ML15322A269

1976-08-23 Branch Technical Position Apcsb 9.5-1-Appendix a Guidelines Fire Protection for NPPs

ML15322A269
Person / Time
Issue date:	08/23/1976
From:	Office of New Reactors
To:
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Download: ML15322A269 (53)

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ENCLOSURE 1 APPENDIX A TO BRANCH TECHNICAL POSITION APCSB 9.5-1 "GUIDELINES FOR FIRE PROTECTION FOR NUCLEJ.\\.R PO\\'lER PLANTS DOCKETED PRIOR TO "lJT~Y 1, 1976"

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I AUGUST 23, 1976

SCOPE This Appendix A provides guidance on the preferred ~nd, where applicable, acceptable alternatives to fire protection design for those nuclear power plants for which applications for conatruction permits were docketed prior to July I, 1976.

The provisions of this appendix will apply to the following categories of nuclear power plants:

(1)

Plants for which applications for construction permits were docketed prior to July 1, 1976, but have not received a construction permit;

'(2)

Plants for \\which construction permits were issued prior to July 1, 1976, and operating plants.

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This appendix modifies, as deemed appropriate, the guidelines in Branch Technical Position (BTP) APCSB 9.5-1, "Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants",... hich are intended for plants whose application for con-struction pe~it is docketed after July I, 1976 *. The guidelines of the above cited BTP were adopted for this appendix and are preferred in all instances.

Alternative acceptable fire protection guidelin~ are identified in this appendix for areas where, depending on the construction or opera-tional status of a given plant, application of the guidelines per se could have significant impact, e.g., \\olhere the building and system designs are alrcady finalized and construction is in progrcss, or where the plant is

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These alternative guidelines are intended to provide adequate and acceptable fire protection consistent with safe plant shutdm*ffi requirements without a significant impact on plant design, constru~tion, and operation.

Particular sections that are intended to apply only to pl.ants under review, under construction or operating are identified under the appropriate column.

Although this appendix provides specific guidance, alternatives may be proposed by applicants and licensees.

These alternatives will be evaluated by the NRC

~taff on a case-by-case basis where such departures are suitably justified.

Among the alternatives that should be considered is the provision of a "dedicated" system for assuring continued safe shutdo~ffi of the plant.

This dedicated system should be completely independent of other plant systems, including the power source; however, for fire protection, it is not necessary for the system to be designed to seisnic Category I criteria or meet single failure criteria. Manual fire fighting capability to protect the other safety related systems would still be required.

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. PERllIT NOT RECEIVED AS OF 7/1/76

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A.

Overall Requirements of Nucl.ear Plant Fire Protection Program

1.

Personnel Responsiblity for the overall fire protection program should be assigned to a designated person in the upper level of management.

This person should retain ultimate responsibility even though formulation and assurance of program implementation is delegated.

Such delegation of authority should be to staff personnel prepared by training and experience in fire pro-tection and nuclear plant safety to provide a balanced approach in dir-ecting the fire protection programs for nuclear power plants.

The quali-fication requirements for the fire protection engineer or consultant who

,,*ill assist in the design and selection of equipment, inspect and test the completed physical aspects of the ~ys tern, develop the fire protection pro-gram~ and assist in the fire-fighting training for the operating plant should be stated.

Subsequently, the FSAR should discuss the training and the updating provisions such as fire drills provided for maintaining the competence of the station fire-fighting and operating crew, including personnel responsible for maintaining and inspecting the fire protection equipment.

The fire protection staff should be responsible for:

(a) coordination of building layout and systems design with fire area OPERATING PLA:-rrS Positions A.

Overall Requirements of Nuclear Plant Fire Protection Program

1.

Personnel SAHE

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APPLICATION DOCIU::TED BUT CO;';STRt.:CTIO~{

rLAl~TS UtmER CO:~STfWCrIO:~ IJm

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requirements, including con-sideration of potential hazards associated with postulated design basis fires, (b) design and maintenance of fire detection, suppression,.and extinguishing systems, (c) fire prevention activities, (d) training and manual fire-fighting activities of plant personnel and the fire brigade.

(NOTE:

NFPA 6 - Recommendations for Organization of lndustrial Fire Loss Prevention, contains useful guidance for organ-ization and operation of the entire fire loss prevention program. )

2.

Design Bases The overall fire protection program shouid be based upon evaluation of potential fire hazards throughout the plant and the effect of postulated design basis fires relative to main-taining ability to perform safety shutdown functions and minimize radio-active releases to the environment.

3.

Backup Total reliance should not be placed on a single automatic fire suppression system.

Appropriate backup fire suppression capability should be provided.

4.

Single Failure Criterion A single failure in the fire suppression system should not impair both the primary and backup fire suppression capability.

For example, redundant fire water pumps with independent power supplies and controls should o

be provided.

Postulated fires or

2.

~esign Bases SAl-IE

3.

Backup SAME

4.

Single Failure Criterion

. A single failure in the fire suppression system should not impair both the primary and backup fire suppr~ssi6n cap-ability.

For example, redun-dant fire water pumps with in-dependent pow~r supplies and

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Al'PLICAl'!.ON DOCKETED JT Cm,STRUCT10N PLANTS, JER CONSTRUCTION J'u.,\\D

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j PERlH'f NOT RECEIVED AS OF 7/1/76 OPE}{}.TING PLANTS fire protection system failures need not be considered concurrent with other plant accidents or the most severe natural phenomena.

However, in the event of the most severe earth-quake, i.e., the Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE), the fire suppression system should be capable of delivering water to manual hose stations located within hose reach of areas containing

. equipment required for safe plant shutdown.

The fire protection systems shoula, however, retain their original design capability for (1) nat-ural phenomena of less severity and greuter frequency (approximately once in 10 years) such as tornadoes, hurri-canes, floods, ice storms, or small intensity earthquakes which are characteristic of the site geographic region and (2) for potential man-created site related events such as oil barge collisions, aircraft crashes

",hich have a reasonable probability of occurring at a specific plant site.

The effects of lightning strikes should be included in the ove!~ll ~lant fire protection program.

5.

Fire Suppression Systems Failure or inadvertent operation of the fire suppression system should not incapacitate safety related systems or components.

Fire suppression systems that are pressurized during normal plant operation should meet the guidelines specified in APCSB Branch Technical Position 3-1, "Protection Against Postulated Piping Failures in Fluid Systems Outside ContaiI'lI\\ent."

6.

Fuel Storage Areas The fire protection pr0gram (plans, personnel and equipment) for btiildings storing new reactor fuel and for adja"-

cent fire zones which could affect the fu~l storage zone should be fully operational before fuel is received at the site.

controls should be provided.

Postulated fires or fire pro-tection system failures need not be considered concurrent with other plant accidents or the most severe natural phenomena.

The effects of lightning strikes should be included in the overall--

plant fire protection program.

5.

Fire Suypression Systems S.hlm

6.

Fuel Storage Areas Schedule for implementation of

~odifications, if any, will be establ"ished on a case-by-case basis.

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APPLICATION DOCKE'" J BUT Cm~STl{uCl'ION.

PLAI,'L.

U~DER Cm~STIWCTION J~';D PER.'IlT HOT RECEIVr:n AS OF 7/1/7 6 OPERATING PI AL~TS

7.

Fuel Londing The fire protection program for an entire reactor unit should be fully oper~tional prior to initial fuel loading in that reactor unit.

8.

Hultiple-Reactor Site~

On multiple-reactor sites where there are operating reactors and construction of remaining units is being completed, the fire protection program should provide continuing evaluation and include additional fire barriers, fire protection capability, and administrative controls necessary to protect the operating units from construction fire hazards.

The superintendent of the operating plant should have the lead responsibility for site fire protection.

9.

Simultaneous Fires o Simultaneous fires in more than one

!'e_actor need not be postulated, where separati,on requirements are met. A 8 fire involving more than one re~ctor unit need not be postulated except for facilities shared between units.

B.

Administrative Procedures, Controls and Fire Brigade Administrative procedures consistent with the need for maintaining the per-formance of the fire protection system and personnel in nuclear power plants should be provided.

Guidance is contained in the following publications:

NFPA 4 - Organization for Fire Services

7.

Fuel Loading Schedule for implcmentntion of modifications, if any, will be established on a case~by-case basis.

8.

Multiple-Reactor Sites SAHE

9.

Simultaneous Fires SAME B.

Administrative Procedures, Controls, and Fire Brigade SANE I

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APPLICATlO;~ DOCKETED..-uT CO~~STRUCTION FLANTS L.. JER CO:~STj\\uCTION lJm PElG1IT NOT RECEIVED AS OF 7/1/76 OPERATING Pl.ANTS NFPA 4A - Organization for Fire Department NFPA 6 - Industrial Fire Loss Prevention NFPA 7 -

~~nagement of Fire Emergencies NFPA 8 - Management Responsibility for Effects of Fire on Operations NFPA 27 - Private Fire Brigades

2.

Effective administrative measures should be implemented to prohibit hulk storage of combustible materials inside or adjacent to safety related buildings or systems during operation or maintcnance periods.

Regulatory Guide 1.39, "Housekeeping Require-ments for Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants Jl

, provides guidance on house-keeping, including the disposal of combustible materials.

3.

Normal and abnormal conditions or other anticipated operations such as modi-ficatlons (e.g., breaking fire stops, impairment of fire detection and suppression systems) and ref!Jeling activities should be reviewed by appropriate levels of m~agement and appropriate special actionS and procedures such as fire watches or temporary fire barriers implemented to assure adequate fire protection and reactor safety.

In particular:

(a)

Work involving,ignition sources such as welding and flame cutting should be done under closely controllcd conditions.

Procedures governing such work should be re-viewed and approved by persons

2.

SM1E

3.

SM1E I

b APPLIC!\\TlON DOCKET~~~UT COi;STIU':CTlO:~

PER."'llT NOT RECEIVED AS OF 7/1/76

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trained and experienced in fire protection.

Persons performing and directly assisting in such work should be trained and

, equipped to prevent and combat fires.

If this is not possible, a person qualified in fire pro-tection should directly monitor the work and function as a fire watch.

(b)

Leak testing, and similar pro-cedures such as air flow deter-mination, should use one of the co~~ercially available aeresol techniques.

Open flames or combustion generated smoke'should not be permitted.

(c)

Use of combustible material, e.g.,

HEPA and charcoal filters, dry ion exchange resins or other combustible supplies, in safety related areas should be con-trolled.

Use of wood inside buildings containing safety related systems or equipme~t should be pernlitted only when suitable non-combustible sub-stitutes are not available.

If wood must be used, only fire retardant treated wood (scaffolding lay dO\\m blocks) should be per-mitted.

Such materials should be allowed into safety related areas only when they are to be used immediately.

Their possible and probable use should be con-sidered in the fire hazard analysis to determine the adequacy of the installed fire protection systems.

4.

Nuclear power plants are frequently located in remote areas, at some distance fron public fire departments.

Also, first response fire departments are often volunteer.

Public fire department response should be con-l'UHT~ )~DER CO(.i ST IWCT'-=I-=O"7N:--t~.h:--'D----

OPERATING PLANTS

4.

SANE I

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APPLICATION DOCKETED BUT CQi,STRUCTION

}'EIt'fIT NOT RECEIVED AS OF 7/1/76 sidered in th~ overall fire pro-tection program.

HO\\*,ever, the plant should be designed to be self-suffi-cient with respect to fire fighting activities and rely on the public response only for supplemental or backup capability.

5.

The need for good organization, training and equipping of fire brigades at nuclear power plant sites requires effective measures be imple-mented to assure proper discharge of these functions.

The guidance in Regulatory Guide 1.101, "Emergency Planning for Nuclear Power Plants",

should be followed as applicable.

(a)

Successful fire fighting requires testing and maintenance of the fire protection equipment, emergency lighting and communi-cation, as well as practice as brigades for the people who must utilize the equipment.

A test plan that lists the indi-viduals and their responsibilities in connection wlth routine tests and inspections of the fire detection and protection systems should be developed.

The test plan should contain the types, frequency and detailed

-~rocedures for testing.

Procedures should also contain instructions on maintaining fire protection during those periods when the fire protection system is impaired or during periods of plant mainten-ance, e.g., fire watches or tem-porary hose connections to water systems.

PLANTS u I~ fJER CO~.j STRUCTlOl' AIiD OPERATING PLANTS

5.

SAME (a)

SANE I

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PER.'HT t:OT RECEIVED AS OF 7 /l/760PERATING PI.Ju'ns (b)

Basic training is a necessary element in effective fire fighting operation.

In order for a fire brigade to operate effectively, it must operate as a team.

All members must know what their individual duties are.

They must.be familiar with the layout of the plant and equipment location and operation in order to permit effective fire-fighting operations during times when a particular area is filled with smoke or is insufficiently lighted.

Such training can only be accomplished by conducting drills several times a year (at least quarterly) so that all members of the fire brigade have had the opportunity to train as a team, testing itself i~ the major areas of the plant.

The drills should include the simulated use of equipment in each area and should be preplanned and post-critiqued to establish the

• training objective of the drills and determine how well these objectives have been met.

These drills should periodically (at least annually) include local fire department participation where possible.

Such drills also permit supervising personnel to evaluate the effectiveness of communications \\-.rithin the fire brigade and \\-lith the on scene fire team leader, the reactor operator in the control room, and the off site command post.

3.

To have proper coverage during all phases of operation, members of each shift crew should be trained in fire protection.

Training of the plant fire brigade should be coordinated with the (b). SANE

3.

SAME

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. PERHIT NOT RECEJ,VED AS OF 7/1/76 OPER./>.Tlj{G PLANTS local fire department so that respon-sibilities and duties are delineated in advance.

This coordination should be part of the training course and implemented into th~

training of the local fire department staff.

Local fire departments should be educated in the operational pre-cautions when fighting fires on

. nutlear power plant sites.

Local fire*

departments should be made aware of the need for radioactive protection of personnel and the special hazards associated with a nuclear power plant site.

4.

NFPA 27, "Private Fire Brigade" should be followed in organization, training, and fire drills.

This standard also is applicable for the inspection and maintenance of fire fighting equip-ment.

Among the standards referenced in this document, the following should be utilized:

NFPA 194, "Standard for Screw Threads and Gaskets for Fire Hose Couplings",

NFPA 196, "Standard for Fire Hose,"

NFPS'197, "Training Standard on Initial Fire Attacks", NFPA 601, "Reconnnended Hanual of Instructions and Duties for the Plant v!atchman on Guard."

NFPA booklets and pamphlets listed on page 27-11 of Volume 8, 1971-72 are also applicable for good training references.

In addition, courses in fire prevention and fire suppressio"n which are recognized and/or sponsored by the fire protection industry should be utilized.

4.

SAME

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. APPLICr.TION DOCKEn....£jUT co~~sn:.t;CTlO;~

PLAl';TS... ;;;OER cm~STRucTION Al:D C.

J PER!lIT NOT RECEIVED AS OF 7/1/76 Qualitv Assurance Program Quality assurance (QA) programs of appli-cants and contractors should be developed and implemented to assure that the requirements for design, procurement, in-stallation, and testing and administrative

~ontrols for the fire protection program for safety related areas as defined in this Branch Position are satisfied.

The program should be under the management control of the QA organization.

The QA program criteria that apply to the fire protection program should include the follo\\,ring:

1.

Design Control and Procurement Document Control Heasures should be established to assure that all design-related guidelines of the Branch Technical Position are in-cluded in design and procurement documents and that deviations therefrom are controlled.

2.

Instructions, Procedures and Drawings Inspections, tests, administrative controls, fire drills and training that govern the fire protection program should be prescribed by doc-umented instructions, procedures or drawings and should be accomplished in accordance with these documents.

3.

Control of Purchased Material, Equipment and Services Measures should be established to assre that purchased material, equip-ment and services conform to the procurement documents.

Ol'ERATl::C PLA,ns

c.

Quality Assurance Program SAME

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APPLICATION DO'C-KE-'-l-'E-D HUT CO!~ST-RU-C-T-I-O-N---**----PLANTS "tJl~nI::R CC)1~STRUCTIOl~ AND PERMIT NOT RECEIVED AS OF 7/1/76 O]'EKATING l']'AI~TS

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4.

Inspection J

A program for independent inspection of activities affecting fire protec-tion should be est~hlished and executed by, or for,' the organization per-forming the activity to verify con-formance with documented installation drawings and test procedures for accomplishing the activities.

5.

Test and Test Control A test program should be established and implemented to assure that testing is performed and verified by in-spection and audit to demonstrate con-formance ",ith design and system readi-ness requirements.

The tests should be performed in accordance with written test procedures; test results should be prop2rly evaluated and acted on.

6.

Inspec!ion, Test and Operating Status Heasures should be established to pro-vide.for the identification of items that have satisfactorily passed required tests and inspections.

7.

Non-Confor~ing Items Measures should be established to control items that do not conform to specified requirements to prevent inadvertent use of installation.

8.

Corrective Action Neasures should be established to assure that conditions adverse to fire protec-tion, such as failures, malfunctions, deficienCies, deviations, defective components, uncontrolled combustible material and non-conformances are promptly identified, reported and corrected.

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APPLICATION DOCKET.t.LJ 1mT CO:~STRUCTJ.ON PLA:n~ U~DER COl~SIRUCTIOU ANlJ PER?-IlT NOT RECEIVED AS OF 7/1/76

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9.

Records

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J Records should be prepared and maintuine to furnish evidence that the criteria enumerated above are being met for activities affecting the fire pro-tection program.

10.

Audits Audits should be conducted and doc-umented to verify compliance with the fire protection program in-cluding design and procurement documents; instructions; procedures and drawings; and inspection and test activities.

D.

General Guidelines for Plant Protection

1.

Buildi.ng Design (a)

Plant Layouts should be arranged to:

(1)

Isolate safety related systems from unacceptable fire hazards, and (2)

Separate redundant safety related systems from each other so that both are not subject to damage from a single fire hazard.

OPEPu\\TH,G PLANTS D.

General Guidelines for Plant Protection

1.

Building Design (1)

SAl*1E (2)

Alternatives:

(a) Redundant safety related systems that are subject to damag from a single fire hazard should be protected by a com-bination of fire retardant coatings and fire detection and suppression systems, or (b) a separate system to perform the safety function should be provided.

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APl'LICAT ION DOCKETED

.. JT CO:~STRUCTION l'LAHTS

_JER CONSTRUCT 10:. A.. \\D PER.~lIT NOT RECEIVED AS OF 7/1/76 OPERATING PlANTS (b)

In order to accomplish l.(a) above, safety related sysiems and fire hazards should be identi-fied throughout the plant.

There-fore, a detailed fire hazard analy-sis ohould be made.

The fire hazards analysis should be reviewed ruld updated as necessary.

ec)

For multiple reactor sites, cable spreading rooms should not be shared between reactors.

Each cable spreading room should be separated from other areas of the plant by barriers (walls and floors) having a minimum fire resistanee of three hours.

Cabling for redundant safety divi-sions should be separated by walls having three hour fire barriers.

(d)

Interior \\vall and structural com-ponents, thermal insulation mat-erials and radiation shielding materials and sound-proofing should be non-combustible.

In-terior finishes should be non-

.- -"combustible or listed by a nationally recognized testing laboratory, such as Factory

}lutual or Undenlriters' Lab-oratory, Inc. for flame-spread, smoke and fuel contribution of 25 or less in i.ts use configura~

tion (ASTM E-84 Test), "Surface Burning Characteristics of Building Haterials").

(e)

Hetal deck roof construction should be non-combustible (see the building materials directory of the Underwriters Laboratory, Inc.) or listed as Class I by Factor Mutual System Approval Guide.

(b)

SANE - Additional fire haz~rds analysis should be done after any plant modification.

(c)

Alternative guidance for constructed plants is shown in Section E.3, "Cable Spreading Roon~."

(d)

SAHE (e)

SAME.

\\~here combustible material is used in metal deck roofing design

• acceptable alternatives are (i) replace com-bustibles with non-combustible materials, (ii) provide an auto-matic sprinkler system, or (iii) provide ahility to cover roof exterior and interior with adequate water volume and pressure.

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'. APPLICATION DOC}~TE.. JUT CO}(STRUCTION PEnNIT NOT RECEIVED AS Or 7/1/76 (f)

Suspended ceilings and their supports should be of non-combustible construction.

Concealed spaces should be devoid of combustibles.

(g)

High voltage - high amperage transformers installed inside buildings containing safety related systems *should be of the dry type or insulated and cooled

'-lith non-combustible liquid ~.

(h)

Buildings containing safety related systems should be pro-tected from exposure or' spill fires involving oil filled transformers by:

°locating such transformers at leas 50 feet distant; or

°ensuring that such building walls within 50 feet of oil filled transformers are \\.lithout openings and have a fire resistrulce rating of at least three hours.

PLANTS ADER CONSTRUCTIOt-l AtlD OPERATING PLAHTS (f)

SAHE.

Adcqua te fire detection and suppression systems should be pro-vided where full imple-mentation is not practicable.

(g)

S~lli.

Safety related systems that are exposed to flammable oil filled transformers should be protected from the effects of a fire by:

(i) replacing with dry transformers or transformers that are insulated and cooled,,,ith non-combustible liquid; or (ii) enclosing the transformer with a three-hour fire barrier and in-stalling automatic water spray protection.

(h)

Buildings containing safety related systems, having openings in ex-terior walls closer than 50 feet to flanwable oil filled transformers should be protected from the effects of a fire by:

(i) closing of the opening to have fire resistance equal to three

hours, (ii) constructing a three-hour fire barrier bet..... een the transformers and the wall openings; or

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~P?LICATION DGCl~TED *. f CO~STRUCTION

, 1'EK~-1lT NOT r.r:CUVED AS OF 7/1/76

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(i)

Floor drains, sized to remove expected fire fighting water flow should be provided in those areas where fixed water fire supp-ression systems are installed.

Drains should also be provided in other areas where hand hose lines ffiay be used if such fire fighting water could cause unacceptable damage to equipment in the area.

Equipment should be installed on pedestals, or curbs should be provided as required to contain water and direct it to floor drains.

(See NFPA 92M, I~ater proofing and Draining of Floors.")

D~ains in areas containing com-bustible liquids should have pro-visions for preventing the spread.

of the fire throughout the drain

-system.

Water drainage from areas which may contain radioactivity should be sampled and analyzed before discharge to the environ-ment.

(j)

Floors, walls and ceilings enclosin separate fire areas should have minimum fire rating of three hours.

Penetrations in these fire barr-iers, including conduits and piping, should be sealed or closed to provide a fire resistance rating at least equal to that of the fire barrier itself.

Door openings should be protected with equivalent rated doors, frames and hardware that have been tested and approved by a nationally recognized laboratory.

Such doors

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~R CO~ST!{\\JCTION Ao."\\D OPF.RATI:';G PLA.. 'HS

(~ii) closinc the opening and pro-viding the c.,p-ability to main-tain a water cur-tain in case of a fire.

(i)

SAME.

In operating plants or plants under construction, if accumulation of water from the operation of new fire suppression systems docs not create unacceptable consequences, drains need not be in-stalled.

(j)

SA}ffi.

The fire hazard in each area should be evaluated to determine barrier requirements.

If barrier fire resis-tance cannot be made adequate, fire detection and suppression should be provided, such as:

(i) water curtain in case of fire, (ii) flame retardant

coatings, (iii) additional fire

'barriers.

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APPLIC/\\TIOi.i DOCKETED Ii;;! CCi.~STRUCTION PERHIT NOT RECEIVED AS OF 7/1/76 should be normally closed and locke or alarmed ~ith alarm and annun-ciation in the control room.

Penetrations for ventilation system should be protected by a standard "fire door damper" where required.

(Refer to NFPA 80, "Fire Doors and Windm..,s. ")

2.

ControJ of Combustibles (a)

Safety related systems should be isolated or separated from com-bustible materials.

~~en this is not possible because of the nature of the safety system or the com-bustible material, special pro-tection should be provided to prevent a fire from defeating the safety system function.

Such protection may involve a combination of automatic fire suppression, and construction capable of \\dthstanding and con-taining a fire that consumes all co~bustibles present.

Examples

.pf such combustible materials that may not be separable from the remainder of its system are:

(1)

Emergency diesel generator fuel oil day tanks **

(2)

Turbine-genrator oil and hydraulic control fluid systems (3)

Reactor coolant pump lube oil system (b)

Bulk gas storage (either compiessed or cryogenic), should not be permitted inside structures housing safety-related equipment.

Storage of flammable gas such as hydrogen, should be located outdoor or in separate detached buildings so that a fire or explosion will not adversely affect any safety related systems or equipment.

PLAHTS Uh __ it CO~~STRUC1'IOi; Al;D Ol'ERI\\TING PUNTS

2.

Coi1trol of Combustible (a)

SAHE (b)

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. APPLICATION DOCKETED fl.. ~ CO~STRUCTIO~

PLANTS UN~.l~ CONSTRUCTION AIm

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J PEIUUT NOT RECEIVED AS OF 7/1/76 OPERATING PU~NTS (Refer to NFPA 50A, "Gaseous Hydrogen Systems.")

Care should be taken to locate high pressure gas storage con-tainers with the long axis parallel to building walls.

This will minimize the possibility of wall penetration in the event of a container failure.

Use of compressed gases (es-pecially flammable and fuel gases) inside buildings should be controlled.

(Refer to NFPA 6, "Industrial Fire Loss Pre-vention. lI

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(c)

The use of plastic materials should be minimized.

In parti-cular, haloginated plastics such as polyvinyl chloride (PVC) and neoprene should be used only when substitute non-combustible materials are not available.

All plastic materials, including flame and fire retardant materials, will burn,,,i th an intensity and

_B.TU production in a range similar to that of ordinary hydrocarbons.

h~en burning, they produce heavy smoke that obscures V1S1-bility and can plug air filters, especially charcoal and HEPA.

The haloginated plastics also re-lease free chloriI~ and hydrogen chloride when burning ~'hich are toxic to humans and corrosive to equipment.

(d)

Storage of flammable liquids should as a minimum, comply with th~

requirements of NFPA 30, "Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code."

(d)

SA.),{E

18

~

---

:-A=-P=-P=-L=-I C=-ll":"":. ~=ll=-O::-:l-:-~ -=n::"":o::"":c::":'KE:::'

T:::E:::D--:::B:-:U=T--=C-::-O:-:-~~-::-S,::,:,1' R::":U:":"' c::":r::":' l:-:O::-:;-:-~ ---t-::P~r.-:-Ilili-:-:*:-=T~:;~U~N D E RCO:-l S TRV cn 0 ~i Aim

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j PERlHT NOT RECEIVED AS OF 7/1/76 OPERATING PLANTS

3.

Electric Cable Construction, Cable Trays and Cable Penetrations (a)

~1ly non-combustible materials should be used for cable tray.

construction.

(b)

See Section E.3 for fire pro-tection guidelines for cable

'spreading rooms.

(c)

Automatic water sprinkler systems should be provided for cable trays outside the cable spreading room.

Cables should be designed to allow wetting down with deluge water without electrical faulting.

Manual hose stations and portable hand extinguishers should be provided as backup.

Safety related equipment in the vicinity of such cable trays, that does not itself require water fire protection, but is subject to unaccepteble damage from

__ sprinkler water discharge, should be protected from sprinkler system operation of malfunction.

(d)

C*able and cable tray penetration of fire barriers (vertical-and hori-zontal) should be sealed to give protection at least equivalent to that fire barrier.

The design of fire barriers for horizontal and vertical cable trays should, as a minimum, meet the require-ments of ASTH E-ll9, "Fire Test of Building Construction and Naterials," including the hose stream test.

(e)

Fire breaks should be provided as deemed necessary by the fire hazards analysis.

Flame or flame retardant coatings may be used as a fire break for grouped elec-trical cables to limit spread of fire in cable ventings.

(Possible cable derating o\\.ling to use of such

3.

Electric Cable Con"truction, Cable Trays and Cable Penetrations (a)

SAHE (b)

SAl-ill (c)

SAHE.

When safety related cables do_not satisfy the provisions of Regulatory Guide 1.75, all exposed cables should be covered with an approved fire retardant coating and a fixed automatic water fire suppression system should be provided.

(d) s~m. Where installed penetration seals are deficient with respect to fire resistance, these seals may be protected by covering both sides with an approved fire retardant material.

The adequacy of using such material should be demonstrated by suitable testing.

(e)

SAl-ill I

19 Al'PLICATION DOCKETED Bur Cm;STRUCTION PER}IIT KOT RECEIVED AS OF 7/1/76 coating materials must be con-sidered during design.)

(f) Electric cable constructions should as a minimum pass the current IEEE No. 383 flame test.

(This does not imply that cables passing this test will not require additional fire protection.)

(g)

To the extent practical, eable construction that does not give off corrosive gases while burning should be used.

(h)

Cable trays, raceways, conduit, trenches, or culverts should be used only for cables.

Mis-cellaneous storage should not be permitted, nor should piping for flammable or combustible liquids or gases be installed in these areas.

(i)

The design of cable tunnels, cul-verts and spreading rooms should provide for automatic or manual smoke venting as required_to facilitate manual fire fighting capability.

(j)

Cables in the control room should be kept to the minimum necessary for operation of the control toom.

All cables entering the control room should terminate there.

Cables should not be installed in floor trenches or culverts in the control room.

1'I.AI'TS Ui~u...t\\. CO ~~S'~RUCTION AND OPERATING !"JA.'iTS (f)

SAME.

For cable in-stallation in operating plants and plants under construction that do not meet the IEEE No. 383 flame test requirements, all cables must be covered with an approved flame retardant coating and properly de~ated.

(g)

Applicable to new cable installations.

(h)

SA}ffi.

Installed equip-ment :l,.n cable tunnels or culverts, need not be removed if they present no hazard to the cable runs as determined by the fire hazards analysis.

(i)

SAME (j)

SAME.

Existing cabling installed in concealed floor and ceiling spaces should be protected ~ith an automatic total flooding halon system.

)

20 APPLICATIO:~ DOCKETED nUT CO:\\STI{uCTIO~

PEru-lIT 1,0T RECEIVED f..S OF 7/1/76

4.

Ventilation (a)

The products of combustion that need to be removed from a specific fire area should be evaluated to determine how they will be contro-lled.

Smoke and corrosive gases should generally be automatically discharged directly outside to a safe location. _ Smoke and gases containing radioactive materials should be monitored in the fire area to determine if release to the environment is within the permissible. limits of the plant Technical Specifications.

(b)

Any ventilatio"n system designed to exhaust smoke or corrosive g~ses should be evaluated to ensure that inadvertent operation or single failures wil<L not violate the con-trolled areas,of the plant design.

This requirement includes con-tainment functions for protection of the public and maintaining habitability for operations

- personnel.

(c)

The pm-ler supply and controls (d)

(e) for mechanical ventilation systems should be run outside the fire area served by the system. -.

Fire suppression systems should be installed ~o protect charcoal filters in accordance witth Reg-ulatory Guide 1. 52, "l;>esign Testing and Haintenance Criteria for Atmospheric Cleanup Air Filtration."

The fresh air supply intakes to areas containing safety related equipment or systems should be located remote from the exhaust air outlets and smoke vents of other fire areas to minimize the possibility of contalninating the intake air with the products of combustion.

PLANTS UN!)j~1{ CONSTRUCTION Al';D OI'ERf..TlNr. rLf..NTS

4.

Ventilation (a)

Sf..!-IE.

The products of combustion which need to be removed from a specific fire area should be evaluated to deter-mine how they will be controlled.

- (b)

SAHE (c)

SAt-iE (d)

SAHE (e)

SAl-IE I

)

21

• .~

-.:.\\

---

.------------.--~.----------

API'LIC/\\l'lON DOCKETED BUT CONSTRUCTIO~~

PI..AHTS tHmL.i~ CO:~STRUCnON A~\\ D PERHIT lWT RECEIVED AS OF 7/J./7C1 (f) Stairwells should be designed to minimize smoke infiltration during a fire.

Staircases should serve as escape routes and access routes for fire fighting.

Fire exit rou~es should be cl~arly marked.

Stairwells, elevators and chutes should be enclosed in masonry towers with minimum fire rating of three hours and automatic fire doors at least equal to the enclosure construction, at each opening into the building Elevators should not be u~ed during fire emergencies.

(g)

Smoke and heat* vents Dlay be useful in specific areas such as cable spreading rooms and diesel fuel oil storage areas and switch-gear rooms.

Hhen natural-convec-tion ventilati.on is used J a minimUlI ratio of I sq. foot of venting area per 200 sq. feet of floor area should be provided.

If :

forced-convection ventilation is

- -used, 300 CFM should be provided for every 200 sq. feet of floor area.

See NFPA No. 204 for additional guidance on smoke con-trol.

(h)

Self-contained breathing appara-tus: using full *face positive pressure masks, approved by NIOSH (National Institute for Occupa-

~ional Safety and Health - approva formerly given by the U. S.

nureau of }lines) ~hould be provided

• for fire brigade, damage control and control room personnel.

Con-trol room personnel may be fur-nished breathing air by a manifold Ol'ERtiTmC PlANTS (0

SAltE.

Hhere stairwells or elevators cannot be enclosed in three-hour fire rated barrier with equivalent fire doors, escape and access routes should be established by p~e-fire plan and practiced in drills by operating and fire brigade personnel.

(g)

SANE (h)

SAHE

22

)

J APPLICATION DOCKETED BUT CO:-iSTIWCTlON PEru-aT NOT RECEIV[D AS OF 7/1/76 system piped from a storage re-servoir if practical.

Service or operating life should be a minimum of one half have for the self-contained units.

At least two extra air bottles should be located onsite for each self-contained breathing unit.

In addition, an onsite 6-hour supply of reserve air should be provided and arranged to permit quick Clnd complete replenishment of exhausted supply air bottles as they are returned.

If com-pressors are used as a source of breathing air, only units approved for breathing air should be used.

Special care must be taken to locate the compressor in areas free of dust and contam-inants.

(i)

'~ere total flooding gas extin-guishing systems are used, area intake and exhaust ventilation dampers should close upon ini-tiation of gas flOty to maintain necessary gas concentration.

(See NFPA 12, "Carbone Dioxide Systems", and 12A, "Halon 1301 Systems.")

5.

Lighting and Communication Lighting and tlVO way voice communi-cation are vital to safe shutdo~~ and emergency response in the event of fire.

Suitable fixed and portable emergency l.it;hting and communication devices should be provided to satisfy the following requirements:

(a)

Fixed emergency lighting should consist of sealed beam units with individual 8-hour minimum battery pm.. 'er supplies.

PL\\N1'S UNDL" CO:~STI~UCTION AND OPERATmr. PLANTS (i)

SAHE

5.

Lighting and Communication SAME

j 23

---

~~~~~~~~----~~~~~~ ' ~

• APl'LICATlON DOCKETED B.

'CO~STRUCTlOH PLANTS.UNL

~TI\\uCTlm~ A~U PERIHT tWT RECEIVED AS OF 7/1/76 (b)

Suitable sealed beam battery powered portable hand lights should be provided for emergency use.

(c)

Fixed emergency communication should use voice powered head sets at pre-selected stations.

(d)

Fixed repeaters installed to per-mit use of portable radio communi-cation units should be protected from exposure fire damage.

- OPERATING PLANTS C.

Fire Detection and Suppression C.

Fire Detection and Suppre~sion J

1. Fire Detection (a)

Fire detection systems should as a minimum comply with NFPA 72D, "Standard for the Installation, Maintenance and Use of Proprietary Protective Signaling Systems."

(b)

Fire detection system should give audible and visual alarm and annunciation in the control room.

. -Local audible alarms should.:;,lso sound at the location of the fire.

(c)

Fire alarms should be distinctive and unique.

They should not be capable of being confused,-rith any other plant system alarms.

(d)

Fire detection and actuation systems should be connected to the plant emergency power supply.

2.

Fire Protection Water Supply Systems (a)

An underground yard fire main loop should be installed to furnish anticipated fire water require-ments.

NFPA 24 - Standard for Outside Protection - gives nec-essary guidance for such installa-tion.

It references other design

1.

Fire Detection SANE-.

Deviations from the requirements of NFPA 72D should be identified and justified.

2.

Fire Protection Water Supply Systems

. (a)

SAJffi.

Visible location marking signs for under-ground valves is accep-table.

Alternative valve position indicators should also.be provided.

24

---

~------_r~-------

Al)PLICA'fJ.Oj~ DOCKETED LUT CO~STRUCl'I.ON PUJ~TS UNDER CO:~STIWCTlO:~ AND J

PERHIT NOT RECEIVED AS OF 7/1/76 codes and standards developed by such organizations as the American National Standards

,Institute (ANSI.) and the'American Water \\.Jorks Association (A\\.JHA).

Lined steel or cast iron pipe should be used to reduce inter-nal tuberculation.

Such tuber-culation deposits in an unlined pipe over a period of years can significantly reduce water flow through the combination of increa-sed friction and reduced pipe diameter.

Heans for treating and flushing the systems should be provided.

Approved visually indicating sectional control valves, such as Post Indicator Valves, should be provided to isolate portions of the main for maintenance or repair without shutting off the entire system.

The fire main system piping should be separate from service o~

sanitary water system piping.

(b)

A corranon yard fire main loop may serve multi-unit nuclear power plant sites, if cross-connected between units.

Sectional con~

trol valves should permit maintain ing independence of the indivi-dual loop around each unit.

For such installations, common water supplies may also be utilized.

The water supply should be sized for the largest single expected flow.

For multiple reactor sites with widely separ-ated plants (approaching 1 mile or more), separate yard fire main loops should be used.

OPERATmr; PLANTS For operating plants, fire main system piping that can be isolated from service or sanitary water system piping is acceptable.

(b)

SAl*fE.

Sectionalized systems are acceptable.

25

~

-~-~------., -----

APPLICATIO;~ DOCKETED liU1' CQi,STRUCTION l'LAl~TS m\\DJ.:.l~ CONSTlmCTlO:~ AND PERt-ll T t~OT RCCEl VED AS OF--.:.7..:../:.::l..:..I...:..7..=.6 ______

--1r.-::C..:;..1'..:.:E..:.:R::...:A:..:,T..:I..:.:N:.::G--..:..P.::L:.:I\\::...:N..:T.::S ___________ _

)

(c)

If pumps are required to meet system pressure or flow require-ments, a sufficient number of pumps should be provided so that 100% capacity will be available with one pump inactive (~.g.,

three 50% pumps or two 100%

pumps).

The connection to the yard fire main loop from each fire pump should be widely separated, preferably located on opposite sides of the plant.

Each pump should have its o"~ driver with independent power supplies and control.

At least one pump (if not powered frem the emergency diesels) should be driven by non-electri-cal means, preferably diesel engine.

Pumps and drivers should be located in rooms separated from the remaining pumps and equipment by a micimum three-hour fire wall.

Alarms in-dicating pump runOling, driver availability, or failure to start should be provided in the

,.. control room.

Details of the fire pump in-stallation should as a minimum conform to NFPA 20, "Standard for the Installation of Centri-fugal Fire Pumps.1I (d)

Two separate, reliable water supplies should be provided.

If tanks are used, two 100% (min-imum of 300,000 gallons each) system capa~ity tanks should be installed.

They should be so interconnected that pumps can take suction from either or both.

However, a leak in one tank or its piping should not cause both

'(c)

SANE (d)

SAHE

26

'"'\\

)

APPLICATION DOCKETED hUT CONSTHUCTION

. PERlnT ImT RECEIVED AS OF 7/1/76 tanks to drain.

The main plant fire water supply capacity should be capable of refilling either tank in a minimum of eight hours.

Common tanks are permitted for fire ond sanitary or service water storage.

vlhen this is done, hOvl-ever, minimum fire 'l-later storage

~equireIDents should be dedi-cated by means of a vertical-standpipe for other water services.

(e)

The fire t.later supply (total capacity and flow rate) should be calculated on the basis of the largest exp~cted flow rate for a period of two hours, but not les!:: than 300,000 gallons.

This flow rate should be based (con-servatively) on 1,000 gpm for manual hose streams plus the greater of:

(1) all sprinkler heads opened and flowing in the largest designed fire area; or (2) the largest open head deluge system(s) operating.

(f)

Lakes or fresh water ponds of sufficient size may qualify as sole source of water for fire protection, but require at least tt.70 intakes to the pump supply.

lfuen a common wa ter supply is permitted for fire protection and the ultimate heat sink, the following conditions should also be satisfied:

PLANTS Ui,J)ER Cm;STRUCTlOi, A:m OPEiu\\TJNC PLAIns (e)

SAME (f)

SAHE

27

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)

APl'LICATlON DOCKETED liUl CONSTlWCTlON l'U~NTS UNDL1{ C():\\STIW(;Tlm~,\\lID PERMIT NOT RECEIVED AS OF 7/1/76 (1)

TIle additional fire pro-tection water requirements are designed into the total storage capacity; and (2)

Failure of the fire pro-tection system should not degrade the function of the ultimate heat sink.

(g)

Outside manual hose installation should be sufficient to reach any location with an effective hose stream.

To accomplish this hydrants should be in-stalled approximately every 250 feet on the yard main system.

The lateral to each hydrant from the yard main should be controlled by a visually indicating or key operated (curb) valve.

A hose house, equipped with hose and combination nozzle, alld other auxiliary equipment recommended in NFPA 24, "Outside Protection",

should be provided as needed but

_ at least every 1,000 feet.

Threads compatible \\.,.i th those used by local fire departments should be provided on all hydrants. hose couplings and standpipe risers.

3.

I~ater Sprinklers and Hose Standpipe Systems (a)

Each automatic sprinkler system and manUal hose station standpipe sho~ld have an independent con-nection to the plant wlder-ground wate~ main.

Headers fed from each end are permitted inside buildings to supply.

multiple sprinkler and stand-pipe systems.

When provided, such headers are considered an extension of the yard main system.

TIle header arrungement should be such that no sinelc failure can impair both the OPERAtING Pl.ANTS (g)

SANE

3.

Water Sprinklers and Hose Standpipe Systems (a)

SANE

28

.: '-\\

---

~--,---------------------

~~~~~~~~----~~~.----

.,~~~~~~~~~~----------

APPLICATlON DOCKETED BUT CONST!{UCTlON PUJH'S UNJ}EK CONSTRUCTlON AND

)

PEP-HIT NOT RECEIVED AS OF 7/1/16 primary and backup fire protection systems.

- ~

Each sprinkler and standpipe system should be equipped with OS&Y (outside screw and yoke) gate valve, or other approved shut off valve, and water flow alarm.

Safety related equip-ment that does not itself re-quire sprinkler water fire pro-tection, but is subject to un-acceptable damage if wetted by sprinkler water discharge should be protected by water shields or baffles.

(b)

All valves in the fire water systems should be electrically supervised.

The electrical supervision signal should in-dicate in the control room and other appropriate command location in the plant (See NFPA 26, "Supervision of Valves. t1 )

(c)

Automatic sprinkler sy~tems should as a minimum conform to requirements of appropriate standards such' as NFPA 13, "Standard for the Installation of Sprinkler Systems", and NFPA IS, "Standard for Water Spray Fixed Syst.ems."

(d)

Interior ffianual hose installation should be able to reach any lo-cation with at least one effec-tive hose stream.

To accomplish this, standpipes with hose connections, equipped with a maximunl of 75 feet of l-!i-inch OPERATING PUNTS

.(b)

SN-1E.

When electrical supervision of fire protection valves is not practicable, an adequate management super-vision program should be provided.

Such a program should include locking valves open with strict.'

key control; tamper proof seals; and periodic, visual check of all valves.

(c)

SAHE (d)

Interior manual hose installation should be able to reach any lo-cation with at least one effective hose steam.

To accomplish this, stand-pipes with hose connection!

J 29

.'~-----.-----;--::-:

J\\Fl'LICAT10;, DOCKETED llL.. Cm:STRUCTlON PI.AI'IS UNI *..* COi~STlWCTlON AND PElUHT t~OT RECEIVED AS OF 7/1/7 ("'-_____ 4_0..:.... P_I_':l_V_I T_I_N_'G_' _P_L_A_~_~T_S ___________ _

woven jacket-lin~d fire hose ~nd suitable nozzles should be provided in all buildings,,

including containment, on all floors and shoUld be spaced at not more than lOO-foot intervals.

Individual stand-pipes should be of at least 4-inch diametcr for multiple hose connections and 2-~-inch diameter for single hose con-nections.

These systems should follow the requirements of NFPA 14, "Standpipe and Hose Systems" for sizing, spacing and pipe support requirements.

Hose stations should be located outside entrances to normally tL"1occupied areas and inside normally occupied areas.

Stand-pipes serving hose stations in areas housing safety related equip-

-ment should have shut off valves and pressure reducing devices (if applicable) outside the area.

Provisions should be made to supply water at least to standpipes and hose connections for manual fire fighting in areas wi thin hose reach 6f equipment required for safe plant shutdO\\offi in the event of ~'Safe ShutdO\\m Earthquake (SSE).

The standpipe system scrving such hose stations should be analyzed for SSE loading and should be provided with supports to assure system pressure in-tegrity.

The piping and valves equipped with a maximum of 7S feet of l-~ inch woven jacket lined fire hose and suitable nozzles should be provided in all buildings, including containment, on all floors and should be spaced at not mOre than IOO-foot intervals.

Individual standpipes should be of at least 4-inch diameter for multiple hose connections and 2-~-inch diameter for single hose connections.

These systems should

£0110\\-1 the requirements

,of NFPA No. 14 for sizing, spacing and pipe support requirements (NELPIA).

Hose stations should be located outside entrances to normally unoccupied areas and inside norm~lly occupied areas.

Stand-pipes serving hose stations in areas housing safety related equipment should have shut off valves and pressure reducing devices (if applicable) outside the area.

30

.,"""'"\\

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~---------------------

J Al'l'LICATIOl~ DOCKETED uUT CONSTIWCTlON

. l'ERHIT NOT RECEIVED AS OF 7/]/76 for the port~on of hose standpipe system affected by this functional requirement should at least sat-isfy ANSI Standard B3l.l, "Power

• Piping." The water supply for this condition may be obtained by manual operator actuation of valve(s) in a connection to the hose standpipe header from a norma Seismic Category I water system such as Essential Service Water System.

The cross connection should be (a) capable of provj,ding flow to at least two hose stations (approximately 7S gpm/

hose station), and (b) designed to the s~~e standards as the seis-mic Category I water system; it should not degrade the performance of the Seismic Category I water system.

(e)

The proper type of hose nozzles to be suppEed to each area should be based on the fire hazard analysis.

The usual ' combin-ation spray/straight-stream nozzle may cause wlacceptable mechanical damage (for example, the delicate electronic equip-ment in the control room) and be unsuitable.

Electrically safe nozzles should be provided at locations where electrical equip-ment or cabling is located.

(f)

Certain fires such as those invol ving flammable liquids respond well to foam suppression.

Consideration should be given to_

use of any of the available foams for'such specialized pro-tection application.

These include the 1110re common chemical and mechanical 101-' expansion foams, high expansion foam and the relatively new aqueous film forming foam (AfH).

'\\

l' LA l'\\ T S U 1 Hi' ';:E:-;-;~:-;:C~O::-i\\~S::;1~

' R:-:-U~C~

' "l~'

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OPERI\\TlHG PLI\\~TS (e)

SM*IE (f)

SN-IE

31

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• 1-

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J

'PERMIT NOT RECEIVE" AS OF 7/1/7~

4.

Halon Suppression Systems The use of lIalon fire extinguishing agents should as a minimum comply with the requirements of NFPA 12A and 12B, "Halogenated Fire Extinguishin Agent Systems - ilalon 1301 alld Halon 1211." Only UL or HI approved agents should be used.

In addition to the guidelines of NFPA 12A and 12B, preventative maintenance and testing of the systems, including check weighing of the Halon cylinders should be done at least quarterly.

Particular consideration should also be given to:

(a) ln1nlmUm required Halon con-centration and soak tine (b) toxicity of Halon (c) toxicity and corrosive.

characteristics of thermal decomposition products of Halon.

S.

Carbon Dioxide Suppression Systems The use of carbon dioxide extin-guishing systems should as a 'minimum comply \\lith the requirements of NFPA 12, "Carbon Dioxide Extin-guishing Systems."

Particular consideration should also be biven to:

(a) mln,JmUm required CO2 concentration and soak time; (b) toxicity of CO2; (c) possibility of secondary therwzl shock (cooling) damage; (d) offsetting requirements for venting during CO2 injection to prevent overprcssurization versus scalj.ng to prevent loss of agent; OPERATING rU~,NTS

4.

Halon Suppression.Systems SAl-IE S.

Carbon Dioxide Suppression Systems SAr*1E

' ~

)

)

)

32 IJlPLICATION DOCKETED nUT CO;,STRUCT iON PERHJI NOT RECEI\\'ED AS OF 7/1/76 (e) design requirements from over-pressurization; and (f) possibility and probability of CO2 systems being out-of-service.because of personnel safety consideration.

CO2 sys-tems are disarmed whcnevet pe6ple are present in an area so pro-tected.

Areas entered frequently (e~en though duration time for any visit is short) have often been fOlmd with CO2 systems shut off.

6.

Portable Extinguishers Fire extinguishers should be pro-vided in accordance ~vith guide-lines of NFPA 10 and IDA, "Portable Fire Exting~ishers, Maintenance and Use. II Dry chemical extinguishers should be installed with due con-sideration given to cleanup problems after use and possible adverse effects on equipment installed in the area.

D.

Guidelines for Specific Plant Areas

1.

Primary and Secondary Containment (a)

Normal Operation Fire protection requirements for the primary and secondary con-tainment areas should be pro~

vided on the basis of specific identified hazards.

For example:

°Lubricating oil or hydraulic fluid system for the primary coolant pumps

°Cable tray arrangements and cable penetrations

°Charcoal filters l'LA};'fS UNDER CONSTlWCTIOlJ Al,l)

OPEMTING PLANT~

6.

Portable Extinguishers SN-lE D.

Guidelines for Specific Plant Areas

1.

Primary and Secondary Containment Ca)

SAJ\\!E except as noted.

III 33

---

. --- ~I--__ -___:_~*-:---t~~~,":7::-~_:_;_;:_:=~~__:_7;-:-:-----_

APl'LlCATIO~ DOCKETEl>

,~UT cOt\\Sna;CTlON l'U.tHS L.. uER CO:{STRUCTION AND

)

PERlHT t;OT RECEIVED AS OF 7/1/76 Because of the general in-accessability of these areas during normal plant operations, protection should be provided by automatic fixed systems.

Automatic sprinklers should be installed for those hazards identified as requiring fixed suppression.

Operation of the fire protection systems should not compromise integrity of the containment or the other safety related systems.

Fire protection activities in the containment areas should function in con-junction,"ith total containment requirements such as control of contaminated liquid and gaseous release and ventilation.

Fire detection systems should alarm and annunciate in the con-trol room.

The type of detection used and the location of the detectors should be mos't suitable to the particular type of fire that could be expected from the identified hazard.

A primary containment general area fire detection capability should be provided as backup for the above described hazard detection.

To acco~plish this, suitable smoke detection (e.g., visual obscuration, light scattering and particle counting) should be installed in the air recirculation system ahead of any filters.

OL1f.RATmG PLANTS Fire suppression ~ystcms should be provided based on the fire hazards analysis.

Fixed fire suppression cap-ability should be provided for hazards that could jeopardize safe plant shut-down.

Automatic sprinklers are preferred.

An acceptable alternate is automatic gas (Halon or CO2) for hazards identified as ' requiring fixed suppression pro-tection.

An enclosure may be required to confine the agent if a gas system is used.

Such enciosures should not adversely affect safe shutdown, or other operating equipment in con-tainment.

Automatic fire suppression capability need not be provided in the primary con-tainment atmospheres that are inerted during normal operation.

However,,special fire protection requirements during refueling and main-tenance operations should be satisfied as provided below

)

)

APPLICATION DOC!~TED BUT CONSTRUCTION PERIUT NOT RECEIVED AS OF 7/1/76 Automatic fire suppression cap-ability need not be provided in the primary containment atmos-pheres that arc inerted during normal operation.

However, special fire protection require-ments. during refueling and main-tenance operations should be satisifed as provided below.

(b)

Refueling and Haintenance Refueling and maintenance opera-tions in containment may intro-duce additional hazards such as contamination cont-col materials, decontamination supplies, \\wod planking, tempqrary wiring, weldin~ and flame cutting (with portable compressed fuel gas supply).

Pos~ible fires lo1OUld not necessarily be in the vicinity of fixed detection and scppressi,on systems.

Management procedures and controls

_. necessary to assure adequate fire protection are discussed in Section 3a.

In addition, manual fire fighting capability should be permanently installed in containment.

Stand-pipes with hose stations, and portable fire extinguishers, should be installed at strategic locations throughout containment for any required manual fire -

fighting operations.

Adeqcate self-contained breathing apparatus should be provided near the containment entrances for fire fighting and damage control personnel.

These units should be independent of any breathing apparatus or air supply systems provided for general plant activities.

PI.Al:TS UNDER CQitSrIWCTION Al';O OPEP-ATING PLANTS (b)

Refueling and Maintenance SAl*IE Equivalent protection from portable systems should be provided if it is impractical to in-stall standpipes with hose stations.

---II-.-l'-P-t-I-C-i-\\

'l-*1-.0-;-~-D-O-C-I~-i:.-

"1-' }-m- *.. ;,-r -(-;(-);\\-. S-'j-' h-' l-;(-:l-'l-O-N-' ---

PERiH'!' lmT RECETVED AS OF 7/.1 /l(1

)

2.

Control Room The control room is essential to safe reactor operation. It must be pro-tected against disabling fire damage and slwuld be separated from other areas of the plant by floors, walls and roofs having minimum fire resistance ratings of three hours.

Control room cabinets and consoles are subject to damage from t\\1IO distinct fire hazards:

(a)

Fire originating within a cabinet or console; and (b)

Exposure fire involving com-bustibles in the general room area.

Manual fire fighting capability should be provided for both hazards.

Hose stations and portable water and Halon extinguishers should be located in the control room to eliminate the need for operators to leave the con~r91 room.

An additional hose piping shut off valve and pressure reducing device should be installed outside the control room.

Hose stations adjacent to the control room with portable extinguishers in the control room are acceptable.

Nozzles that are compatible \\oTith the hazards and equipment in the control room should be provided for the Iflanual hose station.

The nozzles chosen should satisfy actual fire fichting needs, satisfy electrical safety and minimize physical damage to electrical equipment from hose stream impingement.

OI'E1U,'j' I ~(: PLANTS ---------------------

?

Control Room SAHE Hose stations adjacent to the control room with portable extinguishers in the control room are acceptable.

JU Al)l'I.ICA'j'W;~ DOCI~ETED ml"!:

(;C,**~:.;~*iUJCECN PLAIns U;'W£R CONSTRUCTlOi, A':~D PERr-lIT NOT RECEIVED 1\\5 01,'.71.V ;6 ___.

OPEn.ATJI ~ G Pl..I\\_N_T_S ____________ _

Fire detection in the control room cabinets, and consoles should be provided by smoke and heat detectors in each fire area. Alarm and annun-ciation ' should be provided in the con-trol room.

Fire alarms in other parts of the plan t should also l?e alarnled '

and annunciated in the control room.

Breathing apparatus for control room operators should be readily available.

Control room floors, ceiling, supporting structures, and \\... alls. including penetrations and doors, should be designed to a minimum fire rating of three hours.

All penetration seals should be air ~ight.

The control room ventilation intake should be provided with smoke detec-tion capability to automatically alarm locally and isolate the control room ventilation system to protect operator~ by preventing smoke from entering the control room.

Maaually operated venting of the control room should be available so that operators have the option of venting for visibility.

Cables should not be located in con-cealed floor and ceiling spaces.

All cables that enter the control room should terminate in the control room.

That is, no cabling should be simply routed through the control room from one area to another.

Safety related equipment should be mounted on pedestals or the control room should have curbs and drains to direct water away from such equip-ment.

Such drains should be pro-vided with means for closing to maintain integrity of the control room in the event of other accidents requiring control room isolation.

Manually operated ventilation systems are acceptaLle.

If such concealed spaces are used, however, they should have fixed automatic total flooding halon protection.

Not applicable.

,.oc;;...

\\

37 APi' L I CATION DOC K ETED II U-T-C-O-~-S-T-h-'

U-C-'I--'l-O~:7"~ -------t-::1':-1."'7I\\"::1 a s-* -U-;\\ J)J; R CO;-'; S '((n.; C-l-']-O-;,-Ai-, u---

~i)~F:.!..

R.:.:.:.:l~J...!'f~N~O..!..T~J~ ::..EC:::.:l~: J:.:..

. \\~' E::::.'l.:.,).:..1\\.:,::S:-.:O:.:..F---!.7..!,./..:::121_..:...7,;:6 ______ -t_OF E R/\\ 'fJ N G l' )_./\\_~_T_S ___________ _

J

3.

Cable Spreading Room The primary fire suppression in the cable spreading room should be an auto-matic water system such as closed head sprinklers, open head deluge, or open directional spray nozzles.

Deluge and open spray systems should have provisions for manual operation at a remote station; however, there should be provisions to preclude inadvertent operation.

Location of sprinkler heads or spray nozzles should consider cable tray sizing and arrangements to assure adequate water coverage.

Cables should be designed to allow wetting down with deluge water without electrical faulting.

Open head deluge and open directional spray systems should be zoned to that a single failure will not deprive the entire area of automatic fire suppression capability.

The use of foam is acceptable.

provided it is of a type capable of being oeliv~red by a sprinkler or deluge system. such as an Aqueous Film Forming Foam (AFFF).

An automatic Hater suppression'*

sys tern,,,ith manual hoses and portable extinguisher backup is acceptable, provided:

(a)

At l~ast two remote and separate entrances are provided to the room for access by fire brigade personnel; and (b)

Aisle separation provided between tray stacks should be at least three feet wide and eight fl!et high.

~.

Cahle Spreadinn Room (a)

The preferred acceptable methods are:

1. Automatic v.'ater system such as closed head sprinklers.

open head deluge, or open directional spray nozzles.

Deluge and open spray systems should have pro~

visions for manual operation at a remote station; however; there should also be pro-visions to preclude inadvertent operation.

Location of sprinkler heads or spray nozzles should consider cable tray sizing and arrangements to assure adequate water coverage.

Cables should be designed to allow wetting down with deluge water without electrical faulting.

Open head deluge and open directional spray systems should be zoned so that a single failure,,,ill not deprive the entire area of auto-matic fire scpprcssion capability.

The use of foam is accept~ble, provided it is of a type capable of being delivered by a sprink-ler or deluge system, such as an Aque0us Film Forming foam (AFFF) *

)

J 38

. '""'1 APl'LlCATlON lJOr.I\\.ETEO li.llT CONSTi\\uCTlON

~ERMIT NOT RECEIVED AS OF 7/1/76 Alternatcly, gas systcrr.s (Balon or CO2) may bc uscd for primary firc Buppression if they are backed up by an installed water spray Ryste~ and hose stations and portable extinguishers ilUllled-iately outside th~ room and if the acccss rcquirements stated above are met.

Electric cable construction should, as a minimum, pass the flame test in IEEE Std 383, "IEEE Standard for Type Test of Class IE Electric Cables, Field Splices and Connections for Nuclear Power Generating Stations.

1I Drains to remove fire' fighting water should be provided with adequate seals when gas extinguishing systems are also installed.

Redundant safety related cable division should be sepcrated by walls with a three-hour fire rating.

-f'Li~N'l'S-U-,, 'J)I;'I~ ' ell:': S '1"1: Ill;:l"llIN',\\~, \\)

OPERATlNr. PL\\NTS (2)

Manual hoses nnd portable extinguishers should be provided as backup.

(3)

Each cable spreading room of each unit should have divisional cable sepnra-tion, and be separated from the other and the rest of the plant by a minimum three-hour rated fire wall (Refer to NFPA 251 or ASTH E-119 [or fire tcst resistance rating).

(4)

At least two remote.and separate entrances are provided to the room for access by fire brigade personnel; and (5)

Aisle separation pro-vided between tray stacks should be at least three feet wide and eight feet high.

b.

For cable spreading rooms that do not provide divisional cable separation of a (3), in addition to meeting a(l), (2),

(4), and (5) above, the follow-ing should also be provided:

(1)

Divisional cable separation should meet the guide-lines of Regulatory Guide

1. 75, "Physical Indepen-dence of Eiectric Systems."

(2)

All cabling should be covered with a suitable fire retardant coating.

(3)

As an alternate to a(l) above, automatically initiated gas systems (Halon or CO2) may be I

l_'I_o:I_,iHT l:!-)'f l~ECEIVED AS Pl-' _7l.VJ3 __

o _____ -t

)

For multiple-reactor unit sites, cable spreading rooms should not be shared bet,oleen reactors.

Each cable spreading room of each unit should have divisional c~ble sepration as stated above and be separated from the other and the rest of the plant by a \\,all with a minimum fire rating of three hours.

(See NFPA 251, "Fire Tests, Building Construction and Haterials", or ASTIr E-119, "Fire Test of Building Construction and l1aterials",

for fire test resistance rating.)

The ver.tilaticn system to the cable spreading room should be designed to isolate the area upon acutation of any gas exti.nguishing system in the area.

In addition, smoke vznting of the cable spreading room may be desirable.

S~ch smoke venting systems should be controlled auto-matic.::ll)' by the fire detection or suppression system as appropriate.

Capability for remote manwll control should also be provided.

4.

Plant Computer Room S~fety related computers should be separated from other areas of the plant by barriers having a minimum three-hour fire resistant rating.

Automatic fire detection Ol'EI~\\T1I ~ r; J'I A:ns

.~~-------------------------

used for primary fire suppression, provided a fixed water system is used as a backup.

(4)

Plants that cannot meet the guidelines of Reg-ulatory Guid~ 1.75, in addition to meeting a(l),

(2), (4), and (5) above, an auxiliary shutdo"m system with all cabling independent of the cable spreading room should be provided.

4. 'Plant Computer Room SAME

4()

)

APPLICATJON DOCKETED HUT CO:'~STRUCTlON l'ERHIT NOT RECEiVED,\\S OF 7/1/76 should be provided to nlarm and annunciate in the control room and alarm locally.

Manual hose stations and portable water and halon fire extinguishers should be pr:ovided.

5.

Switchgear Rooms Switchgear rooms should be separated from the re~~inder of the plant by minimum three-hour rated fire barriers, if practicable.

Automatic fire detection should alarm and annunciate in the control room and alarm locally.

Fire hose stations and portable*

extinguishers should be readily available.

Acceptable protection for cables that pass through the switchgear room is automatic water or gas agent suppression.

Such auto-

.. matic suppression must consider preventing unacceptable damage to electrical equipment and possible necessary containment of agent following discharge.

6.

Remote Safety Related Panels The general area housing remote safety related panels should be provided with automatic fire detectors that alarm locally and alarm and annunciate in the control room.

Combustible materials should be controlled and. limited to those required for operation.

Portable extinguishers and manual hose stations should be provided.

---

.~------

PI..Al'TS lb.JER CO::ST1~UCnO:~ Ai.;})

OJ'Erv'.Tl ).;(:

l'J.:\\~T~ ----------------

5.

Switchgear Rooms S\\oo'i tchgea r rooms should be separated from the remai.nder of the plant by minim~m three-hour rated fire barriers to the extent practicable.

Automatic fire detection should alarm and annunciate in the control room and alarm locally.

Fire hose stations and portable ex-tinguishers should be r.eadily available.

Acceptable protection for cables that pass through the switchgear room is automatic water or gas agent suppression.

Such automatic suppression must consider preventing un-acceptable d~mage to elec-trical equipment 'and possible '

necessary containment of agent following discharge.

6.

Remote Safety Related Panels SAl-IE I

. ~\\

)

Ill'PLlCi\\TlOI~ DOCKETED.... '" r C(J;*:STJ~U~*i* J O:~

PERl-lIi HOT RECEIVED AS OF 7/)/76

7.

Station Battery Rooms Battery rooms should be protected against fire explosions.

Battery rooms should be separated [rom each other and other areas of the plant by barriers having a minimum fire rating of three-hours inclusive of all penetrations and openings.

(See NFPA 69, "Standard on E,.:plosion Prevention Systems.")

Ventilation systems in the battery rooms should be capable of maintaining the hydrogen concentration well below 2 vol. % hydrogen concentration.

Standpipe and hos~ and portable extinguishers should be provided.

Alternatives:

(a)

Provide a total fire rated barrier enclosure of the battery room complex that exceeds the fire load con-teined in the room.

(b)

Reduce the fire load to be within the fire barrier cap-ability of 1-1/2 hours.

OR.

(c)

Provide a remote manual act-uated sprinkler system in each room and provide the 1-1/2 hour fire barrier separation.

8.

Turbine Lubrication and Control Oil Storage and Use Areas A blank fire \\"all having a minimum resistance rating of three hours should separate all areas coa-taining safety related systems and equipment [rom the turbine oil system

- -------- -- \\ ------------- --------

l'J.Ala~; mH":!: CO:\\STI~UCT J o;~ 1\\:,1.1 1*

Station Hattery nooms SANE

8.

Turbine Lubrication and Control Oil Storage and Use Areas SA1ffi.

h~en a blank wall is not present, open head deluge protection should be provided for the turbine oil hazards and automatic open head water curtain protection should be provided for wall openings.

)

\\

J\\l'PLICATION DOCKl:TED LU'!'

,~a":l'!'i*' iJCfjCtf

. PEIUHT l~CT Rl':CEIVED AS l':,' "Jf.J.ji6 ___. ___ _

9.

Diesel Generator Areas Diesel generators should be separated from each other and other areas of the plant by fire barriers having a m1n1mum fire resistance rating of thre~

hours.

Automatic fire suppression such as AFFF foam, or sprinklers should be installed to combat any diesel generator or lubricating oil fires.

Automatic fire detection should be provided to alarm and annunciate in the control room and alarm locally~ Drainage for fire fighting water and means for local manual venting of smoke should be provided.

Day tanks with total capacity up to 1100 gallons are permitted in the diesel generator area under the following conditions:

(a)

The day tank is located in a separate enclosure, with a minimum fire resiscance rating of three hours, including doors or penetrations.

TIlese enclosures should be capable of containing the entire contents of the day tanks.

The enclosure should be ventilated to avoid accum-ulation of oil fumes.

(b)

The enclosure should be protected by automatic fire suppression systems such as AFFF or sprinklers.

10.

Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Areas Diesel fuel oil tanks with a cap-acity greater than 1100 gallons should not be located inside the

___. __ **1 _________________ _

l'L,\\IHS u,"Jj~!; C():~S'1'1~UCT 111:~ AIm OPElU.l'mC Pl.At:T:;.S __________ _

~.

Diesel Generator Ar~ns SANE

~qlen day tanks cannot be separated from the diescl-generator one of the following should be provided for the diesel generator area:

(a)

Automatic open head deluge or open head spray nozzle system(s)

(b)

Autom~tic closed head sprinklers (c)

Automatic AFFF that is delivered by a sprinkler deluge or spray system (d)

Automatic gas system (Ha~Dn or CO2) may be used in lieu of foam or sprinklers to combat diesel generator and/or lubricating oil fires.

10.

Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Arens SAME

)

':-:\\ _____. ________ ---- "1 _____._

Al'PLJ.CATJO~ DOCKETED BUT CO:iSTl~UCTJO:~

PLAinS U~lJ)Li: CmlSl1 : 11CTlOI~ AJ';U PEmUT J:()1' r-r:CE1VEJ) AS OF 7/1 /7(J OI'ERA'!'] NC l'I..\\_t_f_I'S_' ______________ __ _

buildings containing safety re-lated equipment.

They should be located at least 50 feet from any building containing safety related equipment, or if located wi thin 50 fee t, they should be housed in a separate building with construction having a minimum fire resistance rating of three hours.

Buried tanks are considered as meeting the three hour fire resistance require-ments.

See NFPA 30, "Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code",

for additional guidance.

When located in a s~parate building, the tank should be protected by an automatic fire suppression system such as AFFF or sprinklers.

Tanl~s, unless buried, should not be located directly above or below safety related sy~tems or equip-ment regardless of the fire rating of separating floors or ceilings.

In operating plants where tanks are located directly above or below the diesel generators and cannot reasonably be moved, separating floors and main structural members should, as a minimum, have fire resistance rating of three hours.

Floors should be liquid tight to prevent leaking of possible oil spills from one level to another.

Drains should be provided to remove possible oil spills and fire fighting water to a safe location.

One of the following accep-table methods of fire pro-tection should also be provided:

(a)

Automatic open head deluge or open head spray nozzle systcrn(s)

44

---

"1------.-.

APPL1CATlO;~ ))OC1~ETED ~UT CO~';ST)~IJCTIO:-l l'LArtrs umn:n CO;~ST)\\llCT J 0:; A;';O

)

)

. PERm."! NOT r-r,CEIVED AS OF 7/1/76

11.

S~fety Related Pumps Pump houses and rooms housing safety related pumps or other safety related equipment should be sep-arat0d from other areas of the plant by fire b~rriers having at least three-hour ratings.

These rooms should be protected by automatic sprinkler protection unless a fire hazards analysis can demonstrate that a fire will not endanger other safety related equipment required for safe plant shutdown.

Early warning fire detection should be installed with al~rm and ~,nunciatiQn locally and in the control room.

Local hose stations and portable extinguishers

. s.hould also be provided.

Equipment pedestals or curbs and drains should be provided to re-move and dir£~C: t wa ter aHay from safety related equipment. "

Provisions should be made for manual control of the ventilation system to facilitate smoke removal if required for manual fire fighting operation.

12.

Ne\\ol Fuel Area Hand portable extinguishers should be located within this area.

Also, local hose stations should be located outside but within hose reach of this area.

Automatic fire detection should 01'EIU>.TI1;r, l'LMn'S

---

~--------------

(b)

Automatic closed head sprinklers; or (c)

Automatic AFFF that is delivered by a sprinkler system or spray system

11.

Safety Related p~

Pump houses and rooms housing safety related pumps should be protected by automatic sprinkler protection unless a fire hazards analysis can demon-strate that a fire will not endanger other safety related equipment required for safe plant shutdown.

Early warning fire detection should be installed with alarm and annunciation locally and in the control room.

Local hose stations and portable ex-tinguishers should also be provided.

12.

New Fuel Area SANE

)

J

. -"""\\

alarm and annunciate in the con-trol room and alarm locally.

Combustibles should be limited to a minimum in the ne\\.,. fuel area.

The storage area should be 'pro-vided with a drainage system to preclude accumulation of water.

The storage configuration of new fuel should always be so maintained' as to preclude criticality for any water density that might occur during fire water application.

13.

Spent Fuel Pool Area Protection for the spent fuel pool area should be provided by local hose stations and portable extinguishers.

Automatic fire detection should be provided to alarm and annunciate in the control room and to alarm locally.

14.

Radwaste Building The radwaste building should be separated from other areas of the plant by fire barriers having at least three-hour ratings.

Auto-matic sprinklers should be used in all areas \\-1here combustible materials are located.

Automatic fire detection should be pro-

. vided to annunciate and alarm in the control room and alarm locally.

During a fire, the ventilation systems in these areas should be capable of being isolated.

Water should drain to liquid radwaste building s~~ps.

Acceptable alternative fire pro-tection is automatic fire detection to alarm and annunciate in the control room, in addition to manual hose stations and portable ex-tinguishers conSisting of hand held and large wheeled units.

III

"')

OI'EI *:/l.Tlr~r.

l'J.!\\~;TS

13.

Spent Fuel Pool Area SAME

14.

Radwaste Building SAl-IE

46

)

Al1PLICA'flON j)OCKJ~'JEJ) lilTT Cl1NSTI\\llCTlOI~

PER~IT NOT RECEIVED AS OF 7/1/76

15.

Decontamination Areas The decontamination areas should be protected by automatic sprinklers if fla~~ble liquids are stored.

Automatic fire de tec-

. tion should be provided to annun-ciate and alarm in the control room and alarm 10cally.

The ventilation system should be capable of being isolated.

Local hose stations and hand portable extinguishers should be provided as backup to the sprinkler system.

16.

_Safety Related '-later Tanks Storage tanks that supply

\\o:ater fot' safe shutdov,'U should be protected from the effects of fire.

Local hose stations and portable extin~uishers should be provided.

Portable extinguishers should be located in nearby hose houses.

Combustible materials should not be stored next to out-door tanks.

A minimum of 50 fcet of separatjon should be provided bet\\oleen outdoor tanks and com-bustible ~2teria1s where feasible.

17.

Cooling Tovers Cooling towers should be of non-combustible construction or so located that a fire will not adversely affect any safety re-lated systems or equipment.

Cooling towers should be of non-combustible construction when the basins are used for the ultimate heat sink or for the fire protection water supply.

15.

Decontaminntion Areas SMfE

16.

Safety Related '.Jater Tanks SAt-IE

17.

Cooling TOl.[CI.S..

SAME.

Cooling towers of com-bustible construction, so located that a fire jn them could adversely affect safety related systems or equipment should be protected with an open head deluge system in-stallation with hydr3nts and hose houses strategically located.

'1,

~

. ~

---

,;rl;~10\\*.1:_.i()ii"""i)iiC-K):;J~I,:D** Jnd~*C()i~~";'il:*i;t*::rlO*i';**-. - :'.-- **'1'; :AI.;':'rS-'i!i<lJi':';: 'c;(',1;!;T6J'(:Tioi(,,;:ii --------

)

' PEl~:'ILT IWT RECEIVED.\\S OF 7/1/76 01~~':.IU\\TJ::~_,\\_~;_T_S __, _________ _

18.

Miscellaneous Areas Miscellaneous areas such as records storage areas, shops, warehouses, and auxiliary boiler rooms shnuld be so located that a fire or effects of a fire, in-cluding smoke, will not adversely affect any safety related systems or equipment.

Fuel oil tanks for auxiliary boilers should be buried or provid~d with dikes to contain the entire tank contents.

E.

Special Protection Guidelines

1.

Welding and Cutting, Acetylene -

pxygen Fuel Gas Systems This equipment is used in various areas throughout the plant.

Stor-age locations should be chosen to permit fire prote~tion by auto-

.matic sprinkler systems.

Local hose stations and portable equip-cent should be provided as back-up.

The requirements of NFPA 51 and SIB are ~pplicable to these hazards.

A permit system should be required to utilize this equip-ment.

(Also refer to 2f herein,)

2.

Storage Areas for Dry Ion Exchan~

Resins Dry ion exchange resins should not be stored near essential safety related systems.

Dry unused resins should be protected by automatic \\o,'et pipe sprinkler installations.

Detection by smoke and heat detectors should alarm and annunciate in the control room and alarm locally.

Local hose sta-tions and portable extinguishers should provide backup for these areas.

Storage areas of dry resin should have curbs.:md drains.

(Refer Lo r~FPA 91H,

"\\~aterproofing and Qraiuing of Floors.")

18.

Hisccllancolls Areas SAHE E.

Special Protection Guidelines

1.

Welding and Cutting~ Acetylene -

Oxygen Fuel Gas Systems SAME

2.

Storage Areas for Dry Ion Exchange Resins SANE

Al'PLICATlll~i DOCKETErir.::~*~ :;*!

• i:'iJC1':i.(;I.

PERlIIT NOT r.ECEJVED AS tl;.' 7 iI/iS

)

3.

Hazardous Chemicals Hazardous chemicnls should be stored and protected in accordance with the recommendations of NFPA 49; "Hazardous Chemicals Data."

Chemicals storage areas should be well ventilated and protected against flooding conditions since some chemicals may react with \\-later to produce ignition.

4.

Haterials Containi.ng Radioactivity Materials that collect and contain radioactivity such as spent ion ex-change resins, charcoal filters, and HEPA filters should be stored in closed metal tanks or con-tainers that are located in areas free from ignition sources or combustibles.

These materials should be protected from exposure to fires in adjacent areas as well.

Consideration should be given to requirements for removal ' of iso-topic decay heat from entrained rudioactive materials.

---

_. '\\.---_._----------

.',Il:!: n/:~sTRUCllO:~ Mm 1'1.ANTS OJ'LI:AT1 Nl; l'L\\r\\TS ---------------

3.

Hazardous Chemicals

4.

Materials Conted.ning Radio-Activity SAME

J

,., \\

E~CI.OSURE 2 SUPPLHIC\\TARY GUT Di\\.'\\CE 0:--:

INFOR!,L\\TIO:, NEED!.:!) FOR FIRE rr{OTECTIO;-': PROGRAM EVALUATJO~

] n order to perform 3 proper firc h3~ards ~nal)'sis, the qua] i fj ed fi re protection engineer should be util ized.

the results of the fire hazards analysis the following must be provided:

scrvi ces.of a To demollstrate information

l. Provide plan and elevation vicws of the plant that shol.,. the plant as divided into distinct fire areas.

Provide a description of the v:lrious systems, both safety-related and non-safety-related,,,'hich occupy the fire area and could provide cooling to the core to safely shutdown the rec1ctor, includi ng decay heat removal.

Provide a description of :1 reas

('If the F Lant that contain radioactive material th:lt mel)' be rd eas J to the excl :lsion area or beyond should a fire occur in those areas.

For each fire area, provide the following:

a)

Describe the fire barrier that defines the fire area; the consequences of the design basis fire for that area; the con-sequences of the fire if the fire protection system func~ions as designed.

b)

Identify the safety related equipment and associated cabling.

Pl'ovide the design criteria for the fi re protl!ct~. on re lated to such equipllient.

Provide the design criteria for protection of such equipment against inadvertent operat; on, careless operation or rupture of extinguishing systems.

c)

Provide a list of the type, quantity, and other pertinent characteristics of combustible. materials associated wi th each fire area.

d)

Provide a list of the fire loadings which represent the combustibles identified in (c) above for each fire area.

e)

Describe all the extinguishing and detection capJbi Ii ties wi thin each fire area.

Discuss all m~ans for cont :lining and inhibiting the progress of a fire, e.g., the \\~e of fire stops, coatings, curbs, walls, etc.

Describe the extinguishing equipment outside an area h'hich has access to the ~lTea.

NOTE:

If large fire areas D.re divided into fire ZOlles for the rlll'pO~l' of fire protect) on, the above information shoul d be prc'\\' i ded fOT each zone.

~

I

\\.

)

J 2.

I\\There redlmdant safety re lated equipment or cab] ing is located in a given fire area, describe the design features \\\\'hich prevent the loss of both redundant trains in a common fire, c. g., the separation provided hy distance, physical barriers, ande lect ri cal isolation.

\\\\11erC control, power, or instrument cables of rcuLL'1clall':

systems used for bringing the reactor to safe, cold shutdown are located in the same cable trays, either provide a bOlmding a~alysis demonstrating that the worst consequences as a result of a fire in the cable trays are acceptable or show that redundant systems required to achieve and maintain a cold shutdown are adequately protected against damage by the fire.