ML16341E685
| ML16341E685 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 05/26/1988 |
| From: | Burdoin J, Mendonca M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML16341E684 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-275-88-13, 50-323-88-12, GL-88-03, GL-88-3, IEB-85-001, IEB-85-1, IEB-88-003, IEB-88-3, NUDOCS 8806100139 | |
| Download: ML16341E685 (12) | |
See also: IR 05000275/1988013
Text
U. S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION
V
Report Nos. 50-275/88-13,
50-323/88-12
Docket Nos. 50-275,
50-323
License
Nos.
Licensee:
Pacific
Gas
and Electric Company
77 Beale Street
Room
1451
San Francisco,
94106
Facility Name: Diablo Canyon Units
1 and
2
Inspection at: Diablo Canyon Site,
San Luis Obispo County, California
Inspection
Condu
ed:
y 9
,
19
Inspectors:
.
F.
B rd in, Reactor Inspector
Approved by:
N. N. Nendonca,
Chief
Reactor Project Section
1
Date Signed
~-/w g
/s'8'ate
Signed
~Summar:
Ins ection Durin
Period of Na
9-13,
1988
Re ort Nos. 50-275/88-13
an
- 2
8-
Areas
Ins ected:
An announced
inspection
by .one regional
inspector of
various vita
areas
and equipment in the plant, licensed operator training,
spurious
CVIs, and follow-up of open items
and bulletins/generic letters.
Inspection
Procedures
Nos.
71707,
41701,
90712,
92701,
92703,
61726
and 30703
were used
as guidance for the inspection.
Results:
No violations or deviations
were identified..
The licensed operator
tra>
>
gnpnrogram
was weil planned,
documented
and acceptably
implemented.
The
licensee's
short term and .long term programs
to correct spurious
Containment
Ventilation Isolations
(CVIs) were adequate.
SS06100139
SS0526
PDh
ADOCK 05000275
9
D'
DETAILS
1.
Individual s Contacted
Pacific
Gas
and Electric
Com an
(PGSE)
.
- J
D
J. A.
- W. M.
. T. A.
S.
R.
- T. L.
S.
W.
S.
D.
J.
N.
P.
W.
D.
D.
R.
C.
M. T.
J.
E.
J.
M.
W. J.
J.
R.
L. R.
Townsend,
Plant Manager
Sexton,
Plant Superintendent
McLane, Acting Assistant Plant Manager,
Technical
Support
Bennett, Assistant Naintenance
Manager
Fridley, Senior Operating Supervisor
Grebel,
Regulatory Compliance Supervisor
Hamilton,
Power Production Engineer
Wilson, Regulatory Compliance
Engineer
Neill, Document Control, Super visor
Provence,
Records Analyst
Malone, Regulatory Compliance
Engineer
Senior
Power Production
Engineer
Hug, Regulatory Compliance Engineer
Molden, Operator Training Supervisor
Becerra,
Senior Training Instructor, Operations
Kelly, Regulatory Compliance
Engineer
Hinds, Regulatory Compliance Engineer
Exner, Training Administrative Supervisor
Various other engineering
and quality control personnel.
- Denotes attendees
at exit meeting
on May 13, 1988.
2.
Area Ins ection
71707)
An independent
inspection
was conducted
in Units
1 and
2 Turbine and
Auxiliary Buildings.
The inspection
examined
areas
and equipment for
debris, potential
hazards, oil and water leakage,
and equipment
condition, e.g., oil level, valve position,
and electrical
connection
configuration
and cleanliness.
The equipment
and areas
inspected
included:
A.
Five Emergency
Diesel
Generator
Rooms.
B.
Six 4160 Volt Switchgear
Rooms.
C.
Combined Two-unit Control
Room.
D.
Pumps (Unit 2).
E.
Three Charging
Pumps (Unit 2).
F.
Four Safety Injection Pumps.
G.
Four Residual
Heat Removal
Pumps
H.
Five Component Cooling Water Pumps.
. I.
Pumps.
J.
Six Emergency Battery Rooms.
K.
L.
N.
N.
0.
p.
Six 480 Volt Vital Bus
Rooms
Two Cable Spreading
Rooms.
Two Hot Shutdown
Panel
Areas.
Two 480 Volt Load Center Areas.
Turbine Building at Elevations 85'nd
140'W/GE
Areas Units
1 and
2 at Elevations 100'nd
85'Unit
2 only)
Housekeeping
and equipment status
appeared
to be acceptable.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
3.
Licensed
0 erator Trainin
41701
This is
a continuation of inspection in the area of licensed operator
training first reported in Inspection
Report Nos. 50-275/88-06
and
50-323/88-06.
The inspector
examined recent performance
evaluations
and documentation
of requalification training for six licensed operators
selected
as the
inspection
sample.
1)
The simulator performance
evaluations
examined
appeared
to be
thorough,
comprehensive
and included evaluation
in how well the
trainee
understood
the subject/system
of concern,
alertness
to react
to simulated plant conditions,
thoroughness
in correcting simulated
abnormal
conditions.
The trainee
was also evaluated for his ability
to function as
a team in correcting simulated
abnormal
plant
accident conditions.
2)
The requalification program is scheduled
over
a period of one year.
The
1986 program which extended
well into 1987 year was made-up of
seven six week sections.
Each section
covers
a particular series of
courses
such as:
Industry events,
procedure(s)
revisions, licensing
event reports,
fundamentals,
plant systems,
general
employee
training, simulator operations,
design
change notices, etc.
The
operators
are rotated every five weeks to spend
one week in
requalification training.
Periodic written examinations
are
required in this training program.
The inspector also reviewed the process
that
a trainee
who fails an
examination
must follow in order to take
a makeup examination.
The
training instructor(s) identifies for the trainee,
areas of weakness
where additional self study is required of the trainee before
a
makeup examination will be administered.
A makeup examination is
required to be taken
and
passed within twelve weeks following the
failed examination.
It is concluded that the licensed operator training met and satisfied
the
requirements
of Section
13 of the
FSAR. It is further concluded that the
licensee's
licensed operator training program is well planned,
documented
and acceptably
implemented.
This item is closed.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
~
'
S urious Containment Ventilation Isolations
90712
Spurious
containment ventilation isolations
(CVIs) have
been
an ongoing
problem in both units since the plants first went operational.
The
causes
of the CVIs have
been identified as voltage spikes that have
occurred
on both the power circuits to the containment vent-radiation
monitors
and the signal circuits from the detectors.
Some of these
voltage spikes
are switching generated
spikes.
Short term corrective measures
to reduce
the CVIs have
been to replace
the C-14,
1 microfarad capacitor with a ten microfarad capacitor in the
input circuit of the rate meter of the radiation monitors.
This
modification was performed under
DCN, DC2-OJ-40119 in Monitors RE-ll, 12,
14A, 14B,
28A 28B for Unit 2 during the first refueling outage in the
summer of 1987.
The modification did reduce
the number of spurious
containment ventilation isolations for Unit 2 that were initiated from
voltage spikes
on the signal circuits.
The
same modification is being performed
under
DCN, DC1-0J-39119,
on Unit
1 containment ventilation radiation monitoring system during the present
(second)
refueling outage.
It is expected that
a similar reduction of
spurious
containment ventilation isolations will result from this
modification.
The licensee is continuing to review and evaluate different techniques
for reducing/eliminating voltage spikes
on the power circuits of the
radiation monitoring system.
The licensee's
long term corrective
program for this problem is to
purchase
and install
a new containment ventilation radiation monitoring
system.
This corrective action has
been initiated; and to date the
specifications for the
new system
have
been developed
and written.
The
next step is to go out for competitive bid.
This corrective
program
has
a five year period associated
with it, so completion of the program is
expected
during the early nineteen nineties.
Based-on this review the
following LERs which reported
spurious
CVIs for Unit 1 are closed:
88-05-LO and 88-10-LO.
Based
on an in-office review, the following LERs were closed
out by the
project inspector during this inspection; 87-05-Ll (Unit 2) and 87-15-L1
(Unit 2).
.The
LERs were reviewed for event description,
root cause,
corrective actions
taken,
generic applicability and timeliness of
reporting.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
Closed
50-275/87-01-02,
Control Of U -to-Date Vendor Manuals
92701
Follow up of this item showed that phase
one of the updating of vendors
manuals
program (vendor manual
review program)
scheduled for completion
by June
1,
1988 was
on. schedule.
Phase
One consists
of an integrity
check of current information for approximately eighty vendors
manuals,
selected
by plant personnel.
Those manuals
were given top priority for
~
'
updating
because
of the importance of this equipment to plant safety
and
operations.
Phase
Two of vendor manual
review program initiated during February
1988
consisted of an evaluation
by the various engineering disciplines of
Nuclear Engineering
and Construction Services
to ensure vendors'anuals
for all Class
I (safety related)
equipment will be identified and
made
available to Diablo Canyon
Power Plant
Document Control.
The scheduled
target date for identifying all the vendors
manuals
was the middle of
Hay.
A review of the present
status of this phase of the vendor manual
review program
has revealed that
Phase
Two was
on schedule.
Phase
Three of the vendor manual
review program
was in the stage of being
developed
and implemented.
Part of this phase
as
proposed
was to
continue the level of review being conducted
on Phase
One material
through
Phase
Two (safety related) materials
on an acceptable
schedule.
This phase of the program also proposed
a system to ensure that complete,
accurate,
and current vendor materials
are maintained
and available for
all plant equipment
and components.
The inspector
concluded after examining the licensee's
program for
control of up-to-date
vendor manuals that the licensee's
actions
were
sufficient. This item is closed.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
6.
Follow-u
of Bulletin(s
and Generic Letters(s
(92703
A.
Closed)
50-275/323
NRC Bulletin 88-03 "Inade uate Latch
En
a ement
ln
~om an
e
atc
sn
e
a
s
anu acture
enera
ectric
This Bulletin requested
licensees'o
perform inspections
to ensure
that all
GE latching-type
HFA relays installed in Class
1E
applications
have adequate
latch engagement,
and that those relays
which failed to meet acceptance
criteria be repaired or replaced.
The licensee's
letter (DCL-88-098) of April 21,
1988 stated that the
HFA type latching relays
noted in the Bulletin were not used in
Class
1E applications at Diablo Canyon Units
1 and 2.
The inspector
examined
the latest version of the licensee's
"Equipment Restricted
From Nuclear Safety Applications"
(NPAP
D-11/NPG 4.5) which identified the
HFA type latching relays
and
source
document
as
NPAP D-11/NPG 4.5 was
established
'to identify and control the use of equipment not
acceptable
for use in Nuclear Safety Application.
The licensee
response
and actions
were acceptable.
This Bulletin is closed for Units
1 and 2..
S
~
'
B.
Closed
"Steam Bindin
Of Auxiliar
Fee water
F
um
s
This issue
was inspected
in the field in April 1986 in response
to
and
was reported
and closed in Inspection Report
50-275/86-12
and 50-323/86-13
dated April 24,
1986.
The inspector conferred with the licensee
and determined that the
requirement for the operator to perform
a manual
temperature
check
of the auxiliary feedwater piping each shift remained in effect,
and
was included
on the auxiliary operators'rounds
sheet."
Also the
installation of temperature
sensors
on each
AFW pump discharge
piping for continuous monitoring of temperature
had
been
completed
for both units.
Alarm annunciation
occurs
on annunciator 'window
PK-0916 in the control
room if the pipe fluid temperature
reaches
200'F.
The annunciator
response
procedure
to window PK-0916
directed the plant operator to vent the
AFW piping (and
pump casing,
if necessary)
should
leakage
occur.
The temperature
sensors
and
response
procedures
satisfied
the recommendation for
recognizing
steam binding and for restoring the
AFW system to
operable status,
should
steam binding occur.
This Generic Letter is closed for Units
1 and 2.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
7.
Reactor Tri
S stem Instrumentation
Technical
S ecifications
TS)
Survei
ance
61
The inspector assisted
the resident inspector in a meeting with the
licensee
and reviewed the time (frequency)
requirements
to satisfy
TS
Surveillance 4.3.1.2 for the three channels
level
transmitters
used in the reactor trip system (Unit 1).
This issue
was
not completely resolved
so will be reported in detail in the resident
inspectors
report(s)
50-275/88-11
and 50-323/88-10.
8.
Exit l1eetin
30703
The inspector
conducted
an exit meeting
on May 13, 1988, with the members
of the plant staff as indicated in Paragraph
One.
During this meeting,
the inspector
summarized
the scope of the inspection activities
and
reviewed the inspection findings and described
in this report.
The
licensee
acknowledged
the concerns identified in the report.
'I