ML15261A290
| ML15261A290 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 10/03/1988 |
| From: | Ernst M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | Tucker H DUKE POWER CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8810260285 | |
| Download: ML15261A290 (18) | |
See also: IR 05000269/1988025
Text
REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)
ACCESSION NBR:810260285
DOC.DATE: 88/10/03 NOTARIZED: NO
DOCKET #
FACIL:50-269 Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 1, Duke Power Co.
05000269
50-270 Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 2, Duke Power Co.
05000270
50-287 Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 3, Duke Power Co.
05000287
W
AUTH.NAME
AUTHOR AFFILIATION
ERNST,M.L.
Region 2,
Ofc of the Director
RECIP.NAME
RECIPIENT AFFILIATION
TUCKERH.B.
Duke Power Co.
SUBJECT: Forwards summary of 880912 enforcement conference re
violations noted in Insp Repts 50-269,270 & 287/88-25.
DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE45D
COPIES RECEIVED:LTR
ENCL
SIZE:
TITLE: Summary of Significant Meeting with Licensee (Part 50)
NOTES:AEOD/Ornstein:1cy.
05000269
AEOD/Ornstein:1cy.
05000270
AEOD/Ornstein:1cy.
05000287
RECIPIENT
COPIES
RECIPIET
COPIES
ID CODE/NAME
LTTR ENCL
ID CODE/NAME
LTTR ENCL
PD2-3 LA
1
0
PASTISH
I
1
INTERNAL: AEOD/DOA
1
1
AEOD/DSP/TPAB
1
1
DEDRO
-
1
1
NRR/DLPG/QAB 10
1
NRR/DREP/EPB 10
1
1
NRR/PMAS/ILRB12
1
1
f C-s
TRACT
1
1
OGC/ROED
1
1
02
1
1
RES/DSIR/EIB
1
1
RGN2
FILE
01
1
1
EXTERNAL: LPDR
1
1
NRC PDR
1
1
NSICC1D1
NOTES:
1
1
TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR
17
ENCL
16
OCT 03 198
Docket Nos. 50-269, 50-270, 50-287
License Nos. DPR-38, DPR-47, DPR-55
.Duke Power Company
ATTN:
Mr. H. B. Tucker, Vice President
Nuclear Production Department
422 South Church Street
Charlotte, NC 28242
Gentlemen:
SUBJECT:
ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE SUMMARY
(NRC INSPECTION REPORT NOS. 50-269/88-25, 50-270/88-25 AND
50-287/88-25)
This letter refers to the Enforcement Conference held at our request on
September 12, 1988.
This meeting concerned activities authorized for your
Oconee facility. The issue discussed at this conference related to inadequate
design analysis of the High Pressure Injection recirculation mode of operation.
A summary, a list of attendees, and a copy of your handout are enclosed. We
.are
continuing our review of these issues to determine the appropriate enforce
ment action.
In accordance with Section 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," Part 2,
Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, a copy of this letter and its enclosures
will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.
Should you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact us.
Sincerely,
Malcolm L. Ernst
Deputy Regional Administrator
Enclosures:
1. Enforcement Conference Summary
2. List of Attendees
3. Handout
,cc w/encls:
%M. S. Tuckman, Station Manager
State of South Carolina
bcc w/encls:
(See page 2)
1810260285 881003
ADOCK 05000269
Q
PDIC
Duke Power Company
2
bcc w/encls:
NRCesident Inspector
DRS Technical Assistant
.Pastis, NRR
Document Control Desk
RH
RII
RII
onser
e es
VBrownlee
LReyes
09/df/88
09//?/88
09/7A/88
09/30/88
ENCLOSURE 1
On September 12, 1988, representatives from Duke Power Company (DPC) met with
the NRC in the Region II Office in Atlanta, Georgia to discuss inadequate
design analysis of the High Pressure Injection system in the recirculation
mode of operation.
The inadequate HPI system design analysis was a finding
resulting from DPCs commitment to the NRC to review all safety related
calculations on Oconee. The commitment was a result of a finding in the Safety
System Functional Inspection (SSFI)
report that identified a concern with
design documentation at Oconee.
Following opening remarks
by M. L. Ernst,
NRC,
RH
Deputy
Regional
Administrator,
DPC gave a presentation (see Enclosure 3) which addressed NRC
concerns.
The presentation covered a brief system description of the High
Pressure Injection (HPI),
Low Pressure Injection (LPI)
and Reactor Building
Spray (RBS)
systems; a sequence of events; DPCs interpretation of the safety
significance; and the corrective actions taken.
DPC's conclusion was that the communications between Duke Design Engineering
and the Oconee site had been a contributing factor in the problem; that the
plant as designed met 10 CFR 50.46, the present hardware was acceptable, and
procedural guidance and training were inadequate; and that in the event of a
single failure, valves to be operated could be operated manually.
The NRC is presently considering enforcement action on this issue.
This
meeting served to enhance Region II's understanding of the issues and DPCs
corrective actions.
ENCLOSURE 2
List of Attendees
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
M. L. Ernst, Deputy Regional Administrator
C. W. Hehl, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP)
E. W. Merschoff, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Safety (DRS)
G. R. Jenkins, Director, Enforcement and Investigation Coordination Staff
(EICS)
T. A. Peebles, Section Chief, DRP
B. Uryc, EICS
R. J. Goodard, Regional Counsel
P. Skinner, Senior Resident Inspector, Oconee, DRP
L. Wert, Resident Inspector, Oconee, DRP
B. R. Bonser, Project Engineer, DRP
F. Jape, Section Chief, DRS
H. Pastis, Project Manager, NRR
Duke Power Company
M. D. McIntosh, General Manager, Nuclear Support
M. S. Tuckman, Station Manager, Oconee
R. L. Sweigart, Superintendent of Operations, Oconee
P. Guill, Nuclear Engineer, Licensing
C. Harlin, Compliance Engineer, Oconee
u. F. Norris, Jr., Senior -Engineer, Design.
D. V. Deatherage, Operations, Oconee
G. B. Swindlehurst, Supervising Engineer
G. E. Rothenberger, Superintendent, Integrated Scheduling, Oconee
ENCLOSURE 3
OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
MEETING
ON
HIGH PRESSURE INJECTION SYSTEM
SEPTEMBER
12, 1988
AGENDA
- INTRODUCTION
- SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
- EVENT SEQUENCE
- SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE
- CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
SYSTEM DESCRIPTIONS
HIGH PRESSIPE INJECTION SYSTEM
- PROVIDES NORMAL SERVICES
-
NORMAL MAKELP TO REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM
-
SEAL INJECTION TO REACTOR COOLANT PtPS
-
PLRIFICATION OF REACTOR COOLANT
-
VOLLIIE CONTROL
- ACCIDENT CONIlTIONS
-
PROVIDES EMERGENCY CORE COOLING
-
PRIMARILY FOR SMALL BREAK LOCA
- SYSTEM PARAMETERS
-
THREE HIG-
-EAD PLNIPS
-
TWO I.ECTION FLOW PATHS
-
SUCTION SOLRCES
-
BORATED WATER STORAGE TANK
-
LOW PRESSLRE INJECTION DISCHARGE
-
LETDOWN STORAGE TANK
LOW PFESSFE INJECTION SYSTEM
- PROVIDES NORMAL SERVICES
-
FEOVES DECAY FEAT DLRING LATTER
STAGES OF NORMAL S-UTDOWN
- ACCIDENT CONDITIONS
-
PROVIDES CORE COOLING IN LARGE LOCA
-
PROVIDES SUCTION TO I-PI IN "PIGGYBACK" MODE
- SYSTEM PARAMETERS
-
THREE PLvPS -
2 SAFETY, 1 NON-SAFETY
-
TWO DISCHARGE PATHS
-
LOW I-EAD SYSTEM
-
SUCTION SOLRCES
-
BORATED WATER STORAGE TAM<
-
REACTOR BUILDING SIP
REACTOR BULDING SPRAY
- ACCIDENT CON[ITIONS OtLY
-
REDUCES REACTOR BUILDING TBvNnAThR
AND PRESSLJRE
- SYSTEM PARAMETERS
-
TWO PLAPS
-
TWO FLOW PATHS
-
SUCTION SOLRCES
-
BORATED WATER STORAG
TANK
-
REACTOR BUILDING SLUP
-
LOW PRESSLPE INECTION SYSTEM DISCHARG
SYSTEM OPERATION
o LARGE LOCA
-
PI INITIATE AT
PRESSLRE
-
LPI INITIATE AT > 500 PSI RCS OR 3 PSI RB
PRESSURE
-
RBS INITIATE AT < 30 PSI RB PRESSURE
-
INITIAL SOURCE OF WATER IS BWST FOR ALL
PLtvPS
-
LONG TERM COOLING PROVIDED BY LPI AND RBS
FROM SLvIP RECIRCLLATION
- SMALL BREAK LOCA
-
BREAK SIZE WILL DETERMINE WHICH OF ABOVE
ACTUATE
-
Ti-ERE IS A CONDITION IN WHICH FPI t..ST TAKE
SUCTION FROM LPI -
PIGGYBACK MODE
-
SMALL BREAK LOCA
-
RCS PRESSURE ABOVE LPI Si-UTOFF
-EAD
-
BWST IS DEPLETED BY FPl AND RBS
-
LLWS FPI TO SLPPLY CONTINUOUS LONG
TERM CORE COOLING
-
REACTOR BUILDING SPRAY SUCTION FROM SUMP
SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
6/86
MRC PEORMS AN SSFI OF ENv1GENCY
FEEDWATER AT OCONEE
-
REPORT IDENTIFIES CONCEFN WITH
DESIGN DOCUvENTATION (08/01/86)
10/86
D(XE COMMITS TO PFORM REVIEW OF ALL
SAFETY-RELATED CALCLATIONS ON OCONEE
10/87
DL<E CALCLLATION FILES REVIEW COMPLETED
-
APPROXIMATELY 600
ECHANICAL CALCS
RETRIEVED FROM FILES
-
CALCS CATALOGUED
-
TEC+N1CAL REVIEW FOR ADEQUACY OF
DOCUIENTATION COMPLETED
-
CONCL.DED THAT I-PI PUMP IPSH CALC
DID NOT ADDRESS PIGGYBACK MODE
5/19/88
IPl NPSH ANALYSIS COPLETED
-
DETERMINED PROCEDURE GJIDANCE NOT
ADEQUATE TO ASSULE IPSH FOR I-PI
-
DETERMINED ELECT POWER SLPPLIES DID
NOT IEET SINGLE FAILLE CRITERIA
INITS 2 AND 3 (DETERMINATION IN ERROR)
-
STATION INFORIVED OF FININGS
-
PROBLEM DETERMINED TO BE REPORTABLE
10CFR50.72 & 50.73
OPERATING PROCEDLPE CHANGED TO
AVOID SING..E FAILLEE
-
AT THIS TIME, STATION PERSOEL DID
NOT REALIZE THAT PIGGYBACK WAS
PART OF ECCS BUT RATHER CONSIDERED
IT ONE OF SEVERAL OPTIONS TO MITIGATE
A SMALL BREAK LOCA
5/20/88
OPERATIONS PROVIDED GUIDANCE TO AVOID
NPSH PROBLEMS
5/24/88
DESIGN ELECTRICAL COMPLETES FORMAL
EVALUATION
5/25/88
DESIGN MECHANICAL COWvPLETES FORMAL
EVALUATION
.
6/7/88
OCONEE EOP'S MODIFIED TO PROVIDE
GUIDANCE
8/1/88
LER 269/88-06 SLBMITTED
8/2/88
NRC RESIDENT QLESTIONS LER STATEMENT
THAT 10CFR50.46 NOT MET
8/4/88
MANUAL OPERATION OF LP-15 AND LP-16
DETERMINIED TO BE REQUIRED FOR SMALL
BREAK LOCA
OPERABILITY DETERMINATION COMPLETED
OCONEE EOP REVISED TO PROVIDE GUIDANCE
FOR MANUAL OPERATION OF LP-15 AND LP-16
SINGLE FAILLRE DETERMINATION ON LP-9 NO
LONGER VALID
8/5/88
VALVES LP- 15. 16 MAJALLY CYCLED TO
VERIFY CAPABILITY
AN LCO WAS ESTABLISHED FOR VALVES
LP-15. 16
8/19/88
OCONEE EOP MODIFIED TO ALLOW
ADDITIONAL TINE TO OPERATE LP- 15. 16,
9, AND 10 IF NECESSARY
8/5 -
ADDITIONAL EVALUATION OF INCIDENT
9/12/88
CONDUCTED
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
PI PIGGYBACK MAY BE A REQUIRED MODE OF
OPERATION FOR A SMALL SPECTRLVI OF LOCA'S
- I-PI PIGGYBACK MODE WAS DISCUSSED IN B&W
DESIGN DOCLENTS AS EARLY AS 1968 AND 1974
- DESIGN SAFETY ANALYSIS KNEW THAT PIGGYBACK
WAS A REQUIRED MODE OF OPERATION
- LIMITATIONS AND PRECAUTIONS WHICH ARE REQUIRED
TO OPERATE THE SYSTEM WERE NOT DEVELOPED
FOR INCORPORATION INTO EOP'S
- PROCEDURE GUIDANCE FOR THE OPERATION OF
PIGGYBACK WAS INCLLDED IN THE EOP'S BUT WAS
NOT SLFFICIENT
- PIGGYBACK WAS CONSIDERED BY OPERATIONS AND
TRAINING TO BE ONE OF SEVERAL MODES TO
COOLDOWN FOLLOWING A SMALL BREAK LOCA
- MANJAL OPERABILITY REQUIREVENTS FOR LP-15 OR
LP- 16 WERE NOT INCLLDED IN TECH SPECS OR
OPERATING PROCEDLFIES
- THE SYSTEM AS DESIGNED IS ACCEPTABLE FOR
OPERATION AND MEETS THE REQUIREVENTS OF
- PROCEDURAL AND TRAINING E4-IANCEMENTS WILL
PROVIDE ASSUIRANCE THAT THE SYSTEM WILL BE
OPERATED AS INTENDED
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE
- PI PIGGYBACK MODE OF OPERATION MAY BE
REQUIRED FOR SOME SPECTR.J
OF BREAK SIZES.
EXACT QUANTIFICATION IS DIFFICULT BUT IS IN THE
RANGE OF 1 -
4.3 INC-ES IN DIAMETER.
IF SINGLE FAILLE HAD OCCIRRED,
THE CORRECT
BREAK SIZE HAD OCCIRRED AND TI-E ADVERSE
COMBINATIONS OF RBS, LPI, AND I-PI FLOW OCCLRED.
.
- IN
THE EVENT OF A SINGLE FAILLE, THE MAJAL
OPERATION OF THE VALVES COULD HAVE OCCLRED.
OCONEE OPERATORS ARE SENSITIVE TO LOSS OF
SUCTION TO IPI PLIvIPS AND PROBABLY WOULD HAVE
STOPPED THE4 PRIOR TO DAMAGE.
- OTI-ER METHODS ARE AVAILABLE WHICH WOULD HELP
1HIS SITUATION SUCH AS STEAM GENERATOR
COOLDOWN, HG-I POINT VENTS, ETC.
0
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
- REVIEW OF MECHANICAL SAFETY RELATED
CALCULATIONS IS NOW COMPLETE
- PROCEDRLAL EIANCE ENTS TO EOP'S COMPLETE
WHICH PROVIDE GJIDANCE TO OPERATORS ON
PIGGYBACK MODE
-
GJIDANCE ON FLOW RECJIREMENTS IN THIS MODE
-
EAFLY OPERATION OF VALVES TO ENSLRE
MANAJAL OPERATION IF NECESSARY
- LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION IMPOSED ON
LP-15, 16
- TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE TO BE S.BMITTED
- VALVES LP- 15, 16 CYCLED MANIALLY TO VERIFY
OPERABILITY AND ADDED TO SLRVEILLANCE PROGRAM
- OPERATIONS TRAINING PACKAGE ISSUED
- PIGGYBACK MODE TO BE STRESSED IN SECTION 5 OF
REQUAL
COMPLETE BY NOVEMBER 1, 1988
- PIGGYBACK TO BE STRESSED IN SlJ.LATOR
SCENARIOS IN SEGvENtTS 7 AND 8.
COMPLETE BY DECElvER 30, 1988
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