ML16260A067

2016-09-DRAFT Outlines

ML16260A067
Person / Time
Site:	Arkansas Nuclear
Issue date:	09/01/2016
From:	Vincent Gaddy Operations Branch IV
To:	Entergy Operations
References
Download: ML16260A067 (49)

Text

ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Facility: Arkansas Nuclear One Unit 1 Date of Exam: August 2016 RO K/A Category Points SRO-Only Points Tier Group K K K K K K A A A A G* A2 G* Total 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 Total

1. 1 4 2 3 3 4 2 18 6 Emergency &

Abnormal 2 2 1 2 N/A 2 1 N/A 1 9 4 Plant Evolutions Tier Totals 6 3 5 5 5 3 27 10 1 3 2 2 3 4 2 3 1 4 2 2 28 5 2.

Plant 2 0 1 1 2 1 0 2 2 0 1 0 10 3 Systems Tier Totals 3 3 3 5 5 2 5 3 4 3 2 38 8

3. Generic Knowledge and Abilities 1 2 3 4 10 1 2 3 4 7 Categories 3 2 2 3 Note: 1. Ensure that at least two topics from every applicable K/A category are sampled within each tier of the RO and SRO-only outlines (i.e., except for one category in Tier 3 of the SRO-only outline, the Tier Totals in each K/A category shall not be less than two). (One Tier 3 Radiation Control K/A is allowed if the K/A is replaced by a K/A from another Tier 3 Category).

2. The point total for each group and tier in the proposed outline must match that specified in the table. The final point total for each group and tier may deviate by +/-1 from that specified in the table based on NRC revisions. The final RO exam must total 75 points and the SRO-only exam must total 25 points.

3. Systems/evolutions within each group are identified on the associated outline; systems or evolutions that do not apply at the facility should be deleted with justification; operationally important, site-specific systems/evolutions that are not included on the outline should be added. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for guidance regarding the elimination of inappropriate K/A statements.

4. Select topics from as many systems and evolutions as possible; sample every system or evolution in the group before selecting a second topic for any system or evolution.

5. Absent a plant-specific priority, only those K/As having an importance rating (IR) of 2.5 or higher shall be selected. Use the RO and SRO ratings for the RO and SRO-only portions, respectively.

6. Select SRO topics for Tiers 1 and 2 from the shaded systems and K/A categories.

7. The generic (G) K/As in Tiers 1 and 2 shall be selected from Section 2 of the K/A Catalog, but the topics must be relevant to the applicable evolution or system. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for the applicable K/As.

8. On the following pages, enter the K/A numbers, a brief description of each topic, the topics importance ratings (IRs) for the applicable license level, and the point totals (#) for each system and category. Enter the group and tier totals for each category in the table above; if fuel handling equipment is sampled in a category other than Category A2 or G* on the SRO-only exam, enter it on the left side of Column A2 for Tier 2, Group 2 (Note #1 does not apply). Use duplicate pages for RO and SRO-only exams.

9. For Tier 3, select topics from Section 2 of the K/A catalog, and enter the K/A numbers, descriptions, IRs, and point totals (#) on Form ES-401-3. Limit SRO selections to K/As that are linked to 10 CFR 55.43.

G* Generic K/As Page 1 of 16

ES-401 2 Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1/Group 1 (RO)

E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K K K A A G K/A Topic(s) IR #

1 2 3 1 2

• 000007 (BW/E02&E10; CE/E02)

Reactor Trip - Stabilization - Recovery /

1 AK3.03 Knowledge of the reasons for the 000008 Pressurizer Vapor Space X 3.7 1 following responses as they apply to the Accident / 3 Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident: 324 Actions contained in EOP for PZR vapor space accident/ LOCA.

(CFR 41.5, 41.10 / 45.6 / 45.13)

EK3.23 Knowledge of the reasons for the 000009 Small Break LOCA / 3 X 4.2 2 following responses as they apply to the small break LOCA: RCP tripping 1089 requirements.

(CFR 41.5 / 41.10 / 45.6 / 45.13)

EA2.11 Ability to determine or interpret 000011 Large Break LOCA / 3 X 3.9 3 the following as they apply to a Large Break LOCA: Conditions for throttling or 684 stopping HPI.

(CFR 43.5 / 45.13) 000015/17 RCP Malfunctions / 4 AK1.01 Knowledge of the operational 000022 Loss of Rx Coolant Makeup / 2 X 2.8 4 implications of the following concepts as they apply to Loss of Reactor Coolant 183 Makeup: Consequences of thermal shock to RCP seals.

(CFR 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3)

AA1.03 Ability to operate and / or monitor 000025 Loss of RHR System / 4 X 3.4 5 the following as they apply to the Loss of Residual Heat Removal System: LPI New pumps.

1091 (CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

AA2.01 Ability to determine and interpret 000026 Loss of Component Cooling X 2.9 6 the following as they apply to the Loss of Water / 8 Component Cooling Water: Location of a 8 leak in the CCWS.

2004 (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13) 000027 Pressurizer Pressure Control System Malfunction / 3 2.1.20 Ability to interpret and execute 000029 ATWS / 1 X 4.6 7 procedure steps.

REPLACE KA and system due to conflict with operating exam (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.12)

Page 2 of 16

EK1.02 Knowledge of the operational 000038 Steam Gen. Tube Rupture / 3 X 3.2 8 implications of the following concepts as they apply to the SGTR: Leak rate vs. 332 pressure drop 2007 (CFR 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3)

EK2.1. Knowledge of the interrelations 000040 (BW/E05; CE/E05; W/E12) X 3.8 9 between the (Excessive Heat Steam Line Rupture - Excessive Heat Transfer / 4 Transfer) and the following: 686 Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, 2008 signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7) 2.4.4 Ability to recognize abnormal 000054 (CE/E06) Loss of Main X 4.5 10 indications for system operating Feedwater / 4 parameters that are entry-level 146 conditions for emergency and abnormal 2004 operating procedures.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.2 / 45.6)

EA2.03 Ability to determine or interpret 000055 Station Blackout / 6 X 3.9 11 the following as they apply to a Station Blackout: Actions necessary to restore Need power.

?

(CFR 43.5 / 45.13)

AK3.01 Knowledge of the reasons for the 000056 Loss of Off-site Power / 6 X 3.5 12 following responses as they apply to the Loss of Offsite Power: New Order and time to initiation of power for the load sequencer. 1057 (CFR 41.5,41.10 / 45.6 / 45.13)

AA1.06 Ability to operate and / or monitor 000057 Loss of Vital AC Inst. Bus / 6 X 3.5 13 the following as they apply to the Loss of Vital AC Instrument Bus: Manual control 945 of components for which automatic control is lost. 2013 (CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

AA2.03 Ability to determine and interpret 000058 Loss of DC Power / 6 X 3.5 14 the following as they apply to the Loss of DC Power: DC loads lost; impact on ability to operate and monitor plant systems.

513 (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13) 2008 AA1.06 Ability to operate and / or monitor 000062 Loss of Nuclear Svc Water / 4 X 2.9 15 the following as they apply to the Loss of Nuclear Service Water (SWS): Control of New flow rates to components cooled by the 1058 SWS.

(CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

AA1.02 Ability to operate and / or monitor 000065 Loss of Instrument Air / 8 X 2.6 16 the following as they apply to the Loss of Instrument Air: Components served by 691 instrument air to minimize drain on system 2008 (CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

W/E04 LOCA Outside Containment / 3 Page 3 of 16

W/E11 Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirc. / 4 EK1.3. Knowledge of the operational BW/E04; W/E05 Inadequate Heat X 4.0 17 implications of the following concepts as Transfer - Loss of Secondary Heat Sink /

4 they apply to the (Inadequate Heat 949 Transfer): Annunciators and conditions indicating signals, and remedial actions 2013 associated with the (Inadequate Heat Transfer).

(CFR: 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3)

AK2.07 Knowledge of the interrelations 000077 Generator Voltage and Electric X 3.6 18 between Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances / 6 Grid Disturbances and the following: 891 Turbine / generator control 2014 (CFR: 41.4, 41.5, 41.7, 41.10 / 45.8)

K/A Category Totals: 4 2 3 3 4 2 Group Point Total: 18 Page 4 of 16

ES-401 3 Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1/Group 2 (RO)

E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K K K A A G* K/A Topic(s) IR #

1 2 3 1 2 000001 Continuous Rod Withdrawal / 1 000003 Dropped Control Rod / 1 X AK1.13 Knowledge of the operational 3.2 19 implications of the following concepts as they apply to Dropped 320 Control Rod: Operating behavior characteristics of the facility.

(CFR 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3) 000005 Inoperable/Stuck Control Rod / 1 000024 Emergency Boration / 1 000028 Pressurizer Level Malfunction / 2 000032 Loss of Source Range NI / 7 AK2.01 REPLACED with system 000033 000033 Loss of Intermediate Range NI / 7 X AK2.01 Knowledge of the 2.4 20 interrelations between the Loss of Intermediate Range Nuclear MOD Instrumentation and the following: 1060 Power supplies, including proper switch positions.

(CFR 41.7 / 45.7) 000036 (BW/A08) Fuel Handling Accident / 8 000037 Steam Generator Tube Leak / 3 X AA2.14 Ability to determine and 4.0 21 interpret the following as they apply to the Steam Generator Tube Leak: New Actions to be taken if S/G goes solid 1061 and water enters steam lines (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13) 000051 Loss of Condenser Vacuum / 4 X 2.4.2 Knowledge of system set 4.5 22 points, interlocks and automatic actions associated with EOP entry MOD conditions. 1062 (CFR: 41.7 / 45.7 / 45.8) 000059 Accidental Liquid Radwaste Rel. / 9 000060 Accidental Gaseous Radwaste Rel. / 9 000061 ARM System Alarms / 7 000067 Plant Fire On-site / 8 000068 (BW/A06) Control Room Evac. / 8 000069 (W/E14) Loss of CTMT Integrity / 5 000074 (W/E06&E07) Inad. Core Cooling / 4 Page 5 of 16

000076 High Reactor Coolant Activity / 9 X AK3.05 Knowledge of the reasons for 2.9 23 the following responses as they apply to the High Reactor Coolant 693 Activity : Corrective actions as a result 2013 of high fission-product radioactivity level in the RCS (CFR 41.5,41.10 / 45.6 / 45.13)

W/EO1 & E02 Rediagnosis & SI Termination / 3 W/E13 Steam Generator Over-pressure / 4 W/E15 Containment Flooding / 5 W/E16 High Containment Radiation / 9 BW/A01 Plant Runback / 1 X AA1.2 Ability to operate and / or 3.2 24 monitor the following as they apply to the (Plant Runback): Operating 162 behavior characteristics of the facility. 2005 (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

BW/A02&A03 Loss of NNI-X/Y / 7 BW/A04 Turbine Trip / 4 BW/A05 Emergency Diesel Actuation / 6 X AA1.1 Ability to operate and / or 4.3 25 monitor the following as they apply to the (Emergency Diesel Actuation) 276 Components, and functions of control 2005 and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.5,45.6)

BW/A07 Flooding / 8 X AK3.2 Knowledge of the reasons for 3.2 26 the following responses as they apply to the (Flooding): Normal, New abnormal and emergency operating 1064 procedures associated with (Flooding).

(CFR: 41.5 / 41.10, 45.6, 45.13)

BW/E03 Inadequate Subcooling Margin / 4 BW/E08; W/E03 LOCA Cooldown - Depress. / 4 X EK1.1. Knowledge of the operational 3.5 27 implications of the following concepts as they apply to the (LOCA MOD Cooldown): Components, capacity, 1063 and function of emergency systems.

(CFR: 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3)

BW/E09; CE/A13; W/E09&E10 Natural Circ. / 4 BW/E13&E14 EOP Rules and Enclosures CE/A11; W/E08 RCS Overcooling - PTS / 4 CE/A16 Excess RCS Leakage / 2 CE/E09 Functional Recovery K/A Category Point Totals: 2 1 2 2 1 1 Group Point Total: 9 Page 6 of 16

ES-401 4 Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant Systems - Tier 2/Group 1 (RO)

System # / Name K K K K K K A A A A G* K/A Topic(s) IR #

1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 K6.02 Knowledge of the effect of 003 Reactor Coolant Pump X a loss or malfunction on the 2.7 28 following will have on the RCPS: 326 RCP seals and seal water supply.

2014 (CFR: 41.7 / 45/5) 004 Chemical and Volume X K5.26 Knowledge of the 3.1 29 Control operational implications of the MOD following concepts as they apply to the CVCS: Relationship between 1069 VCT pressure and NPSH for charging pumps.

(CFR: 41.5/45.7)

A3.02 Ability to monitor 004 Chemical and Volume X automatic operation of the CVCS, 3.6 30 Control including: Letdown isolation. 654 (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5) 2007 K1.09 Knowledge of the physical 005 Residual Heat Removal X connections and/or cause-effect 362 31 relationships between the RHRS MOD and the following systems: RCS.

1068 (CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8)

A1.05 Ability to predict and/or 005 Residual Heat Removal X monitor changes in parameters 3.3 32 (to prevent exceeding design 611 limits) associated with operating the RHRS controls including: 2013 Detection of and response to presence of water in RHR emergency sump.

(CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)

K2.04 Knowledge of bus power 006 Emergency Core Cooling X supplies to the following: ESFAS- 3.6 33 operated valves. 903 (CFR: 41.7) 2014 K5.02 Knowledge of the 007 Pressurizer Relief/Quench X 2.6 34 operational implications of the Tank following concepts as they apply 561 to the PRTS: Method of forming a steam bubble in the PZR. 2010 (CFR: 41.7)

A3.04 Ability to monitor 008 Component Cooling Water X 2.9 35 automatic operation of the CCWS, including: Requirements 627 on and for the CCWS for different conditions of the power plant. 2005 (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5)

Page 7 of 16

2.4.31 Knowledge of annunciator 008 Component Cooling Water X alarms, indications, or response 3.7 36 procedures. MOD (CFR: 41.10 / 45.13) 1070 K6.03 Knowledge of the effect of 010 Pressurizer Pressure Control X a loss or malfunction of the 3.2 37 following will have on the PZR New PCS: PZR sprays and heaters.

1071 (CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)

K2.01 Knowledge of bus power 012 Reactor Protection X supplies to the following: RPS 3.3 38 channels, components, and 85 interconnections.

2002 (CFR: 41.7)

A4.04 Ability to manually operate 012 Reactor Protection X and/or monitor in the control 3.3 39 room: Bistable, trips, reset and 966 test switches.

2013 (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8)

K3.02 Knowledge of the effect 013 Engineered Safety Features X that a loss or malfunction of the 4.3 40 Actuation ESFAS will have on the 337 following: RCS.

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.6) 2.1.28 Knowledge of the purpose 013 Engineered Safety Features X and function of major system 4.1 41 Actuation components and controls. New (CFR: 41.7) 1073 K4.03 Knowledge of CCS design 022 Containment Cooling X 3.6 42 feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: 909 Automatic containment isolation.

2014 (CFR: 41.7) 025 Ice Condenser A1.03 Ability to predict and/or 026 Containment Spray X 3.5 43 monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design New limits) associated with operating the CSS controls including: 1075 Containment sump level.

(CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)

K5.05 Knowledge of the 039 Main and Reheat Steam X 2.7 44 operational implications of the following concepts as they apply MOD to the MRSS: Bases for RCS cooldown limits. 1074 (CFR: 41.5 / 45.7)

A4.10 Ability to manually operate 059 Main Feedwater X and monitor in the control room: 3.9 45 ICS. 565 (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8) 2005 Page 8 of 16

K1.07 Knowledge of the physical 061 Auxiliary/Emergency X connections and/or cause-effect 3.6 46 Feedwater relationships between the AFW 269 and the following systems:

Emergency water source.

(CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8)

A1.01 Ability to predict and/or 061 Auxiliary/Emergency X monitor changes in parameters 3.9 47 Feedwater (to prevent exceeding design MOD limits) associated with operating the AFW controls 1076 including: S/G level.

(CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)

K4.03 Knowledge of AC 062 AC Electrical Distribution X distribution system design 2.8 48 feature(s) and/or interlock(s) New which provide for the following:

Interlocks between automatic bus 1077 transfer and breakers.

(CFR: 41.7)

A2.01 Ability to (a) predict the 062 AC Electrical Distribution X impacts of the following 3.4 49 malfunctions or operations on 140 the ac distribution system; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

Types of loads that, if de-energized, would degrade or hinder plant operation .

(CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)

A3.01 Ability to monitor 063 DC Electrical Distribution X automatic operation of the DC 2.7 50 electrical system, including: New Meters, annunciators, dials, recorders, and indicating lights. 1078 (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5)

K1.05 Knowledge of the physical 064 Emergency Diesel Generator X connections and/or cause-effect 3.4 51 relationships between the ED/G 792 system and the following systems: Starting air system.

(CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8)

K5.01 Knowledge of the 073 Process Radiation Monitoring X operational implications of the 2.5 52 following concepts as they apply New to the PRM system: Radiation theory, including sources, types, 1065 units, and effects.

(CFR: 41.5 / 45.7)

Page 9 of 16

K4.02 Knowledge of SWS design 076 Service Water X feature(s) and/or interlock(s) 2.9 53 which provide for the following: Bank Automatic start features associated with SWS pump controls. 1079 (CFR: 41.7)

K3.03 Knowledge of the effect 078 Instrument Air X that a loss or malfunction of 3.0 54 the IAS will have on the 227 following: Cross-tied units.

2011 (CFR: 41.7 / 45.6)

A3.01 Ability to monitor 103 Containment X automatic operation of the 3.9 55 containment system, including: 104 Containment isolation.

2004 (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5)

K/A Category Point Totals: 3 2 2 3 4 2 3 1 4 2 2 Group Point Total: 28 Page 10 of 16

ES-401 5 Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant Systems - Tier 2/Group 2 (RO)

System # / Name K K K K K K A A A A G* K/A Topic(s) IR #

1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 A2.17 Ability to (a) predict the 001 Control Rod Drive X impacts of the following 3.3 56 malfunction or operations on the 674 CRDS and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to 2007 correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

Rod-misalignment alarm.

(CFR: 41.5/43.5/45.3/45.13)

K5.10 Knowledge of the operational 002 Reactor Coolant X implications of the following 2.5 57 concepts as they apply to the RCS: 193 Relationship between reactor power and RCS differential temperature. 2005 (CFR: 41.5 / 45.7) 011 Pressurizer Level Control 014 Rod Position Indication K2.01 Knowledge of bus power 015 Nuclear Instrumentation X 3.3 58 supplies to the following: NIS channels, components, and New interconnections.

1066 (CFR: 41.7) 016 Non-Nuclear Instrumentation X K3.01 Knowledge of the effect that a 2.6 65 loss or malfunction of the NNIS will 309 have on the following: MFW system.

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.6)

A2.02 Ability to (a) predict the 017 In-Core Temperature Monitor X impacts of the following 3.6 59 malfunctions or operations on the MOD ITM system; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to 1067 correct, control or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

Core damage.

REPLACE? No core damage effect for CETs (except melting, could fail either way).

(CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.5) 027 Containment Iodine Removal 028 Hydrogen Recombiner and Purge Control 029 Containment Purge Page 11 of 16

K4.01 Knowledge of design 033 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling X feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which 2.9 60 provide for the following: 200 Maintenance of spent fuel level.

2011 (CFR: 41.7) 034 Fuel Handling Equipment A4.02 Ability to manually operate 035 Steam Generator X and/or monitor in the control room: 2.7 61 Fill of dry S/G. 662 (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8) 2014 A1.02 Ability to predict and/or 041 Steam Dump/Turbine Bypass X 3.1 62 monitor changes in parameters Control (to prevent exceeding design limits) MOD associated with operating the SDS controls including: 1080 Steam pressure.

(CFR: 41.5 / 45.5) 045 Main Turbine Generator 055 Condenser Air Removal 056 Condensate 068 Liquid Radwaste K4.04 Knowledge of design 071 Waste Gas Disposal X 2.9 63 feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: Isolation of MOD waste gas release tanks. 470 (CFR: 41.7)

A1.01 Ability to predict and/or 072 Area Radiation Monitoring X monitor changes in parameters (to 3.4 64 prevent exceeding design limits) 379 associated with operating the ARM system controls including:

Radiation levels.

(CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)

K3.07. REPLACED, See system 016 075 Circulating Water (65) 079 Station Air 086 Fire Protection K/A Category Point Totals: 0 1 1 2 1 0 2 2 0 1 0 Group Point Total: 10 Page 12 of 16

ES-401 Generic Knowledge and Abilities Outline (Tier 3) Form ES-401-3 Facility: Arkansas Nuclear One Unit 1 Date of Exam: August 2016 Category K/A # Topic RO SRO-Only IR # IR #

2.1. 2.1.2 Knowledge of operator responsibilities 4.1 66 during all modes of plant operation.

New (CFR: 41.10 / 45.13) 1083 2.1. 2.1.4 Knowledge of individual licensed operator 3.3 67 responsibilities related to shift staffing, such as medical requirements, no-solo operation, 838 maintenance of active license status, 10CFR55, 2011 1.

Conduct of etc.

Operations (CFR: 41.10 / 43.2) 2.1. 2.1.15 Knowledge of administrative 2.7 68 requirements for temporary management directives, such as standing orders, night New orders, Operations memos, etc. 1084 (CFR: 41.10 / 45.12)

Subtotal 3 2.2. 2.2.13 Knowledge of tagging and clearance 4.1 69 procedures.

(CFR: 41.10 / 45.13) 231

2. 2007 Equipment 2.2. 2.2.6 Knowledge of the process for making 3.0 70 Control changes to procedures.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.3 / 45.13) New 1082 Subtotal 2 2.3. 2.3.12 Knowledge of radiological safety 3.2 71 principles pertaining to licensed operator duties, such as containment entry requirements, New fuel handling responsibilities, access to locked 1081 high-radiation areas, aligning filters, etc.

(CFR: 41.12 / 45.9 / 45.10) 3.

Radiation 2.3.4 Knowledge of radiation exposure limits Control 2.3. 3.2 72 under normal or emergency conditions.

751 (CFR: 41.12 / 43.4 / 45.10) 2008 Subtotal 2 Page 13 of 16

2.4. 2.4.3 Ability to identify post-accident 3.7 73 instrumentation.

(CFR: 41.6 / 45.4) 242 2010 2.4. 2.4.12 Knowledge of general operating crew

4. 4.0 74 responsibilities during emergency operations.

Emergency (CFR: 41.10 / 45.12) 51 Procedures /

Plan 1998 2.4. 2.4.25 Knowledge of fire protection procedures.

3.3 75 (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13) 848 Subtotal 3 Tier 3 Point Total 10 7 Page 14 of 16

ES-401 Record of Rejected K/As Form ES-401-4 Tier / Randomly Reason for Rejection Group Selected K/A RO 1/1 008 AK3.01 This KA is for a Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident and states, Why PZR level may come back on scale if RCS is saturated. Could not develop a question for this K/A with one correct answer and three incorrect but plausible distractors. Replaced with K/A AK3.03.

RO 1/1 025 AA1.23 This K/A is for monitoring/operating RHR heat exchangers as they apply to a loss of RHR. Another question relating the DH heat exchangers is being asked on another system so to remove this duplication the K/A was replaced with AA1.03.

RO 1/1 038 EK1.03 The EPE is Steam Generator Tube Rupture and the K/A concerns natural circulation. ANO-1 does not have any unique actions in 1202.006, Tube Rupture, for natural circulation conditions. Replaced with K/A EK1.02.

RO 1/1 056 AK3.01 ANO-1 does not have individual load sequencers. Sequencing of loads is accomplished by time delay relays on the individual breakers.

RO 1/1 062 AA1.03 ANO-1 does not use the Service Water System as a backup to CCWS. The Unit 1 equivalent of CCWS is Intermediate Cooling Water (ICW) and Service Water provides cooling to the ICW heat exchangers but it is not considered a backup system to ICW. Replaced with K/A AA1.06.

RO 1/2 003 AK1.21 ANO-1equivalent of Delta Flux (DI) is Axial Power Imbalance. The Technical Specification (3.2.3) is used in conjunction with the Core Operating Limits Report (COLR). COLR Figures 6A-C, 7A-C, 8A-C give such broad limits for Axial Power Imbalance such that a single dropped control rod would have little operational implications other than performing the surveillance for TS 3.2.3. Replaced with K/A AK1.13.

RO 1/2 032 AK2.01 ANO-1 AOP 1203.021, Loss of Neutron Flux Indication, Section 3 contains no actions for resetting the power supplies for Source Range indication. There are actions for resetting power supplies for Intermediate Range detectors, replaced with system 000033 K/A AK2.01, RO Importance Rating 2.4. JUSTIFICATION FOR USE OF K/A WITH RATING LESS THAN 2.5: Monitoring of neutron flux during power changes, particularly startups, is important to reactor safety and thus the health, safety, and welfare of the general public.

RO 2/1 004 K5.32 This KA concerns purpose and control of heat tracing. This is NLO knowledge. Replaced with K/A K5.26.

RO 2/1 005 K1.01 ANO-1 equivalent of CCWS is Intermediate Cooling Water (ICW) and the ICW system has no interconnection with the RHRS equivalent, the Decay Heat System. Replaced with K/A K1.09.

RO 2/1 007 K4.01 This K/A concerns the design features which allow for Quench Tank cooling. This is the only K/A in this category with an importance rating greater than 2.5 and has thus been over-used in exams. Changed to category K5 and replaced with K/A K5.02.

RO 2/1 008 2.2.12 Knowledge of surveillance procedures would best be tested via a JPM instead of the written exam, and ANO-1 does not have any surveillances for the ICW system since it is not in Tech Specs. Replaced with K/A 2.4.31.

Page 15 of 16

ES-401 Record of Rejected K/As Form ES-401-4 RO 2/1 013 K3.03 This K/A concerns the impact a malfunction of the ESFAS would have upon containment. A question was developed for this K/A, however this question was a better fit for the other K/A selected for the 013 system.

Replaced with K/A K3.02.

RO 2/1 022 K4.04 This K/A concerns Containment Cooling System design features and/or interlocks which provide for cooling of the control rod drive motors.

ANO-1 does not have direct cooling of the CRDMs via the CCS, therefore no question could be developed for this K/A. Replaced with K/A K4.03.

RO 2/1 026 A1.02 This K/A concerns the ability to monitor containment temperature as relates to operating Containment Spray controls. ANO-1 Reactor Building Spray System is not operated based upon containment temperature but upon containment pressure. Replaced with K/A A1.03.

RO 2/1 039 K5.01 This K/A concerns the definition and causes of steam/water hammer. A licensed level question could not be developed for this K/A. Replaced with K/A K5.05.

RO 2/1 061 A1.03 This K/A concerns Emergency Feedwater System interactions with multi-units. ANO-1 does not have cross-connects with Unit 2 for the EFW system. Replaced with K/A A1.01.

RO 2/1 062 K4.06 This K/A concerns 6.9KV one line diagrams. A licensed level question could not be developed for this K/A. Replaced with K/A K4.03.

RO 2/2 002 K5.02 This K/A concerns the need for a vent path during draining. A licensed level question could not be developed for this K/A. Replaced with K/A K5.10.

RO 2/2 075 K3.07 This K/A concerns the connection between Circulating Water and ESFAS.

ANO-1 has no connection between the two systems. A CW K/A with a rating greater than 2.5 and a lack of conflict with other questions could not be found. Replaced with system 016 and K/A K3.01.

RO 3 2.1.14 This K/A concerns the knowledge of things which require plant wide announcements. A licensed level question could not be developed for this K/A. Replaced with K/A 2.1.2.

RO 3 2.1.26 This K/A concerns the knowledge of industrial safety requirements. A licensed level question could not be developed for this K/A. Replaced with K/A 2.1.15.

RO 3 2.2.41 This K/A concerns the ability to obtain and interpret station electrical and mechanical drawings. This K/A can only be used to develop a system based question. Replaced with K/A 2.2.6.

RO 3 2.3.5 This K/A concerns the ability to use fixed radiation monitors and alarms which would result in a radiation monitoring system question, or use of portable survey instruments which would best be evaluated via a JPM.

Replaced with K/A 2.3.4.

RO 3 2.4.46 This K/A concerns ability to verify alarms are consistent with plant conditions. This K/A can only be used to develop a system based question. Replaced with K/A 2.4.25.

Page 16 of 16

ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Facility: Arkansas Nuclear One Unit 1 Date of Exam: August 2016 RO K/A Category Points SRO-Only Points Tier Group K K K K K K A A A A G* A2 G* Total 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 Total

1. 1 18 4 2 6 Emergency &

Abnormal 2 N/A N/A 9 1 3 4 Plant Evolutions Tier Totals 27 5 5 10 1 28 3 2 5 2.

Plant 2 10 3 0 3 Systems Tier Totals 38 6 2 8

3. Generic Knowledge and Abilities 1 2 3 4 10 1 2 3 4 7 Categories 2 2 1 2 Note: 1. Ensure that at least two topics from every applicable K/A category are sampled within each tier of the RO and SRO-only outlines (i.e., except for one category in Tier 3 of the SRO-only outline, the Tier Totals in each K/A category shall not be less than two). (One Tier 3 Radiation Control K/A is allowed if the K/A is replaced by a K/A from another Tier 3 Category).

2. The point total for each group and tier in the proposed outline must match that specified in the table. The final point total for each group and tier may deviate by +/-1 from that specified in the table based on NRC revisions. The final RO exam must total 75 points and the SRO-only exam must total 25 points.

3. Systems/evolutions within each group are identified on the associated outline; systems or evolutions that do not apply at the facility should be deleted with justification; operationally important, site-specific systems/evolutions that are not included on the outline should be added. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for guidance regarding the elimination of inappropriate K/A statements.

4. Select topics from as many systems and evolutions as possible; sample every system or evolution in the group before selecting a second topic for any system or evolution.

5. Absent a plant-specific priority, only those K/As having an importance rating (IR) of 2.5 or higher shall be selected. Use the RO and SRO ratings for the RO and SRO-only portions, respectively.

6. Select SRO topics for Tiers 1 and 2 from the shaded systems and K/A categories.

7. The generic (G) K/As in Tiers 1 and 2 shall be selected from Section 2 of the K/A Catalog, but the topics must be relevant to the applicable evolution or system. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for the applicable K/As.

8. On the following pages, enter the K/A numbers, a brief description of each topic, the topics importance ratings (IRs) for the applicable license level, and the point totals (#) for each system and category. Enter the group and tier totals for each category in the table above; if fuel handling equipment is sampled in a category other than Category A2 or G* on the SRO-only exam, enter it on the left side of Column A2 for Tier 2, Group 2 (Note #1 does not apply). Use duplicate pages for RO and SRO-only exams.

9. For Tier 3, select topics from Section 2 of the K/A catalog, and enter the K/A numbers, descriptions, IRs, and point totals (#) on Form ES-401-3. Limit SRO selections to K/As that are linked to 10 CFR 55.43.

G* Generic K/As Page 1 of 11

ES-401 2 Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1/Group 1 (SRO)

E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K K K A A G* K/A Topic(s) IR #

1 2 3 1 2 000007 (BW/E02&E10; CE/E02) Reactor Trip - Stabilization - Recovery / 1 000008 Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident / 3 EA2.02 Ability to determine or interpret 000009 Small Break LOCA / 3 X 3.8 76 the following as they apply to a small break LOCA: Possible leak paths. MOD (CFR 43.5 / 45.13) 1051 000011 Large Break LOCA / 3 000015/17 RCP Malfunctions / 4 000022 Loss of Rx Coolant Makeup / 2 AA2.02 Ability to determine and interpret 000025 Loss of RHR System / 4 X 3.8 77 the following as they apply to the Loss of Residual Heat Removal System: Leakage MOD of reactor coolant from RHR into closed 639 cooling water system or into reactor building atmosphere.

(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13) 000026 Loss of Component Cooling Water / 8 000027 Pressurizer Pressure Control System Malfunction / 3 EA2.01 Ability to determine or interpret 000029 ATWS / 1 X 4.7 78 the following as they apply to a ATWS:

Reactor nuclear instrumentation New 1085 (CFR 43.5 / 45.13) 000038 Steam Gen. Tube Rupture / 3 2.4.6 Knowledge of EOP mitigation 000040 (BW/E05; CE/E05; W/E12) X 4.7 79 Steam Line Rupture - Excessive Heat strategies.

Transfer / 4 584 (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13) 000054 (CE/E06) Loss of Main Feedwater / 4 000055 Station Blackout / 6 2.2.36 Ability to analyze the effect of 000056 Loss of Off-site Power / 6 X 4.2 80 maintenance activities, such as degraded power sources, on the status of limiting MOD conditions for operations. 586 (CFR: 41.10 / 43.2 / 45.13) 000057 Loss of Vital AC Inst. Bus / 6 Page 2 of 11

000058 Loss of DC Power / 6 000062 Loss of Nuclear Svc Water / 4 000065 Loss of Instrument Air / 8 W/E04 LOCA Outside Containment / 3 W/E11 Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirc. / 4 EA2.2 Ability to determine and interpret BW/E04; W/E05 Inadequate Heat X 4.0 81 Transfer - Loss of Secondary Heat Sink / 4 the following as they apply to the (Excessive Heat Transfer): Adherence to New appropriate procedures and operation within 1050 the limitations in the facilitys license and amendments.

(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13) 000077 Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances / 6 K/A Category Totals: 4 2 Group Point Total: 6 Page 3 of 11

ES-401 3 Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1/Group 2 (SRO)

E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K K K A A G* K/A Topic(s) IR #

1 2 3 1 2 000001 Continuous Rod Withdrawal / 1 000003 Dropped Control Rod / 1 000005 Inoperable/Stuck Control Rod / 1 000024 Emergency Boration / 1 000028 Pressurizer Level Malfunction / 2 000032 Loss of Source Range NI / 7 000033 Loss of Intermediate Range NI / 7 000036 (BW/A08) Fuel Handling Accident / 8 X A08 AA2.2 Refueling Canal Level 4.0 82 Decrease: Ability to determine and 347 interpret the following as they apply to the (Refueling Canal Level Decrease) Adherence to appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the facilitys license and amendments.

(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13) 000037 Steam Generator Tube Leak / 3 000051 Loss of Condenser Vacuum / 4 000059 Accidental Liquid Radwaste Rel. / 9 X 2.3.11 Ability to control radiation 4.3 83 releases.

New (CFR: 41.11 / 43.4 / 45.10) 1086 000060 Accidental Gaseous Radwaste Rel. / 9 000061 ARM System Alarms / 7 000067 Plant Fire On site / 8 X 2.4.25 Knowledge of fire protection 3.7 84 procedures.

1045 NEW (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13) 000068 (BW/A06) Control Room Evac. / 8 000069 (W/E14) Loss of CTMT Integrity / 5 000074 (W/E06&E07) Inad. Core Cooling / 4 000076 High Reactor Coolant Activity / 9 W/EO1 & E02 Rediagnosis & SI Termination / 3 W/E13 Steam Generator Over-pressure / 4 W/E15 Containment Flooding / 5 W/E16 High Containment Radiation / 9 BW/A01 Plant Runback / 1 BW/A02&A03 Loss of NNI-X/Y / 7 BW/A04 Turbine Trip / 4 BW/A05 Emergency Diesel Actuation / 6 Page 4 of 11

BW/A07 Flooding / 8 BW/E03 Inadequate Subcooling Margin / 4 BW/E08; W/E03 LOCA Cooldown - Depress. / 4 BW/E09; CE/A13; W/E09&E10 Natural Circ. / 4 X 2.2.44 Ability to interpret control 4.4 85 room indications to verify the status 737 and operation of a system, and understand how operator actions and directives affect plant and system conditions.

(CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.12)

BW/E13&E14 EOP Rules and Enclosures CE/A11; W/E08 RCS Overcooling - PTS / 4 CE/A16 Excess RCS Leakage / 2 CE/E09 Functional Recovery K/A Category Point Totals: 1 3 Group Point Total: 4 Page 5 of 11

ES-401 4 Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant Systems - Tier 2/Group 1 (SRO)

System # / Name K K K K K K A A A A G* K/A Topic(s) IR #

1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 A2.01 Ability to (a) predict the 003 Reactor Coolant Pump X 3.9 86 impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on 638 the RCPS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

Problems with RCP seals, especially rates of seal leak-off.

(CFR: 41.5 / 43.5/ 45.3 / 45/13) 004 Chemical and Volume Control 005 Residual Heat Removal 006 Emergency Core Cooling 007 Pressurizer Relief/Quench Tank 008 Component Cooling Water 010 Pressurizer Pressure Control 012 Reactor Protection A2.05 Ability to (a) predict the 013 Engineered Safety Features X 4.2 87 Actuation impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on New the ESFAS; and (b) based Ability 1052 on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations; Loss of dc control power.

(CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13) 022 Containment Cooling 025 Ice Condenser 026 Containment Spray 039 Main and Reheat Steam 059 Main Feedwater 2.2.37 Ability to determine 061 Auxiliary/Emergency X 4.6 88 Feedwater operability and/or availability of safety related equipment. 740 (CFR: 41.7 / 43.5 / 45.12)

Page 6 of 11

A2.06 Ability to (a) predict the 062 AC Electrical Distribution X 3.9 89 impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on New the ac distribution system; and 1046 (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

Keeping the safeguards buses electrically separate.

(CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13) 063 DC Electrical Distribution 2.4.11 Knowledge of abnormal 064 Emergency Diesel Generator X 4.2 90 condition procedures.

New (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13) 1047 073 Process Radiation Monitoring 076 Service Water 078 Instrument Air 103 Containment K/A Category Point Totals: 3 2 Group Point Total: 5 Page 7 of 11

ES-401 5 Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant Systems - Tier 2/Group 2 (SRO)

System # / Name K K K K K K A A A A G* K/A Topic(s) IR #

1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 001 Control Rod Drive 002 Reactor Coolant 2.2.40 Ability to apply technical 011 Pressurizer Level Control X 4.7 91 specifications for a system.

MOD (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13) 1056 (Replaced, see system 011) 014 Rod Position Indication 015 Nuclear Instrumentation 016 Non-Nuclear Instrumentation 017 In-Core Temperature Monitor 027 Containment Iodine Removal 028 Hydrogen Recombiner and Purge Control 029 Containment Purge 033 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling A2.03 Ability to (a) predict the 034 Fuel Handling Equipment X 4.0 92 impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the New Fuel Handling System; 1048 and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Mispositioned fuel element.

(CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13) 035 Steam Generator 041 Steam Dump/Turbine Bypass Control 045 Main Turbine Generator 055 Condenser Air Removal 056 Condensate 068 Liquid Radwaste 071 Waste Gas Disposal 072 Area Radiation Monitoring 075 Circulating Water Page 8 of 11

079 Station Air A2.04 Ability to (a) predict the 086 Fire Protection X 3.9 93 impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the Mod Fire Protection System; and (b) 1053 based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Failure to actuate the FPS when required, resulting in fire damage.

(CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)

K/A Category Point Totals: 2 1 Group Point Total: 3 Page 9 of 11

ES-401 Generic Knowledge and Abilities Outline (Tier 3) Form ES-401-3 Facility: Arkansas Nuclear One Unit 1 Date of Exam: August 2016 Category K/A # Topic RO SRO-Only IR # IR #

2.1.5 Ability to use procedures related to shift staffing, such 3.9 94 as minimum crew complement, overtime limitations, etc. MOD Replace - too many fuel handling KAs 1055

1. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.12)

Conduct of Knowledge of the fuel-handling responsibilities of 2.1.35 3.9 95 Operations SROs.

846 (CFR: 41.10 / 43.7)

Subtotal 2 2.2.7 Knowledge of the process for conducting special or 3.6 96 infrequent tests.

MOD (CFR: 41.10 / 43.3 / 45.13) 486 2.

Equipment 2.2.17 Knowledge of the process for managing maintenance 3.8 97 Control activities during power operations, such as risk assessments, work prioritization, and coordination 879 with the transmission system operator. 2014 (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13)

Subtotal 2 2.3.4 Knowledge of radiation exposure limits under normal 3.7 98 or emergency conditions.

3. MOD Radiation (CFR: 41.12 / 43.4 / 45.10) 1049 Control Subtotal 1 2.4.29 Knowledge the emergency plan. 4.4 99 (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.11) New 1088

4. Knowledge of events related to system Emergency 2.4.30 4.1 100 operation/status that must be reported to internal Procedures / 411 organizations or external agencies, such as the State, Plan the NRC, or the transmission system operator.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.11)

Subtotal 2 Tier 3 Point Total 7 Page 10 of 11

ES-401 Record of Rejected K/As Form ES-401-4 Tier / Randomly Reason for Rejection Group Selected K/A SRO T1G1 BW/E04 EA2.2 This is not a rejection, just a record of a correction. Sample plan submitted to ANO used EA2.2 from BW/E05 Excessive Heat Transfer instead of the EA2.2 for the T1G1 topic BW/E04Inadequate Heat Transfer. Excessive Heat Transfer was already being tested in topic 000040 in T1G1. The word Excessive was changed to Inadequate and IR changed from 4.0 to 4.4.

SRO T1G2 000059 AA2.02 This APE is titled Accidental Liquid Radioactive-Waste Release. The KA is The permit for liquid radioactive-waste release. If it is an accidental release, then a permit is not in effect. The APE for Accidental Gaseous Radwaste Release does not have any K/As referring to release permits.

After reviewing the remaining AA2 K/As for this topic, concluded that none of the K/As would produce an SRO level question. Replaced with generic K/A 2.3.11.

SRO T1G2 000067 2.4.18 The APE is Plant Fire on Site and 2.4.18 refers to the knowledge of specific bases for EOPs. Our Fire and Explosion AOP does not have a bases document so this would be a difficult K/A to develop a question for.

Replaced with K/A 2.4.25.

SRO T2G2 000014 2.1.32 This generic K/A concerns the explanation of system limits and precautions. An SRO level question could not be developed for this KA.

Additionally, Rod Position Indication is being evaluated by a JPM so a different system had to be selected. Selected system 000011 PZR Level Control System and K/A A2.11 as a replacement.

SRO T3 2.1.40 This generic K/A concerns fuel handling. Randomly selected K/A 2.1.35 also concerns fuel handling. Fuel handling was randomly over sampled.

Selected K/A 2.1.5 as a replacement.

SRO T3 2.3.6 This generic K/A concerns the ability to approve release permits. It is difficult to evaluate this K/A with a written exam question. This is best evaluated with an administrative JPM. Replaced with K/A 2.3.4.

SRO T3 2.4.9 This generic K/A concerns the knowledge of low power implications during accident situations. This K/A would only result in a system type question which is not desired in Tier 3. Replaced with K/A 2.4.29.

Page 11 of 11

ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Facility: ____ANO-1_______________________ Date of Examination: __8/22/2016__

Examination Level: RO SRO Operating Test Number: _2016-1__

Administrative Topic (see Note) Type Describe activity to be performed Code*

Given their work history, select the eligible Conduct of Operations R, N operators to fill vacancy due to illness of KA - 2.1.5, Importance rating 2.9 the on watch ATC.

(RO/SRO)

Perform Time to Boil and Time to Core Conduct of Operations R, M Uncovery Calculations KA- 2.1.23, Importance 4.3 RO/SRO Determine the mechanical and electrical Equipment Control R, N boundary isolations for P-36B Makeup KA - 2.2.13, Importance 4.1 Pump seal replacement.

RO Given a survey map and associated RWP, Radiation Control R, N determine the entry requirements to KA - 2.3.7, Importance 3.5 perform a task in the Letdown Cooler RO Room.

Not used Emergency Plan NOTE: All items (five total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only four items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics (which would require all five items).

• Type Codes & Criteria: (C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank ( 3 for ROs; 4 for SROs & RO retakes)

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank ( 1)

(P)revious 2 exams ( 1; randomly selected)

ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Facility: ____ANO-1_______________________ Date of Examination: __8/22/2016__

Examination Level: RO SRO Operating Test Number: __2016-1__

Administrative Topic (see Note) Type Describe activity to be performed Code*

Given their work history, select the eligible R, N operators to fill vacancy due to illness of Conduct of Operations the on watch ATC.

KA - 2.1.5, Importance rating 3.9 (RO/SRO)

Perform Time to Boil and Time to Core Uncovery Calculations Conduct of Operations R, M KA- 2.1.23, Importance 4.4 RO/SRO Review and approve the tagout provided Equipment Control R, N for P-36B Makeup Pump seal replacement.

KA - 2.2.13, Importance 4.3 If not approved, provide the reasons why.

SRO Provided with the dose history for each Radiation Control R, N individual. Determine which of the 5 are KA - 2.3.4, Importance 3.7 eligible for performing the task during an SRO emergency situation.

R, D Determine the correct PAR and Emergency Plan evacuation/sheltering required for a given KA - 2.4.44, Importance 4.4 GE.

SRO NOTE: All items (five total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only four items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics (which would require all five items).

• Type Codes & Criteria: (C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank ( 3 for ROs; 4 for SROs & RO retakes)

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank ( 1)

(P)revious 2 exams ( 1; randomly selected)

ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Facility: __Arkansas Nuclear One - Unit 1___ Date of Examination: _8/22/2016_

Exam Level: RO SRO-I SRO-U Operating Test No.: __2016-1__

Control Room Systems:* 8 for RO; 7 for SRO-I; 2 or 3 for SRO-U System / JPM Title Type Code* Safety Function

a. API-RPI Comparison 014 A1.02 (RO 3.2 / SRO 3.6) N/S 1 RO

b. Throttle HPI 013 A4.01 (RO 4.5 / SRO 4.8) A/D/EN/L/S 2 RO / SRO-U / SRO-I

c. Manually Control RCS Pressure with the Pressurizer Spray Valve D/S 3 010 A3.02 (RO 3.6 / SRO 3.5)

RO / SRO-I

d. Shutdown RCP P-32A at Power 003 A2.02 (RO 3.7 / SRO 3.9) A/D/E/S 4P RO / SRO-I

e. Pump the Quench Tank 007 A1.01 (RO 2.9 / SRO 3.1) D/S 5 RO / SRO-I

f. Transferring Buses From Unit Aux Transformer to a Startup Transformer A/N/S 6 062 A4.07 (RO 3.1 / SRO 3.1)

RO / SRO-I

g. RPS and Manual PB Fails to trip the Reactor 007 EA2.02 (RO 4.3 / SRO 4.6) A/D/S 7 RO / SRO-U / SRO-I

h. Shift ICW Pumps 008 A2.01 (RO 3.3 / SRO 3.6) D/S 8 RO / SRO-I

ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 In-Plant Systems* (3 for RO); (3 for SRO-I); (3 or 2 for SRO-U)

i. Alternate Shutdown for RO#1 A06 AA1.01 (RO 4.3 / SRO 4.2) A/D/E/R 4S RO / SRO-U / SRO-I

j. Defeat S/U #2 Load Shed 062 A2.01 (RO 3.4 / SRO 3.9) D/L 6 RO / SRO-U / SRO-I

k. Align T-16A (TWMT) for Recirc / Sample 068 A2.02 (RO 2.7 / SRO 2.8) N/R 9 RO / SRO-U / SRO-I

• All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all five SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.

• Type Codes Criteria for RO / SRO-I / SRO-U A)lternate path 4-6 (5) / 4-6 (5) / 2-3 (3)

(C)ontrol room 8 (8) / 7 (7) / 2-3 (2)

(D)irect from bank 9 (8) / 8 (8) / 4 (4)

(E)mergency or abnormal in-plant 1 (2) / 1 (2) / 1 (1)

(EN)gineered safety feature 1 (1) / 1 (1) / 1 (1) (control room system)

(L)ow-Power / Shutdown 1 (2) / 1 (2) / 1 (2)

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A) 2 (3) / 2 (2) / 1 (1)

(P)revious 2 exams 3 (0) / 3 (0) / 2 (0) (randomly selected)

(R)CA 1 (1) / 1 (1) / 1 (1)

(S)imulator

ES-301 Operating Test Quality Checklist Form ES-301-3 Facility: ANO-1 Date of Examination: 8/22/2016 Operating Test Number: 2016-1 Initials

1. General Criteria a b* c#

a. The operating test conforms with the previously approved outline; changes are consistent with sampling requirements (e.g., 10 CFR 55.45, operational importance, safety function distribution).

b. There is no day-to-day repetition between this and other operating tests to be administered during this examination.

c. The operating test shall not duplicate items from the applicants audit test(s). (see Section D.1.a.)

d. Overlap with the written examination and between different parts of the operating test is within acceptable limits.

e. It appears that the operating test will differentiate between competent and less-than-competent applicants at the designated license level.

2. Walk-Through Criteria -- -- --

a. Each JPM includes the following, as applicable:

• initial conditions

• initiating cues

• references and tools, including associated procedures

• reasonable and validated time limits (average time allowed for completion) and specific designation if deemed to be time-critical by the facility licensee

• operationally important specific performance criteria that include:

- detailed expected actions with exact criteria and nomenclature

- system response and other examiner cues

- statements describing important observations to be made by the applicant

- criteria for successful completion of the task

- identification of critical steps and their associated performance standards

- restrictions on the sequence of steps, if applicable

b. Ensure that any changes from the previously approved systems and administrative walk-through outlines (Forms ES-301-1 and 2) have not caused the test to deviate from any of the acceptance criteria (e.g., item distribution, bank use, repetition from the last 2 NRC examinations) specified on those forms and Form ES-201-2.

3. Simulator Criteria -- -- --

The associated simulator operating tests (scenario sets) have been reviewed in accordance with Form ES-301-4 and a copy is attached.

Printed Name / Signature Date

a. Author ______________________________________________ __ _ ______________

b. Facility Reviewer(*) ______________________________________________ __ _ ______________

c. NRC Chief Examiner (#) ______________________________________________ __ _ ______________

d. NRC Supervisor ______________________________________________ __ _ ______________

NOTE:

• The facility signature is not applicable for NRC-developed tests.

1. Independent NRC reviewer initial items in Column c; chief examiner concurrence required.

ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Facility: ANO Date of Exam: Operating Test No.:

A E Scenarios P V 1 2 3 4 T M P E O I L N CREW CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION T N I T POSITION I

C A S A B S A B S A B S A B M A T L R T O R T O R T O R T O U N Y O C P O C P O C P O C P M(*)

T P E R I U RX 1 1 1 1 0 NOR 1 3 2 1 1 1 I/C 2,3,4, 2,4,5, 9 4 4 2 U1 / U2 5,6 6 MAJ 7 7 2 2 2 1 TS 2,3 4,5 4 0 2 2 RX 0 1 1 0 NOR 3 1 1 1 1 R1 / R2 I/C 2,3,4 2,4,5 6 4 4 2 MAJ 7 7 2 2 2 1 TS 0 0 2 2 RX 1 1 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 1 1 I/C 3,5, 2,4, 6 4 4 2 R5 / R6 6 6 MAJ 7 7 2 2 2 1 TS 0 0 2 2 RX 1 1 1 1 0 NOR 3 1 1 1 1 I/C 2,4,5, 3,5,6 2,5,6 10 4 4 2 I1 / I2 6 MAJ 7 7 7 3 2 2 1 TS 4,5 2 0 2 2 Instructions:

1. Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions. Instant SROs (SRO-I) must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an SRO-I additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.

2. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a one-for-one basis.

3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.

4. For licensees that use the ATC operator primarily for monitoring plant parameters, the chief examiner may place SRO-I applicants in either the ATC or BOP position to best evaluate the SRO-I in manipulating plant controls.

ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Facility: Date of Exam: Operating Test No.:

A E Scenarios P V 1 2 3 4 T M P E O I L N CREW CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION T N I T POSITION I

C A S A B S A B S A B S A B M A T L R T O R T O R T O R T O U N Y O C P O C P O C P O C P M(*)

T P E R I U RX 0 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 2 1 1 1 I/C 2,3,4, 2,3,4, 10 4 4 2 U3 / U4 5,6 5,6 MAJ 7 7 2 2 2 1 TS 2,3 2,3 4 0 2 2 RX 0 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 1 1 R3 / R4 I/C 2,3,4 2,4,6 6 4 4 2 MAJ 7 7 2 2 2 1 TS 0 0 2 2 RX 0 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 1 1 I/C 3,5, 3,5,6 6 4 4 2 R7 / R8 6 MAJ 7 7 2 2 2 1 TS 0 0 2 2 RX 1 1 2 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 1 1 I/C 2,4, 2,4,6 2,3,4, 11 4 4 2 I3 6 5,6 MAJ 7 7 7 3 2 2 1 TS 2,6 2 0 2 2 Instructions:

1. Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions. Instant SROs (SRO-I) must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an SRO-I additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.

2. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a one-for-one basis.

3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.

4. For licensees that use the ATC operator primarily for monitoring plant parameters, the chief examiner may place SRO-I applicants in either the ATC or BOP position to best evaluate the SRO-I in manipulating plant controls.

ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Facility: Date of Exam: Operating Test No.:

A E Scenarios P V 1 2 3 4 T M P E O I L N CREW CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION T N I T POSITION I

C A S A B S A B S A B S A B M A T L R T O R T O R T O R T O U N Y O C P O C P O C P O C P M(*)

T P E R I U RX 1 1 2 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 1 1 I/C 2,4, 2,3,4, 2,3,4, 13 4 4 2 I4 6 5,6 5,6 MAJ 7 7 7 3 2 2 1 TS 2,3 2,6 4 0 2 2 RX 1 1 1 1 0 NOR 3 1 2 1 1 1 I/C 2,4,5 2,3,4, 3,4,6 11 4 4 2 I5 5,6 MAJ 7 7 7 3 2 2 1 TS 2,3 2 0 2 2 RX 1 1 1 1 0 NOR 3 1 2 1 1 1 I/C 2,4,5 2,4,6 3,4,6 9 4 4 2 R9 MAJ 7 7 7 3 2 2 1 TS 0 0 2 2 RO RX 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 2 2 1 TS 0 2 2 Instructions:

1. Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions. Instant SROs (SRO-I) must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an SRO-I additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.

2. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a one-for-one basis.

3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.

4. For licensees that use the ATC operator primarily for monitoring plant parameters, the chief examiner may place SRO-I applicants in either the ATC or BOP position to best evaluate the SRO-I in manipulating plant controls.

ES-301 Competencies Checklist Form ES-301-6 Facility: Date of Examination: Operating Test No.:

APPLICANTS RO R1 / R2 R5 / R6 U1 / U2 SRO-I ATC / BOP BOP / ATC SRO-U Competencies SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 3 4 Interpret/Diagnose 2,3,4,5, 1,2,3,4, 2,3,4, 2,3,4,5, 3,5,6, 1,2,4, Events and Conditions 6,7,8,9 5,6,7,8, 7,8,9 7,8 7 6,7,8 Comply With and 1,2,3,4, 1,2,3,4, 2,3,4, 2,3,4,5, 1,3,5, 1,2,4, Use Procedures (1) 5,6,7,8, 5,6,7,8, 7 7,8 6,7 6,7,8 9

Operate Control 2,3,4. 2,3,4,5, 1,3,5, 1,2,4, Boards (2) 7,8,9 7,8 6,7 6,7,8 Communicate 1,2,3,4, 1,2,3,4, 2,3,4. 2,3,4,5, 3,5,6, 1,2,4, and Interact 5,6,7,8, 5,6,7,8, 7,8,9 7,8 7 6,7,8 9

Demonstrate 1,2,3,4, 1,2,3,4, Supervisory Ability (3) 5,6,7,8, 5,6,7,8, 9

Comply With and 2,3 4,5 Use Tech. Specs. (3)

Notes:

(1) Includes Technical Specification compliance for an RO.

(2) Optional for an SRO-U.

(3) Only applicable to SROs.

Instructions:

Check the applicants license type and enter one or more event numbers that will allow the examiners to evaluate every applicable competency for every applicant. (This includes all rating factors for each competency.) (Competency Rating factors as described on forms ES-303-1 and ES-303-3.)

ES-301 Competencies Checklist Form ES-301-6 Facility: Date of Examination: Operating Test No.:

APPLICANTS RO R3 / R4 R7 / R8 U3 / U4 SRO-I ATC / BOP BOP / ATC SRO-U Competencies SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 2 3 4 Interpret/Diagnose 2,3,4,5, 2,3,4,5, 2,3,4, 2,4,6,7, 3,5,6, 3,5,6, Events and Conditions 6,7,8,9 6,7,8,9 7,8,9 8 7 7,9 Comply With and 1,2,3,4, 1,2,3,4, 2,3,4, 1,2,4,6, 1,3,5, 3,5,6, Use Procedures (1) 5,6,7,8, 5,6,7,8, 7 7,8 6,7 7,9 9 9 Operate Control 2,3,4. 1,2,4,6, 1,3,5, 3,5,6, Boards (2) 7,8,9 7,8 6,7 7,9 Communicate 1,2,3,4, 1,2,3,4, 2,3,4. 1,2,4,6, 3,5,6, 3,5,6, and Interact 5,6,7,8, 5,6,7,8, 7,8,9 7,8 7 7,9 9 9 Demonstrate 1,2,3,4, 1,2,3,4, Supervisory Ability (3) 5,6,7,8, 5,6,7,8, 9 9 Comply With and 2,3 2,3 Use Tech. Specs. (3)

Notes:

(1) Includes Technical Specification compliance for an RO.

(2) Optional for an SRO-U.

(3) Only applicable to SROs.

Instructions:

Check the applicants license type and enter one or more event numbers that will allow the examiners to evaluate every applicable competency for every applicant. (This includes all rating factors for each competency.) (Competency Rating factors as described on forms ES-303-1 and ES-303-3.)

ES-301 Competencies Checklist Form ES-301-6 Facility: Date of Examination: Operating Test No.:

APPLICANTS I1 / I2 I3 I4 I5 SRO/ATC/BOP ATC/BOP/SRO ATC/SRO/SRO BOP/SRO/ATC Competencies SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO 2 3 4 2 3 4 2 3 4 2 3 4 Interpret/Diagnose 1,2, 3,5, 2,4, 1,2, 2,4, 1,2, 1,2, 2,3, 1,2, 2,3, 2,3, 3,5, Events and Conditions 3,4, 6,7, 5,7, 4,6, 6,7, 3,4, 4,6, 4,5, 3,4, 4,5, 4,5, 6,7, 5,6, 9 9 7,8 8 5,6, 7,8 6,7, 5,6, 7,8 6,7, 8,9 7,8, 7,8, 8,9 7,8, 8,9 9 9 Comply With and 1,2, 3,5, 1,2, 1,2, 1,2, 1,2, 1,2, 1,2, 1,2, 2,3, 1,2, 1,3, Use Procedures (1) 3,4, 6,7, 4,5, 4,6, 4,6, 3,4, 4,6, 3,4, 3,4, 4,5, 3,4, 5.6, 5,6, 9 6,9 7,8 7,8 5,6, 7,8 5,6, 5,6, 7,8 5,6, 7 7,8, 7,8, 7,8, 7,8, 7,8, 9 9 9 9 Operate Control 3,5, 2,5, 1,2, 1,2, 1,2, 2,3, 1,3, Boards (2) 6,7, 7,9 4,6, 4,6, 4,6, 4,5, 4,6, 9 7,8 7,8 7,8 7,8 7,8 Communicate 1,2, 3,5, 1,2, 1,2, 1,2, 1,2, 1,2, 1,2, 1,2, 2,3, 1,2, 1,3, and Interact 3,4, 6,7, 4,5, 4,6, 4,6, 3,4, 4,6, 3,4, 3,4, 4,5, 3,4, 4,5, 5,6, 9 7,9 7,8 7,8 5,6, 7,8 5,6, 5,6, 7,8 5,6, 6,7, 7,8, 7,8, 7,8, 7,8, 7,8, 8,9 9 9 9 9 Demonstrate 1,2, 1,2, 1,2, 1,2, 1,2, Supervisory Ability (3) 3,4, 3,4, 3,4, 3,4, 3,4, 5,6, 5,6, 5,6, 5,6, 5,6, 7,8, 7,8, 7,8, 7,8, 7,8, 9 9 9 9 Comply With and 4,5 2,6 2,3 2,6 2,3 Use Tech. Specs. (3)

Notes:

(1) Includes Technical Specification compliance for an RO.

(2) Optional for an SRO-U.

(3) Only applicable to SROs.

Instructions:

Check the applicants license type and enter one or more event numbers that will allow the examiners to evaluate every applicable competency for every applicant. (This includes all rating factors for each competency.) (Competency Rating factors as described on forms ES-303-1 and ES-303-3.)

ES-301 Competencies Checklist Form ES-301-6 Facility: Date of Examination: Operating Test No.:

APPLICANTS R9 BOP/BOP/ATC Competencies SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO 2 3 4 2 3 4 2 3 4 2 3 4 Interpret/Diagnose 2,3, 2,4, 1,3, Events and Conditions 4,5, 6,7, 5.6, 7,8 8 7,9 Comply With and 2,3, 1,2, 1,3, Use Procedures (1) 4,5, 4,6, 4,6, 7,8 7,8 7,8 Operate Control 2,3, 1,2, 1,3, Boards (2) 4,5, 4,6, 4,5, 7,8 7,8 6,7, 8

Communicate 2,3, 1,2, and Interact 4,5, 4,6, 7,8 7,8 Demonstrate Supervisory Ability (3)

Comply With and Use Tech. Specs. (3)

Notes:

(1) Includes Technical Specification compliance for an RO.

(2) Optional for an SRO-U.

(3) Only applicable to SROs.

Instructions:

Check the applicants license type and enter one or more event numbers that will allow the examiners to evaluate every applicable competency for every applicant. (This includes all rating factors for each competency.) (Competency Rating factors as described on forms ES-303-1 and ES-303-3.)

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: __ANO-1_________ Scenario No.: _____1_______ Op-Test No.: __2016-1_

Examiners: ___________________________ Operators: ____________________________

Initial Conditions: _100% power .

Turnover: ____100% power, Drain RB Sump to AUX Building Sump (This is NOT the first draining of the month)________________________________________________________

_P-3D Circulating Water Pump OOS for maintenance ____________________________________

Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description 1 BOP N Drain Reactor Building Sump 2 ATC I Pressurizer level fails high. (LT-1001)

SRO TS 3 All I OTSG Press fails high. (PT-2618A)

TS 4 ATC C E-3A Feedwater Heater tube leak 5 BOP C P-2A Condensate pump trip with a failure of the standby to auto start 6 BOP C Loss of 480 V Load Center B3 with a failure of C-5B to auto start 7 M Pressurizer steam space leak 8 ATC I Failure of ES Channel 2 to automatically actuate CT 9 ATC C RPS fails to trip and RX trip pushbutton fails.

CT

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (TS) Technical Specification, (CT) Critical Task

Scenario starts with plant power at 100%. During turnover the BOP will be directed to drain the Reactor Building Sump to the Auxiliary Building Sump. This will be completed with no malfunctions. After the sump draining is complete, LT-1001 - Pressurizer Level Transmitter will fail high causing two alarms (Hi Level and Hi HI Level) and results in the RCS Makeup Valve being demanded closed due to the false high level. The ATC / BOP will determine which transmitter has failed and the ATC will select a good signal for pressurizer level control. The CRS will also enter T.S. 3.3.15 (PAM) for the failed transmitter. Next, PT-2618A, the A Steam Generator Pressure Transmitter, fails high causing the associated Atmospheric Dump Valve (ADV) to open fully. An initial condition built into the scenario is leakby of the ADV Isolation Valve, so the open ADV will result in a steam release and power rise. A call from the field will prompt the crew to look at the components in the Pent House which should lead them to identifying the open ADV, if they havent already noticed prior to the call from the field. PT-2618A also impacts EFIC and will result in Channel A being INOPERABLE and the CRS will enter T.S. 3.3.11 for the inoperable channel. The BOP should be directed to place Channel A in Maintenance Bypass to comply with T.S. 3.3.11. Next, a tube leak in Feedwater Heater E-3A will result in a lowering of Main Feedwater Pump Suction (MFWP) and a rise in reactor power.

Power will stabilize at ~103% with no operator action. The crew should take action to maintain power <100%. Next a Condensate Pump (P-2A) will trip with a failure of the standby Condensate Pump to automatically start. The standby Condensate Pump (P-2C) can be manually started from the control room. The trip of P-2A will result in an automatic runback to 40% power. Following the runback a loss of the Non-Vital 480V Load Center (B3) will occur with a failure of C-5B, Condenser Vacuum Pump to automatically start. C-5B can be started manually from the control room. The major event occurs next and is a Pressurizer Steam Space Leak that results in a LOSM and an ESAS actuation. The size of the leak will result in pressure stabilizing around 1200 psig. During the ESAS actuation Channel 2 (HPI) will fail to actuate. Both trains of HPI are required to regain adequate SCM for the given leak size.

Therefore manual actuation of ES Channel 2 is a critical task. Additionally, RPS is failed and will not result in an automatic reactor trip, so the ATC will manually trip the reactor and this is also a critical step.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: __ANO-1_________ Scenario No.: _____2_______ Op-Test No.: __2016-1_

Examiners: ___________________________ Operators: ____________________________

Initial Conditions: _90% power .

Turnover: ____90% power clearance has been given by Ops Manager and Shift Manager to raise power to 95% power. __________________________________________________________

_P-75 Aux Feedwater Pump OOS for oil sample.________________________________________

Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description 1 ATC R Raise power to 95% using control rods 2 All C Trip of running Makeup Pump 3 BOP N Restore L/D 4 All I / TS NI-5 fails low 5 BOP C K01-C4 #2 EDG oil leak. #2 EDG declared INOPERABLE CRS TS 6 ATC I Seal Injection Flow Transmitter fails high 7 All M LOOP with failure of #1 EDG to automatically start BOP CT 8 All C MSSV fails open on A SG CT

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (TS) Technical Specification, (CT) Critical Task

This scenario starts with plant power at 90%. During turn over the crew was directed to raise power to 95%. Following the up power, the running Makeup Pump will trip. This results in a loss of makeup and seal injection. The BOP will start the standby Makeup Pump and the ATC will restore makeup and seal injection. The CRS will then direct the BOP to restore letdown flow. Next NI-5 power range indicator will fail low, this will have no immediate effect on the plant but does require the CRS to declare RPS Channel A INOPERABLE and entry into T.S. 3.3.1.

The BOP will place the RPS Channel A in Manual Bypass to comply with T.S. 3.3.1 Condition A.

Next a Critical Trouble Alarm on low oil pressure for the #2 EDG will alert the crew to a significant oil leak rendering the #2 EDG INOPERABLE. The CRS will enter T.S. 3.8.1 and should direct the BOP to place the EDG in Lock Out to prevent an automatic start. Next, the RSP Seal Injection Total Flow Recorder (FR-1239) will fail high which will cause the Seal Injection Flow Control Valve (CV-1239) to go closed. This will isolate seal injection and result in an alarm and rising seal bleedoff temperatures. The ATC will take manual control of CV-1239 and open it enough to restore 8-10 gpm flow to each RCP. Next, a Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP) will occur with a failure of the #1 EDG to automatically start requiring the BOP to manually start the #1 EDG (critical task) to provide power to the Red Train ES components.

Following the reactor trip a Main Steam Safety Valve (MSSV) on the A Steam Generator will fail open resulting in an overcooling and a transition to the Overcooling section in the Degraded Power EOP. Isolating the A Steam Generator is a critical task to stop the overcooling. Once the overcooling is stopped and temperature is being controlled the scenario is complete.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: __ANO-1_________ Scenario No.: _____3_______ Op-Test No.: __2016-1_

Examiners: ___________________________ Operators: ____________________________

Initial Conditions: _35% power ._

Turnover: ____35% power, P-34A Surveillance in progress and ready for pump start __

____________Pleasant Hill Line OOS, Breakers B5122 and B5148 Open to isolate the line. ____

Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description 1 BOP N Perform P-34A Surveillance 2 CRS TS P-34A Pump Trip 3 ATC C ERV leaking CRS TRM 4 BOP C Chill Water Pump Trip 5 ATC C RCS leak requiring a down power.

6 BOP I Main Turbine Controlling header pressure fails high ATC 7 All M RCS leak resulting in Rx trip and pressure dropping below 150 psig.

8 BOP C / CT CV-1400 fails to open automatically.

9 ATC CT ES Channels 5 and 6 fail to actuate

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (TS) Technical Specification, (CT) Critical Task

This scenario starts with plant power at 35%. During turnover the BOP is directed to complete a Decay Heat Pump (P-34A) surveillance already in progress. After starting the Decay Heat Pump and establishing the required flowrate P-34A shaft will shear requiring the BOP to diagnose the failure and stop the decay heat pump. The crew will declare P-34A INOPERABLE and the CRS will enter T.S. 3.5.2 Condition A (ECCS). Next, Pressurizer ERV will start leaking which will require the ATC to recognize that the RCS pressure is below the ERV setpoint and he will close the isolation valve, the CRS will enter TRO 3.4.2 Condition A for the RCS Vent Path.

Next the Main Chillers Chilled Water Pump will trip which will result in a Reactor Building temperature rise. The BOP will place Service Water Cooling to the Reactor Building Cooling Units in service while the Auxiliary AO works on recovering the chilled water pump. Next, an RCS leak will begin to develop and continue to degrade. Initial response will require a downpower to take the unit off line. During the downpower, the main turbine controlling header pressure instrument will fail resulting in the Main Turbine failing to respond correctly. The BOP will take manual control of the Main Turbine and the ATC will be required to close TBVs that responded to the failed high pressure. The downpower will be continued after the crew selects the good header pressure transmitter and return the Main Turbine to ICS Auto. They will proceed with the downpower using the SG/RX to manually control the shutdown rate. The RCS leak will degrade to the point resulting in an automatic reactor trip and RCS pressure stabilizing below 150 psig which will result in a LOSM and a transition to the ESAS EOP. CV-1400, (B LPI Isolation valve) will fail to open on ES Channel 4 actuation, a critical task will be for the BOP to identify the failure and manually open CV-1400 to provide the only available LPI flow. The RCS leak will also cause Reactor Building pressure to exceed the setpoint for ES Channels 5 and 6, these channels will fail to actuate and the ATC will have a critical task of manually actuating these channels in order to provide Reactor Building Isolation.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: __ANO-1_________ Scenario No.: _____4_______ Op-Test No.: __2016-1_

Examiners: ___________________________ Operators: ____________________________

Initial Conditions: _100% power, P-7B EFW Pump OOS _

Turnover: ____100% power, P-7B EFW Pump OOS, Group 7 rods at 95% ___________________

Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description 1 ATC R Dilute rods in 2%

2 BOP C CFT Pressure high CRS TS 3 ATC I B Steam Generator S/U Level Fails Low.

BOP 4 ATC C P-8A Trips requiring down power to 70%

5 BOP I Turbine stops responding to down power 6 All C RCP Seal Cooler leak TS 7 All M Condensate system leak results in a loss of all MFW and Reactor trip 8 ATC I Failure of EFIC to actuate CT 9 BOP C P-7A Trip resulting in transition to Overheating EOP CT

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (TS) Technical Specification, (CT) Critical Task

This scenario begins with plant power at 100% and Group 7 rods at 96%. During turnover the crew is directed to dilute and insert rods 2% (Approximately 4 ppm dilution). After the dilution is started, the CFT (Core Flood Tank) pressure will rise above the T.S. limit which will require entry into T.S. 3.5.1 Condition B. The BOP will be directed to vent tank pressure off. After venting the CFT, the B Steam Generator S/U Level will fail low. The ATC will have to identify the failure, he will then place the B MFW Pump H/A Station to HAND, the BOP will verify the other channel reading properly and the BOP will select the NNI-Y channel. After the MFW Pump control is back in automatic, a Heater Drain Pump (P-8A) will trip which requires a rapid downpower to 70% (10%/min) during this time the Main Turbine will stop responding to the downpower requiring manual action by the BOP to balance the plant and continue with the downpower. After the downpower is complete, an RCP Seal Cooler leak will develop requiring entry into T.S. 3.4.13 for RCS Leakage and taking the unit off line. The major event will begin with a large Condensate System leak which will result in the loss of both Main Feedwater Pumps and prevent the use of the Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (P-75). EFIC will fail to actuate EFW requiring the ATC to complete the actuation (critical task). This will result in P-7A being the only source of feed since P-7B was out of service as indicated in the initial conditions. Next, the steam driven EFW pump P-7A will trip which will require a critical action of the BOP to initiate HPI Cooling.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: __ANO-1_________ Scenario No.: _____5_______ Op-Test No.: __2016-1_

Examiners: ___________________________ Operators: ____________________________

Initial Conditions: _60% power, ICS runback defeated, EH Oil Pump auto start defeated _

Turnover: ____60% Power, Swap Condensate Pumps _______________________________

_____________P-28A - A MFWP Emergency Lube Oil Pump OOS.________________________

Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description 1 BOP N Swap Condensate Pumps 2 BOP I Gland Steam Pressure Controller fails closed 3 ATC C Dropped rod in Group 6 CRS TS 4 ATC I ICS signal to A MFW Pump fails low 5 BOP C EH Oil Pump trips with failure of the standby pump to auto start 6 All C / TS SG Tube Leak requiring shutdown 7 All M / CT SG Tube Rupture 8 ATC C / CT 2 Stuck Rods post trip 9 ATC CT Commence C/D 10 ATC C TBVs fail closed

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (TS) Technical Specification, (CT) Critical Task

This scenario starts with plant power at 60%. During turnover the BOP will be directed to swap the in service Condensate Pumps. Following the pump swap the Gland Sealing Steam Pressure Controller will fail closed resulting in lowering condenser vacuum. The BOP will throttle open the pressure regulator bypass valve to regain sealing steam to the main turbine.

Next, a rod will drop in (Group 6 Rod 3) which should result in a plant runback to 40% but the automatic runback fails which will require the ATC to manually lower power to 40% using the SG/RX station. After power is reduced to 40%, the ICS signal to the A MFW Pump will fail low which will lower Feedwater flow to the A SG. The ATC will trip the A MFW Pump and verify flow to both steam generators. Next, the running EH Oil Pump will trip with a failure of the standby pump to automatically start. The BOP will be able to manually start the standby EH Oil Pump from the control room to prevent a turbine trip. Then a small steam generator tube leak will develop in excess of the T.S. limit requiring a plant shutdown. The major event will be an escalation of the tube leak to a Tube Rupture. Post trip there will be two stuck rods which will require emergency boration which is a critical task. The second critical task is to commence a cooldown and depressurization. Initially the TBVs will be utilized for the cooldown in order to reduce the tube leak by lowering the dp between the RCS and the secondary side of the steam generator. Once the cooldown is in progress Condenser Vacuum will degrade to the point where the TBVs are interlocked closed, this will require a transition to the ADVs in order to continue the cooldown. The scenario will complete once the cooldown is re-established on the ADVs.