ML16342E128
| ML16342E128 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon |
| Issue date: | 06/15/1998 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML16342E129 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-275-98-99, 50-323-98-99, NUDOCS 9806230118 | |
| Download: ML16342E128 (12) | |
See also: IR 05000275/1998099
Text
IIIW
SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT OF LICENSEE PERFORMANCE (SALP)
Report 50-275/98-99; 50-323/98-99
I.
BACKGROUND
The SALP Board convened on May 12, 1998, to assess
the nuclear safety performance of the
Diablo Canyon facilityfor the period of August 18, 1996, through May 9, 1998. The Board
Meeting was conducted in accordance with Management Directive 8.6, "Systematic Assessment
of Licensee Performance."
The Board members were K. E. Perkins (Board Chairperson),
Director, Walnut Creek Field Office, Region IV; D. D. Chamberlain, .Deputy Director, Division of
Reactor Safety, Region IV; and W. H. Bateman, Director, Project Directorate IV-2, Office of
Nuclear Reactor. Regulation.
This assessment
was reviewed and approved by the Region IV
Administrator.
in
Plant Operations
Maintenance
Engineering
Plant Support
2
1
2
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II.
PLANT OPERATIONS
Overall performance in Plant Operations improved during this assessment
period. The licensee
continued to demonstrate the strengths observed during the previous assessment
and took
actions to address previous weaknesses;
however some actions were not fullyeffective.
Management oversight was generally effective, resulting in conservative decision making and a
strong focus on safety.
Operator response to events and abnormal conditions continued to be
strong, although performance during routine evolutions revealed instances of inadequate
communications, inattention to detail, and procedural noncompliance.
Continued weakness was
observed with the proper implementation of the clearance process.
In addition, shift turnover
practices by licensed operators and shift supervision were considered weak. Operator training
remained effective, and audits of the operations department generally resulted in management
taking effective corrective'actions.
Management oversight was generally effective, resulting in conservative decision making and a
strong focus on safety. The focus on safety was particularly evident when power reductions
were initiated for anticipated adverse weather conditions, for offsite grass fires that potentially
threatened power lines, and for emerging equipment problems.
Management was involved in
planning and direct oversight of significant evolutions, including midloop operations during the
Unit 2 outage.
An exception occurred during the Unit 2 startup transformer replacement when
NRC involvement was necessary to ensure that management
adequately considered
contingency plans.
Management was sensitive to conditions affecting operators as evidenced
by their control of potential maintenance distractions, emphasis on correcting control room
deficiencies, moving the shift foreman into the control room, and reducing the amount of
paperwork reviewed in the control room. Management took action since the last assessment
to
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AOGCK 05000275
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provide consistent performance expectations
in most areas, but had not developed full staff
acceptance or implementation of those expectations.
Problems with procedure adherence
and
clearance control continued to occur although to a lesser extent.
Operator response to events and abnormal conditions continued to be strong.
Operators
performed well when faced with main feedwater pump problems and the inadvertent isolation of
a main steam line. In addition, operators effectively performed several power level changes
in
response to external events and to permit maintenance activities. Control room command and
control improved as a result of implementing new standards for communications, peer and
self-checking, and reactivity control. Despite the general improvements observed in control
room work practices, the conduct of shift turnovers was observed to be weak in that operators
did not perform thorough control board walkdowns and shift supervisors did not consistently
enter the main control room area during their shift tumovers.
Some problems occurred
during
routine evolutions which typically resulted from a lack of thorough communications and
inattention to detail.
In addition, procedure adherence problems continued to occur, and in one
noteworthy instance,
a licensee quality evaluation report identified that two senior reactor
operators deliberately deviated from procedures.
Although the licensee generally observed a lower number of significant clearance errors during
the assessment
period, incidents of significant clearance errors continued.
These incidents
included three occurrences where all of the barriers imposed to protect personnel and
equipment were ineffective and other instances where multiple barriers were ineffective. These
incidents did not result in personnel injury or equipment
damage, but indicate'd that revisions to
the clearance procedure to simplify implementation of the clearance process were not fully
effective.
Overall, training of operations staff continued to be effective, and requalification examinations
were challenging and well constructed.
Training conducted prior to the Unit 2 outage provided
valuable lessons to the operators and identified necessary
procedure changes.
A training,
program weakness
in tracking qualification status resulted in some operators not completing the
annual refresher for self-contained breathing apparatus and many operators not having the
appropriate corrective lenses for use with the equipment.
Nuclear Quality Services audits were of high quality, and corrective actions were generally
effective. Operations'elf-assessments
improved but were not consistently self-critical of
performance.
Finally, personnel in the operations department demonstrated
a good
understanding of the corrective action process, and the process was used effectively to identify
and correct deficiencies.
Performance
in the Plant Operations functional area was determined to be Category 2.
III.
NlAINTENANCE
Maintenance performance improved during this assessment
period and attained a superior level
during the latter portion of the period. Management effectiveness and support were improved,
oversight was effective, and decision making was conservative.
The maintenance and
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surveillance program and procedures were well established and effective for routine activities,
but in some instances nonroutine activities were not well controlled. Conduct of maintenance
and surveillance activities was generally strong, with isolated procedure compliance and
implementation problems.
Maintenance backlogs were significantly reduced over the
assessment
period and were effectively controlled. Material conditions continued to improve
and were considered excellent, especially for safety related equipment.
The technical capability
of craft personnel remained high, which indicated effective training and qualification programs.
Performance assessment
programs were considered excellent.
Management involvement and support were effective during this period. Supervision was
routinely involvedin field observations,
in evaluation of "as found" conditions, and in
determinations of appropriate corrective actions.
Conservative decision-making was
demonstrated
by the prudent decision to defer the second Unit 2 transformer outage because of
poor weather conditions.
Relatively isolated procedure compliance and implementation errors
occurred during this assessment
period, and maintenance services recently implemented a
formal process for management field observations to further reduce errors.
The maintenance and surveillance program and procedures were well established and
effectively controlled most activities. Earlier in the assessment
period, the maintenance
rule
baseline inspection identified some problems, primarily related to the application of the risk
aspects of the program, which were effectively addressed
later in the period. Some nonroutine
maintenance activities were not well controlled with appropriate procedures or oversight.
Examples included a procedure which failed to require a post maintenance test to demonstrate
that auxiliary saltwater system check valves were properly installed, a failure to ensure proper
oversight and current training of a contractor installing a ground buggy, and a failure to instruct
personnel to use caution in removing scaffolding when working near the main steam isolation
valves.
In the latter case, personnel working near the main steam isolation valves inadvertently
caused a reactor trip and subsequent
safety injection actuation.
The conduct of maintenance and surveillance activities was generally strong.
Performance
problems appeared to decline over the assessment
period, and many of those that occurred
were self-identified, reported, and effectively corrected by the licensee.
Improvements were
noted in reducing the number of clearance errors, but some significant errors occurred
through
the end of the assessment
period, warranting continued management attention.
In addition,
there was an instance of inappropriate painting activities which caused a turbine driven auxiliary
feedwater pump to be degraded.
Right after the end of the assessment
period, the continued
need for management
attention to conduct of maintenance was evidenced when oil was drained
from the wrong auxiliary feedwater pump.
The overall material condition of the facility continued to improve over the assessment
period
and was considered excellent. A notable example was the intake structure and equipment.
Balance of plant material condition was improved, but isolated controller problems with the main
feedwater pumps continued to occur.
Maintenance backlogs were significantly reduced over the
assessment
period and were considered effectively controlled during the latter portion of the
period.
The technical capability of the craft personnel remained high. Training and qualification of
maintenance and surveillance personnel was considered effective. A challenge for the licensee
willbe to continue the trend in reduced procedure compliance problems and isolate performance
errors noted toward the end of the assessment
period as they implement planned organizational
changes.
Performance assessment
programs in the form of audits and department self-assessments
were
considered excell nt. Problem identification through the corrective action process was effective
with the licensee routinely self-identifying and correcting problems.
Intrusive and self-critical
audits were performed to identify both strengths and weaknesses
in the maintenance and
surveillance programs.
Performance
in the Maintenance functional area was determined to be Category 1.
IV.
ENGINEERING
Engineering performance was good with improvement noted during this assessment
period.
Management initiatives were effective in addressing many of the issues raised during the
previous assessment
period. The consolidation of engineering into a single onsite organization
has presented management challenges.
Procedures
and programs were effective, but some
process modification was needed to address the regulatory aspects of design changes and
design basis fidelityearlier and more effectively. Technical adequacy of the engineering
organization was a strength when the organization was focused.
Engineering support to
operations and maintenance was good.
Insightful results from quality organization audits were
utilized to strengthen engineering.
Management was effective in this assessment
period in reviewing and prioritizing the large
engineering backlog.
Some items were eliminated, and a large number were worked such that
only a small number of quality-related items remained.
Management initiated a quality plan
program that enabled engineering to better track its performance and identify areas of resource
need.
To facilitate consolidation of engineering onsite, management developed innovative
initiatives to retain design basis corporate knowledge, assure effective knowledge transfer, and
centralize various data bases.
The ongoing consolidation of engineering onsite warrants
continued management
attention.
Procedures were effective with only a few exceptions noted.
Most programs were effective in
accomplishing their objectives.
Weaknesses
were evident, however, in the 10 CFR 50.59 and
design basis fidelity programs.
Regulatory aspects of design changes were not always
adequately addressed
in reviews performed under the 10 CFR 50.59 program.
This was evident
in the instances of reviews that raised concerns regarding potential unreviewed safety
questions.
Problems with the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) update programs
related to design basis fidelity continued to be identified by the licensee and the NRC, and
indicated weaknesses
in the licensee's sampling approach to this issue.
The architect engineering inspection confirmed the high quality of engineering work.
Engineering technical competence was a strength when management
ass'ured issues received
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an appropriate focus.
However, some instances of late identification or slow resolution of
issues during this assessment
period were identified and necessitated
NRC involvement. The
issue involving operability of the auxiliary saltwater system floor drain check valves was
identified by the licensee but required NRC involvement to assure prompt resolution.
Engineering support to operations and maintenance was generally good. An engineering fix-it-
now team was formed to be more responsive to daily issues, and engineering supported
the
evolving facility asset teams.
Operability evaluations were improved from the last assessment.
Technically sound and timely resolution of issues was characteristic of system engineering.
However, the licensee was occasionally slow to address self-identified issues such as
abnormally high concentration ofwater in the governor of a turbine driven auxiliary feedwater
pump. Weaknesses
identified in system engineering knowledge of the Maintenance Rule during
the NRC's baseline inspection were promptly corrected.
The quality assurance
organization and the independent safety engineering group were
aggressive in performance oftheir responsibilities.
Their audits were rigorous and critical.
Engineering's use of audit and self-assessment
results was fundamental to the improvements
made during this period. Corrective actions were tracked and were generally effective although
not always timely.
Performance in the Engineering functional area was determined to be Category 2.
V.
PLANT SUPPORT
Overall performance in the Plant Support area continued to be superior with several
improvements noted during the assessment
period.
Performance
in the radiological controls
area was strong with outstanding performance noted in reducing person-rem exposures for plant
workers.
performance continued to be strong. The security area
performance issues noted in the last assessment
were effectively addressed
during this period
and performance was considered excellent.
Housekeeping at the facilitywas very good.
Fire
protection program implementation continued to be generally strong.
Performance assessment,
problem identification, and corrective action effectiveness were excellent, although timeliness of
corrective actions for identified problems could be improved in some areas.
Superior performance was noted in the radiological controls area during this assessment
period.
Management provided strong support for an extended (approximately 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />) reactor
shutdown chemistry initiative, which combined with the installation of additional temporary
shielding and emphasis on maintaining exposures ALARA,resulted in significant improvement in
person-rem exposures
at the facility. The 3-year person-rem exposure average for the facility
was better than the national average for pressurized water reactors.
Personnel contamination
events, contaminated surface areas, generation of radioactive waste, and incidents of
contamination found outside the radiological controlled area were reduced during the
assessment
period indicating effective controls in those areas.
Overall, excellent programs were
effectively implemented for radioactive waste eNuent management,
solid radioactive waste
management,
radioactive material transportation, and environmental monitoring. Excellent
performance was noted in the reduction of airborne noble gas, iodines, particulates, and liquid
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mixed radionuclides.
Chemistry performance at the facility has historically been strong and
continued at a superior level during this assessment
period.
Effective self-assessment
programs were in place in the radiological controls area.
Self-assessment
findings and other
identified problems were generally effectively addressed
in a timely manner, although initial
actions to correct a problem with personnel entering the radiological controlled area without
appropriate dosimeters were not fullyeffective. Performance at the end of the assessment
period indicates that the licensee has been effective in addressing this issue.
performance continued to be strong during this assessment
period.
Performance during the simulator walkthrough inspection and during the biennial exercise was
considered very good. Actual events which occurred during the period were properly classified
and offsite agency initial notifications were timely. The emergency preparedness
training
program was well implemented and training was effectively tracked.
Program enhancements,
including a job task analysis, lesson plan upgrades, and increased drill frequency demonstrated
a high level of management support. Although strong performance was noted overall, some
problems were noted with incomplete lessons-learned
documentation for two actual events and
with untimely response to some emergency preparedness
corrective action requests.
Security performance improved over this assessment
period and was considered excellent.
The
performance issues noted in the security area during the last assessment
period were effectively
addressed
during this period. Areas which improved included searching material entering the
protected area, implementing the access authorization program, and reducing the number of
vital area alarms.
Program strengths were noted in the security backup power supply system,
radio communications system, and the records and reports programs.
An Operational
Safeguards Response
Evaluation (OSRE) determined that the security force demonstrated
excellent contingency response capability. Late in the assessment
period, an issue was
identified regarding changes made in the deployment of armed response officers. The licensee
committed to address the issue by maintaining response as demonstrated
during the OSRE.
The installed vehicle barrier was evaluated as capable of protecting required plant vital
equipment from a vehicle bomb threat.
The security testing and maintenance program was
generally effectively and properly documented although some action requests were not
completed in a timely manner.
Housekeeping at the facilitywas considered very good. The fire protection program and its
implementation continued to be strong during this assessment
period.
audits were found to be self-critical and aggressive.
Fire brigade and fire watch personnel were
very knowledgeable of their assigned duties. The licensee effectively controlled transient
combustibles with the exception of some isolated problems at the intake structure.
were appropriately maintained and the licensee had an aggressive program to correct identified
problems with penetration seals.
Licensee response to a fire during the assessment
period was
effective.
Performance assessment
programs in the form of audits and internal self-assessments
were
considered
a strength.
Problem identification and corrective action effectiveness were generally
strong although timeliness of corrective actions for identified problems could be improved in
some areas.
Performance in the Plant Support functional area was determined to be Category 1.