ML16342D854
| ML16342D854 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 10/31/1997 |
| From: | Allen D, Wong H NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML16342D855 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-275-97-16, 50-323-97-16, NUDOCS 9711120046 | |
| Download: ML16342D854 (32) | |
See also: IR 05000275/1997016
Text
ENCLOSURE
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
Docket Nos.:
'icense
Nos.:
Report No.:
Licensee:
Facility:
Location:
Dates:
Inspector:
Approved By:
50-275
50-323
DPR-82
50-275/97-01 6
50-323/97-01 6
Pacific Gas and Electric Company
Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units
1 and 2
7 1/2 miles NW of Avila Beach
Avila Beach, California
August 31 through October 11, 1997
D. B. Allen, Resident Inspector
H. J. Wong, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch
E
Attachment:
Supplemental
Information
I
V7ataaOOCS
V7'SOSa
ADGCK 05000275
9
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units
1 and 2
NRC Inspection Report 50-275/97-016; 50-323/97-016
This inspection included aspects of licensee operations,
maintenance,
engineering
and
plant support.
The report covers
a 6-week period of resident inspection.
~Oerations
In general, operations were conducted
in a conscientious,
competent,
and
professional manner, with focus on safety and procedural compliance.
Operators
were knowledgeable
of plant conditions and activities, and responded
quickly and
properly to annunciators
(Section 01.1).
Observations
were made, which were indicative of a lack of attention to detail in log
keeping in the control room.
Operation logs in some instances lacked sufficient
information, did not document why an action was taken or the outcome of the
action, and clerical errors were found (Section 01.2).
Operators demonstrated
good performance
in the October 3 dedrease
in Unit 1
turbine load from 50 percent to 38 percen't to repair a steam leak.
The down power
was well coordinated, with continuous
and diligent monitoring of the plant
conditions, and timely response
to alarms and indications.
The shift foreman was
clearly in control of the evolution and constantly aware of plant conditions
(Section 01.3).
Operations was effective in maintaining appropriate configuration control of the six
emergency
diesel generators
and their subsystems
and supporting systems.
The
systems were correctly aligned and in compliance with the Updated Final Safety
Analysis Report (UFSAR), Technical Specifications
(TS), and applicable plant
procedures.
The material condition of the equipment was good with only a few
minor equipment problems, which were documented
in Action Requests
(AR)
(Section 02.1).
Quality assessments
of operations during the Unit
1 refueling were effective.
Improvements
in control room formality were noted and the continuing problems
with clearances
were documented.
Areas for improvements were identified,
including performance of risk assessments,
and operators understanding
of the
Maintenance
Rule.
These assessments
were consistent with the findings of the
NRC Maintenance
Rule inspection (Section 07.1).
-3-
Maintenance
Maintenance
personnel were effective in the performance of maintenance
activities.
Personnel
were knowledgeable
of the equipment,
procedure,
and tasks to be
performed, the work documents
and procedures
were in use at the work site, and
required clearance tags were hung (Section M1.1).
A special surveillance test was conducted
in a high quality manner.
Procedure
Surveillance Test Procedure
(STP) M-75, "4KV Vital Bus Undervoltage
Relay
Calibration," previously performed only during shutdown, was performed at power.
The management
briefing covered management's
expectations,
such as the need to
~
exercise caution and conservatism.
The procedure
had been thoroughly reviewed to
ensure the test had no unexpected
impact on the plant (Section M1.2) ~
The plant equipment was well maintained, with an appropriate focus on deficient
conditions.
Existing equipment problems were identified by AR tags and new
problems were reviewed daily and priorities set to ensure quick response to those
problems that could degrade
safety-related
equipment.
The priorities were generally
based on sound conservative judgement (Section M2.1) ~
Encnineering
The Engineering backlog continued to be a challenge for the licensee.
Although the
licensee's efforts had not reduced the number of open items as much as desired,
there was increased confidence that quality issues had been identified and a clearer
understanding
of the priority of the individual issues (Section E6.1).
Plant Su
ort
Radiation protection technicians provided high quality support to operations
personnel
"in performance of the venting of the emergency
core cooling
system
(ECCS). The radiation protection technicians were knowledgeable
of
radiological protective measures,
proficient in handling the vent bottle, hoses,
gloves, rags and waste water, and performed numerous radiation and contamination
surveys (Section R4.1).
0
Re ort Details
Summar
of Plant Status
Unit
1 began this inspection period at 100 percent power.
On October 3, the unit was
reduced to 38 percent power to repair a leaking flange on an extraction steam line to
moisture separator
Reheater
1-2B.
On October 5, th'e unit was returned to 100 percent
power and remained at 100 percent power for the remainder of the inspection period.
Unit 2 began this inspection period at 100 percent power.
On September
5, the unit was
reduced to 50 percent power to clean the circulating water intake flow path.
The unit was
returned to 100 percent power on September
10.
On September
12, the unit power was
reduced to 50 percent to remove Main Feedwater
Pump 2-1 from service to repair a pump
casing drain line. The unit was returned to 100 percent power on September
15 and
remained at 100 percent power for the remainder of the inspection period.
I. 0 erations
01
Conduct of Operations
01.1
General Comments
71707
Using Inspection Procedure 71707, the inspectors conducted frequent reviews of
ongoing plant operations.
In general, operations were conducted
in a conscientious,
competent,
and professional manner, with focus on safety and procedural
compliance.
Operators were knowledgeable
of plant conditions and aware of plant
activities that impacted their work station.
Operators responded
quickly and
properly to annunciators.
01.2
Review of 0 erations
Lo s
a.
Ins ection Sco
e 71707
The inspector reviewed Units
1 and 2 Shift Foreman's
Log, Control Operator's
Log,
and Nuclear Operator's
Log for compliance with Administrative Procedure
Operating
Procedure
(OP) 1.DC37, "Plant Logs," Revision 4B.
b.
Observations
and Findin s
Most logs reviewed contained at least the minimum information specified in
Procedure
OP1.DC37.
However, some entries were so brief as to not meet the
intent as described
in the scope section of the procedure.
The procedure stated
that the log should preserve the actions and events of the day and document what
was done, why it was done,-and the outcome of what was done.
For example, on
October 1, the TS 3.7.12 limit on inlet water temperature
was exceeded
and
both units entered the Action Statement,
which is to place a second vital
component
cooling viater heat exchanger
in service within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.
The actions of
placing the second train in service were delayed for over 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, in part due to
questions
related to chlorinatiori of the associated
auxiliary saltwater trains.
Neither
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Unit
1 nor Unit 2 Shift Foreman's
Logs, nor Unit
1 or Unit 2 Control Operator's logs
documented
the reason for the delay.
According to Procedure OP1.DC37, the control operator's
log should include
starting and stopping of plant equipment,
and the reason.
The reason was not
always clearly documented.
Several clerical errors, such as checking the incorrect
shift or entering an incomplete date, were identified to the licensee personnel
and
corrected.
c.
Conclusions
tn general, the togs contained the minimum information required by the licensee's
administrative procedure.
In many cases the logs did not document why an action
was taken nor the outcome of the action.
The clerical errors noted were indicative
of a tack of attention to detail in maintaining the plant logs.
01.3
Conduct of Unit 1 Load Chan
es For Steam Leak Re airs
a.
Ins ection Sco
e 71707
On October 3, the inspector observed control room activities dUring load reduction
from 50 percent to 38 percent and return to 50 percent to support repair of an
unisolable leak on an extraction steam line flange.
b.
Observations
and Findin s
Operators performed the load changes
in accordance
with Procedure
OP L-4,
"Normal Operations at Power," Revision 37.
The procedure provided the necessary
directions to perform the required activities.
An additional control operator was
assigned
to assist in the control room during this activity. This was espe=ially
useful to facilitate compliance with the licensee's policy of peer checking each
operation of a plant control.
The additional operator facilitated frequent operation of
the boration and dilution controls, in addition to operation of rod and turbine
controls.
The low value of moderator temperature
coefficient at this time in core life made
reactivity control during the resultant Xenon transient more difficultthan usual.
The
control operator was diligent in monitoring and controlling the reactor while
remaining in control of the load change activities.
The unloading of Main Feedwater
Pump
1-1 was well coordinated
and minimized the effects on the reactor
temperature
and steam generator levels.
The operators
had reviewed the steps in
the procedure,
discussed
the expected
response,
and planned the coordination of
their actions.
The shift foreman initiated each major evolution and was constantly
aware of plant conditions.
-3-
The operators'esponse
to alarms and annunciators
was timely and in accordance
with their annunciator response
procedures.
Communications with personnel
outside the control room was quickly initiated to ensure the necessary
actions were
taken to respond to each new alarm.
In general, the shift foreman and control
operators were well informed of activities in the plant and the effects of those
activities on the control room indications.
c ~
Conclusions
The conduct of ope'rations during the load change was well coordinated, with
continuous
and diligent monitoring of the plant conditions and timely response to
each alarm and indication.
The shift foreman was clearly in control of the unit and
always aware of plant conditions.
The control operator continuously monitored
plant parameters
and maintained those parameters
well within acceptable
limits.
02
Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment
02.1
Emer enc
Diesel Generator Walkdown
a,
Ins ection Sco
e 71707
The inspector performed
a walkdown of the six emergency
diesel generators to
verify proper system configuration and equipment condition to support operability.
Procedure
OP J-6B:I, " Diesel Generator
2-1 Make Available," Revision 12, was
reviewed for technical adequacy
and used during the walkdown.
Applicable
sections of the TS and UFSAR were used to assure consistency with plant design
and operation.
b.
Observations
and Findintis
The systerh was aligned in accordance
with operation procedures
and consistent
with the UFSAR and TS. The general condition of the equipment was acceptable,
with minor discrepancies
noted, such as minor lubricant leaks.
Relief
Valve DEG-2-RV-274 on the discharge
line of Air Dryer 2-38 for a starting air
compressor was noted to be missing
a lead seal.
This was identified to the
licensee, who promptly documented
the condition, evaluated it for impact on the
plant equipment,
and identified corrective actions.
The control switches in the control room and in the plant were properly aligned.
Local and remote indications were within acceptable
bands.
Subsystems,
such as
fuel oil, lubricating oil, starting and turbocharger
air, as well as AC and DC electrical
systems,
were also reviewed and found to be properly aligned.
Seated valves were
confirmed to have their seals intact.
Tank levels were verified within acceptable
ranges.
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c.
Conclusions
The six emergency
diesel generators
and their subsystems
and supporting systems
were correctly aligned and in compliance with the UFSAR, TS, and applicable plant
procedures.'he
material condition of the equipment was good with only a few
minor equipment problems, which were documented
in AR.
02.2
Walkdown of ECCS Valve Ali nment
a.
Ins ection Sco
e 71707
The inspector reviewed the position of the Unit 2 ECCS valves listed in Surveillance
Requirement
(SR) 4.5.2 and the status of power to the valves.
Surveillance
Procedure. STP l-1A, "Routine Shift Checks Required By Licenses," Revision 67,
was reviewed.
b.
Observations
and Findin s
The valve were found to be in their required positions as determined by control
room indications or local obser'vation.
The power to the valves was verified to be
removed either by the associated
480 volt supply breaker checkbd in the open
position, or for six valves, by their series contactor cutout switches verified to be in
the open position.
The shift surveillance procedure contained steps to verify the
position of the valves, the position of the associated
480 volt breakers and the
position of the cutout switches.
c.
Conclusions
'Those valves specified in SR 4.5.2.a were in their required position and power was
removed.
The shift surveillance procedure contained steps to meet the SR
requiremen't to verify these conditions at least every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
07
Quality Assurance
in Operations
07.1
Licensee Qualit
Assessment
of 0 erations Refuelin
Outa
e 1R8 Activities and in
Im lementation of the Maintenance
Rule
Ins ection Sco
e 71707
The inspector reviewed the licensee's self-assessment
of operations performance
during the Unit
1 eighth refueling Outage
1R8 and operations
role in implementing
the Maintenance
Rule, which were documented
in Nuclear Quality Services
(NQS)
Audit 970850023.
This audit was conducted
from April 1 to June 30, 1997.
-5-
b.
Observations
and Findin s
0 erations Refuelin
Outa
e 1R8 Activities
NQS assessment
of operations activities during Refueling Out'age
1R8 were focused
on conduct of operations
and command and control of operations.
The assessment
was performed by observing the conduct of operations
and comparing it to written
policy and procedure guidance.
Under conduct of operations,
NQS assessed
control room formality,
communications,
tailboards (preactivity briefings), self-verification, and peer
checking.
A notable improvement in control room atmosphere
(i.e., stress and
congestion)
was attributed to changes
implemented by operations
in control room
formality.
NQS assessed
procedural adherence
by operations, with particular interest in how
operators responded
to unexpected
situations or steps that could not be performed.
Overall, NQS found the procedures
to be adhered to and discrepancies
handled
appropriately.
NQS focused on clearance related errors due to previous problems in this area.
Despite efforts to enhance
the clearance
process,
clearance
related events remained
at a significantly high number.
0 erations
Role in lm lementin
the Maintenance
Rule
NQS assessed
operations activities related to 10CFR50.65,
"Requirements for
Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance
at Nuclear Power Plants."
NQS
evaluated
adequacy of procedures,
procedural compliance, operator knowledge of
the rule and their responsibilities,
and the training program.
NQS found operations to be complying with the regulatory requirements'of the
Maintenance
Rule.
They also identified the need for improvements
in the procedure
which specifies the requirements to perform a risk assessment
prior to removal from
service of risk significant equipment.
C.
Conclusions
NQS assessments
of operations during Refueling Outage
1R8 were effective.
Improvements
in control room formality were noted and the continuing problems
with clearances
were documented.
Observations of clearance
problems during
Refueling Outage
1R8 were previously documented
in NRC Inspection
Report 50-275;323/97-06.
Needed improvements were identified in the areas of
performing risk assessments
and operations
understanding
of the Maintenance
Rule.
Operations response
to the audit includes continued training of operators
on the
Maintenance
Rule and revision to the administrative procedure to clarify the
-6-
requirements
for performing risk assessments
prior to removing structures, systems,
or components
from service. The licensee's
assessment
is consistent with the
findings of Maintenance
Rule inspection documented
in NRC Inspection
Report 50-275;323/97-04.
II. Maintenance
M1
Conduct of Maintenance
M1.1
Maintenance
Observations
a.
lns ection Sco
e 62707
The inspectors observed
all or portions of the following work activities:
Sample Turbine Bearing and Governor Oil, Auxiliary Feedwater
(AFW)
Pump 1-1, Work Order (WO) R00172202
Unit 2 Control Room Ventilation, Bus H, Preventative
Maintenance
on various
fans, and associated
components
Verify Benchset/Calibration
of PCV-22/PO-546, WO C0154576
Maintenance
Procedure E-50.33A, Westinghouse
Type SSV-T Relay
Maintenance,
on Second
Level Undervoltage
Relay 27HGB3, WO R0158503
b.
Observations
and Findin s
Maintenance
personnel were knowledgeable
of the equipment,
procedure,
and tasks
to be performed.
The work documents
and applicable procedures
were at the work
site, and were used and signed as the work progressed.
Clearance tags were hung
to protect the equipment and personnel.
The calibration and benchset
of PCV-22 were performed per Appendix 10.1 of
STP l-4-PCV22, "10 Percent Steam Dump Valve PCV-22 Calibration," Revision 3A.
The required caution tags and Man-On-Line tags were hung, the test equipment was
within calibration interval, the procedure
steps were signed as they were performed,
and the as-left data was within procedural desired values.
Operations performed
postmaintenance
test per STP V-3R1, "Exercising 10 Percent Atmospheric Dump
Valves PCV-19, 20, 21, 22."
The inspections
and maintenance
of the second
level undervoltage
relays were
performed in a n>eticulous manner with close attention to the details.
The test
requirements
were well understood
by the technicians
and carefully observed.
I
4
-7-
c.
Conclusions
The maintenance
activities were performed in accordance
with the procedural
requirements.
The personnel
performing the activity were knowledgeable
of the
equipment,
procedures,
tools, and methods used.
The results of the maintenance
appeared
to be effective in ensuring the components
willfunction as designed.
M1.2 Surveillance Observations
a.
Ins ection Sco
e 61726
Selected surveillance tests required to be performed by the TS were reviewed on a
sampling basis to verify that:
(1) the surveillance tests were correctly included on
the facility schedule;
(2) a technically adequate
procedure existed for the
performance of the surveillance tests; (3) the surveillance tests had been performed
at a frequency specified in the TS; and (4) test results satisfied acceptance
criteria
or were properly dispositioned.
The inspectors observed
all or portions of the following surveillances:
STP M-89
ECCS System Venting, Revision 23 "
STP V-3R1
Exercising 10 Percent Atmospheric Dump
Valves PCV-19, 20, 21, 22, Revision 14
STP P-AFW-11
Routine Surveillance Test of Turbine-Driven AFW
Pump 1-1, Revision 4
STP R-3D
STP M-75
Routine Monthly Flux Map, Revision 16
4KV Vital Bus Undervoltage
Relay Calibration,
Revision 18
b.
Observations
and Findin s
Prior to the performance of STP M-89, "ECCS System Venting," operations
performed
a briefing in the control room.
The briefing was thorough, covering'the
scope, responsibilities, interface with radiation protection and control room operator,
precautions
and limitations, as well as the significant procedural steps.
The
operator performed the venting per the procedure,
signing the steps as they were
completed.
The operator used good work practices to prevent spilling of water, to
contain potential contamination,
and to carefully remove and reinstall the pipe caps
to protect the pipe threads.
The venting was successful with little air found.
Procedure
STP V-3R1 was appropriately used as postmaintenance
test for
10 percent dump Valve PCV-22.
The procedure satisfied the TS requirements to
-8-
demonstrate
operability and complied with the Inservice Test Program, Second
10-Year Interval requirements
for stroke timing. The operators performing the test
were knowledgeable
of '.he equipment operation and procedural requirements.
The
operators
used peer checking and three-way communications.
The operators
properly documented
the test results, showing that the valve stroke times met the
TS requirement
and were within the procedure's
ACTION values.
Procedure
STP P-AFW-11 was performed to satisfy the quarterly testing
requirements of TS and the Inservice Test Program.
Operators performing the test
were knowledgeable
and signed the procedure
steps
as they were completed.
The
system engineer was present and assisted.
A small leak was identified in a
coupling in the cooling water line to the turbine bearing.
Maintenance
personnel
tightened the coupling, reducing the leak to
1 drop every 2 minutes, and installed a
catch bag to direct the teakoff to a drain.
An AR was written to repair the coupling
at a later time. The test instruments were within their calibration frequency.
The
test results satisfied the TS and procedural requirements.
Procedure
PEP R-3A, "Use of Flux Mapping Equipment," Revision OA, was
performed by Reactor Engineering to obtain a Unit 2 full core flux map to satisfy the
monthly SR.
The engineers
had identified det'ector drives and paths, which had
previously been difficultto access,
and confirmed that no new f)roblems with drives
were identified.
Procedure
STP M-75, "4KV Vital Bus Undervoltage
Relay Calibration,"
had
previously been performed only during outages.
Its performance at power was
treated as special test in accordance
with AD13.ID1, "Conduct of Plant and
Equipment Tests."
This required
a pretest briefing by management
and Section
Director oversight.
The briefing contained the required information including
management's
expectations,
such as the need to exercise caution and conservatism
during the test.
The test procedure
had been thoroughly reviewed to ensure it
could be performed at power.
The test procedure contained
an attachment to track
the TS actions entered
and exited during the test.
This was beneficial to
operations,
as the test required numerous entries into several TS actions.
One first
level undervoltage
relay was found out of tolerance
and was replaced.
The testing
progressed
well with no unexpected
impact on the plant.
Conclusions
The inspectors found that the surveillances
observed
were being scheduled
and
performed at the required frequency.
The procedures
governing the surveillance
tests were technically adequate
and personnel performing the surveillance
demonstrated
an adequate
level of knowledge.
The inspectors
noted that test
results appeared
to have been appropriately dispositioned.
-9-
M2
Maintenance and Material Condition of Facilities and Equipment
M2.1
Plant Material Condition
During routine plant tours, the inspector noted plant equipment to be well
maintained, with minor equipment problems such as minor lubricant leaks to be
identified with a corrective maintenance
AR tag.
Specific equipment inspected,
at
least in part, included emergency
diesel generators,
480 volt vital switchgear,
4160 volt vital switchgear, AFW pumps and associated
valves, ECCS valves
identified in TS 4.5.2, and control room ventilation equipment.
Corrective maintenance
ARs were reviewed in daily meetings where priorities were
set to ensure quick response
to those problems that could degrade safety-related
equipment or equipment needed for continued electrical generation.
The priorities
were generally based
on sound conservative judgement, considering both impact of
removing equipment from service and potential for deteriorating condition.
M8
MIscellaneous IVfaintenance Issues (92902)
M8.1
Closed
Unresolved Item
URI 50-275 323 97012-01:
failure to review and
evaluate previous battery operated
light (BOL) failures as maintenance
preventable
functional failures (MPFF).
The BOLs were included in the licensee's
Maintenance
Rule program in February.
Three BOL failures, which occurred in May 1995, March
1996, and January
1997, were documented
on ARs, but the ARs did not include an
evaluation of the failures as MPFFs.
The failure to include the BOLs in the scope of
the Maintenance
Rule from July 10, 1996, until February 1997 has been addressed
in a separate
Mairitenance Rule NRC Inspection Report (50-275;323/97-04).
The BOL system engineer had been reviewing and trending the results of the
maintenance
and surveillance tests on this system to identify performance problems
that may r'esult from service life, maintenance
performance,
or BOL environment.
Upon review of the type and number of equipment problems and the system
engineer's
monitoring of the system performance,
the inspector concluded that the
system engineer,had
reviewed the previous failures and had concluded that the
failures were not maintenance
preventable.
The licensee had demonstrated
effective control through maintenance
such that the BOLs would perform their
intended function and placing the system under (a)(2) of the Maintenance
Rule was
appropriate.
Based upon this analysis, this URI is closed.
-10-
III. En ineerin
E6
Engineering Organization and Administration
E6.1
Workload Mana ement
a.
Ins ection Sco
e
37551
The inspector reviewed status reports depicting Nuclear Technical Services'NTS)
backlog of engineering
assigned
ARs and Action Evaluations
(AE).
b.
Observations
and Findin
s
The licensee trended the NTS AR and AE workload.
As of September
22, 1997,
approximately 5000 open AR and AE items were assigned to NTS. This was
approximately four percent more items than in August.
Efforts to reduce the
backlog have had limited success
in reducing total open items.
The licensee
reviewed the ARs and AEs in the backlog to verify the correct identification and
coding of quality issues.
Since quality issues receive quicker attention, this review
was performed to ensure the backlog did not contain misidentified quality issues.
The number of open quality issues have remained
a small percerltage of the total
open workload, and the number of overdue quality issues have remained small.
The ARs and AEs in the backlog were also prioritized for importance (required
verses discretionary items) and the distribution in each priority trended.
A large
number of items were considered discretionary and the licensee initiated an effort to
review and work off this burden.
This effort resulted in many items being more
correctly identified as higher priority.
The items in the backlog were also reviewed for assignment
of due dates consistent
with each item's importance.
Additional effort by NTS has resulted in a significant
reduction in overdue work, dropping from 40 percent of AR/AE in overdue status in
March to 6 percent overdue status in September.
C.
Conclusions
The NTS backlog of ARs and AEs continued to be a challenge for the licensee.
Although the licensee's efforts had not reduced the number of open NTS'Rs and
AEs as much as desired, they had resulted
in increased confidence that quality
issues
had been identified and a clearer understanding
of the priority of
the'ndividual
issues.
The reduction in overdue items and the small number of overdue
quality issues indicated
a better focus of the work effort.
-11-
IV. Plant Su
ort
R4
Staff Knowledge and Performance
in Radiological Protection
Ec Chemistry
Ins ection Sco
e 71750
The inspector observed
Radiological Protection technicians supporting
an operator
during the ECCS venting.
b.
Observations
and Findin s
The radiation protection technicians provided high quality support, in addition to
performing numerous radiation and contamination surveys.
The results of the
surveys were documented
by the technicians.
The technicians assisting with the
handling of the vent hose and bottle and the disposal of the waste water, and in
general, assuring good radiological measures
were taken to contain the potential
contamination.
The technicians assisted with clean gloves each time the operator
changed activities from a contaminated
component to a clean component,
c. Conclusions
The technicians were knowledgeable
of the necessary
radiological protective
measures
and proficient in handling the potentially contaminated
material, including
the vent bottle and hoses, gloves, rags, and waste water.
V. Mana ement IVleetln s
X1
Exit Meeting Summary
The inspector presented
the inspection results to members of licensee management
at the
conclusion of the inspection on October 10, 1997.
In the meeting the licensee
acknowledged
the findings presented.
The inspector asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection
should be considered
proprietary.
No proprietary information was identified.
0
ATTACHMENT
PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
Licensee
D. R. Adams, Supervisor,
Nuclear Quality Services
R. Cheney,
Engineer,
Nuclear Quality Services
W. G. Crockett, Manager, Nuclear Quality Services
T. L. Grebel, Director, Regulatory Services
B. C. Hinds, Director, Scheduling
and Outage Planning
S. C. Ketelsen, Supervisor,
Regulatory Services
T. King, Director, Technical Maintenance
D. B. Miklush, Manager, Engineering
Services
R. P. Powers, Vice President
and Plant Manager
D. A. Taggart, Director, Nuclear Quality Services,
Engineering
and Procedures
INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED
IP 37551: Onsite Engineering
IP 61726: Surveillance Observations
IP 62707: Maintenance
Observations
IP 71707: Plant Operations
IP 71750: Plant Support
IP 92902: Followup - Maintenance
ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Closed
50-275;323/97012-01
Failure to review previous BOL equipment failure for
MPFF is an unresolved
item pending
NRC review
P
-2-
LIST OF ACRONYMS USED
AE
BOL
IFI
LER
NTS
NQS
OP
SR
TS
1R8
action evaluation
action request
battery operated light
inspection followup item
Licensee Event Report
Maintenance
Procedure
maintenance
preventable functional failure
Nuclear Technical Services
Nuclear Quality Services
operating procedure
Public Document Room
surveillance requirement
surveillance test procedure
Technical Specification
Updated
Final Safety Analysis Report
unresolved
item
work order
Unit
1 eighth refueling
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