ML16342C274

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Forwards Insp & LER Data for Use in Preparing SALP Performance Analyses for Period 900101-910630.Informs That Tables Subj to Review & Comment Until SALP Process Completed
ML16342C274
Person / Time
Site: Diablo Canyon  Pacific Gas & Electric icon.png
Issue date: 07/05/1991
From: Morrill P
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
To: Jordan E, Perkins K, Scarano R
NRC OFFICE FOR ANALYSIS & EVALUATION OF OPERATIONAL DATA (AEOD), NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
References
NUDOCS 9107170014
Download: ML16342C274 (32)


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  • y4 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION V 1450 MARIALANE,SUITE 210 WALNUTCREEK, CALIFORNIA94596 JUL 5 -

1991

.Docket Nos.

50-275 and 50-323 Report No. 91-19 MEMORANDUM FOR: '.

K.

R.

J.

H.

R.

D.

W.

F.

L.

R.

S.

J.

G.

p.

,K.

B.

G.

M.

D.

Jordan, AEOD
Perkins, RV
Scarano, RV
Dyer, NRR/PD5
Rood, NRR/PD5 ZiIIIIerman, RV
Kirsch, RV McNulty, OI Wenslawski, RV Mi1 1 er,. RV Hu'ey, RY
Richards, RV
Reese, RV
Yuhas, RV
Narbut, RV
Johnston, RV
Olson, RV
Good, RY Cillis, RV
Shaefer, RY FROM:

SUBJECT:

P. J. Morrill, Chief Reactor ProjectsSection I

FORWARDING OF INSPECTION AND LER DATA FOR DIABLO CANYON SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT, OF LICENSEE PERFORMANCE JANUARY 1, 1990 THRU JUNE 30, 1991 Pursuant to R.

P. 2iIImerman's memorandum dated June 20, 1991, the following data tables are provided for your use in preparing performance analyses for the subject SALP.

Table 1:

Inspection Activities and Enforcement Summary Table 2:

Enforcement Items Table 3:

Synopsis of Licensee Event Reports Table 4:

Listing of Licensee Event Reports Inspection results and LERs occurring during approximately the last month of the SALP period may not be included in the enclosed tables.

Also, at the time of this memorandum, the total number of inspection hours were not available.

An update of the tables, inc)vding pertinent data through the end of the SALP period wUl be issued to the Board members prior to the SALP Board meeting.

9107170014 910705 PDR aDDeI< 0500027s 0

PDR

JUL 5 -;99I The tables are subject to review and comment until the SALP process is completed.

Comments should be given to B. Olson.

"The tables are =for information and will not be included in the SALP report.

Enclosures:

As Stated P. J. Morrill Chief Reactor ProjectsSection I cc w/o enclosures:

J. Martin, RV B. Faulkenberry, RV

RV/jk UEST C

PY R

ST COPY YES /

NO YES /

NO

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NORRILL AH 7/g /91 7/ L /91 C

DCS/PDR J YES /

NO

]

TABLE 1 INSPECTION ACTIVITIES AND ENFORCEMENT

SUMMARY

DIABLO CANYON UNIT 1 (01/01/90 - 06/30/91) unctional Area Inspection Percent Severity Level H'ours of Effort I II III ~V V.

Dev NDV

1. Plant Operations.
2. Radiological Controls
3. Maintenance/

Surveillance 1298 201 790 1

1

4. Emergency Preparedness
5. Security
6. Engineering/

Technical Support 196 183 790 1

2

7. Safety Assessment/

884 Quality Assurance TOTALS:

1 11 1

8

TABLE 1 INSPECTION ACTIVITIES AND ENFORCEMENT

SUMMARY

DIABLO CANYON UNIT 2 (01/01/90 06/30/91) u t'onal Area

1. Plant Operations
2. Radiological Controls
3. Maintenance/

Surveillance

4. Emergency Preparedness
5. Security
6. Engineering/

Technical Support Inspection pours 1010 156 636 142 53 472 Percent.

Severity Level of Effort I ~I ~II ~V V Dev NCV

7. Safety Assessment/

713 Quality Assurance TOTALS:

1 1

1 1

TABLE 2 DIABLO CANYON UNIT 1 ENFORCEMENT ITEMS (01/01/90 06/30/91)

Inspection e ort o.

~Sub 'ect Severity Functional Qevel

~rea 89-33 Lack of administrative controls to ensure operability of the positive displacement pump.

Battery instruments were found to be out-of-calibration N

90-01 Licensee administrative procedures and tech.

specs.

not followed while performing ECCS check valve tests on four occasions.

Poor cleanliness in fire hazard

areas, damaged cable tray fire
barrier, and missing fire stop material.

90-02 Operations department was not given sufficient time to review a proposed design change A safety system functional audit and review identified inadequate vital area barriers.

N A security officer was involved in actions which caused his/her compensatory actions to not remain in effect.

N Individuals gained access to vital areas without proper authorization, entries into vital areas were not properly recorded, and the licensee failed to protect safeguards information.

Licensee failed to respond to an alarmed vital area door on multiple occasions.

N Individual entered a protected area without being searched.

N

TABLE 2 Diablo Can on Inspection e

t o.

Un't 1 Enforcement Items

~ub 'ct Severity Functional

>e~v'L

~re a 90-02 Licensee failed to reactivate a

vital area door alarm upon completion of tests.

N 90-05 90-14 90-16 90-17 Licensee general construction personnel inadvertently uncovered and gauged buried Aux. Saltwater system piping and failed to initiate an Action Request.

Sealed radioactive material container was not tested for leakage or contamination.

Limitorque maintenance updates not forwarded to the supervisor as required.

Quality evaluation not performed for spring pack deficiencies in Limitorque actuators.

Licensee failed to respond to a vital area door alarm.

N Licensee failed to properly handle security safeguards information.

N 90-30 91-03 Magnetic strip chart recorders out of service or unreliable since 1987', resulting in the inability to compare event vibration signatures to previously recorded values.

Security watchperson inattentive'to his duties in that he was reclining in his chair with his eyes closed, and failed to notice an NRC inspector standing within three feet of the watchperson.

TABLE 2 iablo Can on Unit Enforcement Items

.Inspection

~Sub 'ct Severity Functional Qevel

~rea 91-04 Failure to identify a breakdown in the program for control of measuring and test equipment and failure to promptly correct this breakdown 91-09 Maintenance procedures did not provide sufficient instructions to preclude crane operation in close proximity of the main transformers

TABLE 2 DIABLO CANYON UNIT 2 NPORCEMENT ITEMS (01/01/90 - 06/30/91)

Inspection

!L'll'

"'9-34

~cb'ect Scaffolding was attached to the vital battery supports without a seismic evaluation Severity Hrrkiaal

~vel korea 90-08 90-11 90-13 90-13 Door between the auxiliary building and, the Fuel Handling Building held open by a hose passing through the door, thus preventing the building ventilation system from attaining a negative. pressure.

During an initial examination of pressurizer welds, the latest examination data sheets were not used, resulting in the surface temperatures not being recorded.

Inadequate instructions for the replacement of the turbine-driven, auxiliary feedwater pump speed governor resulting in turbine overspeed.

Maintenance for the replacement of the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump speed governor was not performed in accordance with the work order N

3 90-30 Warning signs not placed on the Fuel Handling Building doors.

D

TABLE 3 SYSNOPSIS OF LICENSEE EVENT REPORTS (LERs)

DIABLO CANYON UNIT 1 (01/01/90 06/30/91) unctional Area SALP Cause Code*

Q C

Q E

Totals

1. Plant Operations
2. Radiological Controls
3. Haintenance/

Surveillance 4.

Emergency Preparedness

5. Security
6. Engineering/

Technical Support

7. Safety Assessment/

guality Assurance TOTALS:

3 1

2 1

1 3

2 1

2 10

  • Functional Areas 1 - Plant Operations 2 - Radiological controls 3 - Haintenance/Surveillance 4 - Emergency Preparedness 5 - Security 6 Engineering/Technical Support 7 - Safety Assessment/guality Verification Cause Codes A - Personnel Errors 8 - Design, Hanufacturing, or Installation C - External Cause D - Defective Procedures E - Component Failure X - Other

A TABLE 3 SYSNOPSIS OF LICENSEE EVENT REPORTS (LERs)

DIABLO CANYON UNIT 2 (01/01/90 06/30/91) unctional Area

1. Plant Operations
2. Radiological Controls
3. Maintenance/

Surveillance

4. Emergency Preparedness
5. Security P
6. Engineering/

Technical Support

7. Safety Assessment/

guality Assurance TOTALS:

~EAPC Cd R

G 9

X 1

1 otals Functional Areas 1 - Plant Operations 2 Radiological controls 3 - Maintenance/Surveillance 4 Emergency Preparedness 5 - Security 6 - Engineering/Technical Support 7 - Safety Assessment/guality Verification Cause Codes A Personnel Errors B - Design, Manufacturing, or Installation C - External Cause 0 Defective Procedures E - Component Failure X Other

TABLE 4 IABLO CANYON UNIT 1 LICENSEE EVENT REPORTS (01/01/90 - 06/30/91)

LER e ort No.

~ub 'ect Functional Cause

~rea Code 83-37 83-38 84-42 84-43 84-44 84-45 Low temperature over pressure protection circuitry improperly separated.

Control room chlorine detection system not fully operable.

Containment isolation valves not sealed closed due to misinterpretation of Tech.

Specs.

Unanalyzed condition of containment spray piping due to procedural inadequacies.

Check valve backflow inservice testing deficiencies due to personnel error.

Violation of containment fan cooler unit Tech.

Spec.

due to personnel error.

6 A

A, D

89-15 89-16 89-17 89-19 P-14 turbine trip engineered safety features signal during restart testing.

Auxiliary feedwater instrumentation inoperable due to missing seismic retaining clips.

Personnel worked overtime in excess of Tech.

Spec.

requirements Fuel handling building ventilation system inoperable during fuel

movement, from an unknown cause.

D D

90-01 90-02 Missed surveillance on heat tracing due to personnel error and training.

Manual reactor trip due to main feedwater pumps tripping from an unknown cause.

TABLE 4 DIABLO CANYON UNIT 1 LERs LER e ort o.

~ub'ect Functional Cause

, ~rea Code 90-03 Control room ESF actuation on high radiation alarm due to inadequate procedures.

D 90-04 90-05 90-06 90-07 90-10 90-12 Tech.

specs.

3.0.3 entry due to personnel error.

Load injection false relay operation resulting in reactor trip on high positive rate.

Inoperable reactor protection system channel was not placed in tripped condition.

Missed surveillance of sealed sources due to personnel error.

Control room habitability design basis potentially exceeded due to leakage from CVCS pipe crack.

Missed axial flux difference due to a computer problem from an unknown cause.

D E

90-13 90-14 Missed reactor coolant sampling due to personnel error.

Reactor trip due to turbine trip from failed cooling water flow switch.

90-15 90-17 ESF actuation P-14 (high-high SG level) due to feedwater regulating and bypass valves leaking.

Reactor trip resulting from a failed-open pressurizer spray

valve, due to incorrect screw installation.

90-18 Fire damper cardox actuation fusible link assembly incorrectly installed.

LER e ort No.

TABLE 4 DIABLO CANYON UNIT 1 LERs

~Sub 'ct Functional Cause

~rea Code 90-19 Actuation of containment ventilation isolation due to personnel error.

91-01 91-02 91-03 91-04 Tech.

Spec.

3.0.3 entry when both RHR pumps were inadvertently de-energized.

Reactor trip on SG low level with steam flow/feed flow mismatch, due to personnel error.

Loss of RHR flow while fillingthe refueling cavity, due to an inadequate shift turnover.

Event report was made late.

Loss of offsite power during refueling due to a crane being in close proximity to a high voltage power line, causing an electrical fault.

91-05 Inadvertent diesel generator start due to the actuation of an incorrect test switch.

91-06 Containment ventilation isolation while in Mode 5, due to a spurious high radiation alarm caused by a motor failure.

91-07 Turbine trip resulting in a reactor 1

trip, due to a feedwater pump speed controller failure.

E 91-08 91-09 91-10 Manual reactor trip after a rod control power supply fuse failed.

Reactor trip due to personnel

error, and safety injection due to leaking steam dump valves.

Lack of procedural control to maintain seismic qualification of the EST.

Voluntary

TABLE 4 IABLO CAMION UNIT 2 ICENSEE EVENT REPORTS LER e ort No.

~ub'ect (01/01/90 06/30/91)

Functional Cause

~rea Code 88-27 I

89-11 Failure to meet Tech.

Spec.

3.7.9.4, due to the failure of two dampers to close and the late issuance of a report Temperature verification of boron injection tank not performed in accordance with Tech.

Spec.

89-12 Containment ventilation system isolation due to actuation of plant vent. radiation monitor.

D 90-01 90-02 Fuel Handling Building ventilation shift to iodine mode due to inadequate work package preparation for a design change.

Fuel Handling Building ventilation system inoperable during fuel movement due to blocked doors.

90-03 Control room and Fuel Handling Building ventilation systems transfer due to an electrical transient.

90-04 90-05 90-06 90-07 Containment vent isolation and Fuel 3

Handling Building ventilation system shift due to an error during troubleshooting.

Main steam bypass valves closure due to air in the flow transmitter reference leg.

Steam flow transmitter inoperable due to the sensing lines being corrected incorrectly.

ESF actuation P-14 (high-high SG level) due to an unanticipated SG level swell at low power level.

D

TABLE 4 DIABLO CANYON UNT.T 2 LERs

~Sub 'ct Functional Cause

~ea Code Degradation of RHR system valves due to improper woodruff key material.

Voluntary Inoperable room temperature monitor 3

due to personnel error.

Inoperable wide range containment reactor cavity sump level channels due to an unknown cause.

X