ML16341D450
| ML16341D450 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 09/19/1985 |
| From: | Chaffee A, Crews J, Huey R, Andrea Johnson, Polich T, Waite R, White R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML16341D451 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-323-85-27, NUDOCS 8510090350 | |
| Download: ML16341D450 (14) | |
See also: IR 05000323/1985027
Text
'
a
.
'I
f
I
a
a
U.'.
NUCLEmARI REGULATORY COMMISSION
,, "REGION V
I
I
Iii
Ii
Report'No.
50-323/85;,27;
"
I
I'
~ ri
License'No.
Licensee: Pacific Gas"'and'lectric
Company
77 Beale Street,
Room 1451
San Francisco,
94106
Facility Name:
Diablo Canyon, Unit 2
II
(
I
Inspection at:
Diablo Canyon Site
Inspection Conducte
Au
st 10-16 and September
4,
1985
Inspectors:
J..
e
S
'or
a
gineer
and
Team Leader'
.D
e
'ned
A
D
o
s
Enfo ce
tOff cer
Da
'gned
R. F
San
n
enior
sident Inspector
Da
e
S gne
T.
Dia
o
C
, Resi
nt Inspector
Da
e
igned
R.
, Reside
Inspector,
WNP-2
Other Accompanying Personnel:
Da
e
igned
R. E. Schreiber,
Consultant, Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratories
R. L. Gruel, Consultant, Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratories
Approved By:
A.
. Chaffee,
Chief
Reactor Projects
Branch
g </~~
Date Signed,
~Summa
Ins ection on Au ust 10-16 and
Se tember
4
1985
(Re ort No. 50-323/85-27)
Areas
Xns ected:
Enhanced
Team Inspection of operating
crews
and operational
readiness
of Diablo Canyon, Unit 2.
This inspection involved 246 inspection
hours by five NRC personnel
and
112 inspection hours by two NRC consultants
including 210 hours0.00243 days <br />0.0583 hours <br />3.472222e-4 weeks <br />7.9905e-5 months <br /> of backshift inspection.
During this inspection,,topics
in inspection procedures
71707,
72302 and 71710 were covered.
--~-1-0-O9 Pygmy'85O919
pDR
ADOCt '0
@DR.
4
II
'
!'
k
W
I a.
t
I
ft
lf
tl
-2"
~Findin s:
No violations of NRC requirements
resulted
from this inspection.
The
NRC Resident Inspection staff is, however, continuing to examine the
circumstances
regarding the status of the fire detection/alarm
system for one
fire zone (containment) of the plant.
Additional information is necessary
to
determine if the condition observed
by the Special Inspection
Team involves
a
violation of NRC requirements.
Observations
by the Special Inspection
Team
were discussed
with licensee
management
and actions
were taken,
and are
expected to continue, to improve operational activities.
These observations
are discussed
throughout the report;
and relate principally to needed
improvements in (1) the procedures
used to identify the operational
status of
equipment in need of repair,
maintenance
or other corrective actions,
(2)
operator alertness
to status lights or other indication of equipment
malfunction (particularly in areas
behind control room panels),
(3)
determination of the operability of fire detection/alarm
system,
(4)
housekeeping
during maintenance
and (5) the review of changes
to test
procedures.
rs
s
fl
I
'1 .,1
"1'J
ffe
1 r
(
s
jc
r
1
I
ps
e fsr
1
n
f
f
II
- s
~ If
H
f,
~
I
I
I'I
',\\, /
Ij f
lf
1
1
p
II
II
n
H C.'
r
1
r
i.
J
h
Hr
1
'I
I'
I
I(*
I
a
I
I
r~
. t-
I
1
c
I
I(
(I
'I
I(
J
l
I
Ij-- <
I
3
I
(3(l
II
13
I
t
I
(3(
(
V
j3
3(
I
J
II~
3 A
I
I"
3
'pl
I j
Ii
I
I
I
f.
DETAILS
Persons
Contacted
- G.
-VJ
R
"-"R.
J.
D.
"~R.
J.
R.
A. Maneatis,
Executive Vice President
D. Shiffer, Vice President
Nuclear Power Generation
C. Thornberry, Plant Manager
Patterson,
Assistant Plant Manager/Superintendent
M. Gisclon, Assistant Plant Manager/Technical
Services
A. Taggart, Director (}uality Support (Site)
P. Flohaug,
Supervisor (}uality Support
(Reactor Operations)
A. Sexton,
Operations
Manager
L. Fisher,
Senior Power Production Engineer
The inspectors
also held discussions
with and observed
the performance
of
numerous
other licensee
employees
during the course of the inspection;
these
included Shift Managers, Shift Foremen, Shift Technical Advisors,
Senior Control Room Operators,
Control Room Operators,
unlicensed
operations
peisonnel,
and maintenance
technicians.
2.
+Attended Management
Meeting on September
4, 1985.
~-"Attended Management
Meeting on August, 3.6,
1985.
I
Enhanced Ins ection Team
Com osition and Pattern of Ins ection
'I
The inspection
was carried out by senior
members of the Region V staff,
Senior Resident, and Resident Inspectors
ass'igned
to operating
power
reactors in Region V, and, two consultants
from the 3attelle Pacific
Northwest Laboratories
(PNL)'.
The PNL consultants
are certified operator
license examinators,
and currently provide contract assistance
to the
NRC
in this capacity.
\\*
To evaluate
the performance of the operating
crews,
members of the
Enhanced
Inspection ~Team were assigned
to around-the-clock
coverage of
shift, operations
commencing
on August 10 and continuing through August
16,
1985.
During this period preoperational
testing
was completed
and
preparations
were in progress for initial criticality of Unit 2,
and
Unit 1 was operating at 100/'power in commercial operation.
I
This pattern of inspection permitted
members of the inspection
team to
observe
several shift crews in the operation of both Unit 1 and
2 from
the dual unit control room.
3.
Assessment
of 0 eratin
Crew Performance
Operating
crew performance
was assessed
based
upon the inspection team's
observation of (1) the conduct of scheduled plant evolutions,
(2) crew
response
to unplanned
events
(including an Unusual Event on August 14,
1985 involving a fatal auto accident
on the plant access
road and ensuing
range fire which threatened
an off-site source of electrical power)
and
(3) thorough discussions
with individual operating
crew members.
I
I
il
I
J,
4
D
I
I
'I
I
r
I
V
P
P
P
I.
I'l
I
I-
4
I
5
I
I
,P
e
P
P
I
Jp
The overall performance of the operating
crews
was judged by the
inspection
team to be above average in terms of their knowledge of plant
systems,
operating procedures
and adherence
to procedures.
Shift turnover procedures
and practices
were observed
to be of
particularly high quality.
Control room manning and shift coordination during periods of activity on
both Units
1 6 2 were given close attention by the inspection
team,
particularly to those positions of Senior Control Operator
and Control
Operator which are
common to both units.
Good discipline and practices
were observed at all times to insure that sufficient operator attention
was given to each unit, particularly during periods of unusual activity
on either Unit.
A specific example
was during an event on Unit 2 on
August 10,
1985 when unanticipated plant response
occurred during
a
planned test of the turbine automatic
runback system.
During the event
an unanticipated unit trip, auto transfer of startup power from the 500
KV to 230 KV offsite power source,
and spurious
auto start of an
occurred.
Coordination
among the operating
crew was observed to be effective and disciplined in responding to the
unanticipated
events
on Unit 2, while maintaining proper attention to
Unit
1 operations.
Observations
of E ui ment Status
Examination of control room panels
by the inspection
team revealed
numerous miniature sticker labels (called
"AR stickers")
on individual
components.
Discussions with licensee personnel
revealed that these
labels were utilized as part of a system recently implemented (for trial
use) by a draft procedure to indicate
components
which were the subject
of Action Request
reports
(AR) or Nuclear Plant Problem Reports
(NPPR's),
indicating that such components
were in need of repair,
maintenance
or
other corrective action.
A,comparison of the status of two of the'AR stickers
revealed that the
associated
with the sticker was closed out without the sticker being
removed.
This observation
was brought to the attention of licensee
supervision who,undertook
a 100/ check of similar stickers in both the
Unit 1 and Unit 2 a'reas of the control room.
The results of the
licensees verification revealed
approximately
35 percent of a total of
more than thirty, stickers did not,'reflect the accurate
status of the
equipment to which they were attached,
in that the associated
AR or NPPR
had been
completed.,
A review of the draft procedure
governing use of the
AR stickers revealed
one potential
cause
os the stickers not accurately reflecting the status
of equipment to which they were at'tached
to be
a provision within the
procedure which requiies that the
AR sticker be removed only by the
person
who applies. the sticker-;
This appears
to be
a carryover practice
which is consistent with the procedures
for equipment clearance
tags,
where personnel
safety is a prime consideration.
1
I
I
'I
I
I
I'
II I
H
II
11
I
I
I
1
I'%
I I
L
Ik(
1
~ I
kl
}I
I
1(1 k
v
I
II
(
4,
l.
k(}
\\I
,1
j
'I
, I..
J
+
I Wk
I
h
I
}
I
I
'i
k
k
II
1 3
I
J
1
Licensee
maiiagement indicated, that changes
would be made to the
procedure to'equire that the stickers
be removed from equipment
when the
associated AR'r NPPR is 'complete
and closed out.
The status of electrical j'umpers, 'caution tags
and man-on-the-line
tags
were exa'mined 'during sever'al tours of plant areas.
Logs and other
controlling documents-for 'such tags
and jumpers
were also examined
on
several occasions.
No discrepancies
of, the nature discussed
above were
identified with regard,to 'these. tags
and jumpers.
Discussions
were 'also held with .Quality Assurance
(QA) personnel
regarding audits conducted'by'them
on the status of tags
and the
stickers
used to indicate the status of plant systems.
These discussions
revealed that
a recent audit had been conducted
by QA of 100/ of the tags
in Units
1 6 2.
The audit had not, however, included the
AR stickers
discussed
above.
0 erator Alertness
and Matchstandin
Practices
Two observations
by the inspection
team revealed
the need for continuing
attention by licensee
management
and supervision to improve the alertness
and watchstanding practices
of plant operators.
One such instance
involved an observation
on August 13,
1985 of a failed
fuse indicator light on the rear of a control room vertical panel.
Subsequent
investigation revealed that the failed fuse was in a redundant
solenoid circuit for a main steam isolation valve in loop 4 of Unit 2.
In response
to this observation,
licensee
management
took prompt action
to correct the condition and include this area of the control room panels
in routine panel walkdown procedures.
Another instance
involved an observation
on August, 13,
1985 regarding
a
pressure
on the Diesel Generator
1-3 lube oil filter which
indicated
a differential pressure
across
the filter of approximately
55
psig.
The normal pressure
across
the filter is 2-3 psig.
A subsequent
check showed that the gauge was,defective,
thus indicating an erroneous
differential pressure.
The defective
had not been identified by
plant operators.
These observations
were discussed with licensee
management
at the time of
Management
Meetings
on August
16 and September
4, 1985.
Plant Housekee in
and Radiation Control
During tours of the plant Auxiliary, Turbine and Containment Buildings
plant housekeeping
practices
were observed
to be generally quite good.
The posting
and control of radiation and contaminated
areas
were observed
to be effective.
An exception to the above
was
one instance while touring the
Diesel-Generator
Room 1-3. It was observed that in the course of
maintenance
a ladder
was left leaning on equipment near the diesel
governor
and fuel rack linkage.
Immediate steps
were taken by the
Ifhl
h
t
g
'
lf
I
IP ~
'I
hf
'IP
F.,
I
1
1
I
h
I
P f
P
N
W
1
licensee
to have the ladder
rem'oved from the area.
This observation
was
discussed
with licensee
management,
in the context of the type of
conditions operations
and other plant, staff should be alert to in their
periodic tours of the plant.
Fire Detection
S stem, Alarm 0 erabilit
On August 11,
1985 a,member of the inspection
team observed that an alarm
wasactuated
on the,.control
room Fire Alarm Control Panel
A.
The actuated
annunci.ator
was for Zone 12, Containment Building.
This observation
was brought to the attention of licensee
management for
investigation.
The licensee's
investigation revealed that the
was actuated
due to 2 of 21 detectors in Zone
12 being
The licensee'ook
steps
to repair the two inoperable
detectors,
thus clearing the annunciator.
This observation is to be followed up by the
NRC resident inspection
staff to determine if the condition observed
by the inspection
team
rendered
the fire alarm system inoperable,
and if so that appropriate
compensatory
measures
were taken by the licensee.
This is an Unresolved
Item.
(50-323/85-27-01)
Control Circuit Groundin
From 1am
Base Short
Pump
(RCP 2-1) tripped unexpectedly
on August 11,
1985.
Subsequent
investigation by the licensee
revealed that the cause of the
trip was the loss of control power to the pump breaker.
The loss of
control power had resulted
from the shorting of adjacent indicating lamp
bases in the control room panel for the pump.
Further investigation by the licensee,
in response
to concern expressed
by the inspection
team,
revealed that
a potentially generic problem for
such shorting existed in other areas of the control room panels
where
a
"three or more" configuration of indicating lamps existed.
In such
a
configuration the close proximity of lamp bases
coupled with one or more
loose
lamp bases
could cause
contact between the electrical connectors
of
adjacent
lamp bases.
The licensee
subsequently
conducted
an examination of all similar lamp
configurations
(approximately 70) in the Unit 2 area of the control room.
Four additional instances
of potential shorting, either loose
lamp bases
or near contact between
connectors
on adjacent
lamp bases,
were
identified and corrected.
A similar examination is to be made of the indicating lamp bases in the
Unit 1 area of the control room during plant shutdown.
Test Procedure
Inade uac
During the conduct of a test of the turbine runback system unanticipated
plant response
was experienced
as discussed in paragraph 3., above.
Evaluation by the licensee
revealed that the unanticipated plant response
resulted from a deficiency in the test procedure.
The deficiency in the
~F
1
I
I
t'g
.4.
" I.*
I
h II
I
I"
I
I
I
p
li
I
iJ
I
- I
'i
'F
I
I
II
F
I
'f
p
t
I
1
hl I
I'
1
I
<< "If
'I If"
ff
I
I
1
I
11
1
I
I 'I
h
5
procedure
had resulted
when changes
were made to the procedure to reflect
changes in the initial conditions to the test from cold shutdown to hot
standby conditions.
Licensee
management
directed that the test be discontinued until the
procedure deficiencies
were thoroughly reviewed
and corrected.
This experience
was discussed
at the Management Meetings, with particular
emphasis
on the need to review changes
to procedure
as thoroughly as the
initial procedures
themselves.
10.
Licensee
Mana ement Involvement
During the week prior to the current inspection licensee
corporate
and
site functional managers
were assigned
to around-the-clock
coverage of
plant operations.
This practice,
which will continue for an indefinite
period during the initial startup of Unit 2>is similar to that
implemented by the licensee
during initial startup of Unit 1.
ll.
Unresolved Items
12.
An unresolved
item is
a matter about which more information is required
in order to ascertain
whether it's an acceptable
item,
an open item,
a
deviation," or a violation.
S
Mana ement Meetin
s
The findings, of the inspection were discussed
with those licensee
representatives
indicated in paragraph
1. at the site
on August 16 and
the c'orporat'e offices'n September
4, 1985.
.e
I'
n
1>,
C
8
'L
I I
Pl-
o
?
I
f.
/I
,
t
t
ll
ll
c
a
li
I
l
I
1