ML16138A659
| ML16138A659 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 04/21/1989 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML16138A658 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8905080170 | |
| Download: ML16138A659 (3) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO.173 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-38 AMENDMENT NO.173 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-47 AMENDMENT NO.170 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-55 DUKE POWER COMPANY OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION, UNITS 1, 2 AND 3 DOCKET NOS. 50-269, 50-270 AND 50-287
1.0 INTRODUCTION
By letters dated October 13, 1986, and December 22, 1988, Duke Power Company (Duke or the licensee) submitted an application proposing revisions to the common Oconee Nuclear Station (0NS) Technical Specifications (TSs) on the testing requirements of certain containment isolation valves. The application would revise Table 4.4-1, "List of Penetrations with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J Requirements."
The proposed amendments would require a Type C local leak test for penetration no. 22, low pressure service water (LPSW) from the reactor coolant pump motors and lube oil coolers outlet (inlet valve, no. 21; outlet valve, no. 22) in accordance with Appendix J, "Primary Reactor Containment Leakage Testing for Water-Cooled Power Reactors."
Because the December 22, 1988, submittal clarified certain aspects of the original request, the substance of the changes noticed in the FEDERAL REGISTER and the proposed no significant hazards consideration were not affected.
2.0 EVALUATION By letter dated November 6, 1981, Duke requested a revision to its September 3, 1981 application on local leak test requirements for penetrations 21 and 22.
In the November 6, 1981 letter, Duke concluded that Type C testing of valve LPSW-15 was not required because the outboard side of the valve would remain pressurized by the LPSW system during a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA).
By November 6, 1981 amendment (Nos. 104, 104, and 100, letter from P. Wagner, NRC to W. Parker, Duke), the NRC staff concluded that sufficient assurance existed that the LPSW would be pressurized on the outboard side of penetration no. 22 to preclude leakage of containment atmosphere. Therefore, the current TS Table 4.4-1 does not require a local leak test for penetration no. 22. The conclusion that testing was not required was based on the belief that, with LPSW being in service, the pressure in the line outside valve LPSW-15 would be greater than 60 psig following an engineered safeguards (ES) closure of this 9050801 70 8'9042 PDR ADOCK 05000269 P_
0 0
-2 valve.
Subsequently, Duke checked the pressure outside LPSW-15 and found it to be 12 psig or less with LPSW-15 closed. This datum invalidated the basis for not requiring a local leak test for penetration no. 22. The licensee has included this penetration in its inservice testing program.
Appendix J to 10 CFR Part 50 requires that licensees identify all containment isolation valves that will be locally (Type C) tested and prescribes methods for conducting the containment isolation valve leak rate tests.
Type C leakage rate test should be performed on valve LPSW-15 to meet Appendix J requirements, and, as noted in the licensee's letter dated December 22, 1988, the test pressure will be applied in the same direction as that when the valve would be required to perform its safety function. This testing will ensure that penetration no. 22 will meet the leak rate criteria of Appendix J during an ES actuation of valve LPSW-15. The revision to the TS would constitute a more stringent requirement by requiring Type C leakage rate testing of penetration no. 22 when no testing was required previously. Therefore, the staff finds this proposed revision to the TSs acceptable.
Based on the above, the staff concludes that the proposed changes to the TS, which add valve LPSW-15 to the Type C testing program, are required by Appendix 0 and are, therefore, acceptable.
3.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION
S These amendments involve a change in the installation or use of facility com ponents located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. We have determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that these amendments involve no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding. Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of these amendments.
4.0 CONCLUSION
The Commission made a proposed determination that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration which was published in the Federal Register (52 FR 16943) on May 6, 1987, and consulted with the state of South Carolina.
No public comments were received, and the state of South Carolina did not have any comments.
We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities
-3 will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and the issuance of these amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Principal Contributor:
J. Pulsipher, SPLB/DEST D. Hood, PD#II-3/DRP-I/II Dated:
April 21, 1989