ML16340C852
| ML16340C852 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 09/17/1982 |
| From: | Burdoin J, Zwetzig G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML16340C851 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-275-82-26, 50-323-82-13, NUDOCS 8210060141 | |
| Download: ML16340C852 (18) | |
See also: IR 05000275/1982026
Text
U.
S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION
V
Report
No.
50-275/82-26
50-323/82-13
Docket No.
50-275,
50-323
License
No.
CPPR-69
Safeguards
Group
Licensee:
Pacific
Gas
and Electric
Com an
s
P.
0.
Box 7442
San Francisco,
94120
Facility Name:
Diablo Can
on Units
1 and
2
Inspection at:
Diablo Can
on Site,
San Luis Obis
o Count
Date Signed
Date
Ssqned
Inspection conducted:
Jul
26-30, Auaust 16-20,
and
Au ust
30
September
1;
1982
Inspector:
~~-.cn//cmp-.-.~c.
J..
Burdoin, Reactor Inspector
Approved by:
~v+IW~;
G.. Zwtig,
CIIse, Engineering
Programs
Section
Summary:
Ins ection durin
the
eriods of Jul
26-30,
Au ust 16-20,
and
Au ust 30-
Se tember 1,
1982
Re ort Nos.
50-275/82-26
and 50-323/82-13
A~Id:
A
di
i
b r
1-b
di
f
construction
and modification activities including:
a site tour, modifications
to piping and electrical
raceway supports resulting from the revised annulus
seismic spectra,
licensee
actions
on previous inspection findings, nonconformance
report review,
and
an allegation concerning
the
RHR System.
The inspection involved 83 inspection
hours
by one
NRC inspector.
Results:'o
items of noncompliance
or deviations
were identified.
0(tl
+~
go
DETAILS
l.
Individuals Contacted
a.
Pacific Gas
and Electric
Comnan
(PGSE
A+*R.
A+*0.
A
F.
+ J.
M.
A
K.
T.
A+*J.
+ D.
+ J.
T.
'C.
M.
- C.
D. Etzler, Project Superintendent
A: Rockwell, Resident Electrical
Engineer
M. Russell,
Resident Civil Engineer
A.
Ammon, Resident
Mechanical
Engineer
E. Leppke, Supervisor,
Onsite Engineering
firoup
A. Nilson, Mechanical
Field Fngineer
'L. Monti, Civil Construction
Engineer
R. Bratton,
QC Inspector
R. Bell,
QC Inspector
J.
Nystrom,
QC Inspector
E. Pierce,
QC Inspector
H. Issel, Electrical Inspector
J. Mello, Mechanical
Inspector
M. Seward,
OA Engineer
Various other engineering
and
QC personnel.
b.
H.
P.
Fol e
Com an
Foie
V.
H. Tennyson,
QC Manager
J.
L. Thompson,
QA Engineering
Group Supervisor
R. T. Knowles, Electrical Planner/Coordinator
S.
L. Watkins, Mechanical
Planner/Coordinator
E. T. Smullen,
QC Clerk
c.
Pullman
Power Products
Cor oration
H..ll. Karner,
QA/QC Manager
.R. J.
Balka, Design Engineer
d.
Bechtel
Cor oration
- A.
G.
Weedman,
General
Superintendent
- Denotes
attendees
at exit meeting
on July 30,
1982.
+ Denotes
attendees
at exit meeting
on August 20,
1982.
A Denotes
attendees
at exit meeting
on September
1, 1982.
NRC Resident
Inspectors
Messrs.
J.
D. Carlson
and
M. M. Mendonca
attended
the exit meeting of September
1,
1982.
Mr. M. M. Mendonca
attended
the July 30,
1982 exit meeting.
l '
-2-
2.
Site Tour
A tour was
made of Units
.1
and
2 containments
and the auxiliary building.
It was observed that additional
bracing
had been
added to
halo.
2-1
accumulator -outlet piping to the cold loop, at elevation
91 in the Unit 2
containment.
In the auxiliary building, it was observed that:
(1) replacement
of the ammonia
and hydrazine
pumps with larger size
pumps
had
been
started,
and (2) work was in progress
on the rupture restraints for the
feedwater piping at elevation 100'.
.Other areas/equipment
inspected
in the auxiliary building were:
the
pump areas,
the vital 480 vblt load centers
and
remote hot shutdown
panels for Units
1 and 2, and the vital 4160
switchgear for Unit 2.
A tour was made of Unit
1 containment,
control
room,
and the
intake structure
on August 30 in the
company of a group of 'managers
and engineers
from NRR and Region V.
I'lo items of noncompliance
or deviations
were identified.
3.
Modifications to Pi in
and Electrical
Racewa
Sup orts
a.
Safet -Related"Pi
e
Su
ort and'Restraint
S stems
Unit 1
To date,
the seismic verification of pipe supports
has determined
that
171 large. bore piping hangers
require modifications.
As
of this inspection,
modifications to 122 hangers
have
been
completed.
Approximately 76 small
bore (2" diameter
and smaller) piping
hangers
require modifications.
Forty-nine of these modifica-
tions are to provide two-way vertical restraint of the pipe.
To date, modifications to 73 small
bore hangers
have
been
completed.
k
The inspector
examined modifications to large
and small bore
pipe supports
in the Unit j. containment
and auxiliary building to
ascertain,
by visual examination,
whether the pipe supports
met
the requirements
specified
by licensee's
drawings,
procedures,
and specifications.
The following pipe supports,
which had
been inspected
and accepted
by the contractor's
Ouality
Control, were examined
and appeared
to satisfy the applicable
requirements
of ESD-223, "Installation and Inspection of
Class
1 Pipe Supports."
0
-3-
Lar e Bore Pi
e Su
orts
Small
Bore Pi
e
Su
ort
- 10-68SL
12-24SL
12-29SL
12-69SL
- 12-45SL
12-46SL
22-347SL
39-24A
41-25R
41-60R
66-8A
- 56N-123
- 57)l-32R :
- 57H-33B
- 57H-34R
.*57H-70R
57H-112A
57N-114R
57N-130R
57H-154R
- 2153-16
2155-42
2155-157
- 2155-234
2156-39
2180-18
- The modifications to these
hangers
had already
been painted.
The
hangers
were inspected
in the field and the
OC records
were examined.
While checking as-.built drawings of hanger modifications, the
as-built drawing of hanqer
57N-129R was found to have errors.
This
deficiency was brought to the attention of the onsite engineering
group supervisor
who initiated an immediate investigation into
the reason for the errors.
This deficiency developed
when field
verification information was being transferred
to detailed
drawings
along with hanger modification as-built information.
Field
verification had been
made of 213 large bore handlers.
A review of
these
213 hanger drawings identified that only eight drawings
had
the potential for the above identified errors.
Of these eight
drawings,
the drawing for hanger
57N-146R was also found to be in
error.
The two identified drawings were corrected.
These
drawings in question
had not progressed
to the final checking
process
which probably would have identified the deficiencies.
No items of noncompliance or deviations
were identified.
b.
Closed
Unresolved
Item
50-275/82-22/02
- Electrical
Racewa
Su
ort
Detail S-102B
Sixteen electrical
raceway supports
(detail
S-102B) located in
auxiliary and turbine buildings were inspected
in the field and
documented
in Inspection
Report 50-275/82-22.
The
OC record review for these
supports
was completed
during the
week of July 26 and found acceptable.
This item is closed.
4.
Licensee Actions on Previousl
Identified Items
a.
Closed
Unresolved
Item- 50-275 82-22/01:
Modification of
Batter
Racks
and
Re lacement of Vital Batteries for
Units. 1 and
2
The rack modifications
and the installation of new batteries
for vital batteries
12, 21,
and 22,
now completed,
were
inspected'in
the field.
The equality Control records for
job orders
E-1085
and E-1108 which accomplished this work were
reviewed.
This item is closed.
b.
Closed
Noncom liance (50-323/82-09
01
Impro er Oualit
Assurance
Practices
b
the Licensee's
Electrical Contractor
H.'P.'Foie
Co.
This item of noncompliance
involved the improper processing
of
Class
I materials
and the release
of this material for installation
prior to receipt of required documentation.
The process of installing materials prior to receipt. of
documentation
was initiated on the basis of written contractor
memoranda.
This process
was first used in 1978.
The measures
taken
by the licensee
to establish
compli.ance
were
examined in the field by the
HRC inspector
and found to be
acceptable.
The contractor, at the direction of the licensee,
initiated a
100/> audit,
on March 15, 1982, of all materials
purchased
by the
Foley Company for Diablo Canyon
back to January
1978.
The
audit, which was closed
on June
30, 1982, involved over 2500
purchase
orders requiring quality assurance,
and identified that
all documentation
required for Class
> materials
purchased
under
several
purchase
orders
had not been received.
The Foley Company
took actions to provide the missing documentation
where required
or to provide duplicate documentation
or justification for accept-
ability of those
purchase
orders in question.
The Foley Company's Ouality Control procedunes
OCP-4,
"Receiving,
Handling and Storage,"
and gCP-3,
"Processing
and Control of
Deviations
and Nonconformances,"
have
been revised to provide
for releasing of materials to construction while assuming
appropriate
quality control follow-up of the material
which is considered
nonconforming until receipt of documentation.
0
-5-
Training sessions
were conducted
on June
22 and 23,
1982 to
instruct the contractor's
management,
purchasing,
engineering,
supervising,
and quality'ontrol personnel
in the procedure
revisions to OCP-3
and
QCP-4.
During follow-up. inspections
the inspector
examined
the audit
of the 2500 plus purchase
orders initiated by the licensee.
Thirty-nine purchase
orders
were deficient in some item of
required documentation
such
as receiving inspection records,
quality related certifications or endorsements.
The dispositions
of the'eficiencies for these thirty-nine purchase
order were
reviewed in the
summary of the audit.
Twenty-four of the
thirty-nine purchase
orders
were examined in detail to establish
that corrective actions,
as described
in the audit, were
incorporated in the purchase
order files.
The revised Quality Control Procedures
(QCP-3
and
QCP-4) were
reviewed
and the attendance
sheets
for the aforementioned
traininq
sessions
were examined.
It is considered
that the actions
described
above will assure full compliance with Ouality Control procedures
and
should preclude similar violations in the future.
This item is closed.
5.
(Closed
Allegation Concernin
Residual
Heat
Removal
System
Interlocked Inlet Valves
a
~
Alle ation
A former employee of the licensee,
during
an interview with an
NRC Investigator
and this inspector in Phoenix, Arizona on
July 7, 1982,
made
an allegation concerning
the interlocks for
the
RHR System inlet valves.
The alleger's
concerns
were three-fold:
(1)
That the interlocks of valves
8701
and 8702
(motor operated
gate valves) in series
in the inlet pipe from the Reactor
Coolant
System
(RCS) to the
RHR system
(pumps)
could potentially cause
the inadvertant closure of these valves during the operation
of the
RHR System.
(2)
That the operating
procedure,
which prescribed
the testinq
details,
had not been revised to prevent the occurrence
described
in concern (1), above.
l
'-6-
(3)
The adequacy of the single failure aspect of the single
pipe from one hot leg serving suction to the two
System
pumps.
b.
Back round
The two inlet valves
8701
and 8702"are interlocked to prevent
subjecting the low pressure
RHR System to the higher
pressure
of about
2200 psig.
The
two valves, .normally closed,
are prevented
from being
opened
,until
RCS pressure
is less
than
400 psig and temperature
is
reduced to 350 F.
Interlocks will also cause
these
valves to
close if primary pressure
rises
abo~e
600 psig or pressurizer
vapor space
temperature
exceeds
490 F.
c.
Findinas
The allegation
was first brought to an
NRC inspector's
attention
by a technician with PGKE's General
Construction
(GC) work force
in June
1981.
The alleqation contended that the control circuitry,
for the
RHR hot leg suction valves,
was
such that after the valves
had been opened,'s
required
by a specific emergency
operating
procedure,
the valves would automatically close
and
RHR shutdown
cooling would be lost.
At that time,
PGLE's Department of
Nuclear Plant Operation
(NPO), was evaluating the concern
based
on
a memorandum from the
GC technician.
About a month later, the concern
was again investigated
and
a
Nuclear Plant Problem Report
(NPPR)
was initiated by NPO.
The
NPPR resolved the concern
by revision to the emerc.ency operating
procedure.
At this time, cautions
and required
responses
were
added to the procedures
to preclude this occurrence.
The
GC
Technician
was informed of this change
by PGhE and the
NRC
inspector.
Several
weeks later, suction to an
RHR pump was lost when the
subject valves closed during surveillance testing of the Solid
State Protection
System.
The
pump was performance
tested after
this in'cident and
no damage
had occurred.
A second
change to
the emergency
operating
procedure
required that motive power
to the valves
be removed to preclude
the control circuitry from
causing
the valves to go closed
when the valves were open.
This
was verified by an
NRC inspector
and the
GC Technician
was
so
informed.
0
L
V'*
.
d.
The subject of single failure in the
RHR suction line has
been
previously considered
in Suoplement
No.
7 to the Safety
Evaluation (SER).of the Diablo Canyon Nuclear
Power Station
Units
1 and" 2,'tray 1978,
page 3-3.
In this
SER, the staff
found that,
based
on the probability, consequences,
and
mitigation actions for a single failure in the
RHR suction
line, the design
was acceptable.
Conclusion:
The allegation
was not substantiated.
4
It is concluded that:
(I) the potential for the valve to
automatically close
and (2) the
need for appropriate
cautions
and required
responses
in operating
and testing procedures
have both been previously addressed
by the initiation of a
NPPR and making the proper changes
and stipulations in emer-
gency
and operating
procedures.
It is further concluded that
(3) the potential for'
single failure in the
RHR suction line
causing
a loss of shutdown cooling has
been adequately
addressed
in Supplement
7 to the Safety Evaluation Report,
and
the experience
to date
does not support re-evaluating this
issue.
6.
Issues of Concern
a.
Ru ture Restraint
Melds
b.
Early in July
a
(}A Auditor employed
by Pullman, the licen-
see's
mechanical
contractor,
raised
a auestion
concerning
excessive
reinforcement
on eight groove type welds
on the
rupture restraints
in the Unit 2 'area.
I'laximum reinforcement
allowed by Dl.0-69 ANS 1969 Code, Section
0.306d is 1/8" maximum
height.
The
excess
reinforcement is estimated
t'o be 1/32
to 1/16 inches.
This excess
was allowed by the licensee's
welding inspectors.
Investigation of this matter
was initiated
during this inspection but was not completed.
This item
remains
unresolved
pending further investiqation $~~3/42=48/034>
Ru ture Restraint Bolt Tensionin
A licensee
employee,
attending California Polytechnic University,
on his
own initiative ran
a computer
code
on torauing requirements
for the bolts
on the rupture restraints
in Unit 2 area.
These
results
appeared
to conflict with the torquing requirements
identified in the specification for accomplishing
the rupture
restraint work.
A copy of this computer
code
has
been supplied
to the licensee's
project engineerinq
nroup for their review.
Investigation of this issue, initiated during this inspection,
will be continued during
a subseouent
insnection.
This item
remains
unresolved
pending further investir ation 4%W888~R.
7.
On-Site Desi
n Activities
The licensee's
on-site-design activities were examined.
The only
design activity conducted on-site is the small
bore pipe hanqer design.
This desi'gn section is
a subsection
.of General
Engineering
Department
which is located at the licensee's
main.'offices in San Francisco.
The Engineering
Manual
and Engineering
Procedures
and Instructions
identify and describe
the procedures
that guide this section in
preparing
and processing
the design of small bore piping hangers.
The preparation of design
packages
is initiated from three
documented
sources;
discrepancy
reports,
design
change notices,
and engineering
questions.
The design
package file is started with the preparation of
detailed design calculations.
A design calc'ulation .cover sheet,
as
required
by procedure
No. P-6, is the controlling document for the
design calculations.
Signatures
and dates of responsible
persons
(preparer,
checker, discipline engineer
and group leader/supervisor)
appear
on this control sheet -to verify the quality of the design
calculations.
A design
change notice
(DCN) controls the transfer of
the design
package
to the mechanical
contractor
who implements
the
design
by revising the isometric (master/control)
drawings.
After
aoproval of the isometric drawing changes
by PGSE,
the mechanical
contractor prepares
detailed
hanger
drawings,
which in turn are forwarded
to
PGKE for review and approval.
Each step in the design
process
is
prescribed
by procedures
to maintain documented
control
and records of
the process.
Inspection of the on-site design activities is incomplete at this
time.
This item remains
open (50-323/82-13/03}:
8.
Unresolved
Items
The two items of paragraph
6, rupture restraint welds
and bolt
tensioning
remain unresolved
pending further investigation to ascertain
whether they are acceptable
items,
items of noncompliance
or deviations.
9.
Mana ement Interview
Meetings were held with the licensee
representatives
(identified in
paragraph
1) on July 30, August 20,
and September
1, 1982.
The scope
of the inspections
and summaries
of the findings,
as noted in this
report,
were discussed.