05000247/LER-2016-001, Technical Specification Prohibited Condition Caused by One Main Steam Safety Valve Outside Its As-Found Lift Set Point Test Acceptance Criteria

Technical Specification Prohibited Condition Caused by One Main Steam Safety Valve Outside Its As-Found Lift Set Point Test Acceptance Criteria

ML16131A636
Person / Time
Site:	Indian Point
Issue date:	05/02/2016
From:	Coyle L Entergy Corp, Indian Point
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NL-16-045 LER 16-001-00
Download: ML16131A636 (6)

LER-2016-001, Technical Specification Prohibited Condition Caused by One Main Steam Safety Valve Outside Its As-Found Lift Set Point Test Acceptance Criteria

Event date:
Report date:
2472016001R00 - NRC Website

text

-~*Entergx NL-16-045 May 2, 2016 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk 11545 Rockville Pike, TWFN-2 F1 Rockville, MD 20852-2738 Indian Point Energy Center 450 Broadway, GSB P.O. Box249 Buchanan, N.Y. 10511-0249 Tel (914) 254-6700 Lawrence Coyle Site Vice President

SUBJECT:

Licensee Event Report# 2016-001-00, Technical Specification Prohibited Condition Caused by a Main Steam Safety Valve Outside Its Required As-Found Lift Setpoint Range" Indian Point Unit No. 2 Docket No. 50-247 DPR-26

Dear Sir: or Madam:

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50. 73(a)(1 ), Entergy Nuclear Operations Inc. (ENO) hereby provides Licensee Event Report (LER) 2016-001;..00. The enclosed LER identifies an event where there was a Technical Specification prohibited condition for an inoperable Main Steam Safety Valve (MSSV), which is reportable under 10 CFR 50. 73(a)(2)(i)(B).

This condition was recorded in the Entergy Corrective Action Program as Condition Report CR-IP2-2016-01204.

There are no new commitments identified in this letter. Should you have any questions regarding this submittal, please contact Mr. Robert Walpole, Manager, Regulatory Assurance at (914) 254-6710.

Sincerely, cc:

Mr. Daniel H. Dorman, Regional Administrator, NRC Region I NRC Resident Inspectors Ms. Bridget Frymire, New York State Public Service Commission

Abstract

\\

On March 4, 2016, during the performance of surveillance procedure 2-PT-R006, Main Steam Safety Valve (MSSV) MS-45B failed to lift within the Technical Specification (TS) as-found required range of +/-

3% of the setpoint pressure.

Valve MS-45B lifted at 1125 psig, 29 psig outside its acceptance range of 1034 to 1096 psig and 5.7% above its 1065 psig setpoint.

The valve was declared inoperable, then subsequently restored to operability upon two successful lifts within the required setpoint range without the need for adjustment.

Nine other MSSVs that were tested lifted within the as-found required setpoint range.

The apparent cause for the failure was internal friction due to spindle rod wear, which causes the spindle rod to bind against internal components.

Corrective actions were modification of MS-45B and twelve other MSSVs, and the replacement of their spindle rods.

The event had no effect on public health and safe.ty.

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SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE

I SEQUENTIAL I REVISION NUMBER NUMBER 001 00 5

OF This event had no effect on the health and safety of the public. There were no actual safety consequences for the event because there were no accidents or transients requiring the MSSVs.

5 There was no significant potential safety impact of the condition under reasonable and credible alternate conditions.

Had an accident or transient occurred during the condition of the out of tolerance MSSV, the condition would not have significantly affected accident mitigation capability and the MSSVs overpressure function would have been adequate.

The design basis of the MSSVs is to limit the secondary system pressure to 110% of design pressure when passing 100% of design steam flow.

Each MS line has an ADV capable of releasing steam to the atmosphere.

The ADVs have the capability to relieve approximately 10% of total steam.

The MSSV design'basis is sufficient to cope with any anticipated operational occurrence or accident considered in the Design Basis Accident and transient analysis.

The events that challenge the relieving capacity of the MSSVs, and thus Reactor Coolant System pressure, are those characterized as decreased heat removal events, whose evaluations are presented in UFSAR Chapter 14.

Of these, the full power loss of external electrical load without steam dump is the limiting event.

The limiting UFSAR Chapter 14 transients which do not credit the ADVs and which are impacted by the higher MSSV setpoint were evaluated and it was concluded that the acceptance criteria for'the transients would have been met with the out of tolerance MSSV.