ML15264A306
| ML15264A306 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 06/10/1985 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML15264A305 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8506200008 | |
| Download: ML15264A306 (5) | |
Text
Enclosure 1 SUPPLEMENTAL SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION DETAILED CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION, UNITS 1, 2 AND 3 DOCKETS NOS. 50-269, 50-270 AND 50-287 By letter dated September 28, 1984, the NRC transmitted a Safety Evaluation Report (SER) on Duke Power's Detailed Control Room Design Review (DCRDR) for Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, & 3. This SER contained several open items. On November 5, 1984, Duke Power submitted a response to these open items. The following represents the staff's Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report (SSER) based upon a detailed review of Duke Power's response:
NRC OPEN ITEM No. 1 - "Provide the NRC assurance that the five scenarios developed from the emergency operating procedures (ATOG's) and used in the task analysis represents a complete set of emergency tasks performed by operators for plant-specific emergency operations."
RESPONSE - Duke Power's response indicated that the five scenarios used in the Oconee Task Analysis represents a complete set of emergency tasks performed by operators for plant-specific emergency operation.
NRC POSITION - This open item is resolved.
NRC OPEN ITEM No. 2 - "Verify that the task analysis process resulted in the identification of operator information and control needs and their associated 8506200008 850610 PDR ADOCK 05000269 r
-2 display and control characteristics required to perform emergency tasks derived from the five selected scenarios. Describe the process(es) used to identify these needs and characteristics and the bases for determining their adequacy.
RESPONSE -
Duke Power's response indicated that emergency operating tasks were analyzed to determine operator information and control needs. The characteristics and parameters of displays and controls required for task performance were determined. These control and display characteristics then were compared to existing control room components and those components missing or not conforming to the required characteristics were documented as HEDs. -To further determine adequacy Duke Power systematically used checklists developed to query operators on the suitability of the existing instruments and controls and their characteristics.
NRC POSITION - This open item is resolved.
NRC OPEN ITEM No. 3 - "Provide additional information and/or description for the proposed corrective actions involving the 48 HEDs identified in the Technical Evaluation Report (Enclosure? 2)."
RESPONSE - Duke Power provided additional clarification for each of the 48 HED resolutions. The staff concludes that the proposed resolutions for 46 of the HEDs are adequate. While the resolutions are adequate for the remaining
-3 two HEDs, further additional clarification is required (see page 3 of the STER).
NRC POSITION - This open item is not resolved.
NRC OPEN ITEM No. 4 - "Provide information concerning control room modifications made or planned as a result of other post-TMI actions and as a result of Salem ATWS events and how those modifications or changes were incorporated into the DCRDR process."
RESPONSE - Duke Power's response indicated that various control room changes identified as a result of compliance with Generic Letter 83-28, and NUREG-0737 (Items II.B.1, II.D.3, II.F.1, II.F.2, and II.E.1.2) have been integrated with control room changes made or proposed as a result of compliance with the DCRDR.
NRC POSITION - This open item is resolved.
NRC OPEN ITEM No. 5 - "Provide revised schedules with sufficient information for the staff to make an adequate determination of the timeliness of Duke's scheduling process. The staff has reviewed Oconee Units 1, 2, and 3 HED Solution Implementation Commitment Schedules (Revision 4) and finds that the scheduling process for implementing design changes lacks sufficient detail to identify which individual HEDs are assigned to each of the four implementation categories linked to the refueling outages."
-4 RESPONSE -
Duke Power has only provided a schedule for implementing 42% of the HED's for Unit 1 (by the completion of fuel cycle
- 9, August, 1986), 45%
of the HED's for Unit 2 (by the completion of fuel cycle No. 8, January 1987),
and 40% of the HED's for Unit 3 (by the completion of fuel cycle No. 8, September, 1985).
NRC POSITION -
This open item is not resolved. Duke Power's Implementation Schedule is not acceptable to the NRC staff as required by Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737. Duke Power is requested to provide a schedule which encompasses all HED corrective actions identified as a result of the DCRDR program, not a partial schedule as presently exists. As a general guideline, the staff uses two refueling outages following submission of the DCRDR Summary Report as the time by which all HED corrections are to be implemented. For Unit 1 this would be the end of fuel cycle No. 10 and the end of fuel cycle No. 9 for Units 2 and 3. Those HEDs that cannot be accommodated under this suggested schedule should be justified in writing for NRC review on an HED by HED basis, providing the following information:
- 1. The degree of degradation of operator performance caused by the HED's.
- 2. Whether the equipment affected by the HED is part of a safety system.
- 3. The effect of the HED on the safety of the plant.
-5
- 4. The availability of the resources needed for correction.
Duke Power is also requested to supply the numerical estimates, in the form of a ratio, that were used to calculate the HED relative significance ratio.
These estimates are requested for each HED that deviates from the suggested NRC Implementation Schedule for Oconee Units 1, 2 and 3. This information will help the staff determine whether any of these HED's should be deferred beyond the NRC's suggested Implementation Schedule.
CONCLUSION Duke Power has not adequately addressed two of the five open items contained in the staff's September 28, 1974 SER. The proposed Oconee Implementation Schedule as described in the licensee's submittal of November 5, 1984 is not satisfactory for implementing required corrective actions for all HEDs. In order for the staff to complete the review of the licensee's DCRDR in accordance with Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737, we require that the licensee provide a satisfactory resolution to the above items. The staff concurs with the technical evaluation recommendations and conclusions documented in the attached Supplemental TER.
Dated:
Principal Contributor: J. Kramer