ML16161A977
| ML16161A977 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 05/02/1988 |
| From: | Cunningham A, Decker T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML16161A978 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-269-88-09, 50-269-88-9, 50-270-88-09, 50-270-88-9, 50-287-88-09, 50-287-88-9, NUDOCS 8805110265 | |
| Download: ML16161A977 (18) | |
See also: IR 05000269/1988009
Text
0 pkREGj
UNITED STATES
o
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323
Report Nos.:
50-269/88-09, 50-270/88-09, 50-287/88-09
Licensee:
Duke Power Company
422 South Church Street
Charlotte, NC
28242
Docket Nos.:
50-269, 50-270,
License Nos.:
50-287
Facility Name:
Oconee Nuclear Station
Inspection Conducted. ,'April 13-15', 1988
Inspector:
Z
_
_
_,
A. L. Cunnin wm
/DateSigned
Accompanying Personnel: B. Bonser
A. Gooden
W. Orders
_M.
Stei
Approved by:__
___S
T. R. Decker, Section Chief
Date Signed
Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards
SUMMARY
Scope:
This routine, announced inspection involved observation and evaluation
of the annual radiological emergency preparedness exercise.
Results:
No violations or deviations were identified; however, an exercise
weakness addressing emergency classification was identified (Paragraph 8).
8805110265 880502
ADOCK
0 5000269
REPORT DETAILS
1. Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
- M. Tuckman, Station Manager
- R. Sweigant, Superintendent, Operations
- L. Wilkie, Superintendent, Integrated Services
- J. Davis, Superintendent, Technical Services
- W. Foster, Superintendent, Maintenance
R. Roach, Administrative Supervisor
- R. Harris, System Emergency Planner
- B. McRee, Corporate Emergency Planner
- C. Jennings, Site Emergency Coordinator
T. Kelley, Fire Protection Specialist
- R. Leonard, McGuire Emergency Planner
- D. Simpson, Catawba Emergency Planner
R. Smith, Analytical Support Supervisor
- F. Owens, Compliance Shift Supervisor
S. Bryant, Nuclear Security Specialist
- S. Adams, Corporate Communications
- R. Bowman, Corporate Communications
- C. Younge, Station Health Physicist
Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen,
engineers, technicians, operators, mechanics, security office members, and
office personnel.
NRC Resident Inspector
- P.
Skinner
- Attended exit interview
2. Exit Interview
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on April 15,
1988, with
those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above. The inspector described the
areas evaluated and discussed in detail the inspection findings listed
herein.
Particular emphasis was directed toward the exercise weakness
discussed in Paragraph 8, below.
No dissenting comments were received
from the licensee.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of
the material
provided to or reviewed by the inspector during this
inspection.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters
No previous emergency preparedness enforcement matters remained
outstanding.
2
4. Exercise Scenario (82301)
The scenario for the emergency exercise was reviewed to assure that
provisions were made to test the integrated capability and a major portion
of the basic elements defined in the licensee's emergency plan and
organization pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), Paragraph IV.F of Appendix E
to 10 CFR 50,
and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.N of
The scenario was reviewed in advance of the exercise and discussed in
detail with licensee representatives on several occasions. While no major
scenario problems were identified, several inconsistencies became apparent
during the exercise. The inconsistencies, however, failed to detract from
the overall performance of the licensee's emergency organization.
The scenario developed for this exercise was detailed, and fully exercised
the onsite emergency organization.
The scenario provided sufficient
information to the State, counties, local government and Federal agencies
consistent with the scope of their participation in the exercise.
The
licensee demonstrated a significant commitment to training and personnel
through use of controllers, evaluators, and specialists participating in
the exercise. The controllers provided adequate guidance throughout the
exercise. Neither prompting nor undue interaction between controllers and
players was observed.
The scenario developed for the fire drill adequately exercised the
participating groups of the licensee's organization and the offsite
support agency.
The plant Fire Brigade, Medical Emergency Response Team
(MERT),
and assigned security demonstrated effective training in their
integrated approach to management and control of the simulated fire, and
interaction with the offsite fire department assisting them during the
drill.
Neither prompting nor undue interaction between controllers and
players was observed during the drill.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5. Assignment of Responsibility (82301)
This area was observed to assure that primary responsibilities for
emergency response by the licensee were specifically established, and that
adequate staff was available to respond to an emergency pursuant to 10 CFR
50.47(b)(1),
Paragraph IV.A of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50,
and specific
guidance promulgated in Section II.A of NUREG-0654.
The inspector observed that specific emergency assignments were made for
the licensee's emergency response organization, and that adequate staff
was available to respond to the simulated emergency. The initial response
organization
was augmented
by designated licensee representatives;
however,
because of the scenario scope and conditions, long-term or
continuous staffing of the emergency response organization was not
required.
Discussions with licensee representatives and detailed review
3
of the site Radiological Emergency Plan indicated that a sufficient number
of trained technical personnel were available for continuous staffing of
the augmented emergency organization, if needed.
The inspector also observed activation, staffing, and operation of the
emergency organization in the Technical Support Center
(TSC)
and
Operations Support Center (OSC).
The Corporate Management Center was not
activated during this exercise. The required staffing and assignment of
responsibility at the activated facilities were consistent with the
licensee's Emergency Plan and approved Implementing Procedures.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Onsite Emergency Organization (82301)
The licensee's onsite emergency organization was observed to assure that
the
following
requirements
were
implemented
pursuant
to
Paragraph IV.A of Appendix E to 10 CFR
50,
and
specific
guidance
promulgated in Section II.B
of NUREG-0654:
(1) unambiguous definition of responsibilities for emergency response;
(2) provision of adequate staffing to assure initial facility accident
response in key functional areas at all times; (3) specification of onsite
and offsite support organizational interactions.
The inspector observed that the initial onsite emergency organization wa's
adequately defined, and that staff was available to fill
key functional
positions within the organization. Augmentation of the initial emergency
response organization was accomplished through use of onshift personnel.
An assigned Shift Supervisor assumed the duties of Emergency Coordinator
promptly upon initiation of the simulated emergency,
and directed the
response until formally relieved by the Station Manager.
Required interactions between the licensee's emergency response
organization and State and local support agencies were adequate and
consistent with the scope and objectives.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Emergency Response Support and Resources (82301)
This area was observed to determine that arrangements for requesting and
effectively using assistance resources had been made, that arrangements to
accommodate State and local staff at the licensee's near-site Emergency
Operations Facility had been made, and that other organizations capable of
augmenting the planned response had been identified as required by 10 CFR
50.47(b)(3), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.A, and specific criteria
in NUREG-0654,Section II.C.
The State of South Carolina's involvement in the subject annual emergency
preparedness exercise was limited to partial participation.
Oconee and
Pickens Counties, however, fully participated in the exercise.
4
Representatives of the State and above cited counties were accommodated in
the licensee's onsite News Media Center.
Licensee contact with offsite
organizations was prompt, effective, and consistent with the scope and
objectives of the exercise.
Assistance resources from State and local
agencies were available to the licensee consistent with the scope of their
participation in the exercise.
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Emergency Classification System (82301)
This area was observed to assure that a standard emergency classification
and action level scheme was in use by the nuclear facility licensee
pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), Paragraph IV.C of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50,
specific guidance promulgated in Section II.D of NUREG-0654, and guidance
recommended in NRC Information Notice 83-28.
An Emergency Action Level matrix and respective procedures were used to
identify and classify an emergency and escalate the plant stafus to more
severe emergency classifications as the simulated accident sequence
progressed.
The
inspector observed,
however,
that the initial
classification of Alert was incorrect, although it was based on a valid
Emergency Action Level, namely, a LOCA greater than 50 gpm. At the time
of the Alert declaration, it was also observed, that consistent with the
scenario,
the control rods remained withdrawn despite the concurrent
existence of the following conditions:
(1) reactor high pressure trip
signals were present due to loss of steam generator feed; (2) control rods
were manually tripped from the control board; (3) conversely, attempts to
manually insert the control rods failed; and (4), the NEOs were ordered to
open the control rod breakers.
In accordance with Enclosure 4.1.5 to
Procedure RP/0/B/1000/01,
Loss of Shutdown Functions, the appropriate
declaration should
have been Site Area Emergency,
based upon the
following:
two or more RPS channels tripped; and control rods remained
withdrawn and could neither be manually tripped nor inserted.
These
findings were discussed in detail with cognizant licensee representatives
both prior to and during the exercise critique. Licensee representatives
were informed that the subject findings constituted an exercise weakness.
Exercise
Weakness
50-269/88-09-01,
50-270/88-09-01,
50-287/99-09-01:
Incorrect classification of an emergency declaration. A response to the
finding will be made by the licensee following receipt of the subject
inspection report.
No violations or deviations were identified.
9. Notification Methods and Procedures (82301)
This area was observed to assure that procedures were established for
notification of State and local response organizations and emergency
personnel by the licensee, and that the content of initial and followup
5
messages to response organizations were established.
This area was
further observed to assure that means to provide early notification to the
populace within the plume exposure pathway were established pursuant to
Paragraph IV.D of Appendix E to
10 CFR
50,
and
specific guidance promulgated in Section II.E of NUREG-0654.
The inspector observed that notification methods and procedures were
established and available for use in providing information regarding the
simulated emergency conditions to Federal,
State,
and local response
organizations, and to alert the licensee's augmented emergency response
organization. Notification of the State of South Carolina, and designated
local offsite organizations was completed within 15 minutes following
declaration of all emergency classifications involved.
The prompt
notification system
(PNS)
for alerting the public within the plume
exposure pathway EPZ was actuated during this exercise.
No violations or deviations were identified.
10.
Emergency Communications (82301)
This area was observed to assure that provisions existed for prompt
communications
among principal response organizations and emergency
personnel pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(6),
Paragraph IV.E of Appendix E to
and specific guidance promulgated
in Section II.F of
The inspectors observed communications within and between the licensee's
emergency facilities, the licensee and offsite agencies,
and the
radiological field monitoring teams and the TSC.
Inspectors also observed
information flow among the various groups within the licensee's emergency
organization.
Emergency communications involving notification of the
State, local agencies, and the NRC of emergency classifications discussed
above, were adequate and consistent with the Radiological Emergency Plan
and Implementing Procedures.
Communications between the TSC and radiological field monitoring teams was
evaluated and determined to be adequate. Communications, once established
with each team,
was good throughout the exercise.
In those instances
where teams were unable to communicate directly with the TSC due to
building structures or topography, information was transmitted via relay
to teams close to the TSC.
No violations or deviations were identified.
11.
Emergency Facilities and Equipment (82301)
This area was observed to assure that adequate emergency facilities and
equipment to support an emergency response were provided and maintained
pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8), Paragraph IV.E of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50,
and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.H of NUREG-0654.
6
The inspectors observed activation, staffing, and operation of the
emergency response facilities, and use of the equipment therein.
Facilities used by the licensee during the exercise included the Control
Room (Simulator), TSC, and OSC. The Corporate Management Center (CMC) was
not activated during this exercise. Note also that the Simulator was used
in lieu of an assigned unit Control Room; however, the term Control Room
will be used throughout the subject Inspection Report.
a. Control
Room -
The Control Room was used and effectively managed
throughout the exercise.
The inspector observed that following
review and analysis of the sequence of accident events, Control Room
operations personnel acted promptly to initiate required responses to
the simulated emergency.
Emergency
procedures were readily
available, routinely followed, and factored into accident assessment
and mitigation exercises.
Control
personnel
involvement was essentially limited to those
personnel assigned routine and special operational duties. Effective
management of personnel gaining access to the Control Room precluded
overcrowding,
and maintained an ambient noise level req'uired for
orderly conduct of operations under emergency conditions.
Control
Room personnel
were cognizant of their duties
responsibilities, and authorities. The staff demonstrated proficient
use of routine operating and emergency operating procedures (EOPs) in
response to plant transients and emergency conditions.
Note,
however, that the initial emergency event declared was incorrectly
classified as an Alert.
Consistent with the sequence of scenario
events, and Enclosure 4.1.5 to Procedure RP/O/B/1000/01, the correct
classification should have been Site Area Emergency.
This item is
fully discussed in Paragraph 8, above.
It was observed that data and information provided during the course
of the exercise sequence and conditions were readily managed by the
Emergency Coordinator and the Control Room staff in implementing
appropriate actions in a timely manner.
The Control Room staff
demonstrated the capability to effectively assess the initial
conditions and implement required mitigating actions.
It
was
observed that a bound log was provided and maintained for documenting
plant conditions and activities of the Emergency Coordinator and
cognizant Shift Supervisor throughout the exercise.
b. Technical Support Center - The TSC was activated and promptly staffed
following notification by the Emergency Coordinator of the simulated
emergency conditions leading to the apparent Alert classification
(refer to Paragraph 8, above).
The facility staff appeared to be
cognizant
of
their
emergency
duties,
authorities,
and
responsibilities.
Required operations at the facility proceeded in
an orderly manner. The facility was provided with adequate equipment
for support of the assigned staff.
TSC security was promptly
established and maintained.
Security maintained a log or otherwise
7
accounted for all personnel assigned to the facility.
Dedicated
communicators were assigned to the facility and maintained all status
boards current.
Effective communications were maintained with the
Control Room and OSC.
Inspection disclosed the following additional findings,
namely:
(1) engineering, maintenance, and other technical support functions
were readily implemented and factored into problem solving exercises;
(2) assumption of duties by the Emergency Coordinator was definite
and firm; (3) transfer of certain emergency responsibilities from the
Control Room to the TSC was promptly implemented; (4) briefings of
the TSC staff were frequent, and consistent with changes in plant
status and related emergency conditions; and (5) accountability,
including identifying missing personnel,
was readily implemented
within the accepted time regime and was consistent with the scope and
objectives of the scenario.
c. Operations Support Center - The OSC.was promptly staffed following
activation of the Emergency Plan by the Emergency Coordinator.
An
inspector observed that teams were promptly assembled, briefed, and
dispatched.
The OSC Supervisor appeared to be cognizant of his
duties and responsibilities. The OSC staff was frequently updated on
plant status and impact of the accident sequence by the
Supervisor. Status boards defining the following were maintained and
frequently updated:
(1) emergency classification and specific plant
status; (2) listings of investigative/repair teams, their respective
tasks, time of deployment/reentry, and return to the facility.
No violations or deviations were identified.
12.
Accident Assessment (82301)
This area was observed to assure that adequate methods,
systems,
and
equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite
consequences of a radiological emergency condition were in use as required
Paragraph IV.B of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50,
and
specific guidance promulgated in NUREG-0654,Section II.I.
The accident assessment program included an engineering assessment of
plant status,
and an assessment of radiological hazards to onsite and
offsite personnel resulting from the accident. During the exercise, the
engineering accident assessment team functioned effectively in analyzing
plant status to provide recommendations to the Emergency Coordinator
concerning mitigating actions required to reduce damage to plant systems
and equipment,
mitigation of releases of radioactive materials,
and
termination of the emergency condition.
Radiological assessment activities involved several groups.
An inplant
group estimated the radiological impact within the plant based upon
inplant monitors and onsite measurements.
Field radiological monitoring
teams
were dispatched by the licensee to determine the level of
8
radioactivity in those areas within the influence of the plume,
and
provide data for determining dose projections derived therefrom.
Dose assessment and projections were conducted in the TSC based upon data
derived
from
inplant
leakage
sources,
and offsite radiological
measurements conducted by field monitoring teams.
The inspector assigned
to evaluate offsite radiological monitoring teams observed two of the six
teams deployed by the licensee.
The referenced teams observed were
designated as Sampling Van No. 1, and Survey Team Charlie, respectively.
Field monitoring
personnel
demonstrated acceptable health physics
practices and contamination control in conducting field measurements and
sample analysis.
Personnel readily located sampling points, and promptly
reported monitoring results and data to the TSC.
Additional findings
disclosed that sampling and monitoring vehicles provided adequate
accomodations for personnel and assigned equipment. The findings listed
below were also disclosed.
a.
Communications problems were observed during commencement of the
exercise; however,
the problems were promptly resolved ,either by
equipment replacement and/or personnel awareness of operation of
radio equipment.
b. Prior to offsite deployment,
Sample Van No.
1 personnel were not
briefed regarding plant status/conditions, meteorological data, radio
channel(s) designated for emergency communication, acceptable health
physics practices and contamination control, and other information
deemed essential to assure effective completion of their assigned
mission.
The latter finding defined above was discussed in detail with cognizant
licensee representatives prior to and during the exercise critique
conducted on April 15, 1988.
The licensee was informed that the subject
finding would be reviewed during subsequent exercises.
The licensee
stated that the item would be reviewed and corrective actions taken where
indicated.
Inspector Followup Item 50-269/88-09-02, 50-270/88-09-02, 50-287/88-09-02:
Briefing of offsite monitoring/sampling
teams prior to deployment to
assigned offsite areas.
No violations or deviations were identified.
13.
Protective Response (82301)
This area was observed to determine that guidelines established for
protective actions were developed and in place,
and that protective
actions for emergency workers including evacuation of non-essential
personnel,
are promptly implemented pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10) and
specific guidance promulgated in NUREG-0654,Section II.J.
0
9
The protective measures decisionmaking process was observed by the
inspector.
Recommendations implemented by the TSC staff were timely,
effective, and consistent with the above criteria.
Protective measures
recommendations were provided by the licensee to the State of South
Carolina as part of the exercise.
It
was noted that the protective
actions recommended by the staff were concurred in and implemented by the
State and participating counties.
No violations or deviations were identified.
14.
Radiological Exposure Control (82301)
This area was observed to determine that methods for controlling
radiological exposures in an emergency were established and implemented
for emergency workers, and that these methods included exposure guidelines
consistent with EPA recommendations pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(11),
and
specific guidance promulgated in Section II.K of NUREG-0654.
An inspector noted that radiological exposures were controlleo throughout
the exercise by issuing supplemental dosimeters to emergency workers and
by conducting periodic radiological surveys in the emergency response
facilities.
Exposure guidelines were in place for various categories of
emergency actions.
Adequate
protective clothing and respiratory
protection were available for use as required. Consistent with the scope
of the exercise,
use of repiratory protection equipment by emergency
response teams was simulated, except during the fire drill.
Health Physics control of radiation exposure, contamination control, and
radiation area access appeared adequate. Note, however, that the offsite
monitoring team assigned to Sample Van No. 1 was not briefed regarding
exposure control or any other items.
This finding is discussed in
PaUagraph 12
above.
Health physics specialists were observed to
thoroughly brief OSC teams prior to their deployment.
Health physics
personnel accompanied each repair/investigative team deployed. Dosimetry
was available and was used.
High range dosimeters were also available in
case they were needed.
No violations or deviations were identified.
15.
Public Education and Information (82301)
This area was observed to assure that information concerning the simulated
emergency was made available for dissemination to the public pursuant to
(7),
Paragraph IV.D of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50,
and
specific guidnace promulgated in Section II.G of NUREG-0654.
Public information was not evaluated during the subject exercise.
No violations or deviations were identified.
10
16. Exercise Critique (82301)
The licensee's critique of the emergency exercise was observed to
determine that shortcomings identified as part of the exercise, were
brought to the attention of management and documented for corrective
action pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14),
Paragraph IV.F of Appendix E to
10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated
in Section II.N of
A formal critique was held on April 15,
1988, with licensee management,
controllers, evaluators,
and NRC representatives.
Findings identified
during the exercise and designated for licensee corrective action were
discussed. Licensee action on identified findings will be reviewed during
subsequent inspections.
The conduct and content of the critique were
consistent with regulatory criteria and specific guidance cited above.
The NRC Evaluation Team also observed the licensee's Controller/Evaluator
critique conducted immediately following the exercise on April 14, 1988.
Inspection disclosed that the subject critique was comprehensive,
and
addressed activation, detailed operation and required functions of the
emergency response facilities, events analysis and mitigation,
dose
assessment and projection, protective action recommendations,
fire and
medical emergency drills, and field monitoring.
All deficiencies and
indicated improvements were fully discussed and documented by licensee
representatives,
and prepared for presentation at the formal critique
discussed above. These findings and respective corrective actions will be
routinely reviewed
by the NRC during the subsequent inspections and
radiological emergency preparedness exercises.
17.
Followup Items (92703)
(Closed)
(50-269/87-43-01,
50-270/88-43-01,
50-287/87-43-01):
Failure to demonstrate
adequate radio communications with offsite
radiological environmental field teams.
Inspection of communications
between assigned field teams throughout the exercise disclosed that
communications were adequate.
(Closed)
IFI
(50-269/87-43-02, 50-270/87-43-02, 50-287/87-43-02):
Excessive prompting by controllers in Simulator-Control Room. Inspection
disclosed an absence of prompting and
undue interaction between
controllers and players.
(Closed)
IFI (50-269/87-43-03,
50-270/87-43-03,
50-287/87-43-03):
Failure to maintain
an adequate Control
Room logbook.
Inspection
disclosed that a bound log book was provided and effectively used to
record plant conditions and selected entries of Emergency Coordinator and
cognizant Shift Supervisor during the exercise.
(Closed)
IFI (50-269/87-43-04, 50-270/87-43-04, 50-287/87-43-04):
Radiological contamination control at the OSC and TSC.
Inspection
disclosed that radiological contamination control at the cited facilities
was proper and consistent with the scope of the exercise.
Friskers were
located at controlled entrances to the cited facilities.
18. Federal Evaluation Team Report
The report by the Federal Evaluation Team (Regional Assistance Committee
and Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region IV staff) concerning the
activities of offsite agencies during this exercise will be forwarded by
separate correspondence.
Attachment:
Exercise Scope and Objectives
Oconee Nuclear Station
1988 Exercise
SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES
A.
Scope
The 1988 Oconee Nuclear Station exercise
is
designed
to
meet the exercise requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix E,
Section IV.F.
The Duke Power Technical Support Center,
Operational
Support
Center,
and
control
room
will
participate fully. The Duke Power Crisis Management Center
will not participate except as needed to support realistic
participation by other organizations.
Oconee and Pickens
Counties will particpate fully and the State of South
Carolina will participate on a partial basis.
On April 14,
1988,
a simulated radiological accident will
be held to test the integrated capabilities and a major
portion of the basic elements within the emergency plans
and organizations.
This exercise will simulpte emergency
conditions which would require response by the on-site
emergency organizations. Exercise objectives are provided
in Section I.B.
A formal critique involving Duke Power,
NRC,
and selected
observers will be held April 15, 1988.
This critique will
be closed to the public and will be held in
the Oconee
Nuclear Station Administration Building, Room A-213.
B.
Exercise Objectives
1.
Demonstrate
the
ability
to
declare
emergency
classification in accordance with procedures.
2.
Demonstrate the ability to notify the State and the
counties
within
15
minutes
after
declaring
an
emergency
or
after
changing
the
emergency
classification.
3.
Demonstrate the ability to alert, notify, and staff
the TSC and OSC facilities after declaring an Alert or
higher emergency class.
4.
Demonstrate the ability to notify NRC not later than 1
hour after declaring one of the emergency classes.
5.
Demonstrate assembly of station personnel within 30
minutes
in
a
simulated
emergency
and
provide
accountability for any not present at the assembly
locations.
6.
Demonstrate access control measures to the plant site.
7.
Test communications equipment among on-site emergency
facilities including plant extensions,
intercoms,
and
the on-site radio system.
8.
Test off-site communications equipment to the counties
and state and to NRC including the Selective Signaling
System, outside telephone lines, and the NRC Emergency
Notification System.
9.
Test the adequacy and operability of emergency
equipment/supplies.
10.
Demonstrate precise and clear transfer of
responsibility
from
the
Shift
Supervisor
in
the
Control Room to the Emergency Coordinator in the TSC.
11.
Demonstrate proper use of the message format and
authentication methodology for messages transmitted to
states and counties.
12.
Demonstrate the ability to provide data to the TSC and
OSC in accordance with station procedures.
13.
Evaluate the adequacy of the following assessment
tools:
1. Drawings
2. Data Display Boards
3. Maps
14.
Demonstrate the ability to continuously monitor and
control emergency worker exposure.
15.
Demonstrate the ability to determine on-site radiation
levels and airborne radioiodine concentrations.
16.
Demonstrate the ability to develop off-site dose
projections in accordance with procedures.
17.
Demonstrate adequate radio communications between the
off-site monitoring teams and the TSC.
18.
Demonstrate the ability to locate a simulated,
radioactive
plume
and
to
measure
the
off-site
radiation levels.
19.
Demonstrate the ability to provide timely and
appropriate
protective
action
recommendations
to
off-site
officials
in
accordance
with
station
procedures.
20.
Demonstrate the ability to assess the incident and
provide mitigation
strategies
in
accordance
with
station procedures.
21.
Demonstrate the adequacy of response to a medical
injury involving contamination with transport to an
off-site
medical
facility.
(Contamination
and/or
radiation consequences.)
22.
Demonstrate adequacy of response to a fire outside the
protected area utilizing volunteer fire support (April
13, 1988 -
separate drill).
23.
Demonstrate the ability to effect an orderly
evacuation of non-essential personnel.
24.
Demonstrate the ability to provide accurate
information to the news media in a timely manner.
\\reh\\scope&.obj
DUKE POWER COMPANY
OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION
ANNUAL EERCISE 88-2
INITIAL CONDITIONS:
1. Unit 2 @ cold shutdown and Unit 3 @ 100% - No major problems
2. Unit 1 @ 55% due to lB FDW Pump work. lB feedwater pump isolated and
and drained for repair for suction relief valve repair.
3. Unit 1 currently operating with some failed fuel (current levels).
4. 1LWD-2 (Liquid Waste Discharge) has been disassembled for repair of
clogged line.
This has placed the unit under a 4 hr. Limiting
Condition for Operation per T.S. 3.6.3.C beginning at 1130.
5. Unit 1 Personnel Hatch Leak Rate Test in progress.
Building entry was made to check some penetration valves the
previous day at 1300 hrs. Unit is under a 72 hr. Limiting Condition
for Operation.
SEQUENCE OF EVENTS:
1215
Performance notifies Unit 1 Supervisor that the Unit 1
Personnel Hatch has failed the Leak Rate Test
1230
The following items occur:
1) Rod 4 GP6 ejects from core
2) Reactor Protective System or Operators attempt to trip
Reactor, but rods do not drop
3) Emergency boration is initiated; "lB" HPI (High Pressure
Injection) Header flow indication is failed to "0".
4) Operators attempt to manually drive rods, but all control
power to rods is lost. This prevents driving rods into
core.
1230:30
The following items occur:
1) "lA" Main Feedwater Pump Trips - causing a loss of Main
2) All Emergency Feedwater Pumps start - no problems
3) Reactor Coolant System Pressure & Temperature will increase
to Power Operated Relief Valve set point and lift the Power
Operated Relief Valve. Reactor Coolant System Pressure
will continue to increase and lift the Pressurizer Code
Relief Valves @ 2400 psi.
1232
Operators arrive at Control Rod Drive Breakers in the Cable
Room but are unsuccessful at tripping breakers.
Aux. Bldg. RIA's (Radiation Monitors) should be increasing to
alarm setpoints.
1235
1) Operators deenergize Control Rod Drives at the 600 V. load
centers 1X9 and 2X1.
Control Rods fall into core taking
Reactor sub-critical. Reactor .Coolant System pressure rapidly
decreases below Power Operated Relief Valve setpoint. RC-66
closes.
- J
DUKE POWER COMPANY
OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION
ANNUAL EKRCISE 88-2
Page 2
1237
A loud noise is heard by Maintenance Crew in Room 61 where the
repair to 1 LWD-2 is taking place. Maintenance calls Control
Room to report an injury and high and increasing rad levels
in Room 61.
They have reported steam and air coming through
the 1 LWD-2 piping.
1245
Site Area Emergency declared.
1300-1315 Both 'A' Steam Generator Start Up levels (ICS) fail low. This
should not present an immediate problem due to Emergency
Feedwater in operation. This failure will occur prior to
reestablishing main feedwater.
1320-1345 General Emergency declared. Plant site should be evacuated
of non-essential personnel.
1345
The following items occur:
1) Fire alarm received in Control Room-Group 6 Pyra Alarm
(Detector 6B over 1TC)
2) 1X8 Deenergizes because feeder breaker on 1TC to 1X8 inter
nally faults
3) 1XS1 becomes deenergized
4) Fire Brigade may be dispatched
1355
Fire Brigade or operator arrives at 1TC Switchgear. No fire
but lingering smoke.
1TC Breaker to 1X8 is scorched.
1355
Operations should then begin making lineups necessary to
power up 1XS1 from 1X9 if they determine there is no fault
on 1XS1.
1400
Status:
1) Maint. should be repairing Reactor Building Personnel Hatch
2) Maint. should be putting a closure-plate on 1LWD-2 piping.
3) Operations should be cooling down plant to Low Pressure
Injection normal decay heat removal.
4) Operations should be reenergizing 1X81 so that Low
Pressure Injection can be put on.
1400
If Chemistry samples are taken at 1245, results would
show 3% failed Fuel. Rate of Fuel Failure from 1245 until
stopping all Reactor Coolant Pumps is 0.25% per 15 minutes.
DUKE POWER COMPANY
OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION
ANNUAL EERCISE 88-2
Page 3
To be completed prior to exercise close-out:
1. Unit placed on normal decay heat removal with system depress
in progress.
2. Reactor Building leaks should be repaired to stop offsite
release.