Text

NRC Inspection Report 05000263/2015008; 07200058/2014001 and Results of NRC Office of Investigation Report No. 3-2014-004
	ML15203B187
Person / Time
Site:	Monticello ; (DPR-022)
Issue date:	07/23/2015
From:	Louden P; Division of Nuclear Materials Safety III
To:	Gardner P; Northern States Power Co
References
	3-2014-004, EA-14-193 IR 2014001, IR 2015008
	Download: ML15203B187 (23)
	v • d • e

P. Gardn

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

2443 WARRENVILLE RD. SUITE 210

LISLE, IL 60532-4352

July 23, 2015

EA-14-193

Mr. Peter A. Gardner

Site Vice President

Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant

Northern States Power Company, Minnesota

2807 West County Road 75

Monticello, MN 55362-9637

SUBJECT: MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT - NRC INSPECTION

REPORT 05000263/2015008 AND 07200058/2014001 AND RESULTS OF NRC

OFFICE OF INVESTIGATION REPORT NO. 3-2014-004

Dear Mr. Gardner:

This is in reference to an investigation conducted by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission's (NRC) Office of Investigations (OI). The purpose of the investigation was to

determine whether two contractors failed to follow procedural requirements while performing

non-destructive examinations on Dry Shielded Canister confinement boundary welds in

accordance with Technical Specification requirements, and falsified non-destructive examination

report forms. Based on the results of its investigation, the NRC preliminarily determined that the

two contractors deliberately violated Monticello procedure requirements and falsified report

forms. The OI investigation was completed on November 13, 2014, and a factual summary of

the OI Investigation Report is enclosed in Enclosure 1. The results of the investigation were

discussed on July 21, 2015, with Peter Gardner and other members of your staff.

Based on the results of NRCs review of the OI investigation, three apparent violations were

identified. It appears to the NRC that parts of these violations were willful as described in the

attached factual summary and inspection report. These apparent violations are being

considered for escalated enforcement action in accordance with the NRCs Enforcement Policy.

The current Enforcement Policy is included on the NRCs website at:

http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/enforcement/enforce-pol.html.

The first apparent violation involves the apparent deliberate failure, on the part of two

technicians, to perform liquid penetrant nondestructive examinations on the dry shielded

canisters in accordance with required procedures. The second apparent violation involves the

apparent deliberate failure by the same technicians to accurately record the results of the liquid

penetrant nondestructive examinations. The third apparent violation involves the apparent

failure to assess the effectiveness of the technicians work. Before the NRC makes its

enforcement decisions, we are providing you with the opportunity to: (1) provide a

P. Gardner

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written response to the NRC; (2) request a Predecisional Enforcement Conference (PEC), or

(3) request Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR).

If you decide to submit a written response to the apparent violations, it should be clearly marked

as a Response to Apparent Violations in NRC Inspection Report 05000263/2015008 and

07200058/2014001; EA-14-193, submitted within 30 days of the date of this letter, and should

include: (1) the reason for the apparent violations, or, if contested, the basis for disputing the

apparent violations; (2) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved;

(3) the corrective steps that will be taken; and (4) the date when full compliance will be

achieved. Your response may reference or include previously docketed correspondence, if the

correspondence adequately addresses the required response. If an adequate response is not

received within the time specified or an extension of time has not been granted by the NRC, the

NRC will proceed with its enforcement decision or schedule a PEC.

If you request a PEC, it should be held within 30 days of the receipt of this letter and we

encourage you to submit supporting documentation at least one week prior to the conference in

an effort to make the conference more efficient and effective. If a PEC is held, the NRC will

issue a press release to announce the time and date of the conference; however, it will be

closed to public observation because the apparent violations are based on an NRC OI report

that has not been publicly disclosed and pertains to whether individuals have committed

wrongdoing. If you choose to request a PEC, the conference will afford you the opportunity to

provide your perspective on the apparent violations and any other information that you believe

the NRC should take into consideration before making an enforcement decision. The decision

to hold a PEC does not mean that the NRC has determined that a violation has occurred or that

enforcement action will be taken. This conference would be conducted to obtain information to

assist the NRC in making an enforcement decision. The topics discussed during the conference

may include: (1) information to determine whether the violations occurred; (2) information to

determine the significance of the violations; (3) information related to the identification of the

violations; and (4) information related to any corrective actions taken or planned to be taken.

In presenting your corrective actions, you should be aware that the promptness and

comprehensiveness of your actions will be considered in assessing any civil penalty for the

apparent violations.

You may also request ADR with the NRC in an attempt to resolve the willful apparent violations.

The term ADR generally encompasses various techniques for resolving conflicts using a neutral

third party. The technique that the NRC has decided to employ is mediation. Mediation is a

voluntary, informal process in which a trained neutral (the mediator) works with parties to

help them reach resolution. If the parties agree to use ADR, they select a mutually

agreeable neutral mediator who has no stake in the outcome and no power to make

decisions. Mediation gives parties an opportunity to discuss issues, clear up

misunderstandings, be creative, find areas of agreement, and reach a final resolution of

the issues. Additional information concerning the NRC's program can be obtained at

http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/enforcement/enforce-pol.html. The Institute on Conflict

Resolution (ICR) at Cornell University has agreed to facilitate the NRC's program as a neutral

third party. Please contact ICR at 877-733-9415 within 10 days of the date of this letter, along

with notifying Mr. Orlikowski, if you are interested in pursuing resolution of this issue through

ADR. The ADR mediation session is normally held within 30 to 45 days of receipt of this letter,

dependent upon availability of a mediator.

P. Gardner

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Please contact Mr. Robert Orlikowski at 630-829-9834 within 10 days from the issue date

of this letter to notify the NRC of how you intend to respond to the apparent violations.

Please be advised that the number and characterization of apparent violations may change as a

result of further NRC review. You will be advised by separate correspondence of the results of

our deliberations on this matter.

In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Section 2.390 of the

NRC's Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response, if you choose

to provide one, will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRCs Public

Document Room or from the NRCs Agencywide Documents Access and Management System

(ADAMS), accessible from the NRCs website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.htm.

To the extent possible, your response should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or

safeguards information so that it can be made available to the public without redaction.

If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact Mr. Robert Orlikowski of my

staff at 630-829-9834.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Patrick L. Louden, Director

Division of Nuclear Materials Safety

Docket Nos: 50-263;72-058

License No: DPR-22

Enclosures:

1. Factual Summary of NRC Investigation

2. IR 05000263/2015008; 07200058/2014001

w/attachment: Supplemental Information

P. Gardner

-3-

Please contact Mr. Robert Orlikowski at 630-829-9834 within 10 days from the issue date

of this letter to notify the NRC of how you intend to respond to the apparent violations.

Please be advised that the number and characterization of apparent violations may change as a

result of further NRC review. You will be advised by separate correspondence of the results of

our deliberations on this matter.

In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Section 2.390 of the

NRC's Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response, if you choose

to provide one, will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRCs Public

Document Room or from the NRCs Agencywide Documents Access and Management System

(ADAMS), accessible from the NRCs website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html.

To the extent possible, your response should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or

safeguards information so that it can be made available to the public without redaction.

If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact Mr. Robert Orlikowski of my

staff at 630-829-9834.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Patrick L. Louden, Director

Division of Nuclear Materials Safety

Docket Nos: 50-263;72-058

License No: DPR-22

Enclosures:

1. Factual Summary of NRC Investigation

2. IR 05000263/2015008; 07200058/2014001

w/attachment: Supplemental Information

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OFFICE

RIII DNMS

E

RIII

E

RIII EICS

E

RIII

E

NAME

MCLearn:ps

PZurawski *

1

RSkokowski

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DATE

06/08/15

06/11/15

06/15/15

06/19/15

OFFICE

RIII OI

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OE

E

OGC

E

RIII DNMS

E

NAME

RGoetz

JWray for NHilton

1

EMonteith for CScott

1

ROrlikowski

DATE

06/15/15

07/13/15

06/30/15

OFFICE

RIII DNMS

E

RIII

NAME

PLouden

DATE

07/23/15

1 - These individuals concurred on the enclosed report; review and concurrence received via e-mail

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

Letter to Peter Gardner from Patrick Louden dated July 23, 2015

SUBJECT: MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT - NRC INSPECTION

REPORT 05000263/2015008 AND 07200058/2014001 AND RESULTS OF NRC

OFFICE OF INVESTIGATION REPORT NO. 3-2014-004

DISTRIBUTION w/encl:

Kimyata MorganButler

RidsNrrDorlLpl3-1 Resource

RidsNrrPMMonticello

RidsNrrDirsIrib Resource

Cynthia Pederson

ROPreports.Resource@nrc.gov

MCID Branch

Enclosure 1

FACTUAL SUMMARY OF OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS REPORT 3-2014-004

On December 18, 2013, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissions (NRC) Office of

Investigations (OI), Region III Field Office, initiated an investigation to determine whether two

contractor technicians at the Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant deliberately failed to perform

nondestructive examinations (NDEs) on the Dry Shielded Canisters (DSCs) in accordance with

procedural requirements and whether they falsified records when recording the NDE results.

The NRC completed its investigation on November 13, 2014.

On October 17, 2013, an NRC inspector observed, by video display, the NDE liquid penetrant

testing (PT) of the outer top cover plate weld for a DSC being conducted by a contractor

technician (Technician A). The inspector believed that the technician failed to comply with

procedural requirements in conducting the PT. The inspector reviewed the procedure,

confirming that the PT was not being performed in accordance with the procedure and notified

plant management. Monticello and the NDE contractor management reviewed the video and

also concluded the PT was not performed properly. The inspector, through meetings and

reviews of documents developed as part of the PTs completed on the DSCs, determined that

two contractor NDE technicians were involved in performing the examinations. These

individuals were involved with examining a total of 66 welds on six DSCs.

Technician A indicated in an interview with OI that he was certified by the contractor as an NDE

Level II technician for the PT being done at Monticello. Technician A indicated to OI the various

steps of the procedure to applying the penetrant and developer, and that he had read and

understood the written procedure for PT of the DSC welds. The contractors procedure, which

was approved by Monticello staff, included tables for the minimum and maximum dwell times for

the different penetrants and developers dependent on the temperature of the surface being

examined. The technician stated that he did not read in the procedure that there was a

10-minute dwell time for the developer. The technician indicated that he questioned his

supervisor, an NDE Level III technician, regarding the dwell times and was told the maximum

dwell time for the developer was 10 minutes. The technician also stated he believed that a

dwell time over 10 minutes would create a problem with cleaning the developer off of the weld.

Technician A was asked by OI why he recorded dwell times of 10 minutes for the developer

when the video showed that he was not completing the required time. Technician A told OI that

he thought the recording of the dwell time was a formality. He further admitted that he

understood that he was not completing the 10-minute dwell time and should not have recorded

that he was. Technician A stated that no one told him to record the dwell time as 10 minutes

when the actual time was less.

Technician B indicated in an interview with OI that he worked for the NDE contractor from

July through October 2013, performing NDE testing at Monticello. The technician indicated that

this was his first job working as an NDE Level II technician. The technician indicated that the

Level II certification testing included the PT procedure being used at Monticello. Technician B

also stated that he knew the testing was real crucial and understood that if a weld defect was

not interpreted correctly, a leak in the DSC could occur. The technician also stated the

contractor stressed the importance of following the procedure. The technician originally told OI

that he thought he was performing the PT in accordance with the procedure and used a wall

clock to time the dwell times. Technician B later admitted that he calculated the amount of time

to complete certain steps in the PT process and used those times to determine the dwell times

for the penetrant and developer. Technician B stated that he understood the contractors written

procedure for PT tests at Monticello. The technician stated that he was rushing himself

2

because he had heard contractor management complain about employees working too slowly

on their assignments. The technician stated that he was never ordered to complete the

PT quickly. Technician B also stated that he thought you could make a determination almost

immediately after applying the penetrant and developer. The OI investigator asked

Technician B how he recorded the penetrant and developer dwell time in the PT examination

report. The technician told OI that he recorded the dwell times that were specified in the

procedure even though he was not following this requirement.

Based on the evidence gathered in the OI investigation, it appears that two contractors

deliberately violated NRC requirements by failing to perform NDE PT of DSCs in accordance

with procedures. Specifically, contractor NDE technicians apparently violated Title 10 of the

Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 72.12(a)(1) by not allowing the developer to dwell for the

period of time specified in the contractors procedure 12751 QP-9.202, Rev. 1, Color Contrast

Liquid Penetrant Examination using the Solvent-Removable Method. Their actions caused the

licensee to apparently be in violation of Certificate of Compliance 1004, Amendment 10,

Technical Specification 1.2.5, DSC Dye Penetrant Tests of Closure Welds, which was

implemented by the contractors procedure, and 10 CFR 72.158, as NDE testing was not

accomplished in accordance with the applicable standards and requirements.

Based on the evidence gathered in the OI investigation, it appears that two contractors willfully

violated NRC requirements by recording false information concerning developer dwell times on

the PT examination report for each NDE, in violation of 10 CFR 72.12(a)(2). This caused the

licensee to apparently be in violation of 10 CFR 72.11(a), which required information required to

be maintained by the licensee to be complete and accurate in all material respects.

Enclosure 2

INSPECTION REPORT

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Docket Nos:

50-263;72-058

License No:

DPR-22

Report Nos:

05000263/2015008 and 07200058/2014001

Licensee:

Northern States Power Company, Minnesota

Facility:

Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant

Location:

Monticello, Minnesota

Dates:

January 1, 2014, through July 21, 2015

Inspectors:

Matthew C. Learn, Reactor Engineer

Rhex A. Edwards, Senior Health Physicist

Paul J. Zurawski, Senior Resident Inspector

Approved by:

Robert J. Orlikowski, Chief

Materials Control, ISFSI, and Decommissioning Branch

Division of Nuclear Materials Safety

2

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

Inspection Report (IR) 05000263/2015008 and 07200058/2014001, 01/1/2014 - 07/21/2015;

Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant, Operation of an ISFSI at Operating Plants.

This report covers circumstances behind the failure to perform nondestructive examination

(NDE) liquid penetrant testing (PT) in accordance with NRC requirements. The NRC identified

three apparent violations (AV) which were processed through the traditional enforcement

program because they either involved willfulness or were associated with an ISFSI. All

violations of NRC requirements are dispositioned in accordance with the NRC's Enforcement

Policy dated July 9, 2013.

The results of the investigation conducted by the NRC Office of Investigations are discussed in

Enclosure 1, Factual Summary of NRC Investigation.

A.

NRC-Identified and Self-Revealed Findings

Apparent Violation (AV): The NRC staff identified an AV that is being processed through

the traditional enforcement process because it appears to involve willfulness and is

associated with an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI).

The AV involves Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 72.158, Control of

Special Processes, which required, in part, that the licensee establish measures to

ensure that special processes, including nondestructive testing, are controlled and

accomplished by qualified personnel using qualified procedures in accordance with

applicable codes, standards, specifications, criteria, and other special requirements.

The licensee established TriVis Procedure 12751 QP-9.202, Color Contrast Liquid

Penetrant Examination Using the Solvent-Removable Method, Revision 1, as the

qualified procedure for use in Dry Shielded Canister (DSC) NDE PT. However, from

approximately September 5 to October 17, 2013, the NRC determined that licensee

contractors apparently willfully failed to follow the TriVis procedure for developer dwell

times, while performing PT on 66 of 66 DSC closure welds examined. The NRC also

determined that the licensee contractors apparently failed to follow other parts of the

TriVis procedure.

Apparent Violation: The NRC staff identified an AV that is being processed through the

traditional enforcement process because it appears to involve willfulness, impacts the

regulatory process, and is associated with an ISFSI.

The AV involves 10 CFR 72.11, Completeness and accuracy of information, which

required, in part, that information required by Commission regulations be maintained by

the licensee to be complete and accurate in all material respects. However, from

approximately September 5 to October 17, 2013, the NRC determined that licensee

contractors apparently willfully completed PT examination forms, a quality assurance

record, with inaccurate developer dwell times. The NRC also determined that the

licensee contractors apparently completed PT examination forms, a quality assurance

record, with other inaccurate information. This information was determined to be

material to the NRC because it had the potential to mislead the NRC and the licensee as

to the suitability for service of the DSCs.

3

Apparent Violation: The NRC staff identified an AV that is being processed through the

traditional enforcement process because it appears to be associated with an ISFSI,

which falls under traditional enforcement.

The AV involves 10 CFR 72.154(c), Control of purchased material, equipment, and

services which required, in part, that licensees assess the effectiveness of the control of

quality by contractors and subcontractors at intervals consistent with the importance,

complexity, and quantity of the product or services. However, from approximately

September 5 to October 17, 2013, the NRC determined that the licensee apparently did

not assess the effectiveness of the control of quality by contractors in that the licensee

apparently did not monitor the work of contractors performing PT testing on DSCs #11

through #16.

B.

Licensee-Identified Violations

Violations of very low safety significance or Severity Level IV that were identified by the

licensee have been reviewed by the NRC. Corrective actions taken or planned by the

licensee have been entered into the licensees corrective action program (CAP). These

violations and CAP tracking numbers are listed in Section 4OA7 of this report.

4

REPORT DETAILS

4OA5 Other Activities

.1

Closed Unresolved Item 07200058/2013001-01, Dry Shielded Canister Liquid

Penetrant Examination

a.

Inspection Scope

During the 2013 Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) cask loading

campaign at Northern States Power - Minnesotas (NSPM) Monticello Nuclear

Generating Plant (MNGP), beginning approximately on September 5, 2013, six

Transnuclear NUHOMS [Nutech Horizontal Modular Storage] 61BTH Type 1 Dry

Shielded Canisters (DSCs) were loaded under Certificate of Compliance (CoC) 1004,

Amendment 10.

Condition 1 of the CoC allows use of the Standardized NUHOMS system subject to the

conditions of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 72.212 and the

CoC 1004 Technical Specifications (TS). TS 1.2.5 of CoC 1004 requires that all

DSC closure welds not subjected to full volumetric inspection be liquid penetrant tested

(PT) in accordance with the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler

and Pressure Vessel (BPV) Code.

On October 17, 2013, the resident inspectors observed part of the non-destructive

examination (NDE) PT activities for the outer top cover plate on DSC No. 16. The

inspectors questioned whether the cleaning and dwell times for the penetrant and

developer used by a contract NDE PT Level II examiner met procedure requirements

demonstrating compliance with the ISFSI TS. The licensee initiated action request

report (AR) 1402246 to document the inspectors questions in the corrective action

procedure (CAP). The AR established actions to determine if procedure requirements

had been met, evaluate operability or reportability, conduct an apparent cause

evaluation, and conduct an extent of condition review.

After initial evaluation of recorded video of the work location, the licensee determined

that the dwell times for both the penetrant and developer for the outer top closure plate

weld appeared not to be in compliance with procedure requirements. Further extensive

review of previous PTs conducted on DSCs 11 - 16 revealed additional examinations

may not have complied with dwell times specified by the procedure, as well as other

potential discrepancies. All of the PTs for these DSCs were performed by two contract

NDE PT Level II technicians. As a result, the licensees immediate operability

determination declared DSCs 11 - 16 inoperable for the failure to satisfy TS 1.2.5, which

specifies all DSC closure welds, except those subjected to full volumetric inspection, be

PT in accordance with the requirements of ASME BPV Code,Section III.

The continued storage of DSCs 11 - 16, which are not fully compliant with TS 1.2.5,

requires either reexamination or an exemption from parts of 10 CFR Part 72 and is being

pursued by the licensee. In the interim, the condition of these DSCs has been evaluated

by the licensee in accordance with the CAP. In its operability assessment, the licensee

concluded that there was reasonable assurance that DSCs 11 - 16 are currently safe in

their current configuration. Specifically, since helium leak testing was completed, with

5

acceptable results, during the loading operations for each DSC by a vendor independent

from the contract organization that supplied the PT technician. Licensee review

concluded the helium leak testing determined each of the DSCs to be leak tight and

consequently no concern existed with the confinement function of the DSCs.

The NRC staff required additional information to review and assess work as performed,

as compared to procedural requirements. Therefore, in NRC IR 05000263/2013005

and 07200058/2013001, the NRC staff opened unresolved item (URI)

07200058/2013001-01. This URI is now closed based on the information documented in

this report.

The NRC staff evaluated the actions in regard to operability, reportability, corrective

actions, and extent of condition reviews. Specifically, the NRC staff reviewed the

videotapes of the contractor performance and compared the videotapes with required

procedure times. Additionally, the NRC reviewed the completed NDE PT examination

forms and compared the documented times with the times shown on the videotapes. In

parallel to the inspection effort, an NRC investigation was conducted.

Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

b.

Findings

Failure to Perform Penetrant Tests in Accordance with Procedural Requirements

Title 10 CFR 72.158, Control of special processes states, in part, that, The licensee

shall establish measures to ensure that special processes, including... nondestructive

testing, are controlled and accomplished by qualified personnel using qualified

procedures in accordance with applicable codes, standards, specifications, criteria, and

other special requirements.

Title 10 CFR 72.212(b)(3), Conditions of general license issued under 72.210, states

The general licensee must: ensure that each cask used by the general licensee

conforms to the terms, conditions, and specification of a CoC or an amended CoC listed

in 72.214.

Title 10 CFR 72.214, List of approved spent fuel storage casks, states, The following

casks are approved for storage of spent fuel under the conditions specified in their

Certificate of Compliance Certificate Number: 1004 Amendment Number 10,

Effective Date: August 24, 2009.

Certificate of Compliance 1004, Amendment 10, Condition A, states Casks authorized

by this certificate are hereby approved for use by holders of 10 CFR Part 50 licenses for

nuclear power reactors at reactor sites under the general license issued pursuant to

10 CFR 72.210 subject to the conditions specified by 10 CFR 72.212 and the attached

Technical Specifications.

Certificate of Compliance 1004, Amendment 10, TS 1.2.5, DSC Dye Penetrant Tests of

Closure Welds, states that All DSC closure welds except those subjected to full

volumetric inspection shall be dye penetrant tested in accordance with the requirements

of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section III, Division 1, Article NB-5000.

The liquid penetrant test acceptance standards shall be those described in Subsection

NB-5350 of the Code.

6

ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section III, Division 1, 1998 with Addendum

through 2000, Article NB-5000, Subarticle, NB-5111, Methods states that,

Nondestructive examinations shall be conducted in accordance with the examination

methods of Section B, except as they may be modified by the requirements of this

Articleliquid penetrant examination shall be in accordance with Section V, Article 6.

ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section V, 1998 with Addendum through 2000,

Article 6, Subarticle T-621.1, Initial Procedure states that, Liquid penetrant

examination shall be performed in accordance with a procedure. Such a procedure shall

consider at least the following information: (a) the materials, shapes, or sizes to be

examined, and the extent of the examination; (b) type (number or letter designation if

available) of each penetrant, penetrant remover, emulsifier, and developer; (c)

processing details for pre-examination cleaning and drying, including the cleaning

materials used and minimum time allowed for drying; (d) processing details for applying

the penetrant: the length of time that the penetrant will remain on the surface (dwell

time), and the temperature of the surface and penetrant during the examination if outside

50°F to 125°F range; (e) processing details for removing excess penetrant from the

surface, and for drying the surface before applying the developer; (f) processing details

for applying the developer, and length of developing time before interpretation;

(g) processing details for post-examination cleaning.

TriVis Procedure 12751 QP-9.202, Revision 1, Color Contrast Liquid Penetrant

Examination Using the Solvent-Removable Method, specifies procedural guidance

for performing PT in accordance with ASME BPV Code Section III, Division 1, Article

NB-5000 and ASME BPV, Article 6.

Specifically TriVis Procedure 12751 QP-9.202, Revision 1 specifies the following

requirements, and NRC inspectors identified the following apparent procedural

non-compliances:

Step 6.1.2 states, in part, Pre-cleaning shall be performed ... Wipe with dry,

absorbent, lint free product. Perform a final wipe with demineralized water and

absorbent lint free towels. Allow to dry for at least 2 minutes before proceeding.

The inspectors determined that the contractor NDE technicians apparently did

not perform a final wipe with demineralized water and an absorbent lint free towel

on 66 welds.

The inspectors determined that the contractor NDE technicians apparently did

not allow 19 welds to dry for at least two minutes before proceeding.

Step 6.2.3 states Apply penetrant by spraying, brushing, or dipping.

The inspectors determined that the contractor NDE technicians apparently failed

to apply penetrant to one weld.

7

Step 6.2.5 states, in part, Ensure that the surface remains wet with penetrant for

the minimum dwell times for each temperature range as designated below.

Surface Temperature Range

Dwell Time Minimum

76°F to 125°F

10 Minutes

126°F to 200°F

3 Minutes

201°F to 325°F

1 Minute

The inspectors determined that the contractor NDE technicians apparently failed

to ensure the surface of 34 welds remained wet with penetrant for the minimum

dwell times, with times as low as 1 minute when a 3-minute dwell was required.

Step 6.3.1 states Remove as much excess penetrant as possible with a dry,

absorbent, lint free product repeating the operation until most traces of penetrant

have been removed.

The inspectors determined that the contractor NDE technicians apparently only

used a moistened cloth while removing excess penetrant from 38 welds.

Step 6.3.2 states, in part, to Remove remaining traces of penetrant by lightly

wiping the surface with a lint free product moistened with the cleaner/remover.

The inspectors determined that the contractor NDE technicians apparently only

used a dry cloth while removing remaining penetrant from 26 welds.

Step 6.4.2 states For examinations above 125°F allow a minimum of 1 minute

and a maximum of 15 minutes drying time after final wipe and before developer

application.

The inspectors determined that the contractor NDE technicians apparently failed

to allow a minimum of 1 minute drying time after final wipe and before developer

application on 26 welds (16 wet wiped, 10 dry wiped). The drying times ranged

from 9 to 43 seconds.

Step 6.5.2, Developer Application states Begin observing for indications as the

developer dries. Evaluate examination results for the purpose of acceptance

within the minimum and maximum developing times for each temperature range

as specified in the following table, beginning after the developer coating is dry.

Surface Temperature Range

Dwell Time Minimum

Dwell Time

Maximum

72°F to 325°F

10 Minutes

15 Minutes

The inspectors determined that the contractor NDE technicians apparently failed

to allow a minimum of 10 minutes on all 66 welds before evaluating examination

results for the purpose of acceptance (i.e., moving to the final cleaning).

Specifically, the developer dwell times ranged from 23 seconds to a few seconds

over 9 minutes.

8

The inspectors identified that in 66 welds, the licensee apparently failed to

evaluate examination results within the minimum and maximum developing

times.

The above issues describe an apparent violation (AV) of NRC requirements. The

licensee documented the AV in its CAP as AR 1402246 and AR 01486887

(AV 05000263/2015008-01; 07200058/2014001-01 Failure to Perform Penetrant Tests

in Accordance with Procedural Requirements).

Inaccurate and Incomplete Information Documented on Liquid Penetrant Test Form

During review of the issue, the inspectors determined that the NDE contract technicians

apparently did not correctly document the actual dwell times. The procedure required

reporting of the penetrant dwell time, the post cleaning drying time, and the developer

dwell time in whole minutes. However, instead of recording a time, in minutes, that

reflected the actual time spent, the NDE technicians appeared to record the procedural

required times. The NRC determined that the recorded times appeared for the majority

of the cases to be greater than actually spent, although there were some instances that

the recorded times appeared to be less than actually spent and a few occasions where

the recorded times appeared to reflect the actual time spent.

10 CFR 72.11, Completeness and accuracy of information, requires, in part, that

information required by the Commission's Regulations to be maintained by the licensee

shall be complete and accurate in all material respects. 10 CFR Part 72.174, Quality

assurance records, requires, in part, that sufficient records be maintained to furnish

evidence of activities affecting quality. Records include closely-related data such as

qualifications of personnel, procedures, and equipment.

CoC 1004, TS 1.2.5, DSC Dye Penetrant Tests of Closure Welds, states that All DSC

closure welds except those subjected to full volumetric inspection shall be dye penetrant

tested in accordance with the requirements of the ASME BPV Code Section III,

Division 1, Article NB-5000. The liquid penetrant test acceptance standards shall be

those described in Subsection NB-5350 of the Code.

The licensee utilized TriVis Procedure 12751 QP-9.202, Revision 1, Color Contrast

Liquid Penetrant Examination Using the Solvent-Removable Method in order to

accomplish this activity affecting quality in accordance with CoC 1004 TS 1.2.5.

TriVis Procedure 12751 QP-9.202, Revision 1, Section 9.0, Documentation, required

that the licensee record the results of the inspection, and all pertinent information, on

the VT[visual testing]/PT examination report form. The VT/PT Examination Report

required penetrant dwell time, dry time, and developer dwell time be recorded.

An AV has been identified, in that, from September 5, 2013 to October 17, 2013, the

completed VT/PT Examination Report form, a Quality Assurance record required by

CoC 1004, TS 1.2.5 and TriVis Procedure 12751 QP-9.202, Revision 1, did not appear

to be complete and accurate in all material respects. Specifically, the completed

VT/PT Examination Report form required penetrant dwell time, dry time, and developer

dwell time be recorded. The information appeared to not be accurate because, in

comparison with the time shown on the videotapes, of the 66 welds examined:

9

30 penetrant dwell times appeared to be over-reported, 23 penetrant dwell times

appeared to be under-reported, 11 appeared to be roughly on time, 1 was not

visible on tape, and 1 appeared to have no penetrant applied.

42 dry times appeared to be over-reported, 22 of which did not appear to meet

the procedural required minimum. There appeared to be 11 under-reports and

6 cases that were roughly on time.

66 developer dwell times appeared to be over-reported.

This information was material to the NRC because the completed VT/PT Examination

Report forms were a quality record that indicated that the PTs were performed in

accordance with the procedure. As the licensee was not required to maintain the video

recordings, these quality records would have become the official record of what had

been done had the NRC inspector not identified the issue.

The licensee documented the AV in its CAP as AR 1402246 and AR 01486891

(AV 05000263/2015008-02; 07200058/2014001-02; Inaccurate and Incomplete

Information Documented on VT/PT Report Forms).

Failure to Assess Contractor Control of Quality

During review of the issue, the inspectors determined that both the licensee and the

contractor apparently failed to provide adequate assessment of the quality of the NDE

PT being performed. The licensee provided advance video recording of the NDE PT

being performed. However, the NRC determined that the contractor supervisor

apparently was not routinely on site, and did not review the videotapes. Additionally, the

licensee apparently did not perform adequate oversight of the contractor performing the

PT, including review of the videotapes.

10 CFR 72.154(c), Control of purchased material, equipment, and services requires, in

part, that licensees assess the effectiveness of the control of quality by contractors and

subcontractors at intervals consistent with the importance, complexity, and quantity of

the product or services.

An AV has been identified, in that, from September 5, 2013 to October 17, 2013, the

licensee apparently did not adequately assess the effectiveness of the control of quality

by contractors in that the licensee apparently failed to monitor the contractors performing

PT on the DSCs. The lack of adequate assessment of the quality of the PT being

performed on the important, complex, and large number of DSC welds resulted in the

DSCs being left in an indeterminate state, due to the consecutive layers of welding.

The licensee documented the AV in its CAP as AR 1402246 and AR 01486892

(AV 05000263/2015008-03; 07200058/2014001-03; Inaccurate and Incomplete

Information Documented on VT/PT Report Forms).

10

4OA6 Management Meetings

.1

Exit Meeting Summary

On June 21, 2015, the NRC staff presented the inspection results to Mr. Peter Gardner

and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues

presented. The NRC staff confirmed that none of the potential report input discussed

was considered proprietary.

4OA7 Licensee-Identified Violations

The following violation of very low significance was identified by the licensee and is a

violation of NRC requirements which meets the criteria of the NRC Enforcement Policy

for being dispositioned as an NCV:

Title 10 CFR 72.158, Control of special processes, requires, in part, that

licensees establish measures to ensure that special processes, including

welding... and nondestructive testing, are controlled and accomplished by

qualified personnel using qualified procedures in accordance with applicable

codes, standards, specifications, criteria, and other special requirements.

Contrary to the above, the licensee identified on May 10, 2014, the licensee

failed to perform verifications of a calibrated leak test instrument used on DSC lid

to shell welds in accordance with Procedure TN 61BT-61BTH-HSMLD, Helium

Leak Testing for NUHOMS Systems, Revision 1. Procedure TN 61BT-61BTH-

HSMLD, Revision 1, performs helium leak tests to demonstrate compliance with

TS 1.2.4.a, 61BTH DSC Helium Leak rate of Inner Seal Weld.

Additionally, contrary to 10 CFR 72.158, on April 2, 2014, the licensee failed to

ensure enough filler material was deposited to achieve the minimum depth of

the shell to outer top cover plate weld on DSC 16 in accordance with

Procedure 12751-MNGP-OPS, Spent Fuel Cask Welding: 61BT/BTH NUHOMS

Canisters, Revision 0. Instructions for welding operations are provided in

Procedure 12751 MNGP-OPS, Revision 0, to ensure in field fabrication is

performed in accordance with the Final Safety Analysis Report design basis

drawings.

During a nuclear oversight review of 2013 dry cask storage loading operations,

the licensee identified that the helium mass spectrometer leak detection,

calibrated leak instrument verification stabilizations, were not performed in

accordance with TN 61BT-61BTH-HSMLD, Revision 1. Specifically

TN 61BT-61BTH-HSMLD, Revision 1, Steps 8.3 and 8.4, require the user to

determine the final instrument indicated leakage rate with the calibrated standard

open and closed. The procedure step requires the user to ensure the system

stabilizes while determining these results. TN 61BT-61BTH-HSMLD, Revision 1,

Note 2, defines a stable signal as no more than a 1.0 E-8 std cm3/sec deviation

in the indicated signal in 60 seconds. The licensee determined that for DSC 11,

12, 14, 15 and 16, stabilization times were less than 60 seconds. Specifically for

DSC 12, stabilization times with the calibrated standard open were performed in

24 seconds, and stabilization times with the calibrated standard closed were

performed in 22 seconds.

11

The licensee entered this issue into its CAP as AR 01430236 and

AR 01486895, and initiated actions to evaluate the condition. The licensee

determined that these procedural errors did not affect the helium leak test

performance.

Following identification of weld concerns on DSC 16, further weld examinations

were performed on the outer top cover plate weld of DSC 16. The weld depth

was originally measured during the placement of the weld in October 2013, with

all weld depths verified to be greater than the procedural minimum requirement

of 0.500. The licensee identified during the new weld examinations that in 13 of

21 areas measured, the weld depth was less than 0.500 with a minimum depth

of 0.463.

The licensee entered this issue into its CAP as AR 01425235 and AR 01486895,

and initiated actions to evaluate the condition. The weld depth was repaired by

adding additional weld material to approximately 3/4 of the circumference of the

outer top cover plate weld. After the repair was completed, satisfactory

non-destructive examinations were performed.

The inspectors determined that these issues were more than minor in

significance using Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix E, Examples of

Minor Issues, example 3h. Specifically, multiple examples were identified of a

failure to ensure control of a special process.

The inspectors determined that the violation was a Severity Level IV violation and

similar to example 6.5.d.1 of the NRCs Enforcement Policy in that the licensee

failed to meet a regulatory requirement, including one quality assurance criteria,

that has more than minor safety significance. The licensee identified violation is

being processed through the traditional enforcement process because it is

associated with an ISFSI, which falls under traditional enforcement.

ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

Attachment

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee

Peter Gardner, Site Vice President

Harlan Hanson, Plant Manager

Mark Lingenfelter, Engineering Director

Michael Baumann, Nuclear Fuels Director

Sandra OConnor, Regulatory Affairs Analyst

Nuclear Regulatory Commission

M. Learn, Reactor Engineer

R. Edwards, Senior Health Physicist

P. Zurawski, Senior Resident Inspector

2

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED AND DISCUSSED

Opened 05000263/2015008-01;

07200058/2014001-01

AV

Failure to Perform Penetrant Tests in Accordance with

Procedural Requirements05000263/2015008-02;

07200058/2014001-02

AV

Inaccurate and Incomplete Information Documented on

VT/PT Report Forms05000263/2015008-03;

07200058/2014001-03

AV

Failure to Assess Contractor Control of Quality

Closed

07200058/2013001-01

URI

Dry Shielded Canister Liquid Penetrant Examination

3

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

The following is a partial list of documents reviewed during the inspection. Inclusion on this list

does not imply that the NRC inspector reviewed the documents in their entirety, but rather that

selected sections or portions of the documents were evaluated as part of the overall inspection

effort. Inclusion of a document on this list does not imply NRC acceptance of the document or

any part of it, unless this is stated in the body of the inspection report.

40A5 Other Activities

0000-H; Operations Daily Log-Part H; Revision 96

12751-MNGP-OPS-01; Spent Fuel Cask Welding: 61BT/BTH NUHOMS Canisters; Revision 0

12751-MNGP-OPS-01; Spent Fuel Cask Welding: 61BT/BTH NUHOMS Canisters; Revision 0;

Weld Depths and VT/ PT Examination Reports for DSC 11

12751-MNGP-OPS-01; Spent Fuel Cask Welding: 61BT/BTH NUHOMS Canisters; Revision 0;

Weld Depths and VT/ PT Examination Reports for DSC 12

12751-MNGP-OPS-01; Spent Fuel Cask Welding: 61BT/BTH NUHOMS Canisters; Revision 0;

Weld Depths and VT/ PT Examination Reports for DSC 13

12751-MNGP-OPS-01; Spent Fuel Cask Welding: 61BT/BTH NUHOMS Canisters; Revision 0;

Weld Depths and VT/ PT Examination Reports for DSC 14

12751-MNGP-OPS-01; Spent Fuel Cask Welding: 61BT/BTH NUHOMS Canisters; Revision 0;

Weld Depths and VT/ PT Examination Reports for DSC 15

12751-MNGP-OPS-01; Spent Fuel Cask Welding: 61BT/BTH NUHOMS Canisters; Revision 0;

Weld Depths and VT/ PT Examination Reports for DSC 16