification

a.

Control

Room Observation

Routinely throughout the inspection period,

the inspector

independently

verified plant parameters

and equipment availability of engineer ed

safeguards

features

against

a plant specific checklist to ensure

compliance with the limiting conditions for operation

(LCO's).

The plant specific checklist

has

been

developed

to assist

the inspector

in ensuring

the following items are observed

during control

room

tours:

Switch and valve position required to satisfy the

LCO's

Alarms or absence

of alarms

Meter indications

and recorder

values

Status lights and power available lights

Front panel

bypass

switches

, Computer print-outs

Comparisons

of redundant

readings

Selected lit annunciators

were discussed

with control

room operators

to verify that the reasons

for them were understood

and corrective

action, if required,

was being taken.

Shift turnovers

were observed

to ensure

proper control

room and shift

manning

on both day and back shifts.

Shift turnover checklists

and

log review by the oncoming

and off-going shifts were also observed

by

the inspector.

No items of noncompliance

were identified.

b.

Review of Lo

s and 0 eratin

Records

The inspector

reviewed the following logs and instructions for the

period November

1 through

December

15,

1980:

Control

Room

Log Book

Reactor Operations

Log Book

Station Shift Supervisor's

Log Book

Station Shift Supervisor's

Instructions

Licensee

Event Report

Log

The logs and instructions

were reviewed to:

Obtain information

on plant problems

and operation

Detect

changes

and trends in performance

Detect possible conflicts with technical

specifications

or regu-

latory requirements

Determine that records

are being reviewed

as required

Assess

the effectiveness

of the communications

provided by the

logs and instructions

Determine that the reporting requirements

of technical

specifica-

tions are met.

No items of noncompliance

were identified.

4.

Observation of Ph sical Securit

The inspector

made observations

and verified during regular

and off-shift

hours, that selected

aspects

of the plant's physical security

system were

in accordance

with regulatory requirements,

physical security plan and

approved

procedures.

The following observations

relating to physical.

security were

made:

The security force

on both regular

and off-shifts was properly manned

and appeared

capable of performing their assigned

functions.

Protected

area barriers

were intact - gates

and doors closed

and

locked if not attended.

Isolation zones

were free of obstructions

and objects that could aid

an intruder in penetrating

the protected

area.

Persons

and packages

were checked prior to entry into the protected

area.

Vehicles were properly authorized,

searched,

and escorted

or controlled

within the protected

area.

Persons within the protected

area displayed photo-identification

badges,

persons

in vital areas

were properly authorized,

and persons

requiring escort were properly escorted.

e

No items of noncompliance

were identified.

5.

Plant Tour s

a.

~Sco

e

During the course of the report period,

the inspector

made multiple

tours of plant areas

to make

an independent

assessment

of equipment

conditions, radiological conditions,

safety

and adherence

to regula-

tory requirements.

The following areas

were

among those

inspected:

I

0

Turbine Building

Auxiliary Control

Room

Vital Switchgear

Rooms

Yard Areas

Radwaste

Area

Diesel Generator

Rooms

Screen

House

Reactor Building

Refueling Area

b.

~Findin

s

The following determinations

were made:

(2)

Monitoring instrumentation:

The inspectors verified that selected

instruments

were functional

and demonstrated

parameters

within

Technical Specification limits.

Radiation protection controls:

The inspectors verified that the

licensee's

Radiation Protection

procedures

were adhered

to at the

time of observations

in the following areas:

(a)

Access control including tagging,

posting

and maintenance

of

step-off pads.

(b)

Confirmation of licensee

survey results

by independent

measurements.

(c)

Verification that requirements

of Radiation Work Permits

are

appropriate

and are being followed.

Plant housekeeping:

Observations

relating to plant housekeeping

identified no unsatisfactory

conditions.

(4)

Fluid leaks:

No significant fluid leaks

were observed.

Piping vibration:

No excessive

piping vibrations were observed

and

no adverse

conditions were noted.

Fire protection:

The inspector verified that selected fire

extinguishers

were accessible

and inspected

on schedule,

that

fire doors were unobstructed

and that adequate

controls over

ignition sources

and fire hazards

were maintained.

The inspector

had

no further questions

in the areas

examined.

6.

Maintenance

Observations

The inspector

observed portions of the following maintenance

items:

On November 6,

1980, the repair of an oil leak on the 0102

Emergency

Diesel Generator.

On November 25,

1980,

repacking of the 011 Liquid Poison

Pump.

Through direct observation

and review of records,

the inspector determined

that:

Redundant

components

were tested to ensure operability prior or starting

the work.

Required tagouts

were obtained.

Approved procedures

were used for repacking the liquid poison

pump.

The repair of the minor oil leak is

a job within the "skills of the trade."

Appropriate radiological controls were established.

gC coverage

was provided.

Equipment

was properly tested prior to returning to service.

The inspector also independently verified that the valve and breaker line-

up for the emergency diesel

generator

and the liquid poison

pump were

correctly returned to

a normal

stand-by condition.

No items of noncompliance

were identified.

7.

Emer enc

Pre aredness

Drill

On November

12,

1980,

the licensee

conducted

a scheduled fire drill to test

the response

of station

personnel

and off-site fire companies

to a simulated

fire in the protected

area.

In addition to the licensee's

observers,

an

independent

consultant,

the Fire Protection

Engineering

Group,

had been

retained to review the fire protection

program

and the drill.

The resident

inspector

reviewed the drill scenario prior to the conduct of

the drill, attended

a pre-drill briefing of the observers,

witnessed

the

licensee's

response

from the Technical

Support Center,

and attended

the

critique following the drill.

Through direct observation,

the inspector

determined that:

'I

The licensee

responded

in accordance

with approved

procedures.

The response

was coordinated,'rderly

and timely.

Designated

individuals were assigned

as observers.

A critique was held following the drill.

The results of the drill have

been

documented

and reviewed

by the Site

Operations

Review Committtee at meeting

number 80-62

on November 21,

1980.

The licensee's

actions to correct identified problem areas will

be reviewed during subsequent

inspections

by the resident inspector.

(50-220/80-19-01)

8.

Verification of Licensee Action in Res

onse to

NRC Confirmator

Order

Dated October

2

1980

As a result of the failure of control rods to scram at

a boiling water

reactor,

Inspection

and Enforcement Bulletin 80-17,

Supplement

1 requested

the installation of a system to continuously monitor water levels in all

scram discharge

volumes

(SDV).

Following receipt of the licensee's

commit-

ment, the

NRC issued

a Confirmatory Order

on this subject to Niagara

Mohawk.

Specifically, the order required that by December

1,

1980,

the licensee

shall:

"l.a)

Install

and

make operable

a system to continuously monitor

water levels in all scram discharge

volumes

(SDV).

b)

The installed

system shall provide for level-indication, with

an associated

alarm,

in the control

room, for each

SDV.

This

equipment shall

povide sufficient information to the reactor

operator

such that if water accumulates

in either

SDY the decision

about actions to be taken

can

be

made in

a timely fashion

from

the control

room.

2.)

Until the

system described

in III.1 is installed

and operating

satisfactorily,

the licensee

shall increase

surveillance

of the

SDV water level to at least

once per shift.

The once per shift

surveillance

checks

shall

be at least

6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> apart."

The inspector

determined that the once per shift surveillance of the

SDV

water level

was conducted during the months of October

and November,

1980.

On December

1,

1980,

the inspector

reviewed the installation of the recently

completed

SDV continuous monitoring system

and the associated

special

pro-

cedure

no.

N1-SOP-15,

"Malfunction of Control

Rod Drive System,"

Revision

4

dated

November 26,

1980.

The as-built

system

had

one

common annunciator

in

the control

room which would alarm if water was detected

in one or more of

the five SDV discharge

headers.

The special

procedure

required that

an operator

be dispatched

to the local

panel

in the reactor building to verify the

member of sensors

(one per

SDV

discharge

header)

detecting water and that

a manual ultrasonic examination

be performed to confirm the presence

of water.

If water was still evident,

a normal orderly plant shutdown would be initiated.

The resident

inspector

informed the Station Superintendent

that sending

an operator to=the local

panel

in the reactor building and requiring

a confirmatory ultrasonic

examination did not meet the requirement that "the decision

about actions

to be taken

can

be

made in a timely fashion from the control room."

On December

2,

1980,

a telephone

conference

call was held between

the resident

inspector,

the Region I Reactor Projects

Section Chief,

and the station

superintendent.

As a result,

the licensee

revised

N1-SOP-15 to require

a

normal reactor

shutdown if water was detected

in two or more

SDV discharge

headers

without waiting for a manual ultrasonic examination.

As a result

of further review by the inspector,

in conjunction with Region I and IE

Headquarters, it was determined that the the licensee's

Continuous Monitoring

System still did not fully meet the intent of the confirmatory order of

October 2,

1980.

On December

12,

1980,

the Region I Office of Inspection

and Enforcement

issued

an Immediate Action Letter,

IAL 80-53, to confirm additional actions

that have

been or will be taken

by the licensee.

These

included:

a.

A television

camera

has

been installed to monitor the local

SDV water

level monitoring system

panel with a display in the control

room.

b.

Special

procedure,

N1-SOP-15,

has

been revised to require

an immediate

manual scram

when the

SDV continuous water level monitoring system

indicates that there is water in more than

one

SDV in either of the

two groups of interconnected

SDV's.

c.

By December

19,

1980,

the

SDV water level monitoring system will be

modified to include individual indicating lights in the control

room

for each of the five SDV detectors.

By direct observation

and review of special

procedure

N1SOP-15,

the inspector

determined that all items addressed

in the Immediate Action Letter had been

satisfactorily completed.

Verification of Licensee Action on the Interim Position for Containment

Pur

e and Vent Valve 0 eration

On October 22,

1979, the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

(NRR) trans-

mitted its interim position for containment

vent and purge valve operation

to the licensee.

It requested

the licensee

to take interim action until

a

valve qualification program

had been

completed.

The interim action

was

intended to further ensure that the valves

remain operable

under the most

severe

operating conditions.

On December

17,

1979 and January

31,

1980, in letters

from Mr. Donald P.

Disc,

NMPC to Mr. Thomas A. Ippolito,

NRR, the licensee

committed to the

interim position for the containment

vent and purge valves.

The inspector

has reviewed the licensee's

commitment

and has specifically verified that:

Containment

vent and purge valves are required to be normally closed

by Operating

Procedure

No. 9, "Nitrogen Inerting and

H -0

Monitoring

System for the Primary Containment

and Pressure

Suppression

System",

Revision

4 dated

November

18,

1977.

The containment vent and purge valves

have

been modified to limit

their maximum opening to 50 degrees.

This modification is documented

by work request

¹13438 dated

March 5,

1980 and guality Control Inspec-

tion Report ¹80-069 dated

March 5,

1980.

There are

two signals (high drywell pressure

and low-low reactor water

level) that would initiate automatic valve closure.

The primary containment isolation logic allows the operator

to override the

high drywell pressure

signal with a key-lock switch.

This is to allow

controlled venting of the primary containment after

a loss of coolant

accident.

The isolation signal

from low-low reactor

water level cannot

be

overridden

and would therefore

be available to initiate valve closure, if

necessary.

The inspector

noted that

a path from the containment to atmosphere

existed

via the drywell nitrogen

makeup

and bleed isolation valves

and the drywell

nitrogen bleed blocking valve.

Since this path was not specifically addressed

in the

NRR interim position, the item is unresolved

pending review by NRR.

{50-220/80-19-02)

10.

Status of Licensee Action in Res

onse to I&E Bulletin 80-14 and 80-17

The inspector

reviewed the licensee's

response

to IE Bulletin 80-14 and 80-17

including Suppl'ements

1,

2 and 3, in accordance

with an IE Headquarters

direct'ive,

to determine if, the licensee

had sufficiently met his commitments

as of November

6,

1980.

In conjunction with the inspector's

assessment,

NRR/IE Headquarters

reviewed

each

response

to determine if an acceptable

commitment

had been

made.

The detailed results of this review were sent to all

BWR licensees

in an

NRR

Generic Safety Evaluation

Report dated

December

9,

1980.

The report concludes

"that interim operation of Nine Mile Point is justified pending

implementation

of long term modifications."

11.

Unresolved

Items

Unresolved

items are matters

about which more information is required in

order to determine whether they are acceptable

items,

items of noncompliance,

or deviations.

An unresolved

item identified during. this inspection is

discussed

in Paragraph

9 above.

12.

Exit Interview

At periodic intervals during the course of the inspection,

meetings

were

held with senior facility management

to discuss

the inspection

scope

and

findings.

Additionally, the resident

inspector attended

entrance

and exit interviews

conducted

by two separate

region-based

inspectors

with regards

to the

licensee's

training and environmental qualification programs.

w

~

'H

@R RECy

P0

CUNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGUL'ATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

631 PARK AVENUE

KING OF PRUSSIA, PENNSYLVANIA19406

Docket No. 50-220

November 12, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Victor Stello, Jr., Director, IE

FROM:

SUBVECT:

Boyce H. Grier, Director, RI

REPORT

OF INVESTIGATION AT NINE'MILE POINT

Enclosed is our report of an investigation

conducted at Nine-:Mile

Point regarding apparent

discrepancies

in the licensee's

response

to

NRR with respect to Item 2.1.8.b of NUREG 0578.

Other related

documents

associated

with this matter are also enclosed

as indicated

below.

During the recent Health Physics Appraisal inspection

conducted

at Nine'ile Point from October

3 to October 10, 1980, it was

identified that the action that had been taken

by the licensee in

response

to Item 2.1.8.b of NUREG 0578,

as further clarified by

NRR letter to the licensee

dated October 30, 1979,

was different

from the action described in the licensee's

response letter to

NRR

dated

December

31,

1979.

The licensee's

response,

which was

an

interim response

in accordance

with the letter from NRR dated October

30, 1979,

was subsequently

reviewed and

a determination

was

made

that the action described

by the licensee

was

an acceptable

interim

response.

It appeared,

however, that the action described

had not

been taken

and that the licensee's

response r:,contained errone

ous"information.

For this reason,

an investigation (Investigation

Report No. 50-220/80-17)

was conducted

from October 22,to November 1,

1980.

This report and an evaluation

memorandum

from Eldon Brunner,

Chief, Reactor Operations

and Nuclear Support Branch,

dated

November

12,

1980, are enclosed.

In view of the findings with respect to Item 2.1.8.b of NUREG 0578

an inspection

was conducted at Nine Mile Point during the period

from October 8 to November 12,

1980 (Inspection Report No. 50-220/

80-18) to determine the status of licensee

compliance with all Category

A

items of the TMI Action Plan.

Th'e report of this inspection is

enclosed.

Several

additional unresolved, items were identified and

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REPORT

OF INVESTIGATION AT NINE NILE POINT

'

their status

has

been reported in the Region I response

to the

Assistant Director for Field Coordination,

DROI requests

of

October 24,

1980 and October 28,

1980.

Prompt resolution of'hese

items should

be pursued

by DROI.

The report of the Health Physics Appraisal at Nine Nile Point is

not yet available.

For this reason,

the details of the findings

related to the licensee's

response

to Item 2. 1.8.b of NUREG 0578

have

been incorporated into the report of the inspection

conducted

from October 8 to November 12,

1980 (Inspection Report No. 50-220/

80-18) discussed

in the previous paragraph.

Details Section 4.f

describes

the findings from the Health Physics Appraisal inspection

of this matter.

We believe that the licensee's

actions

regarding

Item 2. 1.8.b of NUREG 0578 represent failure to comply with the

Commission's

Order to Show Cause

dated January

2, 1980,

and the

clarification contained in the letter from NRR to the licensee

dated

October 30, 1979.

A Notice of Violation describing this noncompliance

is also enclosed.

Our recommendation

concerning the enforcement

action which we believe to be appropriate will beeforwarded to you

shortly.

Our evaluation of the results of the investigation

does not establish

that there

was

a deliberate

attempt

by the licensee

to deceive the

NRC.

In our view, however,

ther e is clear evidence of a material

false statement.

This false statement in the licensee's

letter to

NRR

dated

December

31,

1979 was knowingly concurred in by the General

Superintendent,

Nuclear.

Higher levels of NMP management

(Vice President

of Nuclear Generation

and Executive Vice President)

apparently relied

on staff input without question.

It appears,

therefore, that the

Executive Vice President

who signed the response

to the Show Cause

Order did so without assuring

accurancy of the response.

We are also

considering this matter further and will recommend appropriate

enforcement

action for what appears

to be ineffective management

controls.

If you have

any comments or questions,

I will be pleased

to discuss

them

with you.

8

ce

H. Grier

Director

(See

page

3 for enclosures

and cc addressees)

a

~ v

0

ai

a

r.

REPORT

OF INVESTIGATION AT NINE MILE POINT

'

Enclosures:

l.

Investigation Report No. 50-220/80-17

2.

Inspection

Report No. 50-220/80-18

3.

Evaluation

Memorandum from Eldon Brunner

dated

November 12, 1980

4.

Notice of Violation

ccw/enclosures:

R.

C.

DeYoung, Deputy Director, IE

N.

C. Moseley, Director,

ROI

H.

D. Thornburg, Director,

RCI

J.

H. Sniezek,

Director,

FFMSI

D. Thompson,

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